An Introduction to the NTC

To most of you, it’s known as the National Training Center - the NTC. To me, and to many others who served there, it was “home” for nearly three years. But for all of us, the NTC offers the finest maneuver and live-fire area in the world. In this article, I want to give those of you who have not been to the NTC a look at what you can expect. For the many of you who have fought on that battlefield, this article will serve as - I hope - a confirmation of what you experienced and as a sort of lessons-learned packet to improve your training experience when you return. What is the NTC? Located in the high desert north of Los Angeles, California, the NTC is approximately 1,000 square miles of open terrain, broken up by granite and lava mountains and hills. There are about half a dozen dry lake beds that gather water during the winter but then dry to a hard clay during the summer. That summer is nearly nine months long. Newcomers to this land find the fluctuating temperature the most difficult adjustment to make. While it is common knowledge that the daytime temperature is usually above 100 degrees, few people realize that the temperature at night often drops 40 to 50 degrees. That swift drop in temperature makes you feel extremely cold, even though the actual temperature might be as high as 70 degrees. And the wind makes the cold at night seem even worse. The wind never seems to end, and it penetrates everywhere. It numbs your face when you are moving against it, and its presence is compounded by the fact that thereis no refuge, no trees or manmade structures to provide protection. But even more important than its effects on your body are the wind’s effects on your tactical operations. The wind can become a formidable ally if you capitalize on its strengths, but it can be a considerable enemy if you fail to take into account its impact. The simplest task, such as putting up a tent, becomes difficult and takes longer to accomplish. The wind can carry sounds great distances, or permit you to operate close to the enemy without being heard. It can play havoc with the performance of your ground surveillance radars and make them the source of much false information. But the wind’s greatest impact on operations is its effect on the use of smoke. Those who have fought at the NTC know that smoke operations play a key role in the OPFOR’s ability to move on the battlefield. Far too many times, however, visiting Blue Force units fail to consider the wind’s direction, its strength, or changes in wind conditions when they employ smoke. You must routinely sample the wind’s direction. These frequent checks become more important just before sunrise until just after the sun has risen and the ground begins to get the effects of the sun’s heat. As these ground temperatures increase, wind direction and speed can change dramatically; frequent, routine checks can either confirm the wisdom of your smoke plan or warn you to make changes if the plan might endanger your forces. Another physical aspect of the NTC which often surprises new arrivals is the vastness of the area. While the openness of the terrain allows you to see the enemy at a much greater distance, it also prevents you from moving undetected, or makes it nearly impossible. It’s not uncommon to be able to observe enemy formations of battalion strength for 30 or 40 minutes before they close into direct fire range. So in this vastness, you must use your imagination in the use of existing cover and concealment, and rely on speed, darkness, and smoke. The Observer-Controllers The observer-controllers are a contingent of commissioned and noncommissioned officers whose job is to see that the visiting unit meets its training objectives. The observer-controllers do this by observing how the unit trains, controlling the flow of the unit’s operations - without sacrificing the realism of the situation - and by offering candid after-action reviews for the soldiers of the visiting units. 10 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare

All Photos by Michael Green Visiting units are often surprised by the vastness of the NTC,.with almost unlimited visibility but little cover. The OPFOR Contingent, which fights units in 14 rotations a year. may be the best prepared “Soviet“ unit in the world. Quite frankly, they don’t have an easy job or one that is much fun, but they do have perhaps the most important job at the NTC. While they are not members of a TOE unit, they observe thousands of soldiers from hundreds of units in all sorts of training situations on the most realistic battlefield in the world, short of an actual one. These dedicated soldiers learn lessons that are reinforced through repetition, the foundation of training. So when an observer-controller recommends a better way to accomplish your mission, you can bet that he knows it usually works and works quite well. You may not agree with him, and you may go ahead and do it your way. That’s all right, too. If it works, the observercontroller has just learned anew technique that he can pass on to other units. If your technique doesn’t work, then you’ve learned something, too! The OPFOR Whenever you talk about the NTC, you inevitably get around to talking about the OPFOR, the “bad guys.” The first point to consider is that the OPFOR are soldiers of the United States Army, and these soldiers like to win just as much as you do. But don’t kid yourself: cheating simply is not tolerated in the OPFOR. The mission of the OPFOR is to provide the most realistic threat situations possible under existing personnel and equipment constraints - and to do that according to correct Soviet doctrine each and every time. You often hear the words “awesome,77 or “incredible” when someone describes the OPFOR. But again, don’t kid yourself. They can be defeated. But there are a few factors that make the OPFOR effective in combat testing the tactics and training of the visiting unit. The first of these advantages is that the soldiers of the OPFOR are acclimatized to the desert’s effects. The OPFOR soldiers know what to expect in terms of temperature, wind, darkness, and the sand. The second factor which may give the OPFOR an advantage is that they know the terrain. In the course of planning for their operations, the OPFOR usually has a good idea of what to expect in terms of observation, fields of fire, cover and concealment, avenues of approach, and obstacles to movement. The OPFOR also knows his enemy: YOU. The OPFOR fights visiting units in fourteen rotations a year (That’s 28 maneuver battalions.). Hence, the OPFOR can fairly well guess at what course of action the visiting unit will take in a given tactical situation. Additionally, the OPFOR is a United States Army unit, and as such must go through their own ARTEPs. Finally, the OPFOR has the advantage of numbers in vehicles and weapon systems, but that advantage is one that our potential adversary of the real world would have, too. So what does that all add up to? In short, when a visiting unit comes into contact with the OPFOR, that visiting unit is fighting probably the best prepared “Soviet” unit in the real world. But the OPFOR does suffer from some disadvantages too. The first disadvantage that the OPFOR has is that, like any other US. unit, the OPFOR has a problem with personnel turbulence. There are always people on leave, people on sick call, people in schools, and people on detail. All of these things take away soldiers who could be fighting you on the battlefield. A second disadvantage is that the OPFOR fights from VISMODs. Most of these vehicles are quite old M551 Sheridans that have been visually modified to appear somewhat like Soviet combat vehicles. While the OPFORdoes an excellent job at maintaining their equipment, these vehicles are out fighting nearly every week, and even the best-maintained vehicles wear out. Another disadvantage is that normally the OPFORis short on infantry, though this is being remedied with some augmentation. Additionally, until the OPFOR is fully equipped with VISMOD M113Als (made to look like BMPs), it will be difficult to move the infantry soldiers quickly around the battlefield. A final disadvantage, of which I will say more later, is that the OPFOR does not have thermal sights. The Attack Up until this point, I have tried to show you what you can generally expect at the NTC. Now, I am going ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 11 to give you some “food for thought” in terms of the actual tactical operations that you will conduct at the NTC. One of the missions that you will perform will be the deliberate attack, usually both in the day and night, against a n OPFOR reinforced motorized rifle company (MRC) in the defense. The MRC will usually consist of 4 T72s, 10 BMPs, 63 dismounted infantry, 9 Vipers, 4 Dragons, and 1 ground-mounted.50 cal. machine gun. (The assortment of US. equipment is used to replicate similar equipment found in the actual Soviet MRC or attached to it.) The biggest weakness of the MRC is the small number of infantry available to him to defend the terrain that he is assigned. (Though, as I mentioned earlier, augmentation of infantry will help in this area.) This problem of the MRC commander is compounded when he is fighting against a J-Series MTOE battalion task force which contains usually four maneuver companies that can attack from two different directions at the same time. The MRC commander cannot rapidly shift his infantry around unless he is fully equipped with the new BMP VISMOD made from an M113. Hence, the MRC commander must try to position his infantry where they will do the best job, knowing that any attempt to reposition them during the battle will be slow and will expose them to the effects of indirect fire. Another disadvantage of the defending MRC commander is his relative lack of counter-surveillance and reconnaissance assets. The OPFOR does not have any thermal sights or night vision goggles, and has only IR sights on the combat vehicles and a minimum number of passive sights for the crew-served and individual weapons. The MRC will be augmented by a ground surveillance radar (GSR), though. This situation forces the MRC commander to rely heavily on the GSR, OPs, LPs, and indican exdoit. This interference should iich he usually ntil the bulk of lis designated him with early ind when his ed by your ef-ions. While the nforced with a sance screen (one BMP, one BRDM, and one motorcycle), his biggest worry remains the possibility that your dismounted infantry will attack or infiltrate during periods of limited visibility. Not only is the MRC commander concerned with his ability to identify your possible dismounted attack or infiltration - but he is also concerned about how to deal with it. Just about his only recourse is to use indirect fire. His lack of night vision devices almost totally eliminates the MRC commander’s ability to maneuver his forces around the battlefield quickly and without unnecessarily exposing them to direct fire or exposing his dismounted infantry to indirect fire. In addition to the problems of identifying and reacting to your limited visibility attack, the OPFORs BMPs, T-72s, and SAGGERs are reduced to about a 1,000-meter effective range at night because of the limited capability of infrared searchlights. You can reduce that capability even further if you can put effective smoke on his position and keep it there. In attacking the OPFOR, you must continually apply pressure and never let him rest; certainly, that is his objective when he attacks you. The MRC commander will usually begin to operate his GSR soon after darkness begins. You can capitalize on this. The GSR will normally be positioned near to the MRC commander so that he can quickly receive any information that the GSR can give him on your intent. You need to position your GSR teams so that you can get a fix on his GSR. That will tell you just about where the enemy is: the MRC commander is usually in the center of mass of his defensive position and located behind the platoon battle positions for security. After identifying the MRC’s location, you need to position your GSRs so that they can interfere with his radar on a sector that you begin bnly after you have initiated a small deception, on a different axis, by using tinfoil to create false images on the MRC’s radar. This action will begin to apply the pressure on the MRC commander because he will first become concerned about the “force” that his radar identified and then will become even more concerned about the loss of his GSRs capability when you begin to jam it. To compensate for this lost capability, the MRC commander will attempt to offset the problem by increasing his OPs and LPs and possibly even by using patrols. That will increase the fatigue of the MRC’s soldiers as the night goes on. In order not to lose this initiative of pressure, you now should request around of illumination every hour in the vicinity of the known enemy GSR location. That will increase the MRC commander’s anxiety by making him think that someone is trying to observe his position from a nearby location. He will also probably increase his state of alert and make an effort to locate the phantom observer. This will further increase the fatique of his soldiers, and as the night continues and the fatique sets in, the MRC’s soldiers - like all soldiers of the world - will become less and less concerned (and less alert) about “cries of wolf.” Using helicopters to fly within hearing distance, on different axes, in simulated airmobile operations will also enhance this deception effort. If possible, deceptive radio trafficcould also increase OPFOR anxiety since it is not uncommon for the OPFOR to search and monitor enemy radio traffic. The next phase of the attack should have the task force’s dismounted infantry closing toward the MRC’s position. The first part of this phase is to reinforce the task force scouts with a dismounted element of infantry. Their mission is to fix and destroy the OPFOR reconnaissance element. For that reason, they should have sufficient night-vision equipment, man-car-. ried antiarmor weapons, and the ability to request and adjust indirect fire. You should cover this action with feints by armored vehicles in order to distract the OPFOR recon element. Even if the 12 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare enemy recon element is not destroyed, these efforts should force its withdrawal and thus increase the anxiety level in the MRC position. Next, infantry should be task organized into two or three separate elements and move out toward the MRC position on at least two - or preferably three - different axes of advance. This movement will be assisted by the hourly illumination round falling on the MRC’s position. One of these infantry forces has the mission of locating routes, obstacles, and possible enemy positions that will affect the follow-on assault forces and vehicles. This first force must have radios in sufficient number so that, if they are taken under fire and have to split up, they can continue their mission in reporting critical information to the follow-on forces. That is their first priority. If they locate barriers, this first force should not spend time attempting to breach them; this force should mark and report the bamers so that follow-on forces can breach them. Another mission for this first force might be to set up OPs to maintain continuous observation of the battlefield for the task force commander. When this first infantry force completes its mission, it should depart and return to the task force location, or a pick-up point, following a different route than will be used by the follow-on forces in their mounted attack. This will minimize the chance that the follow-on force’s attack route will be discovered by the OPFOR before the mounted attack. The second infantry force - the dismounted assault force - should then approach, or preferably infiltrate into, the MRC’s position so as to be ready to attack and destroy enemy vehicles as the mounted attack commences. This force must have the majority of the task force’s man-portable antitank systems so that if it is discovered, it can break up into small killer teams and continue its mission. This dismounted assault force must be prepared to cause all sorts of confusion within the MRC’s position as the attack begins. It should also be briefed on the predesignated signal that will alert all the infiltrated elements that preparatory artillery fire will start within a designated time for a designated period. This briefing should also include a signal which permits warning the assault force of any change in the attack time and the preparatory fires so that the force can take cover and can assault at the correct times. You should plan for the use of smoke during the movements of these infantry forces so that you can conceal their movements and inhibit the MRC’s capability to react. Plan this smoke in front of the moving forces and on the MRC’s position until the dismounted assault force is in its assault position. Once the task force scouts have eliminated or driven off the OPFOR recon elements, the scouts can be used to recon or clear anticipated armor routes of advance and then be positioned to guide the main mounted attack. These infantry efforts can, if successful, cause the OPFOR defense to collapse prior to the scheduled attack time. You should take this possibility into consideration in that the armor attack force must be prepared to begin its attack ahead of schedule. If you cannot attack ahead of schedule, the dismounted assault force should make every effort to remain undetected until the main attack commences. Then the mounted attack and the dismounted assault should occur simultaneously. If attack helicopters are available, they should only be committed upon the collapse of the enemy’s defense in order to catch the MRC while attempting to reposition. These valuable assets should never be sent directly into a prepared enemy position. The infantry carriers or Bradley Fighting Vehicles without their squads (those belonging to the dismounted assault force) should move as a unit in the armor attack to give the impression to the MRC commander that he is facing a full-strength mounted attack. Of course, these vehicles should be prepared to support the attack by fire. I do not intend what I have written here to be a blueprint for victory. As we all know, the factors of METT-T have great impact on what you do on the battlefield. However, the OPFOR does have weaknesses that you can exploit as you attack. The Movement to Contact A visiting battalion task force normally conducts a movement to contact against a reinforced motorized rifle battalion (MRB) of the OPFOR. That unit will normally consist of 31 BMPs, 13 T-72, 2 ZSUs, 2 BRDM (AT-s), and 6 122- mm howitzers. The number of BMPs can be higher if additional vehicles are present to replicate certain combat support elements from the regiment. The lead element of the MRB will be a combat reconnaissanc patrol (CRP) consisting of 3 BMPs. The CRP’s mission is to find you and destroy you if he can. If he can’t, the CRP will “hunker down” and try to fix you until the MRB’s forward security element (FSE) can arrive to either destroy you or thicken the battle until the main body of the MRB arrives. The key elements here are that the FSE follows the CRP by up to 10 kilometers, and that the main body of the MRB, which is the advance guard of the regiment, follows the FSE by another 5 or 10 minutes. This knowledge allows you to plan to ensure that you amve at the point of contact “first and with the most.’’ - ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 13

The FSE will sist of the remainder of the lead MRC and will consist of the remaining 7 BMPs and 4 T-72s. The important fact here is that you have the opportunity to attack and deal with one company at a time. You will have 15 to 40 minutes to deal with this company before confronting the main body of the advance guard. This affords you the opportunity to use attack helicopters, too, since it is highly probable that the ZSUs will be moving with the main body. Additionally, the rapid emplacement of OPs and small antitank killer teams on key terrain can also provide effective indirect fire adjustment on request, and can serve to deny the OPFOR this same terrain. As the task force concentrates, the FSE commander will realize that he is outnumbered and that he must go into a hasty defense until help arrives. It is at this point that the OPFORis most vulnerable. The BMPs are greatly degraded when moving since they posssess no STAB system, and this makes their 73-mm gun practically useless. The BMPs are also unable to fire the Sagger on the move. These BMPs are now easy game for all of your vehicles except the M113. With the addition of the M1, M2, and M3, your chances of success during this running gun battle are even greater. Even against the OPFORT-72, you can outmaneuver and outshoot him in mobile combat. You have greater range, and with your greater speed you can easily maneuver out of his range while you pick off threat vehicles at will. Once you have identified the route that the main body is using - usually the same one that the FSE used - you should start to smoke that route in front of the enemy main body. The smoke will slow his advance and hinder his ability to deploy into combat formation. Anything you can do to slow the main body down will give you more time to complete the d e struction of the FSE and prepare to take on the main body. This is another good time to use attack helicopters; they should try to pick off enemy vehicles as they come out of the smoke. The attack helicopters should engage ZSUs, tanks, and BMPs in that order. I also recommend that you consider off-loading a portion of your infantry soldiers -on key terrain if possible - so as not to chance their loss in the maneuver battle. They can be transported to key terrain by other means or given the mission to defend the trains until the maneuver battle is complete. OPFOR Offensive Operations The OPFOR relies very heavily on intelligence that it receives when it is about to attack visiting units. The OPFOR offensive operations are characterized by simplicity and regimentation - just like those illustrated by Soviet doctrine. Hence, intelligence - good intelligence - is the OPFORs key to planning its maneuver. The regimental staff even prepares its artillery plan from that intelligence because the OPFOR considers artillery fire as a form of maneuver. The plan is essentially a schedule of fires that fall based upon the predetermined rate of movemen attack. for the regiment in the Don't believe, though, that the OPFOR is totally without flexibility. The regimental staff does plan for contingencies, and if updates to their intelligence indicate that the original plan will not be appropriate, the OPFOR will change its plan to accomplish its mission. To gather this vital intelligence information, scouts from the regiment deploy at different time intervals along different axes of advance. Normally, motorcycles will move out first, around midnight if the regiment is to attack at dawn, The mission of these motorcycle scouts is not only to gather intelligence on where your positions and obstacles are; they are also tasked to penetrate deeply into your sector and set up OPs. About 1 to 2 hours after the motorcycle scouts depart, the scouts and engineers, mounted in BMPs and BRDMs, move out to clear the obstacles reported by the earlier scouts. The BRDMs will move so that they can cover their movement with the noise of the BMPs. In this way, if the BMPs are discovered because of their noise, the BRDMs can slip around the confusion and continue to infiltrate into your rear area. The OPFOR will also use dismounted infantry to attempt to infiltrate your positions. Their mission is to attack at first light, simultaneously with the main mounted attack and as the lead MRBs close in on the initial obstacle locations. How can you overcome these tactics? First of all, you must be extremely concerned about OPSEC. Light and noise discipline are man- 14 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare datory if you don’t want to give away your positions to the regimental scouts. Secondly, you must cover barriers and obstacles with fire. When the scouts attempt to find them or clear them, destroy the scouts and ensure that the obstacles can still accomplish their purpose when the main attack comes. Finally, make maximum use of all of your night vision capability to discover, report, and destroy the OPFOR intelligence gathering units. Your Successful Defense The success of your defense will depend on how well you can deny the OPFOR the intelligence that it.so desperately needs to conduct its attack. You must fix responsibility for that mission, not only at the FLOT, but also in depth. Failure to do this has caused great confusion in visiting units, and on many occasions has caused friendly fratricide and assisted the OPFOR regimental scouts in their attempts to locate friendly positions and penetrate deeply into the rear area. A company team commander should have a small reaction force available at his location, so that even if the command net is jammed, the reaction force can be ordered out quickly. The team commander also should position his combat vehicles closer to avenues of approach during periods of limited visibility to ensure that OPFOR vehicles can’t slip by. At the battalion task force level, there must also be a larger reaction force available under the command of a key leader who can personally maneuver that force to stop any penetration reported by other elements. Infantry should be organized into antitank killer teams and dismounted elements. This will allow you to make the best use of your weapons systems. For example, tank killer teams can be placed in depth along the likely vehicle avenues of approach to reinforce company teams. By working with the company teams, the tank killer teams can assist in providing good security and support the company team’s sleep plan. The organized dismounted infantry need to sleep during the day as much as possible. Their primary jobs are done at night. These teams will not only gather intelligence through active patrolling, but will repel and destroy the OPFOR recon elements who try to find and destroy your obstacles. Don’t leave -50 caliber machine guns in the rear of the battle area. Position them in groups or pockets along likely avenues of approach. These weapons can take out BRDMs and BMPs. Groups of four heavy machine guns in mutual support straddling likely avenues of approach can be very effective. As much as possible, company team commanders should use their soldiers to put in wire and mines, freeing engineer units to prepare the barriers and the fighting positions so important to survivability. Soldiers from the service support elements should also be used to emplace barriers and provide security so that infantry can rest for the battle; they will be up all night. You should concentrate the fires of all tank-killing systems on T-72s. BMPs are less formidable and all systems down to the 50-caliber can kill them. Use sniper tactics. Designate TOW systems to pick out all enemy vehicles with numbers ending in a

6. These are command vehicles; taking them out will limit the OPFORs flexibility. A good way to cover barriers is to dig your OPs in close to them, in spider holes if possible. These close-in OPs can detect OPFOR breaching elements in smoke or darkness more effectively than can vehicles in battle positions. Finally, keep in mind that any small elements or even individual vehicles of your force that the OPFOR bypasses in their attack can cause extreme difficulties for the OPFOR’s follow-on battalion. It is better sometimes to hide and fight later than to die on the move. Summary My purpose here has not been to tell you how to beat the OPFOR, but to pass on some of the lessons I have learned. These lessons can make you and your force more capable on any battlefield in the world. And that is the purpose of the National Training Center.

was commissioned in Armor in 1976 following OCS at Fort Benning. He has served asatankplatoon leader, tank company XO, support platoon leader, and battalion and squadron motor officer in assignments in CONUS and USAREUR. He has also served as a squadron com- m u n ica t ions officer, tank company commander and headquarters company commander and is presently assigned to the Company Team and Cavalry Division, Command and Staff Department,

USAARMC.

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