What Infantrymen and Tankers Need to Know About Serving as Armored Cavalrymen

Preface As an armored cavalryman attending the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, I have found a general misunderstanding by my contemporaries of “things cavalry.” With only a two-hour block of instruction on missions found in FM 17-95(H), Cavalry Operations, with most of our tactical problems starting at the forward edge of the battle area, and with the changes in both our doctrine and Corps/Division 86 force structure, I can easily understand why this confusion exists. The purpose of this article is to try to explain the resultant changes to the cavalry unit force structure and to educate both the infantryman and pure tanker on the roles and function of cavalry. Combined arms leaders must think as cavalrymen. Introduction Three combat imperatives, found in the early chapters of FM 100-5, Operations, capture the essence of “things cavalry”: Direct friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses. Designate and sustain the main effort. Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly.’ It is through the understanding of these imperatives, and in the aggressive execution of armored cavalry missions, that armored cavalrymen earn their spurs. AirLand Battle doctrine emphasizes the concepts of Auftragstaktik,2 risk-taking, and the mamage of firepower with maneuver. These concepts further define “things cavalry.” Armored cavalrymen are weaned away from detailed operations orders and are quickly thrust into the vague and fast-paced world of combined arms operations. Mission-type orders come in the way of fragmentary orders and maybe a copy of the squadron’s overlay. Battle drills and standard operating procedures reduce the risk-taking somewhat at platoon or troop levels. Early on, the young armored cavalry officer learns to “deploy, report, and develop the situation.” Doctrinal changes, due to FM 100- 5’s adoption, and structural changes found in the Corps 86 and Division 86 force will result in non-cavalry units performing traditional cavalry missions. ARTEP 71-2 and FM 71-2 both need to includereconnais-sance and security missions to complement the missions of move, attack, and defend. A Very Short Cavalry History US Cavalry tradition was established by a Virginian, “Light Horse” Harry Lee, during the Revolutionary War.... His cavalry was used in what we now call an economy of force role, because of the numerical inferiority of the colonial troops to their opponents. Lee’s cavalry were masters of reconnaissance, delay, trap, and charge, operating both mounted and dismounted. Because of Lee’s skill, the expression “you never see a dead cavalryman” became common.3 Numerous books have been written on cavalry throughout the ages. There have been books on Napoleon’s cavalry, the Confederate cavalry, the Polish Lancers, and countless others. The purpose of this paper is not, however, to retell stories of saber charges and thrown horseshoes, but to discuss armored cavalry missions and their function. Major Robert W. Grow, a horse cavalryman who became a key figure in the mechanization of cavalry in the 19309, had this to say about his branch: One of the principal reasons for the success of some of the great armies of former times is again apparent. From one-sixth to one-fourth of their fighting strength was vested in highly mobile units.... (This) highly mobile fighting element of an army is its cavalry.... The application of (technology) to warfare has not altered missions, but its application to cavalry has materially assisted the latter to carry out its missions. We hear of “moto-mechanized‘’ divisions, “mobile“ divisions, the ”Panzer Corps,” etc. It seems to be the fashion of the times to apply a (new) name to these units. But have new missions been developed for them? Not at all. They are designed to carry out cavalry missions.... The skillful commander has hiscavalry in hand for its primary mission, to fight.4 Cavalry fights in many different Cavalry fulf i I Is three basic and closely related functions: reconnaissance, security, and economy of force. These traditional functions are inherent to warfare. They are valid on today’s (AirLand) battlefield and will still be valid on tomorrow‘s. Some force must fulfill them, and the force that does so is cavalry, whether called so or not.5 Throughout history there have been foot cavalry and mounted cavalry. WW I1 saw: ways, but primarily: Thirteen mechanized cavalrygroups, thirteen mechanized cavalry squadrons organic to the light armored divisions, two armored reconnaissance battalions belong tothe heavy armored divisions, one unattached mechanized reconnaissance squadron, and forty-two mechanized cavalry reconnaissance troops organic to the infantry divisions, a total of seventy-one units.0 But this proliferation was not true for all sides during the 1930s and 1940s. After the war, in perfect 20120 hindsight, BG Hawkins wrote in the Cavalry Journal that: The Germans failed to take Moscow in 1941 largely because they lacked 18 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfar- enough cavalry to protect the flanks of their spearheads against the attacks of the Russian cavalry. The subsequent German disasters... were due in large measure to the activities of the Russian tank-cavalryteamsandthe lackof German cavalry which might have neutralized their efforts.... It is not pleasant to contemplate what the Germans could have done if they had had a large force of cavalry available when they broke through our lines in the Belgium Bulge.' This is not to say that the proper or improper use of cavalry caused the outcome of WW 11. What did influence the outcome, at the end of both world wars, was the mechanization of land forces. The birth of armored cavalry resulted from a massive staff study. At the end of WW 11, a general board was created to study:... the strategy, tactics and administration employed by the United States forces in the European Theater.... Two of the studies are significant to the cavalry...., Study number 48, "The Organization, Equipment, and Tactical Employment of the Armored Division" and Study number 49, "The Tactics, Employment, Techniques, Organization, and Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry Units."The mechanized cavalry study was the genesis of modern cavalryorganizations. That is, until the

CAVALRY TROOP.

@ I I I m m

This troop is found in both divisional and regimental units equipped with older M6Oand M113familyvehicles. k Division 86 Cavalry Squadron came along........ Although originally intended for use in pure reconnaissance roles, "the (WW II) study classified (cavalry) missions into five categories - offensive combat, defensive combat, reconnaissance, security, and special arms."8 That reconnaissance was the least-assigned mission of all listed will be addressed later. The Seeds of Controversy Tracking the tables of organization and equipment from WW 11 until the present shows a steady growth from separate reconnaissance companies up to and including a corps armored cavalry regiment. Rather than reproduce these TO&Es, the diagrams below illustrate today's variations of the armored cavalry troop.

DIVISIONAL CAVALRY TROOP.

REGIMENTAL CAVALRY TROOP.

A. m 6

Note the loss of the main battle tanks (MBT). The C W stands for the M3 Bradley system. @I I "Heavy" cavalry found in the Corps 86 armored cavalry regiment (ACR). Squadron composed of three troops, a tank company, HHT. and a howitzer battery. ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 19

There are three ground squadrons in an ACR, as well as a combat aviation squadron, a support squadron, and five separate troops (one each of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC); engineers; air defense; combat electronic warfare and intelligence; and a regimental headquarters). Divisions find their cavalry squadrons within their organic air cavalry attack brigade

All this may seem a bit confusing. The key is to focus on ground cavalry assets and think about functional relationships or missions. In August 1980, the Army Chief of Staff approved the Division 86 cavalry squadron operational and organizational concept. This action: Deletes the missions of guard*and cover from the repertoire of the Division 86 cavalry squadron and includes the following: 0 Detailed ground/air reconnaissance within, and to the front, flanks, and rear of the division. Command and control liaison. Screening. 0 Internal surveillance to facilitate rear area protection (RAP) operations (rear area combat operations (RACO) and area damage control (ADC)). 0 Emplacement and monitoring of remote sensors. 0 NBC reconnaissance. El I I I I Of all missionsandtasks, itsprimary function is detailed ground and air reconnaissance within and to the front, flanks, and rear of the division.1° This action sparked considerable controversy among armored cavalrymen. One school of thought claims that the division will now rely on corps armored cavalry to carry out cover and guard missions. The counter-argument is that “the corps’s ACR will be used in fighting the corps commander’s fight, and this leaves the division to form its own economy forces.”11 The first group of armored cavalrymen fall into a “pure reconnaissance” school. The second group claim “security and economy of force.” as the chief cavalry functions. Reconnaissance Is Everyone’s Job It is here that I must side with school number two. I choose this approach because “reconnaissance Selected Bibliography Field Manuals FM 2-15 Cavalry, 8 Apr 41. FM 17-22 Reconnaissance Platoon & Com-FM 17-36: Employment of Tanks with Zn-FM 17-36: Armored Cavalry, 1961. FM 17-36 Armored Cavalry, 1965. FM 17-36: Armored Cavalry. 1968. FM 17-36: Armored Cavalry, 1973. FM 17-47: Air Cavalry Combat Brigade, FM 1750 Attack Helicopter Operations, FM 17-50-1: Attack Helicopter Team Hand-FM 17-50-2 Crew Drills for Aeroscout and FM 17-95(H): Cavalry Operations, Draft, FM 17-95-1: Air Cavalry Platoon Hand-FM 17-98 (Test): The Army 86 Scout Pla-FM 71-W: Tank & Mech Znf Bn TF (Draft). FM 90-14: Rear Battle, June 85. FM 100-5: Operations, Aug 82. ARTEP 17-55 Cavalry ARTEP 71-2: Mech InfantryITank TF NR. 7R - Infantry Division, 23 Feb 55. NR. 7C - Infantry Division, 23 Aug 56. pany, 1950. fantry, 1944. Aug 82. May 84. book, May 83. Attack Helicopters, Feb 84. 1982. book, Oct 83. toon, July 83. Army Training and Evaluation Programs Tables of Organization and Equipment NR. 7D - Infantry Division, 1 Feb 60. NR. 7E -Infantry Division, 15 July 63. NR. 7G - Infantry Division, 31 March 66. NR. 17R - Armored Division, 10 March NR. 17D -Armored Division, 1 May 1960. NR. 17E -Armored Division, 15 July 1963. NR. 17G - Armored Division, 31 March NR. 1765R - Armored Cavalry, Reconnais-NR. 17-87T - Armored Cavalry, Company, NR. 17-55D -Armored Cavalry, Squadron, NR. 17-553 - Armored Cavalry, Squadron, 1955. 1966. sance Battalion, 10 Mar 55. Infantry Division, 20 Dec 56. AC Regiment, 1 March 60. AC Regiment, 2 June 65. Periodicals Bigelman, Major Paul A. “Force Designs for the Future.” Army, June 81. Bush, Major Robert P. “The Division Commander’s Eyes and Ears.” Armor, SepOct.83. Coroalles, Captain Anthony M. “Maneuver to Win: A Realistic Alternative.” Military Review, Sep 81. Depuy, GEN William E. “Technology and Tactics in Defense of Europe.’’ Army, April 79. Dials, Major Thomas A. “Economy of Force - the Cavalry Connection.” Armor, Jul-Aug 83. Gerhardt, LTC Igor D., “Risk: The Commander’s Decision.” Military Review, Aug80. Hawkins, BG. “General Hawkins’ Notes: The Germans Had No Cavalry.” The Cavalry Journal. Vol. LIV. No. 4.1945. Hollis, LTC James B., “Screen. Cover, Guard: What’s the Difference?’ Military Review, July 83. Luttwak, Edward N. “The American Style of Warfare and the Military Balance.” Air Force Magazine, August 1979. All That.” Military Review, Aug 80. Wagner, Col Robert E. “Active Defenseand Other Sources Baker, LTC Ronald L. “What In the Hell Did They Do to the CAV?” US. Army War College Military Studies Program. 28 Apr 83. Balck, Hermann and A. D. F. W. von Mellenthin. “On Tactics: Implications for NATO Military Doctrine.” Published by the BDM Corporation under contract by theDirectorof Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 19 Dec 80. Battreall, Col R. R. “Cavalry Roles and Missions.” U. S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 31 July 79. Beamish, North Ludlow. Cavalry Zn War. London: T. & W. Boone, 1855. vonBernhardi, LTG Frederick. Cavalry Zn Future Wars. London: John Murray, 1909. Fuller, MG J. F. C. Armament and History. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1945. Fuller, MG J. F. C. Machine Warfare. Washington, D. C.: The Infantry Journal, 1943. Orgorkiewicz, R. M. Armoured Forces. New York: ARC0 Publishing Company, 1970. Rommel, Erwin. The Rommel Papers. Edited by B. H. Liddell Hart. New York, DaCapc Press, 1953. 20 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile W a r f a r p J a n u a r y - F e b r u a r y 1987

.is an integral part of all missions”l2 for all branches. Reconnaissance does not belong solely to cavalry units. The difference between the outlook of each group of cavalry follows in that:... Scout ptatoons perform reconnaissance bystealth in order to survive, but cavalry platoons are organized to fight for intelligence. The fight for intelligence is violent, offensive in nature, and highly fluid. It requires high tactical mobility, aggressive maneuver, and sustained, all-weather combat power. Only one weapons system so dominates the battlefield as to provide the edge needed to win the intelligence fight: the main battle tank.l3 Restated by another author: It is of limited interest to the force commander to know where the enemy’s first line of security outposts is located. (The commander) is more interested in where the main body is, how it isdisposed. and what it isdoing. To penetrate enemy security and gain this information (called ”developing thesituation”) thecavalry must be able to fight.14 This means fight - using tanks and scouts together as a team. Generally speaking, reconnaissance historically makes up but 10 percent of the various missions assigned to cavalry units.15 Attack, defend, guard, cover, screen, pursuit, protect, exploit, fillling gaps, constituting a mobile reserve for other forces, and providing liaison between larger units account for the other 90 percent.16 The question becomes: Can the aviation assets found in the division commander’s “fourth brigade” - the ACAB - take the place of the main battle tank? The answer is no. Scout and attack helicopters are neither all-weather capable, nor can they hold terrain. Until technology permits all-weather flying, the division commander is forced to supplement his ground cavalry with line infantry and/or armor. The Main Point The contributions of armored... cavalry to modern combat are: Reconnaissance to enable the commander to “see the battlefield“ in clearer detail than hissensorscan yetachieveandto develop the situation to react to the resultant intelligence over abroad front without diverting other combat forces from their primary missions; Security to ensure the main body against surprise and interference in either offense or defense, again without diverting other fighting units from their tasks; and economy of force as the division and corps commander’s “fire brigade“ to cover gaps, secure risk areas, seize opportunities, and respond to sudden threats, all without distracting other units from their roles at the critical point.” Armored cavalry serves this purpose by allowing for the three combat imperatives mentioned in the introduction to be realized. Infantry and armor units will no doubt be called upon to either work with divisional cavalry or to serve as cavalry in an economy of force mission. There are inherent limitations to employing infantry and armor battalions in an economy of force role. Training will be necessarv to OD-Footnotes ‘FM 100-5, Operations. 2OAugust 82, pp. 2-8 2“Autbugstaktik is the theory and practice and training in the use of mission-typeorders, in order to amplify the advantages which flow from the full exploitation of the battlefield initiative of the German officer and soldier.” Generals Balck and von Mellenthin on Tactics: Implications for NATO Military Doctrine. 19 December 80, p. L5-11-21, as published by the BDM Corporation under contract by the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense. 3Rozelle, LTC H. Joseph. The Armored and Mechanized Division Armored Cavalry Squadron. CGSC masters thesis. 10 June 77.

p. 12. ‘Grow, Major Robert W. As quoted by LTC

H. Joseph Rozelle, Zbid.. pp. 17-18. 5Battreall. Col R. R. “Cavalrv Roles and - 2-9. Missions.” U. S. Army Armor kenter, Fort &ox, Kentucky. 31 July 79, p. 3. 6Baker, LTC Ronald L. “What In the Hell Did They Do to the CAW” U. S. Army War College Military Studies Program. 28 April

83. DD. 67. ‘Hawkins, BG. “General Hawkins’ Notes: The Germans Had No Cavalry.” The Cavalry Journal (Vol. LIV, No. 4,1945). pp. 42-43. *Baker, op. cit., pp. 3, 7. ’+‘Division 8 6 Final Report.” U. S. Army Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Oct 81. (Organizational chart extracted from this report.) ‘OBush, Major Robert P. ‘The Division Commander’s Eyes and Ears,” Armor, S e p Oct 83, p. 13. ”Dials, Major Thomas A. “Economy of Force - the Cavalry Connection,” Armor, Jul-Aug 83, p. 45. “Baker, op. cat., p. 17. 13Dlals, op. cit., p. 45. “Battreall, op. cit., p. 5. IsBaker, op. cit., paraphrase of statistical analysis of cavalry mission performed during ww 11. *6FM 2-15, Cauulry, paraphrase from 8 April 41 issue, Chapter 1, paragraph 4. ’‘Battreall, op. cit.. p. 8. W.ommel, Field Marshal Erwin. The Rom-me1 Papers, edited by B. H. Liddell Hart. DaCapo Press, New York, 1953. p. 204. erate over extended distances. Task organizing into LP/OPs, and mobile reaction forces will have to be practiced. Enemy identification skills and reporting procedures will need more frequent drilling. Auf-tragstalttik must become the natural way of doing business as units are required to operate with less guidance than they may otherwise be used to. Summary “....the modern army commander... must be in a position continually to adapt his ideas of warfare to the facts and possibilities of the moment. If circumstances (or missions)require it, he must be able to turn the whole structure of his thinking inside out.”18 - Field Marshal Erwin Rommel In this paper, I have briefly covered the history and organization of the present armored cavalry. I have tried to capture a little of the spirit, or modus operandi, of the cavalry. In addressing the few ground cavalry units, I have suggested that infantry and armor may have to assume the role of cavalry. In short, I have written of “things cavalry” in an attempt to share its elan, aggressiveness, and will-to-fight.

was commissioned from West Point in 1979 and has served in the 1 l t h ACR as a tank platoon leader and cavalry platoon leader. He was the Black Horse modernization and development officer and served as M Company commander. He is a graduate of the AOBC, Advanced Infantry Officer Course, Airborne and Ranger schools. He is presently assigned to the Materials Technology Laboratory, Watertown, MA, where he is working on advanced materials applications in armor vehicles.. _ - ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 21