Defeating the Iraqis

Defeat i n g t h e I ra q is Saddam's Troops Are Not Ready For a War of Maneuver by Colonel Wallace Franz (USA, Ret.) A militaj victory gives the national command authority the opportunity to successfully terminate a conflict. Victory in battle, in a campaign or even in a war, cannot in and of itself achieve the objectives set by the country's leadership. The Vietnam war is an example of that fact. The many U. S. victories did not lead to achieving the goals set by several U. S. governments. Statesmanship must take the opportunities presented by victory on the battlefield to achieve its objectives and end a war. The nature of the victory in also critical. A victory with high casualties, along, drawn-out campaign, a particularly destructive campaign, all can make it difficult to achieve the required politi- 'cal results in spite of apparent military success. It is the job of a country's armed forces to provide its government with the kind of military success that will aid in achieving the political objectives of the government. If it turns out that the objectives set by the U. S. government in the Persian Gulf can only be achieved through military action, then the 0peratio.n must be swift and not produce a large number of casualties. Certainly the time will come when the force ratio in the region will favor the anti-Saddam alliance. Can the United States and its allies conduct such a campaign against the Iraqi Army in and about Kuwait? Much has been made in the popular press of the military capability of Saddam Hussein's army, an army of one million men, and thousands of tanks and artillery pieces. This army has the battle experience of the eight-year war with Iran and such statements as "Iraq's battle-seasoned armored units" appear in the news. There seems to be little doubt on the part of most analysts that the United States and its allies could defeat Saddam's army. The question seems to be, how long would it take, and what casualties would the United States suffer? Some have put the casualty figure at 30,OOO or more. While it is a cardinal sin in military planning to underestimate your enemy, it is important not to overestimate your enemy and thus eliminate some viable options. There is a tendency in some circles to overestimate the capabilities of the Iraqi military, and, therefore, its ability to cause casualties to U. S. forces. A close look at such important factors such as combat experience, equipment, and leadership will put the Iraqi military capabilities in proper perspective. The Iraqi Army does not have a record of military success. It attacked an unprepared Iranian Army in 1980 and lost most of its early gains by 1982. It spent the next six years defending itself against human wave assaults conducted by an unprofessional Revolutionary Iranian Army. In spite of the fact that it usually had air superiority and fire superiority, it suffered a number of. r.... *r. mance in the 1973 Arab-Israeli Wi They do not do well at mob mechanized warfare because tl calls for an ability to think rapid to improvise in the heat of batt and the willingness of junior office to take responsibility or ma decisions on the spot. Officers a reluctant to take action without ( ders. The elimination of Iraqi ( ficers who think independently, who disagree with Saddam, co tinued during the war with Irs The officers corps has suffered number of purges over the years Saddam has cemented his control the army. On the other hand, in t defense, fighting from prepar positions, Iraqi troops have do well. Their army has been mold by its eight years of fighting a war position, tied to fortifications ai communication nets, against a lo tech enemy. In spite of its large number tanks, many of which are obsole the Iraqi Army is not experienc in handling mechanized forces mobile operations requiring exte sive maneuver. If it comes to a f i in the desert, they will face a sit1 tion they have not had to face sin their costly experience against t Israelis in 1973. The United Stal will have air superiority, fire sui riority, and high-tech intelligen systems, all supporting an A I trained and equipped for mob warfare. This is not to say the Ir;.. *. t aereats, sucn as Menran, Knorram-Army is a paper tiger. It nas shah, and the Majoon Islands. It strengths and weaknesses. 'I has lost about 80,000 troops as point is to take advantage of thc prisoners. Iraqi forces received low weaknesses and use U. S. strengl marks from Israeli. Svrian and Jor-against them. For instance, I I.

danian officers for their perfor-Gnited States must not attempt 8 ARMOR - January-February 7991 fight a war of position requiring costly assaults on prepared defenses. Israeli Major General Chaim Herzog, in discussing the lessons learned from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, points out the need to avoid tactical attacks on strongly held Arab defensive positions. He advocates an indirect operational approach that allows an army trained in mobile warfare to use its strength. In other words, make the enemy tight your kind of war. Keep the initiative, and make the enemy react to your maneuvers. History is full of examples of successful campaigns that were completed quickly and with little cost. One of these examples can give an idea of what might be accomplished in a conflict involving opposing forces having many of the characteristics discussed above. Early in WWII, the British and Italian armies were involved in a winter desert campaign in Libya and Egypt. On 13 September 1940, the Italian Tenth Army began its invasion of Egypt. A force of about 80,000 men advanced 60 miles to Sidi Barrani. The Italians, under General Graziani, occupied Sidi Barrani three days after crossing the Egyptian border. The Italians then began to construct a series of defensive camps and to build up their administrative resources and communications. No effort was made to advance any farther. On the night of 7 December 1940, the British, under General O’Connor, attacked the fortified positions south of Sidi Barrani from their rear. O’Connor’s army of 30,000 consisted of the 7th Armored Division and the 4th Indian Division British trooas suffered few Casualties in deseit war of maneuver against the Italians (the 6th Australian Division later replaced 4th Indian Division). This same force was employed against four different Italian troop concentrations: Sidi Barrani, Bardia, Tobruk, and Beda Fomm. Within two months, two British divisions had advanced 500 miles and defeated an army of ten Italian divisions. In doing so, they suffered about 2,000 casualties, but captured 130,000 enemy soldiers, nearly 400 tanks, and over 800 guns. The Royal Air Force achieved air superiority and destroyed 150 enemy aircraft. The RAF allowed O’Connor’s small army to maneuver free from air attacks and enemy aerial observation. The reasons for the British victories were many. At the tactical level, they had the Matilda infantry tank, very heavily armored for that period of WWII. Italian tanks were lightly armored, and much of their equipment was obsolete. At the operational level, the British Army was completely mechanized, while the Italian Army was not. This, combined with the air superiority achieved by the RAF, gave the British freedom of maneuver on a grand scale. In addition, the Royal Navy controlled the sea off the coast of western Libya. General OConnor was aggressive, flexible, and commanded from the front. The forces employed were small enough to be controlled by the British command system. Later, in this theater of war, they had difficulty controlling larger (corps-size) mechanized forces in mobile operations against the Germans. The Italian Army suffered from poor leadership; many of the ofARMOR - ficers were politically appointed. The command system was ponderous; operations were conducted in a sluggish manner. The army had a defensive mentality. The Italians, when faced with the unexpected, such as threats to their lines of communications, tended to panic, then break and lose cohesion. It can be seen from this example that an army that has mastered the handling of mechanized forces in mobile operations, given the right circumstances, can quickly defeat a defensively-oriented army without suffering excessive casualties. Employ maneuver to achieve local superiority over a portion of the enemy army, destroy its cohesion, and then move to destroy another part of that army. This process works especially well against an enemy tied to its defensive positions. This is just the type victory required in Kuwait in order to give the United States and its Allies the opportunity to achieve their stated objectives. Colonel Wallace Franz, a combat veteran of Korea and Vietnam, retired in 1984 after five years on the faculty of the U. S. Army War College, where he was Director of Combat Theory. He holds a bachelor’s degree in history from Stanford University and a masters from the University of South Carolina. Commissioned in Infantry in 1951, he is also a graduate of the C&GSC and the U. S. Army War College. 9