Hood Experiment

''The or;Sanizatiori wlticlt CTsstircs iiriitv of coirthatarils sltould he Dcttcr tliroiiglioiit and rrtore rational... soldiers, no matter how well drillcrl, who are as.eiithlpd liapltazariilv irrto coniparties arid battalioris will ricw haw, rtwer hmu* had, Ilia1 cprilircB iiriie wltich is honi of niiihial (IC-qiairitariceship. - Coloitcl Ardaitt rhi Picq. In early 1986. the commander of 111 Corps obtained approval to organize three combined arms maneuver battalions. Two of the hat-talions would be armor hcavy; the third would he balanced. with an infantry base and its organic antitank company. On 3 Septembcr 10.30, the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, reorganied in accordance with the DA-approved Combined Arms Maneuver Battalion

MTOE. The brigade will remain or-ganired under the CAMB MTOE for at leilst two years for evaluation. Simply stated, a comhincd;irms maneuver battalion is a hattalion oC mechanized infantry, armor, and antitank companies, with:I hcarl-quarters company composed oC support elements which arc in proportion to the number and types of line companies.

clnkam.."....-"& vmm.".- 2 Ennsud..-"...m m i m YZ a m 12 wol 8 YlW (Balancad) m 2m Hm: 13 M2 14 M I 12 wol Why CAMB? CAMB's obiective is to optimbe the warlighting capability (if our heavy forces by organiin battalions to train as they will fight. Its basis is in the Army'straining philosophy: "Successful armies train as they intend to fi$ht, and fight as thcy are trained."- More to the point: "Units and headquarters that will fight togcther in teams, task forces. or larger units. should train together improves the fishling capability of heavy forces by improving leaders' proficiency at integrating tanks and mechanized infantry; facilitates task organization and its sustainment; i d capitalizes on the cffccts of constant association. CAMB units are also expected lo reap long-term professional development benefits in the exposure thcy provide 1c:idcrs of combincd arms opera! ions. Thcrc is probably little argument with thc doctrinal necessity to train routinely in across-attached mode. Howcver, with the ficlding of ncw, more capablc and more complcx systems, the need to train that way has become increasingly urgent. For the first time, we have an infantry fighting vchicle intentionally desiged Cor its employment in combination with the new main battle tank. Wc expcct the effect of the Bradley IFV and the Abrams tank, whcn properly employed together, to be grcater than that of either system cniployed separately. This effect, however, is not automatic. Events at the National Training Center have shown that units find it difficult to obtain their full potential. The speed of the MI and M2 makes their employment harder to control. A friendly platoon covers the distance to a position before the artillery can process and fire its request for fire on thiit position. The demands to get infantrymen forward.to breach and clcar ohstaclcs compete with the pressing need to keep Bradley TOW launchers firing from long t d - o f f ranges. One quickly learns that, indeed. "The Bradley is not a tank." as the enemy precipitously destroys thcm in a mutter of seconds. The command and control arrangcmcnts for dismounting infantrymen, unique to the Bradley force and necessarily effected hnsti-ARMOR - January-February 7988 I 74

Ori the E i t i p l i i i t qf Coriibiricd h i i s iri Mbrld M'ar II: " Wlieriewr possible, it was best to join tlie sarnc tank arid irifaritni irriits together iri trairtirig arid cornbat. Not ortlv did tlic slaff jiirictiori bctter, But the Iwcr iiriit cortiritariicrs uric! iri-dividiial tank crew arid iri-farirry sqiiadLy bccariie ac-qirairited arid gniried cori-fiticricc. iri cacli otlicr. Uriifs gairicd objcctiws as n tcnrit arid riot as iridiiYhia1 aniis." - nte Aniior Scltool, 1947 Iy in this fast-paced contcxT. are an entirely new dimension in the employment of infantry. Under the most stressful conditions. short of actuid comhat. commanders must draw heavily from their previous experience in the employment of combined arms. Too often that experience has proved inadequate. There is just too much to know about the relative capabilities of the Bradley and Ahrams systems alone, I'ar more than:I few short training expericnces with cross-at-tachnients can provide. The CAMB argument is that it has hecome largely pointless for battalions to continue to live as pure units and to only cross-attach occasionally, as has heen the tradition. We ciin gain more by organizing as comhincd arms. with pure tiink or mechanized infantry units as the ex-ccpt ion. One of the goals of CAMB is to strengthen armor-infantry teamwork hy living and working together. In view of such programs as COHORT and the Regimentid System, this goal should not require much discussion. Beyond the obvious benefits of tankers and in-fiintrymcn marching under the same battalion colors, there are other ad-vanlases that specifically apply to warfighting. Onc of the lour basic tenets ol AirLand Battle doctrine is "Initiative." "If subordinates are to exercise initiativc without endangering the overall success of the force, they must thoroughly understand thc commander's intent.'" Any properly experienced armor captain, for example. can understand his infantry task force commandcr's concepts of operation. But to "thoroughly understand his intent" requires that he personally know the commandcr. He should also havc an appreciation of his own commander's lrame of reference. Under CAMB, the armor captain gets to know his infantry com-mmdcr. and. over the long term. develops a general appreciation of infantry. And, for his part, the task force commander can hctter entrust his tank company commander's initiative, because he knows him and his capability. I f experiences to date are any indication, CAMB will have a positive catalytic effect on the close combat heavy force as a whole, as well. The CAMB inherently provides a common k m s to the Armor and Infantry communities. Task Organization Many fear that CAMB will create fixed organizations, prcempt task organizing on the hasis of METT-T, and reduce higher commanders' llexihility to tailor battalions according to the situation. Ironically, the proponents of CAMB share these understandable concerns. Their intent is to crcate no such constraints, but quite the opposite. By developing a common hattalion base (HHC) to command. control, and support up to five maneuver companies in any combination; by routine staff and service support experience in sustaining across-at-tachcd organi7ation; and, by continu ing to practice cross-at t achi ng companies from one CAMB lo another; CAMB intends to, and does, facilitate task organization. The result clearly increases commanders' flexibility. In terms of its organizational design, CAMB is certainly not the final solution. It is more probably a 60-8O-percent solution to any comhat task organization. As one commander put it: "What are we really talking about anyway! There are only so many ways to split a

II Onicar..-..45 WOr............ 2 Ennsld.....ssa TOTAL...-do0

MANEWER BAlTALlON (Armor Heavy)

I I I Dl 2 HI rn 13 M2 a 14 M1 6 M3 6 Y108 DENOTES OPERATlONAL

CHANGE OR PARA ORO.

ARMOR - 15 brigade." Beyond that, it follows that it is much easier to go from some mix to any other mix, than to start from a pure tank or mechanized infantry organization. For the CAMB headquarters and its support structure, there is cssen-tially no change in leadership whcn making further cross-attachment. At this point, one might ask: Why make CAMB a documented organization? Could we not accomplish the same goals through "semi-permanent" cross attachments o l a lcw months duration? In fact, many FORSCOM brigades do just that for their train-ups before NTC rotations. In reality, however, if such provisional cross-attachmcnts last longer than a months. they become inefficient to the point of being counter-productive. From their prcvious experience at being cross-attached for six months without MTOE documentation, two of the current CAMBs found there to be some 73 administrative functions that required special or olf-line miinagemcnt. Actions normally handled in stride, ranging from simple personnel actions t o suhmis-sion o f USRs, ran counter to the "systcm" at every Icvel and consumed inordinate amounts of valuable time. MI'OE documentation for CAMB "legalizes" the unit in the system, resulting in the disappearance of problems associated with provisional organization. CAMB In the 1st Cav Division The combined arms maneuver bat- t;ilion organidon is shown in figures J and 2. Task force 1-5 C*ii\&y, balanced. is at figure 1. Task forces 1-8 Cavalry, and 1-32 Armor, both armor heavy, are at figure 2. It is important to undcrstancl that the CAMBs are composed of cxist-ing personnel and equipment authorizations - a zero-sum cx-change among the three battalions. In addition to the line company cross-attachmcnts, which include each compmv's maintenance team, some adjustments in personnel and equipment were made to align the HHC's. The most immediate lesson o l CAMB orgnnijlation is the need to align the HHC's of the tank and nicchani;led infantry 17attiilions. Undcr their. I-scries MTOEs, the HHCs of thc two type battalions are not suited to rilpid cross-attiich-mcnt, nor for the sustainment of task forces. The liggcst difference is in the support platoons. Thc infantry hattalion's support platoon hils 5-ton cargo i d tank and pump unit (TPU) trucks: while the tank hiittalion has the IO-ton cargo and 2,3(K)-gaIlon fuel H EhlMTs. The two types of trucks have considerable differences in crosscountry mobility and load capacity. Undcr normal circumstances of task organization. infantry task forces find it hnrd to meet the additional fuel i d ammunition needed by their attached tank companies. To compensate for this, tank hart. I' tons normally send two cargo HEMMTs and two fucl HEMMTs with their detached tank companies. Infmtry battalions respond in kind with S- ton cargo trucks rind TPUs. This exchange solves the transportation prohlem but creates a problem in miiintcnancc. The tank battalion's maintenance scction has the tools. mechanics. and repair parts to support 5-ton trucks; but the infantry battalion has no mechanics (MOS03S). spccinl tools, or parts t? support the HEMMT. There arc further problems. The infantry and armor hattiilions both have some M2/M3-qualiliecl mcch- a n i q and hlYM.3 PLL. because their scout platoons (MZ-equipped) itre the same. But the tank hattalion's assets are insufli-cicnt to sustain even one attached Bradley company; and the infantry battalion has no tank maintenance capability at all. The traditional soh-tion to these maintenance support problems is to breitk out of each battalion's maintenance section a "special maintenance package" t o sustain cross-attachments. This is time-consuming and is not a complete solution, heciiuse the leaders o l each type battalion are not normally familiar with the other's vehicles and equipment. The CAMB solution was to cross-level trucks and H EMMTs, drivers. fuel handlers, i d mechanics, ancl to adjust the battalions' PI. Ls. The result is Ihitt each CAMB has most ol' the rcquired assets in place to sustain it task organization. And. by working with the different vehicles on a didy hasis. maintenance leaders become increasingly more qualified to perform their service support functions. Because the CAMB exchanges were made from within existing assets. there remain some shortfalls in TMDE ancl STE. The inliintry-hascd CAMB, for example, is left critically short one set of M I adapter hardware for STE-MI/FVS and MI break-out boxes. There was one other significant change under the CAMB MTOE. The hattalion executive officer and S3 Air slots of the tank and halitnced CAMBs were changed to reflect Infmlry and Armor primary specialties, respectively. Bottom line, the reorgani7ation to rcquires no additional people. If CAMB were to be formcd permanentlv, we would have to address equipment rcquircnients such as additional hardware for the infantry-based CAMB. The HHCs would probably be better suited for the sustainment of cross-attachments if all had the HEMMT, but that is really an issue scparate from CAMB. The 5-ton ARMOR - I cargo truck has some good fcatttres - the troop hauling capability, for example. and the 5-lon/HEMMT com-hination worked-out under thc current CAMBs might prove to be a feasible alternative. As aside note, the reorganbation to CAMB surfaced some other significant differences in the.?-series MTOEs of the tank and infantry hattalions. For example: although the infantry company XO is a second-in-command lighter, like any other line company XO. he rides in an M I J.3, which cannot keep up wilh the rest of his company. A tank company XO commands a tank, which keep\ him up and enables him to take command niore rapidly. What Has Not Changed Under CAMB, many things do not change and;ire not intended to change. The line company organizations do not change at all. They train as they always have, and their platoons are occasionally cross-attached to form company teams. At every opportunity, the CAMBs take on their normal conibat support and service support "slice" to train as full-up task forces. Organizational relationships with fire support teams (FIST). engineers, and so on, remain unchangcd. Views of the CAMB Experience In FY 1988, authorities will make formal assessments to determine whether the CAMB concept should bc pursued further. To bc sure, the answers to many questions will he elusive. Evaluation will he largely subjective, relving heavily on the sensings of CAMB leaders and subject matter experts. Those measurc-ments that are quantifiable will be influenced by numerous varinhles and will, in many cases, lack appropriate basclines or precedents for comparison. Meanwhile, it may be of interest to consider somc of the issues and obscrvations already surfacing. To say that CAMB is an emolional issue in relation to branch allilia-lions is a gross understatement. One of the first issues inevitably raised is the suspected degradation of individual training that may result from hranch biases of the various CAMB leaders. A casc in point is the concern over training and use of the Bradley-mounted infantryman, (MOSllM). To he candid. the feeling is that, particulnrly under an armor-based CAMB, the 11M soldier will not receive adequate training in basic infantry fighting skills. The implication is that the quality and content of individual training stem directly from the battalion commander and his infantry-or-armor-flavored staff. But, in reality, individual training takes place almost entirely within the purview of company command. Under CAMB, recall, nothing changes at line company level. BTMS and its botlom-up approach to planning remain in effect, and the leadership positions in CAMB companies remain occupied by hranch-qualified individuals. O f equd significance is the veiled suspicion that iirmor and infantry CAMB commanders will rcspectivc-Ig pay less attention to thc infantry or armor-specific training needs of their soldiers. Even if one were to assume this concern to he a reality, as a natural function or battalion commanders' hackgrounds. then one might just 11s ell assumc that a commander who came up through a CAMB or similar experience would be niore inclined lo pay due attcn-tion to both tankers and infant rymcn. Finidly. we should remind ourselves that CAMB is an organizational issue - how best to train an organimtion to fight other organizations. Individual training is certainly one consideration; hut, it is shortsighted to weigh the relative merits of this concept on the basis of individual performance. One CAMB commander raised two interesting points. Thc Grst involves ownership. Normnlly, when an infantry battalion commander, for example, gets an attached tank company, he does not overly con-ccrn himself with its state of tmining. The company's shortcomings succumb to the temporary nature of its attachmcnt. But, under CAMB, the battalion commander "owns" that tank company and, therefore, has a vested interest in its performance. For that reason alone, the battalion commandcr sets higher standards for the company. Indeed, he is able to set higher stitndards, because he hits lcarned more about what to look for - has become more technically proficient - with respect to the tank company. Finally, his ownership of the company enables the CAMB commander to enforce the standards he sets for it. The second point is ahout training focus. Because it is more closely organized for warfighting, CAMB tends to focus its conimandcr'straining efforts more sharply on mission. Again, using the 1 I M infantryman as an example, the CAMB commander finds himself more inclined to train his infantrymen in the tasks associated with their specialty; e.g., breaching and securing maior tank ohstacles. There is liltle perceived need, and precious less time, to be training the 11M soldier as a man for all seasons - doing such things as rapelling and airmobile assaults. <;cnerally, infantrymen have found that they have not lost their dismounted skills but have relined them in coordination with tanks. In terms of preparation for combined arms operations, CAMB has I 1 ARMOR - 17 me CAMB Experience Problems and Solutions:

Armor and Infantry support platoons use two kinds of trucks - the 5-ton and the 10-ton HEMTT - with different mobility and load-carrying characteristics.

Infantry units can't support HEMTTs or maintain tanks. 0 Armor unit's assets insufficient to maintain Bradleys. 0 Infantry-based CAM6 is short M1 adapter hardware for STE-

Infantry XO rides in an M113 that has difficulty keeping up. MlIWS test equipment. SOLUTION: UnRs exchange trucks. SOLUTION: Cross-level trucks, HEMTTs, drivers, fuel handlers, mechanics. SOLUTION: None found. SOLUTION: None found. so many built-in training efficiencies that it may well be the best hargdn in town. Resourcing, cross-training, and professional development are ii few areas in which CAMB offers extra returns on investment. When it comes to rcsourcing, CAMB is an especi:illy good deal. When a CAMB wants lo go to thc field as a task force, or wants to send out a company team of tanks and infantry, the resources to do so are readily at hand. However, a pure battalion must coordinate with another battalion to set its desired tank or infantry element. This is not only time-consuming. hut, often one finds the other battalion in a different training cycle, or following its own (conflicting) schcdule, which prevents the opportunity entircly. The problem of having to break a company out or its parent battalion's schedule is nonexistent when the companies required for combined arms training arc already within one's hattalion. Commanders have traditionally tried with varying and usrliilly slipht degrees of success to gct thcir units to cross-train their soldiers. CAMBs still make these concerted, formal-izcd efforts. But, to a very liirgc dc-gree, cross-training in ii CAMB occurs naturally and affects cveryone from the battalion commander to the private soldier. Through this mode, officcrs i d men of CAMBs learn routinely - in the normal course of daily operations - what other battalions will only experience in task-organized field operations. Consider for a moment the case of the battalion motor ofliccr (BMO). on a large scale with the fault diagnosis, rcpir. services, parts iclcn-tities, and so on, of both tiink and infantry systems. Compare that with the case of his pure battalion counterpart, who must deal with the two systems For the first time. and then only temporarily, whcn his battalion is task organi7ed in the field. The three existing CAMBs have already produced BMOs. technicians, and NCO supervisors who "know" the Bradley as wcll as they alreadv knew the tank. In response to questions on what hc h:td learned i t h u t the vehiclc, one BMO,;in armor officer, went beyond that iisped. He said, "1 havc not only learncd the Bradley, I have learned thc people who maintain it. When anew Brad-Icy mechanic is iissigncd to my in-filntv company's maintenance tcam, 1 know from experience his capaldities. I know what the schoolhouse taught him, and what we Evcry dity, the CAMB'S BMO dcitls must teach him here. Before. 1 only kncw such things of tank mechanics." At the mechanics' Icvel, the cross-training that naturally permeates garrison maintenance and services pays huge dividends in the work-sharing that necessarily occurs in the 24-hour-a-day efforts of unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) operations. On the job, C'AMBs produce bona fide "new systems mechanics." The high ()peril-lional rates that the CAMBs have sustained throughout extcnsive field exercises are likely a manifestation of what their mechanics and maintenance supervisors learned through cross-fertilization. One of the clearest examples of the cross-training opportunity offered by CAMR is in the support platoon. Except in the event of war, a standard lxttalion's support platoon will iilmost certainly nevcr experience the handling and transport of both tank and Bradley munitions. But CAMB support platoons get that experience all year long - every time their units go to any live-firc range. Professional Development CAMB provides a singular opportunity to "train the trainers" of 18 ARMOR - January-February 7988 tank/infantry task forces and heavy brigades. The only other place such an opportunity exists is in regimen- t;11 c;lvi1Iry, where commanders learn multiple systems throughout their career progression. Compare that with the situation of a typical brigade Commander. If he did not command a CAMB, then he may have worked with hoth tanks and infantry in only a few ARTEPs and maybe in at Icast one NTC rotation. CAMB commanders and staffs do almost nothine, dtly-to-diiv. that does not involve both armor and infantry considerations. In time, they become increasingly proficient and confident in their iihility to train subordinates on the multiple systems of teams and task forces. In ficlrl operations. their estimates and decisions become basctl more on personal experience and less on supposition. And it should not ovcrly tax one’s imagination to foresee the wcll-roundcd S3 or coniniandcr that such an individual as the BMO just described might one day become. Implicit in most of what I have said is a professional hlenrling thiit is occurring in the CAMB. Except for Ihe adherence to branch qualification for company commanders, CAMBs niakc easy the normal intra-battalion assignment changes that promotions and viican-cies require. As a result. infantry officcrs have become support platoon leaders for tank task forces. armor officers have become motor officcrs lor the infantry-based task force, and so on. As thesc officcrs (and some senior NC‘Os) move on to other assignments, they will take with them valuable expience. Normally, armor and infantry battalions go ahout their business with little need to talk with one anothcr. But C‘AMB commanders, staffs, master gunners, and so on, art‘ in frequent communication on topics from gunnery and maintenance to tactics, SOP, and citreer counseling. The swapping of idcas and assets fosters teamwork in the hrigadc and would seem bcnclicial to the force as a whole. Task Organization and Sustainment As a rcsult of the HHC realign-mcnt, CAMBs have become more adept at supporting further cross-attachments. Changes in task organization, which usually involved the addition of a fourth or lifth company, have hecn cxecutcd in stride. The only rcid xljustrncnts were adaptations to new personalities. Thc anticipated improvcnients in maintenance support and support platoon operations were realized in ARTEPs and NTC rotation. In one NTC battle. the armor CAMB’s infantry company sufkred 70 percent casualties. The battalion was able to evacuate all casualties in one hour. The battalion XO attrilwted the success 0 1 this feat to the stafrs and infantry company’s familiarity with one anothcr and to their common knowledge of the battalion’s combat service support SOP. The XO expressed fear at whiit might have happened h i d the infantry company been unfaniiliar, or had the staff not had routine experience in supporting an infantry company. Conclusion Whether the Army will build on the strengths of CAMB remains to bc sccn. Crcation of the existing CAMBs has at lcast caused some healthy i d timely introspccticm about our iipproach to training heavy forces for employment in com-ha^. In the process, some irrefutable organizational design changes have surfxul; some of the hranch stovcpiping hiis been removed: and many leaders’ perspectives on the cmploymcnt of combined arms have broadened. ARMOR - The relative merits of CAMB may be extremely difficult to quantify. Bccause of the rcnlities and cffccts of variables such as personnel lur-hulcncc, for example, expected improvements in commanders’ ability to integrate tanks and infantry may not be inimcdiatcly apparent. If the dccision-makers at least accept CAMB as a promising idea, then in deciding to pursue it furthcr, they will need to rely largely on subjective assessments and their own intuitions. We have seen that FORSCOM brigades recognbe the need to form their battalions into task forces for NTC train-ups. often for up to siu months. So a good question to ask is this: Why do they go hack to pure battalions for the remainder of the training year? Notes ‘In his two-year command, the author’s battalion actually assumed three different configurations: first. as a balanced, MlIM2-equipped task force extended in cross-attachment for six months; then, as a pure M1 tank battalion for a year: and, for the last six months, as a CAMB of three Abrams tank companies and one Bradley infantry company. ’FM 25-1 (Training). 3FM 1CC-5 (Operations). 4FM 100-5 (Operations). LTC Robert G. Bernier was commissioned in Armor from the University of Maine in 1967 and holds a Master of Arts degree in Management from Webster University. With service in five different cavalry squadrons, in CONUS and overseas, he has served multiple tours as platoon leader and troop commander. He has also been a squadron S3, squadron XO, brigade S1 and brigade S3. Most recently, he commanded the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry (CAMB), 1st Cavalry Division. He is currently attending the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island. 19