Abrams Vehicles Fires: An Analysis of FY91

The lives lost and resources spent on accidents involving modem Army weapon systems are staggering. Accidents in the Armor Force are no exception. Although Abrams vehicle fires typically do not result in fatalities or injuries, the potential is always there. During the past three years, there have ‘been ammunition and personnel heater fires within the crew compartment, which have resulted in at least three fatalities and serious injuries. Abrams fires do, however, tend to be very expensive in vehicle damage and repair. A very small fire lasting only a few minutes can result in thousands of dollars worth of damage (for example, the average cost of an Abrams fire during FY91 was over $130,000). Once a fire has occurred, investigation completed, and findings published, the bottom line usually is that the accident was caused by human error or maintenance oversights, and wm preventable. During FY91 there were 43 Abrams vehicle fires reported. Ten fires were reported in Southwest Asia, and 33 in various other locations. This total represents a slight increase over the FY90 total of 39 fires (Figure 1). The increase in Abrams fires can be explained by the increased operations and reserve component mobilization in support of Operation DESERT STORM/DESERT SHIELD. What catches the analyst’s eye is that 28 of the 43 fires (65 percent) 70 60 SO 40 30 20 10 0

II il I - Figure 1 FY89 FY90 FY91 (59) (39) (43) reported during FY91 were directly related to maintenance shortfalls and/or soldiers not following proper procedures. The following summary is an example of a costly fire caused by an oversight or poor vehicle maintenance: MlIP Abrams tanks were conducting field training exercises at the National Training Center (NTC). The crew on one tank turned on its smoke generator system to create a smoke screen on the “battlefield.” As the driver was backing out of position, he noticed fuel on the ground. He notified his TC. turned of the smoke generator, and stopped the vehicle. The crew heard aloud noise from the engine andflames were seen coming from the grill doors. The vehicle’s automatic first shot fire extinguisher discharged, second shot was manually discharged, many hand-held extinguishers were expended, and the fire continued to burn. The local fire departmentfinally extinguished thefire. The investigation revealed that the fuel line fitting, located between the smoke generator check valve and the T-fitting, was loose, and allowedfirel to leakonto the hot engine and ground. The cost of vehicle damage was estimated at more than $300,000. A review of FY91 fire reports shows that the causes, by subsystem, are very similar to the trend established over the 1 1-year history of Abmms vehicle tires. Fuel and electrical fires continue to be the top two fire categories, followed by 10 ARMOR -

FUEL -- n hydraulic fluid fires (Figure 2). However, one unusual occurrence surfaced during the fiscal year, which needs to be highlighted. There were seven smoke generator fires reported during FY91, compared to 18 reported from FY80 through FY90. All but one of the smoke generator fires occurred because of missing or improperly installed hardware. Other points of interest are highlighted in Figure 3. The number of Abrams vehicle fires over the past few years has not increased significantly; however, the number of fires that continue to occur, which should have been prevented, is alarming. There have been many hardware retrofits and operator/maintainer manual changes made, which should correct hardware deficiencies and alert crew-medmaintainers to problem areas. Additionally, films have been made and distributed, Chief of Armor messages and safety-of-use-messages transmitted, and “hip-pocket” checklists distributed to alert the force about Abrams fires and what soldiers should and should not do to prevent vehicle fires. These fire prevention efforts were aimed at warning everyone of potential fire hazards and hardware changes that need immediate andcontinual attention. Our efforts have been rewarded, and Abrams fire numbers are holding steady. However, we cannot be comfortable with these results and turn our attention elsewhere, because battery bus bar retainerbolts are still found missing, spray cans are still placed in the turret on the personnel heaters, fuelhydraulic hoses are found loose, and other seemingly minor oversights are occurring in the field that will lead to vehicle fires and possible catastrophes. This summary of FY91 Abrams vehicle fires should serve as a reminder of the extreme dangers vehicle fires pose to the Armor Force. In addition to the hazards fires pose, they are extremely costly to the force as a whole in this era of diminishing resources. Abrams vehicle fires can and must be further minimized and controlled by continuous attention and supervision of operations and maintenance. Abrarns Vehicle Fires FY91 Key Highlights: Ten of the Abrams fires occurred in SW Asia. There were seven smoke generator fires in FY91, compared to 18 in the 10 previous years. Ten of the fires involved National Guard units. Four of the fires occurred at test sites. Damage from the 10 SW Asia fires cost more than $5 million. Damage from the remainder of the fires cost $1.7 million, an average of Five fires caused no reported damage Twenty of the fires resulted in costs below $10,000. $52,798. Figure 3 ARMOR - January-February 7992 Mr. Gregory Skaff has been the Armor Systems Safety Engineer for the Directorate of Combat Developments, Armor Center and School, Fort Knox, Ky. since

1987. He has a Bachelor of Science Degree in Civil Engineering from West Virginia University and an MS in Environmental Health and Safety Management from Indiana University. 11