Armor in Europe - a New Perspective

Armor in Europe - A New Perspective by Lieutenant Colonel Massimo Dal Piaz The employment of armored units is universally determined by several important factors. The high cost of armored vehicles requires a continuous and accurate evaluation of these fundamentals that, in turn, will lead to the most effective use of these weapon systems. The most important factors that condition and, at times, limit, armored operations may be placed in two cate gories: Tactical. Essentially, this includes an accurate knowledge of the enemy situation, the composition, l o cation, and disposition of his forces and how they relate to the friendly situation. Environmental. This category is based on the acquisition of knowledge of the following: Distinctive characteristics of the terrain; the negotiability of the terrain by tracked vehicles; and the presence of fields of f i e and observation that permit the full use of all available weapon systems. A lack of information in any of these areas may make a decisive difference in the effectiveness of a planned armored operation and may prevent the attainment of the desired tactical results. In accordance with the above, it is evident that the employment of armored units is favored by wide open, flat, or gently rolling terrain characterized by low-growing and sparse vegetation, and free of any elements that would interfere with maneuver, observation and target engagement. The employment of armored forces is therefore ideal in desdlike terrain or in low, flat, plains such as the steppes; but the use of tank units is also quite possible in those areas which are moderately covered by vegetation or characterized by limited urbanization, provided that the terrain is negotiable, and that open areas (to allow room for maneuver and the engagement of targets at reasonable ranges) exist between the areas of vegetation and the built-up zones. Briefly, because of the maneuver space required by armored units, and because of the need to maximize the capabilities of on-board weapons, the “long range” fields of fire and observation that characterize the desert are most desirable. Nevertheless, the effective employment of armor is also possible in terrain marked by “medium-range” fields of fire and observation, as long as the limitations of such terrain are not excessive. The terrain of the principal theaters of operation in Western Europe (Germany and Italy in particular), differs significantly h m either the desert, the steppes, or the low, flat, sparsely vegetated plains referred to above. Instead, it is characterized by conditions that include a high degree of urbanization and of agricultural use and these pose numerous difficulties in the use of armor. Karl von Clausewitz in his treatise, “On War,” did more than simply affirm that the nature of the terrain has a direct impact on maneuverability and on the possibility of good observation and fields of h. He also concluded that the extensive employment of cavalry was useless on terrain that for various reasons, to include the presence of agricultural activity, was difficult to negotiate or maneuver on. Furthermore, on such terrain there have been no recent military operations characterized by the employment of tank formations on a large scale. Such operations, which are always a distinct possibility in view of international events, pose numerous questions regarding the methods of employment of armored units, their effectiveness, and the capabilities and effects of on-board weapons. Recent conflicts in Vietnam and the Middle East have allowed us to draw some conclusions and learn some lessons on modem tank warfare, but the peculiar environmental and terrain characteristics of each of these situations are not comparable to the large, densely urbanized plains to be found in Westem Europe. Nor is it possible, given merely the differences in topographical realities, to extrapolate rules or experiences or to simply look for adequate technical adaptations and modifications. Presently, tank units conduct periodic training exercises on artificial firing ranges, the conditions and constraints of which differ significantly from those conditions likely to be encountered in combat. Consequently, many engagement techniques and scenarios drawn from this trainingjanuary-february 1984 11 as well as some tactical developments and, to an extent, the psychological climate fostered by these factors-may be ill-suited, or not suited at all, to those conditions which will probably characterize the European battle field The European Environment Aerial photographs and l a r g d e maps clearly show the high degree of urban European sprawl, which continues to spread with each passing year. As a result of this urbanization, the natural environment is becoming more and more transformed, either by residential and industrial construction or by the cultivation of the land for agricultural purposes. The terrain in its original state may be observed only in limited zones-usually along the banks of the numerous rivers and waterways. In many cases, cultivated stretches of land or builtup areas appear one after the other in an irregular pattern. Among the many Merent crops to be found, grain, which varies moderately in height from an average of about 21/2 meters, is dominant. Furthermore, agricultural techniques have led to the creation of a mosaic-like pattern of relatively small plots of land. These are separated by rows of trees (which tend to limit field of fire and observation), and by ditches and rivulets (which present serious obstacles to the free move ment of tank formations). One also encounters endless rows of grape vines and numerous orchards which sometimes exceed three meters in height. The builtup areas are charactmized by small towns without clearly d e fined outlines, but having instead very extended, sometimes elongated, outskirts that tend to be concentrated along those roads linking them with similar towns. The effect of this pattern is the creation of long “curtains” of buildings and structures. The r e sult, in turn, is a peculiar landscape in which the tactical considerations valid in wideopen, relatively flat, terrain become inapplicable. ization and cultivation, together with Europe’s dense network of rivers, canals and roads, makes for a class of terrain all its own. The adverse impact is not limited to long-range target acquisition and destruction (which modern tanks are technically capable of), but extends to the effeds on maneuver. Only with extreme difficulty, given the available space, is it possible to employ armor in large formations: An offensive operation conducted at higher than the company level would be seriously limited and confined even to the extent that the unit may not be able to deploy properly along a normal front. Also, it would be rare that such formations could develop in depth beyond 23 kilometers. The ele menta of the agri-urban environment described above, combined with the many forested areas, would eventually break up the formations and the visual contact on which they are based. The obstacles appearing between tanks, platoons and companies would cause units to break up and become separated from adjacent units. Indeed, the many “curtains” formed by rows of trees, crops, wooded and builtup areas, would prevent even the individual tanks within one platoon from keeping the proper interval, maintaining visual contact and concentrating upon the same objective, transforming what should be a small unit operation by a simple formation into the sum of several uncoordinated operations by individual tanks, working alone. In such cases, the modes of employment would bear more of a resemblance to the techniques used in an isolated ambush than to those of a conventional armored operation. More over, for each tank moving either alone or in formation, target acquisition and engagement at relatively long ranges would be permitted in only one or two directions at a time, This peculiar arrangement of urban-and even then rarely at ranges beyond 1,O00-1,500 meters. Such ranges might be attainable in conjunction with roads or certain fields, while the rest of the landscape would remain highly cluttered. The obstacles posed by the built-up areas and the terrain would compel each tank commander to fend for himself-seeking routes and passages around the obstacles and thus complicating the already significant problems of coordination at the platoon level. The urbanization and the natural terrain characteristics that dominate Western Europe tend to prevent the full use of fire and maneuver techniques that form the basis of current training. Within the tank itself, the limitations of the wain directly affect the two crewmen who provide the vehicle with its mobility and firepower-the driver and the gunner. The driver (due to limited vision) is incapable of accurately evaluating the various obstacles to be met. This is especially true of the many ditches and canals, whose exact depth and dimensions are often difficult to dekrmine.The driver is also unable to pick out reliable routes that stretch beyond what is usually considerably less than 100 meters. The gunner is limited in his ability to observe through his sights, which are linked to the gun tube. His field of vision depends directly on the lay of the gun, which is controlled by the tank commander. It is the tank commander who must direct and coordinate the crew actions by simultaneously acquiring and evaluating targets for the gunner (and sometimes determining the ranges as well), while evaluating various terrain features and setting the direction of travel for the driver. He must, of course, be able to do all this in a hostile environment, charaderized by lethal and rapidly changing situations and, above all, he must maintain communication with his platoon or company commander. This coordinating role of the tank 12 commander is conceivable in open terrain, be it flat or moderately hilly, in which the presence of long-range fields of fire and of observation translates into the timely acquisition and thus rapid neutralization of targets as well as the easy identification of natural obstacles. But in terrain that is both highly urbanized and extensively cultivated, and with a high incidence of forested areas, the tank commander’s task becomes extremely difficult. Without long-range fields of fire and observation, he cannot iden-tdy or react to targets or obstacles in a timely manner. Tactical Remedies In such an environment, one must abandon the traditional use of armor in massed formations. However, the renunciation of the principle of “mass” in this case occurs only at the most simplistic level. For mass, prop erly understood, is not an agglomeration of a particular weapons system-in this case the tank-but the concentration of combat power at the d e cisive point. The mass of an armored force is determined by the degree to which it concentrates its efforts and firepower on the objective. If placed in terrain that compartmentalizes efforts and prevents coordination, it loses a certain degree of power and may easily lose local superiority in the offense or the defense. An alternative method of concentrating combat power, therefore, becomes necessary. Given the characteristics of the European landscape, dominated by limited fields of observation and fire, it would do well to review several tactical remedies. A larger role should be assigned to medium and long-range missiles (with effective ranges of 2,000-3,OOO meters) mounted on a substantial number of attack helicopters. These weapons systems are not subject to the same limitations as ground systems and would play a decisive role in the timely application of firepower. At shorter ranges (500-1,500 meters), the employment of armored units must be integrated with the mechanized infantry. When dismounted, the infantry can rely on their various light and medium antitank weapons, thereby compensating for their initial disdavantage on the ground. In addition, the mechanized infantry can act as the eyes and ears of the tanker, thus enabling him to deal with the limitations of the terrain described earlier. In fact, at short ranges, even attack helicopters may play a very significant role because of their capability of overcoming the confining asp& of terrain by overflying it. In any case, it is imperative that we all learn to operate in an environment dominated by short range fields of fire and observation. Reaction times and target engage ment times must be reduced to the absolute minimum by all available means. Technological developments, training exercises, and modifications in tactical doctrine must be driven by this priority. Furthermore, the role of cavalry units in reconnaissance and security operations needs to be re examined. Without downgrading the importance of joint armored, mechanized infantry and attack helicopter o p errations, armor must acquire an enhanced defensive capability per se-again with constant emphasis on the short-range European battle field. This will be possible only after january-february 1984 13 ana tne veioacy 01 tne rouna itsel1 while maintaining its lethality. This change in parameters is fundamental for effective combat operations at ranges of 1,OOO meters or less. Training Remedies In the area of training, the time has also come to adopt techniques appre priate to the particular environment in which we will have to fight. Current training methods tend to give tankers the false assurance that they will operate in flat, open, terrain and imply the presence of all the favorable conditions for the employment of armor. The ability to operate in terrain that is both highly urbanized and cultivated must be gained by training that is tailored to this end, and that will be characterized by some of the following approaches: The study and application of methodologies and techniques ap propriate for extremely limited fields of observation and fire. The use of a greater degree of operational decentralization extending down to the lowest echelons. A greater emphasis on combined operations of armor, mechanized infantry and air cavalry (attack helicop ters) that would result in the most effective combination of surprise, shock, Srepower and mobility. ‘!t’he urbmization and the Itaac-ral terrain characteristics that dominate Western Europetendto preventthefuuuseoffireandma-neuver techniques that form the basis of current training. Within the tank itself, the limitations of the terrain directly affect the two crewmen who provide the vehi- d e w i t h i t s m o ~ a n d ~ t ? l . - the cIriva and the gunner.” Exercises that better simulate the presence of both “moderately urbanized” terrain in which cropland is predominant over small built-up areas and in which fields of fire range from 500 to 1,OOO meters, and “highly urbanized” terrain in which built-up areas predominate, characterized by fields of fire of 500 meters or less. Greater emphasis on training for the mechanized infantry in the execution of short-range reconnaissance operations, and on the use of infantry and armor in a combined arms mode to carry out rapid offensive and mop up operations in built-up areas, small groups of buildings as well as isolated buildings. Development of a more special-conventional tanks and attack helicopters and thus play a key role in terrain that prevents the effective use of armor at long ranges. ized and &hnical kind of train-ing in short-range reconnaissance operations in terrain that sharply limits visibility. The almost treacherous nature of the terrain, as well as the extreme difficulty of determining the enemy location and disposition, makes it impossible for armor to be effective beyond the tank’s limited field of fire at any one time. Thus, the closest cooperation between armor and mechanized infantry in combined arms operations is an indispensable prerequisite for the effective employment of armored Units. Conclusion The above considerations still permit us to look with confidence to the armored force as the true protagonist of the modem defensive battle in all of its phases. Nevertheless, the armored vehicles of today are fully effective only in terrain characterized by wide, long-range fields of observation and fire, as in the desert-like terrain of the Middle East. Looking into the future, then, it would do well to consider the introduction of a new kind of combat vehicle capable of an enhanced rate of fire and, therefore, more appropriate to engagements at short range. Such vehicles would operate together with

LIEUTENANT COLONEL

MASSIMO DAL PIAZ, a graduate of the Italian Military Academy, was commissioned in cavalry in 1965. He has served as scout platoon and ‘tank platoon leader, Leopard company commander, and as executive officer in a scout helicopter battalion. He attended flight school and is also a graduate of the Italian Command and General Staff College and the Italian War School. He served as G3 and G4 on the Italian Army general staff prior to corning to Fort Knox. where he is currently the Italian liaison officer at the USAARMC. 14