Cavalry in the AirLand Battle

I 1 Mention the word cavalry around any group of combined-arms fighters today and it conjures up an image like this or something less complimentary. If you asked this same group what the role of cavalry is in our doctrine of AirLand Battle, you’d get a variety of opinions. Some would say that cavalry performs reconnaissance and screening tasks for units to which assigned or attached. Others would say it does that and additional security tasks, guard and cover, plus defend, delay, and attack in an economy-of-force role. Moreover, even if our combined arms wamors did agree on the missions, few will agree as to the organizations required to accomplish those battlefield tasks. But one thing is certain. There will be no concensus on cavalry roles, missions, or structure. And that’s not good because it means we don’t have a doctrine - a shared understanding - of what cavalry is organized and equipped to do for the combined arms team, nor of the concepts for its employment at the operational and tactical levels of war. This article is the first of a series of threeintended to describe the fundamental role of cavalry in AirLand Battle and to articulate doctrine for the employment of cavalry, both ground and air, in the corps and division. The Fundamental Role of Cavalry In addition to reviving an awareness of the Principles of War and restoring an offensive spirit to the character of our Army, AirLand Battle Doctrine has embraced a couple of combat fundamentals about fighting and winning. First, the force which seizes and sustains the initiative, and exercises it aggressively to defeat the enemy, will win. Second, decisive combat power concentrated at the right time and place will decide the outcome of battle. Maneuver - fast, continual, and synchronized with other elements of the combined arms team -is the essence of our doctrine. Our intent is continually to keep our enemy off balance by delivering a series of blows from unexpected directions - the essence of maneuver warfare. From these tenets of our doctrine stem the requirements for cavalry. Cavalry serves as a “I have travelled a heap of late, and had occasion to retire into some very sequestered regions, but nary hill or holler, nary mountain gorge or inaccessible ravine, have I found but what the cavalry has been there, and ‘just left.’ And that is the reason they can’t be whipped, for they always ‘just left,’ and took a horse or two with ’em.” -Bill Arp Confederate Humorist catalyst to translate those doctrinal tenets into battlefield capabilities. Cavalry, by providing current combat information, facilitates a commander’s ability to seize and sustain the initiative and concentrate overwhelming combat power against the enemy at the decisive place and time. Provide Current Combat Information “he ability of a commander to seize and sustain the initiative and concentrate superior combat power at the right time and place is predicated on having fresh information about the enemy - his exact disposition, size, composition, direction of movement, and rate of advance. A commander must also have current information about terrain features and trafficability within his area of operations. These factors, more than any other, influence his ability to maneuver ground forces to the point of decision. Commanders court disaster without this kind of combat information. It is not easy to acquire. To piece the puzzle together, corps and division commanders have a variety of sources of intelligence at their disposal - military intelligence organizations, long-range surveillance units, artillery target acquisition systems, air defense warning systems, Air Force and Army air reconnaissance/surveillance systems and national technical means. Collection efforts are focused well forward of the FLOT in an attempt to predict most probable enemy responses to our initiatives. These predictions must be projected ahead far enough in time to be consistent with the time necessary to plan and execute corps and division operations. This intelligence information is used primarily to support planning of further operations. It serves as a basis to dispose and concentrate forces to achieve operational objectives. While this type of intelligence information is necessary for success, it is not sufficient. The commander needs fresh combat information during execution to be precise in his maneuvers. Precise application of combat power is predicated on having current information about the enemy and terrain. A commander’s cavalry unit remains his primary source of fresh information that he can use for the rapid execution of maneuvers and fire support in response to the immediate combat situation. Performing reconnaissance, cavalry tells a commander what he needs to know to fight - the actual size and composition of the enemy, his exact disposition, where he’s strong, where he’s weak, and where the application of superior combat power could have a decisive effect. Cavalry shows a commander how to move his ground forces to objectives despite conditions on the battlefield which conspire to defeat him - battlefield debris, impassable routes, blown bridges, unfordable streams and rivers, contaminated areas, refugee columns, converging friendly forces - and enemy. Preserve Combat Power Cavalry also performs missions which protect and preserve the combat power of divisions and corps until commanders determine where forces need to be concentrated and until forces can be maneuvered into engagements with the enemy. When fighting a bigger, echeloned, enemy, sustainment and preservation of combat power is critical. Just winning the current battle isn’t good enough. We must minimize losses. In defensive operations, cavalry provides early warning of enemy approach and counters enemy ground reconnaissance ven- 22 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare

COPYRIGHT 1985 by Robert Torsrud tures, effectively screening its parent unit from enemy observation. Operating at a distance from the main body, cavalry develops the situation, preventing its parent unit from fighting at a disadvantage - unwarned, poorly deployed, not poised to fight. In the process, cavalry affords the commander an opportunity to seize the initiative. In offensive operations, well in advance of its parent unit, cavalry prevents the premature deployment and attrition of its parent unit until it reaches its objective, due to the influences of terrain or enemy forces. Time and Space Corps and division commanders need time and space to exploit local tactical success into operational victories - time to solve the puzzle, decide what to do about it, and concentrate superior combat power at the point of decision and space to maneuver large ground forces, retain flexibility, and absorb the momentum of the enemy’s operations. Performing reconnaissance and security missions at considerable distances from its parent unit, cavalry provides commanders time and knowledge of available space for effective synchronization of maneuvers, supporting fires, and logistical support. Economy of Force We are fighting a bigger opponent. Outnumbered in the macro, we must be decisively stronger in the micro at the critical point. The only way to do this is to accept risk. This is fundamental to our doctrine. There will always be a need for economy of force by somebody, maybe cavalry. Organized as a combined arms team, cavalry provides a commander an economy-of-force option to free other combat maneuver units for employment elsewhere within the area of operations. Restoration of Command and Control On a battlefield that’s fluid and chaotic, with communications frequently lost or jammed, command and control within corps and divisions is fragile. Loss of communications with subordinate units, gaps, and dead spaces within the area of operations are conditions very likely to occur. Cavalry is particularly suited to meet this battlefield challenge. Performing reconnaissance, cavalry finds and re-tablishes physical contact and communications with subordinate units, fills dead spaces to restore the continuity of defensive operations, and fills gaps to prevent exploitation by the enemy if detected. Disruption of Operational Plans There is a decisive benefit to disrupting the operational plan of the enemy. The Soviets are rational players who construct top-down scientifically-based, highly-detailed plans. Any disruption in the execution of their plan will break the tempo of their operation and provide an opportunity for us to ‘seize the initiative. Deception at tactical and operational levels is a key element of the disruption effort. Cavalry is a central player in deception operations. Cavalry can portray a false combat operation to deceive the enemy and his target acquisition systems or create the signature of a much larger unit. In its counter-reconnaissance role, cavalry can deny the enemy accurate combat information about our tactical and operational intentions. Cavalry Today Several of the roles and missions which cavalry performs today are traditional. Others have evolved to satisfy the requirements of our operational concepts and AirLand Battle doctrine. Others have evolved in response to changes in our enemy’s doctrine and operational art. Cavalry is a versatile, combined-arms maneuver force which increases a commander’s options. It facilitates his ability to seize or sustain the initiative, achieve depth, retain agility, and synchronize maneuvers, supporting fires, and logistical support. Cavalry facilitates the commander’s ability to preserve, and then concentrate, overwhelming combat power with precision where it will decide the battle or campaign. We have set the stage for a more detailed discussion of cavalry operations by establishing the doctrinal framework. The roles, missions, and organization of cavalry at corps level - namely the armored cavalry regiment - will be examined in the next article. Scouts out! This article, which reflects current doctrine, was prepared by the Cavalry Branch, Command and Staff Department of the Armor School. The article was written by Major John D. Rosenberger and Colonel Thomas E. White of the Combined Arms Center. ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 23