Reactive Armor: New Life for Soviet Tanks

At left, a T-80 with reactive armor. Captain MaiiSFeld was pleased with the siiccess achieved by his tearit diiriiig tlie last coiiple of dqs. nie 'Xwassiiis" had beeit deploved sirice the veri? bcgiiiiiiiig; arid had been in coiiibat sirice the dav afer Clirislriias. Die bunied-oiit eiieriiv tanks scattewd to the east of BP Tiger were proof that his tankers aiid Bradley crews had done a good 48- hoiirs work. He was jiist rehiniilig to his own MI wlieri he started to wonder wliv the eiteiiiy tanks Itad riot been as hard to kill as the S2 had briefed. Die briefing incliided a descriptioii of a riiiriiber of eiieiiiv tanks fitted with anew gpe of aniior that coiild pose a threat to the task force's firepower. It seemed prem clear to Captain Maiifleld, as lie a-aiiiiiied the slowlv dissipating coliiiiirts of siiioke coni-irig oiit of EA Tiger-Trap, that tliose eiieiiiv tanks were not fitted with tlie iiew tjpe of aniior. He was jiist uboiit to pit these tlioiiglits oiit of his ittirid in favor of that riiglit's operatioris order when lie received a call oii the task force coniiiiaiid net. nie cull iii-chided a report froiii an iiifaiitn, team that had been attacked by an erieiiiy coiitpmiv wliile it was set iip iii arid aroiirid a towri to the nortli-east of BP Tiger. Altlioiigli the eiieiiiv attack occiined at rtiglit, the iifaiiti?, was able to report that the ericiiiy tanks were fitted with anew hpe of aniior that was apparentlv able to take a lot of piiriislinteiit. nie report ended with iiricorifiniied stories of eneiiiv tanks mplodirig after being hit, arid then coiitiriiiiitg IO fire into friendly positioris. nie images of the battle that had taken place in that town in the dark were ciit short b), a spot report called iii froiii his Brad& platoon leader. Several eiieiiiv tanks were approaclt-Big BP Tiger from the iiortlieast; eiieiiiy tanks that lie coiild riot specifi-callv ideiitifi. As the straiige-looking tanks came into view, Captaiii Marisfield was able to corifinii that t l i q were eiieiiiv, but lie coiild not be siire what niodel t l i q were. It looked like each eneiiiv tank was covered with a l a w of blocks or bricks. Seconds later, his Bradlqs opened fire, followed iiiiriiediatelv bv the tank platoons. Jiist as Captaiii Mansfield was start-irig his own fire coriiriiuiid lie saw sometliirig that lie had i i e w seeii before. At tliut nioiiierit lie couldn't be sure, biit it looked like tliese modified eiieiiiv tanks were being hit arid aplodirig, arid tlicri retiirniiig fire... Origins in Israel In August 1982, advertisements for the Israeli Military Industries (IMI) two-tank ferry raft were in various defense-related magazines. The photograph that accompanied the ad was significant more for the cargo than for the raft itself. That cargo consisted of two Israeli main battle tanks; a modified Ceiihirioii, followed by a modified MW. Each of the tanks had a series of what appeared to be mounting points or studs for some unseen equipment or gear belonging to the crcws. These mounting points were in various patterns and were welded on to the front slope, hull deck, turret front, turret side, and turret roof of each of the sand-colored tanks. The important role played by these mounting points lo both Israeli tanks and tank crewmen was dramatically demonstrated two months earlier during Operation "Peace for Galilee." On June 4, 1982, the Israeli armed forces launched an offensive into 6 ARMOR - southern Lebanon. The three-pronged advance included large numbers of heavily-modified armored vehicles. During the first few days of the operation, news magazines printed photographs showing Israeli tanks with a previously-unseen type of applique armor that consisted of a series of blocks or bricks. The application of these bricks was so extensive that even a trained observer would be slow to properly identify each tank model. As more photographs became avail-Israeli Blazer armor array on M60, as first used in the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Note different shapes of the armor blocks in different locations. - - able, it was possihle to examine this new armor more closely, and to finally determine its purpose. The armor was a reactive type that the Israelis have since named "Blazer." Development History Rafael, an Israeli company, developed Blazer specifically to defeat modern antitank weapons that rely on high explosive (HEAT). This massive category of tank-killing weapons includes both antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) and the less sophisticated rocket-propelled weapons (RPG-7/RPG-16) and light antitank weapons (LAWS). This HEAT-defeating capability has attracted the interest of many countries, especially the Soviet Union. How It Works Blazer armor consists of a series of bricks, each attached to the tank by a bolt and nut, and containing a special plastic explosive sandwiched between two steel plates. In theory, this reactive armor "simply involves the use of chemically-stored energy to extend the range of the variables of hardness, density, spacing, and differential obliquity."' When a HEAT warhead hits one of these bricks, the plastic explosive inside would also have the additional drawback to an enemy of displaying a vehicle signature (from the detonating bricks) where a conventionally-armored tank would remain hidden. In spite of Israeli claims to the contrary, this aspect of reactive armor probably remains to be proved. During operation "Peace for Galilee," 'the artillery threat was at best modet." the brick detonates. The explosive force of this detonation is directed away from the brick'sinner steel plate, and concentrates in the opposite direction of the attacking warhead. This explosion forces the HEAT-formed "jet' to malform and lose its energy so that the heavily-weakened jet is not capable of penetrating the tank's main armor. It is easy to see that a tank equipped with this type of armor, under attack by HEAT weapons, could give the impression that it had received a crippling blow, while actually it only sustained the loss of one or more of it's reactive armor bricks. According to the manufacturer, Blazer bricks "are not activated by small arms ammunition fire, or artillery shell fragments.." One source stated that detonation of the bricks would only occur if hit by 23-mm rounds or larger. In spite of the capabilities that this new armor has to offer, it does have some limitations. The first of these deals with attack discrimination. The armor must have the capability to distinguish between artillery airbursts, heavy machinegun fire, and attack by an antitank weapon. If artillery shell fragments could cause the reactive armor to detonate, the effectiveness of this armor could be negated by the preparatory fire delivered prior to an attack. This The second limitation concerns the prohlem of detonation chain reaction. The hit on a single brick mounted at 10 o'clock on the turret front, for example, should not cause a series of detonations that would leave the entire left side of the turret exposed. A third limitation deals with the safety of friendly forces supporting tanks fitted with reactive armor. A reactive armor brick detonated by an RPG-16 could cause a serious problem for the tank's supporting infantry teams. This danger would not be limited to dismounted infantry, but could include the unbuttoned crew of the tank that was hit as well. While the employment of body armor would lesson the danger to some degree, this is an inherent problem that may be impossible to solve. A fourth limitation concerns the lack of effectiveness of reactive armor (as it is currently designed) against tank main gun-fired kinetic energy projectiles. These armor-piercing rounds, such as APDS-T and AI'FSDS-T, are apparently only marginally affected by reactive armor bricks. The final point for discussion here is more of a challenge than a limita- I ARMOR - 7 1 tion, how to replace damaged or detonated reactive armor bricks while in thc field. It will be obvious that a crew will have to replace battle-damaged bricks as soon as possible. The brick design must allow for easy crew replacement. Once this has been achieved, the logistics problem must he solved. Will newly delivered bricks be considered and handled as explosive ammunition, or as replacement parts? The design of Blazer armor allows the tank to go for an unlimited time without the bricks, and then to add them during increased tension. This capability allows the reactive armor to be secured in a safe place while the tanks in training, as well as providing the additional benefit of keeping the design and any "up-armoring" a secret from a potential enemy. The capability of carrying out a rapid up-armoring program under a veil of at least some degree of secrecy is another characteristic that has attracted the Soviets to adopt reactive armor. The Soviets could have applied the same level of secrecy to their initial deployment of reactive armor that they histori-callv have used to hide the existence of their most capable antitank weapons. According to Soviet author Viktor Suvorov, these weapons are only employed "at times of acute tension." The amount of information concerning the effectiveness of Israeli Blazer armor during Operation "Peace for Galilee" is very limited. We know that the Israeli Army litted the armor to a variety of its tanks, including MWAIs, Cen-hmrions, and M60A.k One of the characteristics of this armor is that the size and shape of each brick is not uniform, and can be tailor-made to protect specific weaknesses of specific vehicles. The Israelis built the bricks in the shapes of squares, rectangles, and triangles, and included many variations of each shape. They mounted the bricks close togethcr and covered most of the front and side surface of each tank. It is interesting to note here that an angled series of bricks mounted on to the hull deck to each side of the driver's position protected the turret ring area. The amount of increased protection on these tanks was obviously substantial; and, according to several unclassified sources, constituted a very successful baptism of fire for reactive armor. The Israelis, who have offered their Blazer reactive armor on the export market since at least 1983, decided that its tactical advantages outweighed the limitations and possible risks characteristic of this type of armor. This decision, which enabled the Israelis to field an improved armor system when it was needed, "could sound the death-knell of existing antitank rockets and missiles." The Soviets Seek Solutions The Soviet Army's concern ovcr the massive deployment by NATO of modern ATGMs is well-documented and has already been discussed in the pages of ARMOR. This long-standing concern has forced the Soviets to seek solutions to counter this NATO capability. Western defense sources have apparently agreed that the best way to negate the effects of the HEAT warhead carried by an ATGM is to make use of Chobham-type armor. These advanccd "brews" of armor, however, have the critical drawbacks of extreme cost and complexity. To date, these drawbacks have been important enough to keep the number of tanks fitted with advanced armor relatively small. The Soviets, long aware of these problems associated with Chobham-type armors, were forced to develop and field other solutions to the ATGM problem. Several intelligence sources have confirmed that the latest ficldcd Soviet main battle tanks are fitted with some form of advanced armor. This armor, while much less sophisticated than the Chobham-types in the West, is still a vast improvement over conventional tank armor. According to Soviet MiIitaT Power 1986, these modern Soviet tanks are fitted with "improved armor incorporating laminates and composites."6 Ifttentatiortal Defense Review puhlishcd a copyrighted drawing in February 1987 of a section view of the Soviet T-80 and T- 648 front slope armor. This drawing clearly showed the armor to have an actual thickness of 200 mm, consisting of steel and glass-fiber composite design. Other unclasssified sources have stated that this composite armor is not limited to the front slopes of these tanks. As already discussed in the pages of ARMOR, the use of a cast turret design does not in any way rule out the use of composite armors. In 1985. the Japanese magazine, Z4NK, published a drawing of a section view of a modern Soviet tank turret that showed large squares or boxes within the turret frontal armor on each side of the main gun. These squares or boxes are most probably some type of composite material. The shape of the turret fronts of modcrn Sovict tanks has undergone a sometimes unnoticed redesign over the years. One of the most dramatic changes was on the most recently-identificd new version of the T-72 main battle tank, which I have labeled the T-72MI (1986). This tank, which paraded in Red Square in November 1986, carries a heavily-modified turret that has anew, pronounced!urret frontal overhang and a large compartment on both sides of the main gun. One can see that the Soviets, using the armor 8 ARMOR - technology and resources available at the time, fielded very capable main battle tanks with very capable armor. Phase One: "Blanket Amor" The first phase of the armor upgrade program began some time prior to 1984, and was first seen fitted to a T-72Ml in November of that year. This modification, which consisted of "blanket" of non-Top view clearly shows added armor "blankets" on urret of this T-72. Experts disagree on its purpose. metallic applique armor bolted to the turret roof, like the third "reactive armor phase," relates directly to the armor protection starting point (composite armor) described above. The non-metallic blanket fitted to the T-72MI was approximately 35- 50-mm thick and ap eared to be very similar to KevlaF fiber panels produced in the West. Some sources claim that the additional armor was to counter the effects of enhanced-radiation weapons in Western Europe. While this theory is possible, it is clearly not the main Soviet motive for such a modification. A more likely reason for adding the soft armor to the turret roof is the increasing threat posed by topattack weapons. These weapons, ranging from 30- mm depleted uranium armor-piercing rounds to "smart" submunitions delivered by a variety of sources, are becoming more and more important to NATO's antitank doctrine. The Soviet applique covers most of the turret roof area. to include the tank commander's (TC) and gunner, hatches, the gunner's GPS "doghouse," and the mounting frames for the TC's vision blocks. It does not, however, cover the area directly above the turret frontal armor. The Soviets apparently felt that this area of the turret was capable enough not to require the additional protection of the armor blanket. In May 1985, the Soviets paraded the T-64 main battle tank for the first time through Red Square, giving Western analysts their first opportunity to examine it. Unclassified sources have identified this tank as aversion of the T-64B that is "not fitted with the guidance equipment for the Kobra guided missile system."' Those T-64s were also fitted with anon-metallic armor blanket. In this case, however, the applique armor was of a different design than that on the T-72M1. On the T-64, the blanket appeared to be made up of several small sections or panels bolted to the turret very closely together; while on the T- 72M1, the blanket was apparently a large one-piece covering. The area of the turret covered on the T-64 also appeared to be smaller than that covered on the T-72Ml. Finally, unclassified photographs that have appeared in defense-related magazines like Soldat iind Techrtik and itfilitan, T C C I I O O V, have confirmed that the non-metallic armor blanket has also been fitted to the hull deck above the driver's position on both tanks. Phase Two: "Horseshoe" Armor on Older Tanks The second phase of the armor upgrade program appeared on Soviet tanks deployed in Afghanistan in 1986. The armor modification, first seen on a knocked-out Soviet T-55, consists of simple cast steel plates added to the turret front (one curved plate on each side of the main gun) and on the front slope. This "horseshoe" armor is about 100-150- mm thick and is intended to defeat infantry antitank weapons? Since its first sighting, this additional armor has appeared on T-54, T-55, and T-62 main battle tanks. Most of the information concerning this armor modification has become available since the well-known withdrawal of some Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Photographs of these forces taken prior to their return to the Soviet Union have appeared in news and defense-related magazines. The tanks featured in these photos are heavily-modified T- 62s (labeled the T-62E by one source for easy identification until the correct Soviet designation is known) that have been fitted with a variety of improvements. The most important is the added armor plates. Two cover the turret from the main gun around the turret front to about the 3 o'clock and 9 o'clock positions. The tanks also had hull-length, non-metallic side plates mounted on each side of the hull. These plates, resembling Kev-lar' fiber panels, are angled slightly outward away From the tank and are most likcly intended to protect the fender fuel cells from heavy machine-gudautomatic cannon fire. The armor plate added to the front slopes appears to be identical to the turret plates, and covers the entire area of the front slope. Finally, these tanks also had fabric or rubberized hull skirting, three I ARMOR - Januaw-Februaw 1988 9 1 large smoke grenade launchers, and what appears to be a small, boxed laser rangefinder mounted above the main gun. While these modified T-54, T- 55, and T-62s do not pose the same threat as rlie inore niodeni T-72, T-64, and 7-NOS, this phase of the armor upgrade program has achieved it's goal. The older tanks that are still in service with the Soviet army have received new life; and, in their up to four layers of reactive armor panels."*' AS far as the turret arrays are concerned, the bricks are in two parallel layers on the turret front of the T-64B; while on the T-SO, the bricks are fitted to the turret in the shape of a "V". This "V" is attached to the turret main armor at it's widest point, with the narrowest part pointing away from T-62 modified with applique armor on turret front updated forms, will continue and sides, non-metallic armor on fuel cells, and;he turret. The result is to be used for training and com-rubber side skirts to predetonate HEAT rounds.that each array resembles the bat into the future. Phase Three: Reactive Armor Is Adopted The final phase of this armor upgrade program is the massive effort the Soviets are undertaking to fit their most modern main battle tanks with reactive armor. This effort, first identified in 1984; is certainly the most significant armor improvement plan so far identified in the Soviet army. Exactly when this Soviet interest in reactive armor first came into being is not clear. At the unclassified level, however, all of the available information points tive armor by the Israelis in 1982. LO the successfl use of Blazer reac-Several open sources have confirmed that the Syrian army captured a number of Israeli tanks fitted with Blazer reactive armor. Exactly how many they captured is unknown, as is the types. The most probable and widely-accepted information confirms that the tanks were MWAIs and that the number the Syrians captured was small. Blazer reactive armor was subsequently made available to the Soviets. This acquired Israeli technology was apparently something that the Soviets were waiting for. As a result, they were able to rapidly field a reactive armor systcm on their most modern tanks. These tanks, described by ARMOR author Steven Zaloga as premium tank types, were suddenly appearing fitted with Soviet reactive armor in East Germany. To date, the only Soviet tanks that have been identified carrying reactive armor bricks are the T-64B and the T-80. Unclassified drawings (in the case of the T-64B) and photographs (in the case of the T- NO) have recently appeared in defense-related magazines. This recently released information has made it possible to assess this new Soviet capability. Unlike Blazer reactive armor, the Soviet bricks appear to consist of one uniform design; although their fitting to the two premium tanks mentioned above is not the same. "The explosive brick measures about 250 x 150 x 70mm. It has four bolt holes, one on each corner to attach one brick to another."ld Each of these bricks attaches to the tank's main armor with two mounting points that hold thcm at specific angles. Just how the bricks are arrayed on each tank type, however, is a different story. The reactive armor bricks fitted to the front slope of both the T-64B and T-80 are set up in the same manner. It is not until we examine the turret and hull-skirting arrays that the difference becomes apparent. "In the case of the T-SO, no panels (bricks) are fitted to the side skirts, while the T-64B has tip or head of an arrow. The reason for these differences is not currently known. One theory is that the main armor of each tank requires a different configuration of reactive armor bricks to achieve a certain level of overall protection. The number of bricks litted to each of these tanks is also different. "The T-80 pattern appears to be the more economical of the two configurations, averaging 11 1 bricks, compared to 185-211 brick panels on the T-64B."" This total number of bricks includes what appears to be a single layer of reactive armor fitted to the turret roof of each tank. Finally, the T-64B and T-8U are the only Soviet tanks that have been seen carrying reactive armor. This does not, however, rule out the application of reactive armor bricks to another tank type in a time of crisis. Based upon the modifications applied to the latest identified version of the 7-72, the groundwork has already been laid. That tank is known as the T-72MI (1986), first seen in November of that year. The smoke grenade launcher array that has been a standard feature of late model T- 72s had been changed with all launchers now mounted on the left side of the turret in a single group. This change not only brought the T- 72 series on line with the latest models of the T-64, it also cleared I i 110 ARMOR - the turret frontal armor of any obstruction that would interfere with the future mounting of reactive armor. Conclusion The Soviets realized many years ago that the promising armor technologies NATO was developing would reach the battlefield before they could produce their own. Cost and complexity of the new armor would be big enough stumbling blocks to keep Soviet tanks with their equivalent of Chohham-type armor on the drawing boards for quite some time. The Soviet army would continue to rely on the "older" designs that made such a huge impact on the armies of the West since as long ago as 1965. One of the primary reasons that tanks like the T-64 and T-80 have made such an impact was that they were protected by some form of advanced armor. The armor of these tanks still poses a serious threat to NATO forces. The problem the Soviets faced was how to update thcir fielded tanks to allow them to hold their own against the much newer NATO main battle tanks. They found the solution with reactive armor. Some sources have incorrectly stated that reactive armor is the ultimate protection a tank will probably ever need. This is far from the truth, I have stated the various reasons for this. Soviet reactive armor should not be considered as a single entity. It is part of an observed three-phase plan to fill the gap hetween currently-fielded tanks and the next Soviet tank. When we correctly assess that the reactive armor on the 7-648 and T-80 sup plements composite armor, we can finally understand this signilicant new threat lo NATO. The significance of this new threat is apparent in the concentrated effort that the armies in the West have initiated to counter it. New ATGMs like the German TRIGAT (two tandem HEAT warheads), the French HOT 3 (two tandem HEAT warheads, and the American TOW 2A (two tandem HEAT warheads), are all examples of this NATO effort. According to Jane's Defence Weekit?, "If the Soviets are fitting reactive armor to tanks already fitted with laminate (composite) armor, then they could well have complete protection against ATGMs on which NATO relies for much of its antitank defensive capa-bilit."' The Soviets have succeeded in rapidly fielding a stopgap improved armor system that will allow them the time they need to develop and field their own version of Chobham-type armor. We must fully understand this success and counter it hefore NATO tank commanders start their fire commands. Reactive armor is indeed new life for Soviet tanks. Captain James M. Warford was commissioned in Armor in 1979 as a dis- t ing uis hed military graduate from the University of Santa Clara, California. He has served as a tank platoon leader, support platoon leader, and has commanded A/2- 66th Armor Regiment (COHORT). He is currently the commander of HHC/2-66th Armor Regiment, 2d Armored Division (FORWARD). Notes 'Simpkin, Richard, "From Array to Disarray7 Tactical Aspects of Active and Reactive Armors," Technoloav, April 1986, p. 20. '"Blazer Add-on Reactive Armour," International Defense Review, vol. 16, no. 11, 1983, p. 1534. 3Simpkln, Richard, "From Array to Disarray? Tactical Aspects of Active and Reactive Armors," Military Technoloav, April 1986, p. 20. %arford, Captain James M., "T-64, IT-122, and IT-130: The Soviet Advantage," ARMOR, September-October, 1985, p. 41. 5aoga, Steven J., "Soviet Reactive Tank Armour Update," Jane's Defence Weeklv. May

23. 1987, p. 1011. 'Secretary of Defense, Soviet Militarv Power, US. Department of Defense, April 1986, p. 67. '"Horseshoe Armour! Wed to Soviet Tanks," Jane's Defence Weekiv, January 10, 1987, p. 18. '"The T-80 Tank Unveiled," Jane's Defence Weeklv, May 3, 1986, p. 804. 'Zaloga, Steven J., "Soviet Reactive Tank Armor Update," Jane's Defence Weeklv, May 23, 1987, p. 1011. "lbid.. 1014. '' lbid, ''lbid. '3Russell, Simon O., "Soviets to Deploy T-64 Reactive Armour," Jane's Defence Weeklv, May 17, 1986, p. 863. ARMOR - 11