Unit Status Reporting: A Broken System?

Division G3,23d A D "I can't believe titis tasking," said tlte G-3, "how are we supposed to have oiir own tank battalions per-fonit orgartizatiortal iitairitertaitce when we have orders to detach a battalion niairiteitaiice platoon for dirty in southwest Asia?" "I don't know, si," said the plaits officer. "Z giess soritebodv over there is in bad shape. To caritpowid oiir probleiit, we've got orib one battalion that cart siipport the requireiitcrit with the eqriipiiieitt requested. Oiir latest status report shows 1-10 Aniior is the only iiriit in the division C-I for eqriipriierit on hand arid equipiiieiit readiness." "Well, Z giess it's tlteiii. Go ahead and make it happen." Battalion HQ, 1-10 Armor: "Do yoii see titis tasking?" the battalion coritritander gasped. "lltree HMMWVs, 12 deiice-aiid-a-lia@, two five-tons arid the five-toti wrecker, the HEMMT wrecker, seven a s, arid foiir 113sl We can't do this at all. We are sltort or rton-operable on every single one of these items acept for tlte five-torts."' "How are we going to qlaiirt titis to division sir?" asked tlte S3. "lliey are going to want to know why we didn't say soriietliirtg sooner. '' "Why slioiild we have said soiiie-titirig, almost all of that eqriipiiierit is ERC-B. Besides, oiir tanks cart get where they are going arid kill the bad giys. ntat seerits more iriiportaitt to me." Can this unit perform its combat mission? The obvious answer is no. However, any battalion in the Army could get caught in the same situation as 1-10 Armor. Loopholes that exist in the Unit Status Report (USR) system allow the above situation to exist. Those loopholes allow a unit to cover its problems with a thick smokescreen. At the same time, the commander can go beyond the mere surface content of the report and into much greater depth to provide the true status of his unit. The strength of the USR exists in the flexibility it provides to the commander to report and highlight unit strengths and weaknesses. The system will not work, however, if a commander's only concern is to paint a rosy picture of his unit, to check another block and move on to the next milestone. To make the system work, it must be used wisely. t The purpose of the USR is to provide a single document to all command levels that reflects a unit's status in selected areas at a point in time? The report is designed to measure unit readiness in selected areas of personnel, equipment, and training resources. The USR is not intended to be an all inclusive reflection of a unit's complete readiness or status. It is intended to identify problem areas, which can be analyzed on a broader level by the appropriate support chain using its own documentation channels (Le., a personnel issue could be examined in greater depth using SIDPERS). All -units are not expected to report the highest level of unit status possible ((2-1). Each unit is expected to be at the highest level possible after considering each unit's contingency requirements and the resources available to the unit. Commanders at higher levels are expected to use the status report to realign or requisition resources, within their ability, to allow subordinate units to maximize their status. For example, it may be perfectly acceptable for a Reserve Component unit to have a rating of C-3, when its only contingency is to reinforce Europe at D+W. The assumption is that this unit will have its shortcomings ftved before deployment. 3 Many users and compilers of the USR state that the system is broken! The system does have shortcomings, but it is workable. The system does not expect perfection, which is a misconception held by some users of the report. Another problem of the system is that AR 220-1, the regulatory guide to USR, is a tedious document. The Department of the Army Inspector General has recommended a rewrite of this document! In the meantime, a careful reading of the AR, with good questions to a subject matter expert (higher headquarters, someone who has prepared it before, etc.) should clear any problems of understanding with the regulation. The biggest problems with the USR system are the numerous loopholes, which can be used to conceal problems, or reveal problems that are not required for submission (i.e. comments on equipment which is ERC B or C). In the case of the ARMOR - 45

USR, it is best to err on the side of too much information, so that all shortcomings are reported. Each of the major areas of the report has its own peculiar loophole. Though commonly used, they only serve as a hindrance to solving a unit's problems. In the personnel area, for example, some of the largest deviations occur in the MOS qualified area. One of the easiest ways to lay a good smokescreen on this portion of the report is to count an MTOE-required slot as being filled by an MOS-qualified person only because a warm body occupies the position. An example of this would be to say an MOS requirement for an intelligence analyst is being filled and met by an armor crewman working in the position. In fact, the unit should report an MOS shortage for an intel analyst. The equipment areas show the most common reporting abuses. The non-reportable line (NRLIN) system is the biggest culprit. This system, in a one-two punch, classifies some equipment as ERC B or C, which means that a unit does not have to report it, and it allows some ERC A equipment to go unreported because a MACOM has determined that the item in question should not. be reported for any of a number of reasons (most commonly because apiece of equipment required on an MTOE has not been fielded). Because of the NRLIN system, large quantities of equipment can go unnoticed on the USR because there is no requirement to report these items (all of a tank battalion's recovery assets, for example, are ERC B). The large number of ERC A items that a unit may have (most tank battalions have approximately 80-90 ERC A lines) will also allow a unit with a small number of lines that are C-4 (lowest level of readiness) to have those C-4 lines go unnoticed because the unit is C-1 statistically. There is no specific mention of an individual line problem except on the appropriate comment card, and an "accidentallt omission of that line from the card would keep the problem from being raised at all. Equipment readiness can also fit through a loophole with a rather simple paperwork shuffle. In many MTOEs similar items of equipment have different ERC classifications (i.e. three of an item may be ERC A and two of the same item may be

ERC B).

If one of the pieces of equipment that by MTOE is ERC A becomes non-mission capable, maintenance personnel could report that one of the ERC B items is down and avoid making it a USR issue altogether. Similarly, if two major components are down for different sub-components (i.e. a tank down for a radio and another for a machinegun), those same maintenance people could report that one major component is down for two sub-components. The last and easiest area to abuse through loopholes is training. This area is easy to abuse because it has a very loose statistical base, and the ratings assigned in this area are subjective judgments. It would be easy for a commander to equivocate in the training area and get lost in shades of giay instead of making a clear distinction. The last several paragraphs have demonstrated not how to beat the system, but have illustrated some ways that the system is abused, sometimes quite inadvertently. The learning point is that the USR requires careful, thoughtful preparation. mr I -.

USR to serve as back-up documentation to the actual DA Form 2715- R (Unit Status Report). These supplements range from commanders' cover letters to a monthly DA Form 2406 (Materiel Condition Status Report). If vital explanatory information is included in the supplementary material, but not the 2715 itself, that vital information will never reach levels above the MACOM. The supplements will be stripped away at the MACOM for electronic transmission of the 2715 data. The key is to remember if there is something important to say, say it on the 2715. Now, the question is probably coming,"How do I make USR work for me?" The simplest way to answer that question is to tell everything. The best way that a commander can accurately portray his unit's true status is through written comments on the supplementary cards. The statistics of the two cover pages almost never hit the target and fully explain a unit's problems. For that reason, it is imperative that the commander spell out in the comments sections exactly what is wrong and what needs to be done to fm the problem. That way a USR reader has no doubt where a unit stands and what needs to be done to resolve identified problem areas. As an illustration of "telling it all," let's examine some examples. As a base assumption, we will assume all areas are statistically C-1, and we will use the case of 1-10 Armor. Old 1-10 AR READY Card-Corn-rnents This iiriit is rated Cl. Sortie ERC B equip sliortages are of coricent birt. I

I nere is one mal, separate area iiriaer corimi. that may cause a lack of communication in the USR system, especially above the MACOM level. Many ments Old 1-10 AR ESRATERRAT C h A A P n h A C nc C..h,.-X-dn L.. A vi JUUUI u i i i a t L i i G a u - quarters require supplements to the:ol None m- 46 ARMOR -