T-80: The Soviet Solution The Tank's Missile System Is Aimed at NATO's ATGM Vehicles, Not Tanks

The first battles had been fought four days ago. Now, on the 8th of July, Team Alfa is set up in defensive positions on BP Eagle, overlooking Engagement Area One. Captain Wilson was pleased with his battle position and his team$ sectors of fire. He felt lucky that BP Eagle was one of the few in TF2-10 AR's area that provided long and clear shots into one of the designated kill zones. Captain Wilson had just called his platoon leaders togo over theplan for tomorrow's attack, when he heard aloud explosion. The call on the radio confirmed that one of his attached M901 ITVs had been hit and destroyed. Suddenly, there were two more explosions - and two destroyed M2 Bradleys. The Bradleys had pulled out of their hide positions to try to find out what had killed the ITV. The team's two tank platoon leaders called in spot reports that identified enemy tanks approaching rapidly from the east. As the number of enemy vehicles increased and closed to within range, the M1 tanks opened fire. The team's remaining ITVs and Bradleys had already started firing into E A One, but with limited success. As Captain Wilson realized that some of the enemy tanks were opening fire from beyond their normal maximum effective range, he got the last spot report from his mech platoon leader: the third Bradley had been lost. For some reason, it appeared that the long-range fire of the enemy tanks was being concentrated on Team Alfa$ Bradleys and ITVs... The Soviet Army's preoccupation with NATO's antitank guided missile (ATGM) development and deployment is well-known and well-founded. This is not only because of along-standing interest in modern antitank weapons - an interest the Soviets have had since the 1940s - but more specifically, they have closely watched the increasing capabilities of high explosive antitank (HEAT), or hollow-charge, warheads. These HEAT warheads, attached to a missile or rocket, could destroy almost any tank. While this technology was developed during WW 11, it did not come into its own until much later. The Soviets have been partially successful in dealing with this threat, but their concern over HEAT-armed weapons remains a priority. It was this concern, combined with their development of the Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) concept, that caused the Soviets to develop and field tailor-made weapons systems. In the area of tank development, they specifically needed to field a system capable of performing as the cutting edge of the OMG tactical concept. With the T-80, this requirement has apparently been satisfied. Background Before the capabilities and characteristics of the T-80 main battle tank can be discussed, the tank's evolution and relationship to its predecessors should be examined. Ever since the fielding of the T-34/85 medium tank in 1944, Soviet tank designs have been a series of successive steps on the same ladder. The first tank in this series - a tank used in combat in some countries as late as the 1970s - started an evolutionary design process that created several other new tank designs and established a consistent theory for Soviet design bureaus. This pattern was unbroken from 1944 until the mid-60s. All of the tanks fielded during this period, with the exception of the T-44, were produced in large numbers and went through a constant series of changes and modifications. The base models, and their years of introduction, are listed here: T-34/85.....................1944 T-44.........................1945 T-54.........................1949 T-55.........................1958 T-62........................ 1961' It was not until work started on the T-62 MBT that a problem was ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 31 encountered. The responsible design bureau had developed anew hull for the new tank, but design problems “prevented it from being ready for the introduction date set for the T-62.”2 The result was that a slightly modified “-54155 hull was used. Work apparently continued on the new hull design while the T-62 was produced and supplied to most Soviet client states. (An interesting point about the development of the T-62 is that very few are used by the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact member countries, and as a result, most of them ended up in the Middle East.) W a s T-70 the T-64 Test Bed? It did not take the Soviets long to correct the problems in the new hull design, because “prior to the first public appearance of the T-62 in 1965, anew Soviet tank - designated the M1970 or T-70, was identified by Western intelligence sources.’’ Several sources also identified another tank, seen prior to the T-70, designated the T-67. This vehicle, which was used for tests only, “consisted of a T-62 on the T-64 (T-70) chasis.” The tests were apparently unsuccessful and the T-67 disappeared from view. The T-70, however, was a completely different story. That tank has clearly been associated with the start of the T-64 MBT program and has appeared in several unclassified books and periodicals. The limited information that has been released suggests that the T-70 was the prototype of the T-64, and as such, would be the key vehicle in the “detour” that was about to change Soviet tank design theory. According to various sources, the T-70 prototype was produced in very small numbers during the early 1960s. The tank mounted the T-62’s 115-mm main gun, but carried it in anew turret that was mated to the new hull mentioned earlier. There is still some confusion and disagreement concerning the T-70, including a discussion in past pages of ARMOR. The unresolved question has to do with both the T-70 and the follow-an production model of the tank, which has since become known as the “-64. The earlier of the two tanks was identified years prior to 1967, the year that several sources claim to be the debut year for the T-64. There are other sources, however, that report the start of T-64 production as early as 1964 or 1965. Based on confirmed sightings of the T-70 prototype prior to 1965, the latter is the more likely of the two possibilities. The appearance of the T-70 prior to the T-64 going into production may also explain why the initial intelligence reports of the T-64 mislabeled the tank as a failure. The reports concentrated mostly on the tank‘s automotive performance, but also went as far as to say that the automatic loading system sometimes “ate” Soviet tankers, and that “few gunners are excited about the prospect of having their arm fed into the breech of the cannon...”5 More recent information, however, when combined with the timetable above, indicates that these early assessments were exaggerated and may not have been references to the T-64 at all. The most likely answer is that these well-publicized problems were related to the T-70 prototype, and that the majority of these problems had been solved by the time the T-64 was put into production. What took the Western intelligence community several years to realize has now been confirmed: by detouring from established procedures, the Soviets were able to field a truly innovative tank that had no real counterpart in the West. The T-64, eventually identified as the best or current main battle tank in the Soviet Army, allowed the Soviets to realize what they had wanted from the beginning. They now had a true main battle tank capable of both operating on the modern battlefield against the huge number of NATO ATGMs and - as required - assume the role of the heavy tank. As a result, the coveted but obsolete heavy tanks could be retired from front-line service. The performance capabilities of the T-64 were the key characteristics the Soviets would carry forward into the next Soviet tank (NST). The firepower of the T-64 is well known and consists of the Rapira 3 125-mm main gun. The capabilities of the standard gun have been widely discussed elsewhere, so more specifics are not required here. But suffice to say that this new gun allowed the Soviets the room they needed to take the firepower of the T-64 a step further with anew capability to be discussed a bit later on. The mobility requirements of the modern battlefield were met by equipping the T-64 with an unconventional engine, a flat 5-cylinder design with horizontally opposed pistons.6 This 750-hp engine provides the 38-ton T-64 with a crosscountry speed high enough to accompany the BMP-1 and BMP-2 IFVs. It may have been this drastic improvement inmobility that sealed the fate of the slow-moving Soviet heavy tanks. It is interesting to note here that one of the features that tie the T-80 to its immediate predecessor, the T-64, is the location of the tank’s exhaust system. The T-64 and the T-80 are the only two tanks built since the T-34/85 that emit their engine exhaust from the rear of the engine compartment. Perhaps the most discussed - and to the Soviets, the most important - aspect of the T-64 is the tank’s frontal armor protection. The possible configurations and designs of this armor have been the subject of heated discussion for several years. While it is known that the Soviets have been working on composite steel-ceramic laminate armor as long ago as 1940, the exact design that reached the field with the T-64 is difficult to second-guess. Some sources have chosen to overcome this difficulty by concluding that the Soviets have not used an advanced armor design at all. One factor that these sources cite is the retention of the cast (apparently) all-steel turret. But as previously discussed in the pages of ARMOR, the employment of a cast turret does not in any way rule out the use of composite armor. It is possible, however, that the Soviets decided not to use advanced armor and simply continued with the cast steel turrets in use since the T-34. This theory, if true, would mean that the Soviets chose to ignore one of their own tank design priorities, the ability to survive hits by modern HEAT-armed antitank weapons. A much more likely theory is that the “-64 employs an effective design of advanced armor for both the glacis plate and the turret front. This composite armor is probably a modem development of the early Soviet (and American) designs pri- 32 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare

The actual T-80 design proved to be more co nventional than an artist’s M1 -like sketch..., marily intended to defeat tne HEAT-armed weapons of their day. Several sources, including International Defense Review, agree that the latter theory is probably correct. According to Soviet Military Power 1986 the latest models of Soviet main battle tanks (to include the T-64) are fitted with “improved armor incorporating laminates and omposites.” Perhaps the best indicator of the defensive capabilities of the T-64’s frontal armor is the massive effort that has been taken by NATO countries to develop new and effective ways to defeat it. The success of this effort is questionable, however, since the newest Western antitank weapons are being designed specifically for top attack, thus avoiding the frontal armor of the tank altogether. A final word about the armor protection of the T-64 concerns the Soviet use of reactive armor. Intelligence sources have confirmed that T-64s are being fitted with add-on reactive armor plates, an armor that appears similar to the Israeli Blazer reactive armor used successfully in Lebanon in 1982. “If the Soviets are fitting reactive armor to tanks already fitted with laminate armor, then they could well have complete protection against most of the antitank guided weapons on which NATO relies so heavily for much of its antitank defensive capability.”8 Identification Problems Develop. When Western intelligence sources were suddenly faced with two new Soviet tanks, upon the appearance of the T-72 in 1977, the problem of correct vehicle designations became a heated issue. The problem continued to be even more of an issue with the appearance of the The NATO armies had been anticipating a still newer tank after the T-64 came on the scene. Defense sources began to talk about the next Soviet Tank (NST), called the T-80, in the mid-’7Os. According to one source, a tank called the T-80 was undergoing troop trials in 1977.9 Information about this tank became available and NATO anxiously awaited the release of a picture of the new tank. In 1977, the T-72 was shown on parade and was subsequently exported, so the T-72 was clearly not the T-80. Speculation on this elusive tank continued, speculation made more complex by anew flow of information pointing to a Soviet tank with a large, boxlike turret. This data seemed to indicate that the new tank would incorporate some form of Chobham armor in its turret. Soviet Military Power published an artist’s impression of this tank, an M1 Abrams lookalike, in 1981, but some sources decided - based on recently released information - that the Abrams-like tank never really existed. This judgment may well prove to be incorrect, but only time will tell. The T-80 designation problem continued with the publication of the next two editions of Soviet Military Power, in 1983 and 1984. The square-turreted vehicle was gone. The tank labeled earlier as the T-80 T-80. was now shown as a modified T-72, called the T-72M1 by the Soviets.lo In spite of the appearance of the T-72M1, the designation of T-80 was still being heard. The confusion was finally put to rest with the publication of Soviet Military Power, 1986 and the release of a few actual photographs of the long-awaited T-80. The tank is very real. Family Resemblances As mentioned above, the direct predecessor of the T-80 was the T-64. If the few pictures that have been released are examined, the relationship between the two tanks is clearly more than coincidence. In fact, the only recognition features of the T-80 that are not on the T-64 are the T-80’s T-72-style, rubber-rimmed roadwheels and the right-hand-side mounting of the primary IR searchlight on the turret. Beyond these two exceptions, the family resemblance is so strong that some sources have described the T-80 as a “modernized version of the T-64 tank.”” As is true with any Soviet weapon system, detailed information concerning the T-80 is very scarce. In spite of this, using some of the details recently made available, an assessment of the tank can still be made. The firepower of the T-80 is probably the single most discussed characteristic of the tank. Based on unclassified information from several sources, the main armament carried by the T-80 has been confirmed to be a combination gun/ missile launcher designed from the ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 33 standard 2A46 Rapira 3 125-mm cannon. This is not only the most controversial feature of the tank, but also the most criticized, in light of the various unsuccessful American attempts at the same type of tank armament. These American missile-firing tank programs, begun in 1961, included five vehicle designs and resulted in one vehicle being fielded in 1974. The most interesting of the designs that were not fielded were the MBT70/KPZ70 and the XM803, test bed tanks that incorporated several new technologies. The most important innovation was the 152-mm cannon/missile launcher, which differed from the short-barrelled gun/launcher on the fielded M60A2; the gun/ launcher on the MBT70 and XM803 was capable of firing a high-velocity 152-mm APFSDS-T round in addition to the HEAT-armed Shillelagh missile. This may have led the Soviets to develop a similar dual-capability main gun. How the AT-8 Kobra Fits In The wisdom - or lack of it - concerning this choice of main armament has been heavily criticized by Western defense sources who contend that the days of the gudmissile launcher are past. The reason for this, cited by these sources, is the advent of Chobham-type and reactive armors which can negate the missile’s shapedcharge warhead. These sources go on to say that this limitation has already been noted by the Soviets and points to the fact that the Soviets have already begun to add top armor to the T72M1 in realization that a newer era of top-attack weapons has begun. Finally, the small diameter of the HEAT warhead that such a missile would carry (because it must be fired through the 125-mm gun tube) would have little or no effect on the advanced frontal armor of NATO’s newest MBTs. According to one source, “The combination of gun/missile-capable main armament would present more drawbacks than assets, even if the ammunition fired were of an advanced type and using laser guidance to achieve superior effect.”lZ While it is true that the unclassified press has published several pictures of the T72M1 fitted with “non-metallic” add-on armor bolted to the turret and hull (above the American Missile-Firing Tank Programs

T95(tunet only)’ 1961 3 turrets Not fielded

1963-1 970 unknown Not fielded M60A2 1964-1 971 526-540 Fielded in 1974; later withdrawn from service Chrysler K-Tank 1968 mock-ups Not fielded; had promise XM803 1970-1 971 unknown Not fielded ‘Mated to M48 hulls for tests only. *Years the M60A2 was in production. From PATTON. A History of the American Main Battle Tank by R. P. Hunnicut. (1 973-1 975)’ driver’s position), and the West is developing anew series of top-attack weapons, there is no reason to associate these developments with the 125-mm gun/missile launcher. The sources mentioned above have failed to bring out the most likely reason the Soviets have opted for such a combined system. The AT-8 “Kobra” antitank missile fired by the T-80 is not intended to kill modern NATO tanks from the front. It is, more likely, designed and employed to destroy the numerous ATGM delivery vehicles deployed by NATO. While there is a secondary capability to engage tanks like the M1 Abrams and the Leopard I1 from the flank or rear, the missile’s primary targets are the M2 IFV, the M901 ITV, and the Jaguar I and 11. These targets are not only much more within the destructive capabilities of a 125-mm HEAT-armed missile, but are also of the utmost concern to the Soviets. The elimination of vehicles like the ITV and Jaguar from a distance beyond the maximum effective range of concurrently deployed NATO tanks, may be just the capability the Soviets have been waiting for. Two final points about the AT-8 “Kobra” concern the missile’s guidance system and the T-64. Several sources have linked the T-80 with a laser-guided missile. The missile guidance system is reportedly housed in an armored box or cover on the right side of the turret, in front of the commander’s cupola. One source went so far as to suggest that the T-80 could use its laser to designate for helicopter-launched ATGMs. While it is possible that the AT-8 is laser-guided. it is more likely that the missile is radio-frequency guided. This is not only a less sophisticated system, but would require less training and support, since the Saviets have been fielding the radio-frequency-guided AT-2 Swatter and AT-6 Spiral for some time. Finally, it should be mentioned that the T-80 is not the only missile-firing tank the Soviets are currently fielding. The earlier tank is designated T- 64B, and “has been in service with the Soviet Army for many years..”l3 This tank, the latest variant of the T-64, has many of the same capabilities as the T-80. One theory about the T-64B carries the strong family relationship between the T- 64 and the T-80 one step further: this theory brings out the possibility that the T-80 could be a combination of anew hull and suspension system, mated to the turret of the T-64B. While this conclusion is possible, more information will have to be released before it can be confirmed. Engine and Armor Compared to the amount of discussion about the T-80’s main armament, very little has been released about the tank’s engine. Several sources have confirmed that the tank is powered by a turbine engine rated at approximately 900-980 hp, which gives “a power-to-weight ratio of 3:l tons/horsepower, superior to that of the T-72.”14 This would imply a weight of about 45 tons for the T-80. Although the T-80 is the first Soviet tank to be fielded with a turbine engine, the Soviets have been interested in these engines for some time. According to one source, the Soviets “had tested - 34 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare

The MBT-70. a joint U. S.-German testbed project, pioneered use of a fin-stabilized kineticenergy round in a gun-launcher system. The gun also fired HEAT rounds and the Shillelagh missile. a turbine-Dowered tank in the late Finally, two conclusions can be 1960s and early 1970s, but it had proven a failure.”15 Even less information has been released concerning the T-80’s armor protection. The most significant known feature here is the use of the cast armor turret. The characteristic Soviet turret appears to have changed very little. Western intelligence sources must be careful, however, to give the tank the assessment it deserves. If the Soviets were capable of designing a composite armor turret for the T-64, as long ago as the tank was designed, it follows that they are capable of doing the same for the T-80. It can be safely stated that the T-80 is fitted with at least the same level of protection as the T-64. Even more likely, however, is that the Soviets have taken advantage of the most recent technological breakthroughs and have improved at least the tank’s frontal armor accordingly. If this proves to be the case, the T-80 can be expected to cause as much of an impact in the West as the T-64 did so many years ago. Footnotes ’Jenkins, D. H. C., “T-34 to T-80: The Evolution of Soviet Battle Tanks, plus IDRs T-62 Test Report,” International Defense Review, December 1981, p. 1652. 21bid., 1651. 3Warford, Captain James M., “T-64, IT-122 and IT-130: The Soviet Advantage,” ARMOR, September-October, 1985, p. 40. “ratzl, J., “T-64- Some Thoughts on the New Soviet Battle Tank,” International Defense Review, Vol. I X, No. l, 1976, p. 54. 5Burniece, Joseph R., and Hoven, Paul A., “Newest Soviet Armor: Super Tanksor Super Myth?!,” Eagle, April, 1986, p. 56. 6Warford, Captain, James M., “The T-95: A Gamble in High Risk Technology,” ARMOR, September-October 1983, p. 41. %ecretary of Defense, Soviet Military Pow drawn from the long-awaited, secretive appearance of the T-80 (and the first Moscow parade appearance of the earlier T-64). First, since very few photgraphs have been published - and all of these by Western sources - it is highly unlikely that the T-80 will be exported to any other country. This pattern has been well established ‘by the T-64. If the T-80 is someday exported, it will be only after another as-now unidentified new tank has replaced the T-80 as the current or best main battle tank in the Soviet Army. This status was confirmed by the sudden appearance of the T-64 in a parade through Red Square in Moscow on 7 May

1985. This was not only the first Moscow parade to feature the T-64, but also provided a first look at a previously unseen version of the tank. Sources have identified this tank as aversion of the T-64B that is “not fitted with the guidance equipment for the Kobra guided missile system.”16 Now that a T-64 has been photographed in Red er, U. S. Department of Defense, April, 1986, p. 67. 8Russell, Simon O., “Soviets to Deploy T-64 Reactive Armor,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 17,1986, p. 863. 9“T-80 Tank on Troop Trials in U. S. S. R.,” International Defense Review, Vol. X, No. 6, 1977. l0“The T-80 Tank Unveiled,” June’s Defense Weekly, May 3, 1986, p. 803. “Ibid. ‘ZEshel, David, “The T-80 Enigma,” Defense Update International, Number 71, p. 6. I3‘‘T-80 MBT with Laser-Guided Missile?,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 6,1985, p. 29. I4Eshel, David, “The T-80 Enigma,” Defense Update International Number 71, p. 6. 1S‘‘The T-80 Tank Unveiled,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 3, 1986, p. 804. ‘6Ibid. Square on parade, it can be expected that the T-64 will soon be seen in service with a Soviet ally. Conclusion The picture of amass of Soviet tanks rapidly approaching NATO defensive positions marked by knocked out and burning ATGM vehicles is a grim one. This prospect, as well as the new Soviet ability to engage NATO vehicles at beyond the NATO tanks’ maximum effective range is what now faces the armies of the West. The Soviets have a main battle tank that is based on the successful technology they fielded with the T- 64, as well as the acquired technology the U. S. Army pioneered with the combined gun/missile launcher. It is this new threat that the armies of the West must understand and counter prior to occupying BP Eagle. The T-80 has allowed the Soviets to finally solve the NATO ATGM problem that they feared for many years. With anew main battle tank that does not require the support of a heavy tank or tank destroyer (a feature that was carried over from the T-64B), plus the speed required to exploit a breakthrough into the enemy’s rear area, the Soviets finally have the tank they have been long awaiting. The T-80 is the Soviet solution.

FORD was commissioned in Armor in 1979 as a distinguished military graduate from the University of Santa Clara, CA. He has served as a tank platoon leader and support platoon leader in the 2d Armored Division. He is currently the commander of A/2-66th Armor Regiment (COHORT), 2d Armored Division (Forward). ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 35