Obstacle Breaching Techniques

carries a Viper line charge, and the NAGMASHOT engineer vehicle, a converted Centurion, carries the combat engineers and their equipment. Linear defenses based on the Soviet "triple-decker'' concept rely on physical obstacles, mutual fire support, and pre-planned kill zones and fire traps, all aimed to delay, stop, or prevent the attacker from breaking through the defense complex. Most of the obstacles in a desert environment are man-made, using large-scale engineering effort to achieve maximum effect. The Iraqi Army has spent the past few months erecting substantial defenses along the Kuwaiti-Saudi borders. Saddam Hussein has recruited most of his earth-moving resources to undertake a massive fortification buildup, creating obstacles, earth berms turned into fortresses, ramps for elevated tank positions, antitank weapon sites, artillery and rocket launching sites, protected water, fuel and ammunition dumps, military roads, and communication trenches. The Iraqi linear defense concept relies on the Soviet basic doctrine, but was modified by Arab armies during the Middle East wars with refinements not seen elsewhere. The Iraqis nearly perfected this concept during the Iraq-Iran war. In the desert-oriented linear defense, there are at least three defensive belts, each contributing to the defense complex in its own way to achieve high attrition rates while engaging the attacker's best units - namely the assaulting forces, which are normally elite formations - with the defender's least effective units deployed forward, while his own elite formations create the mobile reserve to be used when the defender wishes to make his decisive move. The Iraqi linear defense consists of three rigid (static) lines of defense, integrated into a complex which includes tactical (mobile) and operational reserves, as well as semi-mobile antitank elements distributed throughout the system. The forward line of defense stretches close to the FEBA, while the entire complex is guarded up front by a series of defended outposts, tasked to establish contact, engage enemy pati and act as alerting forces to enemy force approach. ' The forward line of defense is manned by infantry brigades, each occupying an area of 16-24 square kilometers along Four to six kilometers of front line. Usually, in- 10 ARMOR - January-February 7997 fantry brigades are deployed with two infantry battalions positioned forward, the third about four kilometers to the rear. The first line is held by three companies, deployed in company or platoon strongpoints known as "pitas," named after the round, flat loaves of bread common in the Middle East. Arab forces invented the pita strongpoint and refined the Soviet defense concept of linear, in-depth trench systems because they were not easy to construct in desert conditions. Shifting sands and soft trench walls required constant strengthening. The pita concept solves this problem, providing not only a suitable fortified defensive stronghold, but also elevated firing positions not normally available in the desert. The pita strongpoint is constructed by bulldozers, which scrape the topmost soil layer from inside and outside to form a circular berm up to five meters high. Unlike the traditional trench system, such berms are excellent obstacles to vehicle movement and act as effective firing platforms for all types of weapons. Pitas, with their inherent elevation advantage, control the normally flat desert terrain with excellent observation and fire. Ramps and firing positions for tanks, ATGMs, mortars, and automatic weapons are dug on the embankment. Semicircular trench lines for communications and protected movement are dug on the ridge line. In the empty area between strongholds, the brigade prepares a complex of antitank barriers, well protected themselves and situated in kill-zones, where it expects the attacker to advance or break through after he has penetrated the forward defense zone. In the intermediate zone, tactical armored reserves are located undercover in dugouts to protect them from artillery and air attack. Typical countermobility obstacles will be anchored on a massive natural or manmade obstacle, such as sand dunes, lava beds, cliffs, gullies, pipelines, or built-up areas. These obstacles are three-dimensional, combining vertical antitank ditches and embankments. Minefields are layered in stretches 80-100 meters wide, scattered with mixed antitank and antipersonnel mines 20-40 meters deep. On the perimeter are the main horizontal obstacles, with trenches, barbed wire fences, and dragon teeth, acting mainly as nuisances. The Israeli Army has faced Arab-originated defense systems since the early 1960s, first with the Soviet linear trench system, and later - since the 1973 war - with the pita-type fortified stronghold belts. Continous practice, training, and weapons development have yielded some unique offensive tactical concepts, practiced successfully in the 1967 and 1973 wars. The IDF learned that well trained, balanced, combined arms combat teams can breach these defense belts. Backed by continous and well placed artillery barrages firing HE and smoke shells, the assault teams combined elite infantry and accompanying tanks, preceded by dedicated assault and mine-breaching equipment. These teams could breach even the strongest defenses. Since the mid-l960s, all first echelon troops in the IDF practice a special breakthrough doctrine in day, night, and adverse weather con- Pitas, with their inherent elevation advantage, control the normally flat desert terrain with excellent observation and fire cover. Ramps and firing positions for tanks, ATGMs, mortars, and automatic weapons are dug on the embankment. ditions, while on regular combined arms exercises in all types of terrain. The IDF requested dedicated equipment for obstacle clearing, and a special design component in the ordnance corps became responsible to develop specialist engineering equipment for combat use. Israeli defense industries produced the hardware according to these design concepts, which are currently foremost in the world. An effective integration of assault engineers in tactical combat units is one of the basic elements of success. The IDF integrates such elements into its combined arms teams at the tactical level. Inclusion of counter-obstacle elements in forward echelons provides the attacking units with the capability to attack in multiple lanes through minefields and across antitank ditches, crush through defenses, and bring the battle right into the enemy position. The IDF also allocated individual obstacle and mine breaching devices to its tanks, which are all fitted to receive these devices. Some are refined versions of the Soviet KMT4 and PT55 attachments adapted to fit IDF tanks of all types. Mine rollers can be replaced by company light aid detachments, working with field equipment, if damaged by exploding mines. Israeli defense industries also developed special cleared lane marking systems to provide follow-on forces with a clearly visible path, both day and night. The Viper rocket-launched line charge system is in-ARMOR - 11

Wheeled assault bridge is pushed across a trench by an M60 tank. This bridge can be attached to any tank, so the unit does not depend on heavy, dedicated bridgelayer tanks. The tank attached assault bridges are inexpensive and can be left on location for long periods, if required stalled on an M3 halftrack and uses short burn rockets to deploy the line charge across the minefield. Once on the ground, the Viper is detonated, clearing a narrow lane through the obstacle. To ensure the flow of forces thiough the obstacle, the initial breaches created by track-width mine plows or Vipers must be widened. This is the task for the combat engineer units, which use either explosive charges or manual mine clearing: still a time-consuming process. Israel developed special explosive charges for the widening of cleared lanes. Once the assault troops have negotiated the minefields, they must overcome the antitank ditch and its embankment. To cross this steep obstacle requires special techniques, similar to those once practiced in the medieval era. Infantry-trained combat engineers secure the far side of the ditch. They also carry special, lightweight assault bridge ladders, which enable them to negotiate the steep walls. Lightweight assault bridges for tanks are also distributed to forward units. Tanks drag the bridges and push them across the obstacle to bridge the antitank ditches in a few minutes. A faster and lighter wheeled assault bridge can be pushed across the trench by tanks. This bridge can attach to any tank, so the unit does not depend on heavy, dedicated bridgelayer tanks, which are few in numbers and expensive. The tank attached assault bridges are inexpensive and can be left on location for long periods, if required for follow-on forces. Bridgelayer tanks are not only expensive, but operate by elevating the bridge, making them vulnerable targets, a lesson proved during the Syrian assault on the "Valley of Tears" on the Golan in 1973. Dozer tanks and heavy bulldozers are also allocated to assault units and provide instant support. They can quickly fill an antitank ditch, breach the embankment, and penetrate the steep walls of a pita fortification. The American Army is also developing aline of dedicated obstacle breaching systems, some designed along the lines of the Israeli devices. The current track-width minerollers are adaptable to both M60 and M1 tanks. A track-width mine plow is in the inventory now, and a full-width, lightweight plow is in development. These devices go after the mine, not its fuse. The mine is physically removed from its place and can be detonated by other means. However, as cleared track-width lanes are used by follow-up vehicles, they tend to become deeper. As the bellies of following tanks get closer to the uncleared ground, they may set off pressure mines or destroy lane markers. Full-width mine plows overcome this deficiency, and no skip zones remain uncleared. After rollers detect mines, explosive breaching systems are used to save time. The explosive systems destroy about 95 percent of the mines by pressing down on their fuses with overpres- 12 ARMOR - sure, neutralizing others by pushing them out of the lane. To remove the remaining mines, the U. S. Army has developed an explosive system, the M58Al/A3 (MICLIC). Each charge can clear about 100 meters into the minefield. The 1,750 pound charge, pulled by a rocket mounted on the M353 trailer, is connected to the firing trailer by a 60-meter tether. It clears a lane about 14 meters by 100 meters. Catapulted fuel-air explosives can also be extremely effective, creating lanes of 20 x 240 meters when firing their entire load. These devices also have a standoff capacity of 100 meters. The U. S. Army now has anew lane-marking system (CLAMS) for day and night use. Using a special dispenser, it can carry 150 luminescent marker candles, which are used in conjunction with breaching and mine proofing efforts, marking the centerline of cleared lanes. Depending on the chemlite used, the candles remain effective from 30 minutes to 24 hours. The Soviets have designed and developed a wide array of obstacle clearing devices, which rate among the best in the world today. They have, apart from the Israelis, the widest experience in using their designs. The Soviet systems include tank-mounted mine-clearing devices and explosive charges of wide variety. The typical tank-mounted mine clearing devices, suitable for all tanks in service, include the KMT4 and KMT5 which weigh 7.5 tons. The PT55 (for the T-55) weighs a ton less. The KMT, moving at up to 12 kph, can survive heavy explosions and clear 73-81-cm lanes with each roller. At night, a special, luminous tape-laying device can mark the swept lane. The SPZ-2 is a metal-framed cable connected to an anchor that is fired across the detected minefield. Once the anchor sticks fast, the explosive charges are connected to the cable end, which is winched across at the rate of 200 meters per hour, and then detonated. The SPZ-4 is a cable assembly that a tank can push, or if using a roller or plow assembly, towed across and detonated by the tank crew. An explosive-filled, rocket-fired line in a boat-shaped container can be used by the T-55 with KMT plow, known to be in service with the Polish Army. The Soviet mine clearing technique uses KMT tanks, at the rate of one per platoon of three, in forward breakthrough regiments. Deployment normally requires 10-15 minutes with trained crews. The normal procedure calls for the rapid advance of KMT-fitted tanks moving directly into the obstacle. If time allows, engineer scouts will reconnoiter the danger zone and mark lane entrances. Mine breaching is the direct responsibility of the ground commander and not an engineer task. The number of lanes to be cleared depends on the tactical situation. Normally, for a battalion, six to eight lanes will be cleared. It is common practice to develop two of these lanes into six- to eight-meter-wide lanes for the passage of wheeled traffic, but this is the responsibility of the engineer unit attached. The widening process uses explosive charges placed under cover of a smoke screen, with sappers moving forward under cover of supporting fires from tanks and BMPs. Anew mine clearing device has been introduced recently and is usually found in engineer units at division level. Designated the M- 1979, it projects an explosive hose ARMOR - across the minefield. Its detonation clears lanes of up to 180 meters long and six to eight meters wide. An improved version is mounted on a special tracked vehicle capable of launching two simultaneous hoses under fire. The device shoots 75- meter hoses in sequence, advancing after each launch. The new model has the capacity to straighten the hoses before firing, thus increasing the detonation effect. The explosive hoses are fired by rockets mounted at the rear of the vehicle. However, the device does have problems. If launched over terrain covered with shrubbery, fences, or electrical wires, all of which prevent the hose from lying directly on the ground, the blast effect is considerably reduced. The multinational forces deployed in Saudi Arabia will have to equip and train thoroughly in the use of dedicated obstacle breaching equipment and its tactical aspects before any attempt to go on the offensive. Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF, Retired, is senior defense advisor to Eshel Dramit Ltd. publications. He is a graduate of the French Armor School at Saumur and a former lecturer at the IDF Command and Staff College. He served many years as a career officer with the Israeli Defense Forces, including combat duty in tank and signal units. His recent book, Chariots of the Desert, is a combat history of the Israeli Armored corps. 13