Irrational Weapon System Acquisition

ilie essence of iiltiriiate decision remains impenetrable to tlie observer - ofen, indeed, to the decider kiriise lf... niere will always be the dank arid tangled stretches in the decision-riiaking process, riiystenoiis even to those who i i a y be most iritiniateh, irt vohed. - J O

Fitzgemld Kerinedv' A guest speaker at one of the nation's senior service colleges recently criticized the U. S. Department of Defense (DOD) for having extreme difficulty in getting new technology applied in non-traditional ways or across service roles and missions. His criticism caused little excitement among the assembled students and faculty. In fact, based on the number of "knowing" glances exchanged in the audience, his indictment seemed to be accepted as dogma. W h y not! Similar criticisms can often be found in the Congressional Record, in press descriptions of the DOD, and in discussions within the military departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). They are part of the rationale for President Reagan's National Security Directive 219 (NSDD 219) on Defense Management and the recent Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433 (PL 99-433). But are his statements factual? Are there other "irrational" kctors that limit the ability of the DOD to get "the most bang from its Research and Development (R&D) buck? What can, and should, be done about it? Recognizing that DOD has and will probably continue to spend millions of dollars and man-hours each year attempting to improve its weapon system acquisition process, this article attempts to answer some of the above questions and to add to what appears to be a rather limited body of work on the "irrationality" of U. S. weapon system acquisition. Framework What is "irrational" about U. S. weapon system acquisition? In a strict sense, an "irrational" element of weapon system acquisition would be any factor that affects the decision-making process other than the cost, the performance, or the effectiveness of the weapon system. But, the reaction of the senior service college audience described above, reflected cost, performance, and effectiveness are not the only issues that a U. S. DOD decision maker must typically deal with. But what is the real world of U. S. weapon system acquisition? A good place to begin any search for understanding of the environment of weapon system acquisition is found in the work of Robert L. OConnell. OConnell argued that although the accepted rules of weapon advocacy appear to leave little room for the nonrational and prejudicial, it is also possible to point to a variety of instances, both recent and historical, when the values and institutions of those involved made it difficult to accept a particular weapon in spite of a clearly demonstrated combat superiority.- OConnell hypothesized that there is a fundamental misunderstanding of the intimate relationship between humans and their armaments? 3 Unfortunately, although OConnell stated that some good work had been done, Keegan's 77te Face of Battle, Lewis' 77ie Social Histon) of tlie Machinegun, and Nefs War arid Hianan Histon) were cited as attacking the problem as he was advocating, O'Connell offered very little substantive evidence to support his hypothesis? Fortunately, and importantly for the purposes of a rigorous examination of the issue, O'Connell also provided a context within which one could examine weapon system acquisition decision-making. O'Connell's framework is comprised of a set of perspectives (anthropological, historical, sociological, psychological, cultural, and arms control), which would allow weapon system development decision-making to be viewed not as something alien, but rather as a tangible manifestation of some of man's most basic fantasies, myths, and institutions? A Political Perspective To be more specific, we should add a political perspective to O'Con- 44 ARMOR - nell's list; especially with the rationaliiration, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) policies of the DOD during the last twenty or so years, and the more recent quantum growth, in numbers, expertise, and power of the congressional committee system. I do not mean to suggest that RSI is necessarily dysfunctional, nor that the Congress does not have a role to play, but merely to identify that there are important "irrational" aspects in weapon system acauisition attributable to the German Stosstruppen infantry units of World War I, and the derivative German Blitzkrieg tactics of World War 11.' The Macedonian Phalanx The Macedonian phalanx provides an early and particularly illustrative example of a weapon system that, if it had been viewed only from an evaluation of cost and effectiveness, would undoubtedly have met an Historically. against ii Macedonian phalanx deployed on level ground with covered flanks, traditionally-armed hoplites had little confidence in their ability to break the juggernaut of massed and leveled sarissae and typically were slaughtered? The Roman Legion The Roman legion, like the Macedonian phalanx, adapted a weanon of doubtful utilitv in these factors. Given recent singie combat to effective U. S. experience, one might mass use which, like the saris-even argue that the political I ' sa, might never have survived perspective is perhaps the the modern development most important consideration process. While the 14-foot in U. S. weapon system acyuisi-sarissa was too long to be ef-tion. fective in single combat, the 18-inch Roman short sword Other Research was too short. Yet, the Romans consciously used John Guilmartin and Daniel training and discipline to weld Jacobowitz offer some of the the short sword, shield, and substantive data missing from pilum to the trained, dis-O'Connell's work. The motiva-ciplincd legionary to make a tion for their effort was a con-Would Hannibal's elephants have survived hichly cohesive tactical sys-cern that the debate over the worth and effectiveness of military technology was all too often conducted in a social and tactical vacuum by a system ill-equipped to take the human element into account. They felt that recent U. S. analyses of military technology neglected the real, but hard-to-quantify, fears, frictions, and uncertainties of combat! the Guilmartin and Jacobowitz probed the critical relationship between weapons, tactics, and cohesion through a selective analysis of historical military systcms. Specifically, they examined the Macedonian phalanx, the Roman legion, the Swiss pike square, the tactical system centered on the English longbow, the Spanish tercio and derivative systems of Gustavus Adolphus and Maurice of Nassau, Napoleon'sand Nelson's systems, modern weapons acquisition cycle? te;. -With shields held in;he early planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) cycle "death." The principal weapon of,the phalanx was the sarissa, a heavy, 14- foot spear, which was virtually useless in single combat. A computer-simulated duel between "the Threat," a conventionally armcd hoplite with his short spear, sword, and shield; and a sarissa-armed infantryman, would undoubtedly reflect thc hoplitc's individual superiority. In the simulation, the hoplite, iteration after iteration, would be played easily avoiding the point of the unthrowable sarissa, brushing its shaft aside with his shield, and drawing the Macedonian onto his spearpoint or blade for the ki11.8 left hand, the tactics of the legion depended on each man's right flank being covered by the next legionary, a cohesiveness inducing dependence made greater by the shortness of the legionary's sword." The Flower and End of Knighthood The combination of the armored knight and a heavy warhorse, a combination made viable by the generalized adoption of iron armor, weapons, and the stirrup, was a highly successful weapon system in Western Europe from the Ninth Century. By the 14th Century, however, the knight's protective armor developed in response to advances in weaponry, notably the crossbow, and in part by the demands of jousting and dueling to I ARMOR - 45 I ness. The fully developed armor helm limited vision, hearing, and speech." Physically fresh knights fighting on flat terrain in a relatively uncomplicated tactical scenario could effectively exploit the advantages of almost complete armor protection, but such circumstances did not always prevail. The improbable result, in too many scenarios, was the superiority in hand-to-hand combat of thinly protected yeomen archers over armored knights.12 The French battlefield defeats of the Hundred Years War demonstrated the use of technology, in the form of the longbow - which must have initially seemed marginally effective to contemporary observers - made tactically decisive hy mating with a social system that encouraged cohesion. Conversely, the French negated the capabilities of the armored knight by allowing discohesive elements to drive technological development in a manner that worked counter to tactical requirements. 13 World War I A persistent European focus on human factors, particularly by the French and British prior to World War 1, resulted in an almost mystic belief that the moral shock value of infantry bayonets and cavalry lances would overwhelm the cyclic manufacture of death by quick-firing artillery, re eating rifles, and the machine gun. I$ World War II Whatever failed the British and French armies in the spring of 1940, it was not the technical capabilities of their tanks. An imaginary systems analyst comparing the hlufildu 11, the Char B-2, and the SOMUA tanks lo the German opposition in the winter of 1939- 40 would have certainly judged the Allied tanks sure winners one-on-one. 1s Yet certain fca-lures of the French tanks, in particular, suggest a continuity of engineering and tactical outlook in the socially-im-pclled characteristics of design going U. S.-German tank development in the 1960s was an unsuccessful effort at weapons cooperation. back to the knight's confining armor. The collar insignia of the French Tank Corps in WWI, for instance, consisted of a closed medieval helm superimposed on crossed cannon," perhaps reflecting the failed doctrinal development of the Allies. Where German tanks almost invariably had the crew grouped together in a large and relatively spacious central compartment, French tank designers tended to isolate the individual members of a tank crew. German tanks all had three-man turrets; French tanks had one-man turrets. German tank designers favored side-by-side seating arrangements for the driver and the assistant driver; the men could see and communicate with each other. By contrast, the crew members of the French tanks tended to be in tandem, separated by machinery. 17 Main Battle Tank Development The U. S.-German experience during 1963-1978, in an attempt to collaboratively develop a main battle tank, provides more recent data on the impact of "irrational" factors on weapon system acquisition. Despite the U. S. Army's desired 1965 acceptance date for anew main battle tank to replace its AI60 series tanks, the initial agreement between the two countries, signed on August 1, 1963, by U. S. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert McNamara and his German counterpart, Franz Josef Strauss, resulted in pushing the earliest possible acceptance date for anew U. S. tank lo 1%9. McNamara's rationale for the agreement, and implicit acceptance of the risk of a less than effective US. tank force during the delay, was to develop a better end product at lower cost and to simplify Allied maintenance and support problems. Others, however, noted an additional reason, and perhaps primary reason, in the need to rectify a serious U. S. balance of payments problem.'8 The U. S. and German program managers for the joint development program realized early on that, lacking a single executive, the requirements formulation process might bog down in debates over differing national tank concepts. To prevent this, the two program managers decided to contract for an impartial parametric design and cost effectiveness study to determine the tank's requirements. Despite this analysis, the commitment of each nation's army to its preferred tank design concepts and the commitment of each nation to its own tank components made the task of generating the new tank's requirements a time-consuming negotiating process. The resulting design compromise was probably more complex and 19 46 ARMOR - risky than either arm would have pursued if left to itself." Development of some of the primary components for the tank ran into severe technical difficulties and, although the first prototypes demonstrated real promise, by the time thcy first appeared, the program had already begun to dissolve." In January 1970 the collaborative effort was formally terminated, leaving the U. S. without the main battl5;ank it had wanted to field in 1965:- After 1970, each nation forged ahead on national tank development programs. Although the U. S. program, the XMI pmject began as a strictly national development, by 1073, the new U. S. SECDEF and his staff had again begun to seek ways of using the program to accrue the benefits of standardization and to create a two-way development street with the Germans. Because their activities threatened the XA4l's cost and development schedule, the SECDEF and his staff were opposed, given that the program was already eight years late, by those in the U. S. Congress who preferred to see the XMI program meet its cost and schedule goals. Although much of the record of the debate hetween and these congressmen focused on the military value of the German tank and its gun, behind this lay a more fundamental debate over the real value of cooperation within the alliane.' As a result of OSD's efforts, the Americans, Germans, and the British agreed to test and evaluate each nation's proposed future tank gun system in hopes of selecting one as standard. The United States went even further and committed to mount the winner of the competition in the XMl. The implementing gun trials demonstrated that although the U. S. 205-mm gun and ammunition provided more than enough power to meet the existing threat, the foreign 120-mm gun systems seemed better suited for meeting the longer term threat. As a direct result, the XMl program was delayed an additional four months to allow for the contractors competing for the XMI contract to incorporate a turret capable of accepting both the US. 105-mm gun system and one of the foreign 120-mm gun systems into their design." Eventually the United States decided in favor of the German gun system. Although the decision maker, in this case the U. S. secretary of the Army, denied that his decision had been influenced by Germany's consideration of an AWACS buy, the symbolic significance to the Ccrmans of the gun decision apparently played a minor role in precipitating support for the decision within OSD.'-F Congress severely criticized the Army's gun decision for its lack of sound military rationale. In testimony before the Congress, the Army general who conducted the U. S. portion of the gun trials stated that the risk and expense of adding the 120-mm gun system to the XMl were too costly a hedge against the possibility that the Soviets might build a tank with armor that fell between the capabilities of a 105-mm and a 120-mm gun. The Army secretariat argued that the 120-mm offered more potential than the 105- mm and that armor remained a highly uncertain tcchnology, one in which the possibility for radical improvements could not be easily discounted.26 Members of the congressional committee reviewing the decision reported that there existed no convincing evidence that the decision was based on military requirements. The congressional view was that the gun decision was anon-military choice?' Conclusions Even this relatively brief examination provides ample evidence to support Robert L. O'Connell's hypothesis that there is an "intimate relationship between humans and their armaments." Especially for the U. S., if one recognizes the open, information-driven, dcrnocratic nature of U. S. society and the unique role played by the Congress in the weapon system acquisition process. Perhaps "intimate rclationship between Americans and their armaments' is a more appropriate description for O'Connell's hypothesis. As suggested earlier, given recent U. S. experience, it seems that the political perspective is the most important consideration when dealing with U. S. weapon system acquisition. The U. S. congressional debate on accepting a 9-mm foreign pistol as the DOD's standard sidearm is probably the most publicized recent example. The presence and impact of factors such as that of the American political system must be acknowledged, understood, and controlled. If nothing else, the historical review of Guilmartin and Jacobowitz clearly shows that these factors are a two-edge sword that, while having the potential to be extremely dysfunctional, can work to provide not only better individual weapon systems but also better tactical systems. Finally, what can or should we do about it? Recommendations Guilmartin and Jacobowitz may provide the key! The U. S. defense establishment must take better ad- I I I ARMOR - 47 I vantage of, more fully accept, and more openly acknowledge the importance of the "Iron Triangle" of U. S. industry, government, and military. thc process by which they provide these resources. Notes First, although military strategy and tactics are the province of the military, the weapons they require must be developed within DOD and with industry in a more active and mutually participatory form.28 The task is not an easy one! "Black" and compartmented programs, which compose an ever-growing share of the defense program and which routinely comprise most of DOD's technologically advanced programs, typically restrict access to only a subset of the already extremely small group of "players" who have a real impact in the acquisition process. Although modern technology is mainly the province of industry, U. S. firms must also be able to more thoroughly understand the military's battlefield needs."9 Industry's task is much more than just the execution of a set of specifications translated by a program manager from the "user's'' requirements. Regardless, both industry and the military, and those who study these issues, must recognize that not only does the parent American society determine the nature and intensity of the cohesive forces that bind together the American soldiers who will use the weapons but, in addition, that the society, in the form of its elected officials, will only provide for the use of its scarce resources on weapons that it understands and supports. All three, the military, industry, and the Congress, must work to reduce the negative impact of the adversarial relationships inherent in 'Allison. Graham T.. w n c e of Decision. Exdainina the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston: Little, Brown and Com- -0Connel1, Robert L., "Putting Weapons in Perspective," Armed Forces and Society, Val. 9, No. 3, Spring 1983, p. 442. P;nY. 31bid, p. 441.?bid, p. 443. 'lbid, pp. 442-453. 6Guilmartin, John F. and Daniel W. Jacobowitz, Technoloav. Primaw Group Cohesion. and Tactics As Determinants of Success in Weapons Svstem Desian: A Historical Analvsis of an Interactive Process, USAF Air Command and Staff College. 1984, p. 2. 'lbid, p. 10. 'lbid, pp. 12-13. 'lbid. "lbid. p. 16. "lbid, pp. 21-22. 121bid. 131bid, p. 23. 141bid, p. 28. "lbid, p. 45. 161bid, p. 45-47. 4 7 Ibid. I f 18McNaugher, Thomas L., Collaborative Development of Main Battle Tanks: Lessons From the U. S. - German Experience. 1963-1978, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1981, pp 57. "lbid, pp. 7-11. 201bid, p. 15. "lbid, p. 18. *Ibid, p. 19. 231bid, pp. 30-31. 241bid, pp. 40-46. 251bid, p. 55. 261bid, pp. 56-57. 27lbid, p. 57. 28Guilmartin and Jacobowitz, pp. 70-71. 291bid, p. 70. Modifying The Army's Armored Vehicles In his book, War As I Knew Ir, General George Patton had a section titled, "Earning My Pay." I would like to present something similar on the subject of modifying some of the Army's armored vehicles. Some of these proposals may already be in development, others may have been tried, but found infeasible. 0 Replace either the M240 at the loader's station or the TC's M2. with the MK-19 40-mm grenade launcher on the MU I series tanks. This weapon would be effective against APCs, helicopters and soft targets. The MK-19 could also be mounted on the MM.5, M60A3, and the M.551 tanks. 0 There are two MMIMM-series vehicles that need to be replaced with new vehicles based on the MI chassis. The first is the M&! WI, which, with the fielding of the MUI, will have it's recovery capabilities pushed to the limit. The other is the M48fMM A E B. This vehicle can't keep up with the MI units. If Abranrs-series vehicles replace these two armored vehicles, tank battalions would have all their heavy, armored vehicles sharing the same chassis and engine. This would make the mechanic'sand supply personnel jobs easier. 0 The MI13 series has been in service since the 1!%Os, and three of the series should be replaced by M2fM3 series vehicles, and anew ARV is also proposed. The M577 is too large and is easily recogized on the battlefield. It should be replaced by an M2 CP vehicle. This version would retain its turret with either a 48 ARMOR -