Let's Talk About

Let's Talk About by JANUS Armor RTICLES appeakg in our m i c e magazines. discus- *at the mice rhooIsor and pamphlets i s a d b y the LI-ar-Depmment lead to the belief -hat the .Amerkan militar). srudent of -&e World M'az may be led astray in formularing condusioDs on tactical questions and on -tion. since he UrcumQaaCes surrouading q u o d ~ s a n c e s " f ~ r t i c i p a t i o n in the W a r a r e M X ppresendinsuf-facRnr detail to enable one to c o d y judge tbe sinratioa studied. Funher-more. the mapricy of OUT Omcers had but 3 brief experience in b n l e and were 50 hard-pred before. during. and mnabacely after engagements -h IC IS &cult for them to d e an a m m e . a i d analysis of the battle wcucs mvolved. and it is wen known ha; a sinsle example is apt to prove a Lu~gerow guide for furure acrion." How me! -Uhu3h the above auourion was written in 1921 for the fit+- j d by Slapr George C. MarshalLL it is q d y applicable to rnodern m i l i v thought-especdly rndleli~ldofannol. Pabps a tkf miew of armor. present and future, might clear up part of the haze which apparently s u d

Mo much of rhe thinking on the sub*& Until his mental per- @e k well-gmudd. the soldier vill be i r & d to anive at a condu-sicnconfusedbp.factuaU~uosubstan-siated examples of the pest and en-snared bT slmcnng yet unfounded hopes for-& funue. ;Ind u. s. OMi-parions upder the sonh Adantic ment to prevent wax or to fight in Trcav. with the attendant require Wes&n~ Eumpe-to say nuthing of tbe )rrlnnrrA ookctive force idea- &e it imperative that the COtRCt slution to annor be obtained immediately. mapart IVith this requirement in mind, let us turn back and examine the past of armor. Like rhe infany, the annored disision has had its p i n g pains and. like the mfanm, it has under-piemany reo anizations .Uthough "2. tanks saw action in iVorld IVar I. they were considered to be one of the NppOrring weapons for the infantry. During the perid k- ween IVorld N7ars our amor consisted only of a few rate tank com-the tank school at Ft. Benning as a pan of the infantry. Tank doctrine still coniemphd only limited objective a:& in close coordination with the infan?. Actually. an ;tmy regu-Iadon prohibited moving tanks more than 50 miles except by rail. During this period the cavab did some ex-dry unit and find\-, in 1940, the separatr! tank units were asembled at Fort Benning and formed into a provisional tank brigade. Meanwbile. the war in Europe was characterid b>. i n d use and importance of armored disisions operating in close coordination with air and . motorid units. the^ highly mobile sttiking forces had p t speed and power and were uniformly successful in their operations. The use of the mechanized cavalry unit and tank brigade in the Louisiana maneuvers resulted in the present con- c t of armored warfare and led in JX .1940, to the organization of the Fisc and Secoad Armored Di*= The training of tbese, as well as the panies. plus one tan T battalion and perimenting with a m e c h u d * cav-units organid later, in the maneuver -of Louisiina, Carolina and California proved the soundness of the mnt,xpt. In fact, in 1 9 1 General Patton first demonstrated the possibilities in the employment of an armored division maneuvering his "Hell on \%%eels" division more than 100 miles and overrunning the rear areas of the opposing Red forces in Louisian;i. His action emphasized the chief character- i d of armor: mobility, tremendous &e power, shock action and Belcibiliv. By 1 July 1941 the United States had four armored divisions with two more being activated. The armored divisions have undergone some drastic organktional changes since General Patton's audacious move. The first came immediately after the mankuver and the ha\? armored division was evolved. Then operations in Africa, Sicily and Italy demonstrated that the division was too big. The mountainous terrain usually permitted use of armor in battalion strength only; objectives were limited; movenxnt forward was measured in yards; and so the light armored division was born. Again. after the St. Lo breakthrough in Sonnandy. when the oppormnity arrived for the armored divisions to use their mobiliy and race around the German flanks and into his rear areas, it became apparent that the light armored division was lacking in the necessar). supply organization to make it self-sustaining in prolonged operations. Hence, since the 2d and M Armored Divisions fought the war as heaq divisions and the rest as light divisions, the experience obtained made it possible to incorporate the d e sirable features of both types into the present division. Armor was used in division stten i! h in N o d Africa, Sicily, Italy, and u- rope md in d e r formations in the ARMOR-JanUay-f.kuOV, 1951 Wbo is tbis guy [arms? Well, i , ~ tell yo# about bim, see! In Roman mythology be is ?be god of "begkings." H e bad two faces, aad could look east rtnd west at the sume time. He bad a tempk tbRt was s h t in time of peace and opened in time of UUT! Golf, anyone.. . ? OT sball u e talk aboud mutot. . . ? Southwest Pacific, rbe Central Pacific. the Philippines and Oliinawa: vet World War I1 statistics show that armored units, even though heavily en- s & e d f e w r casualties than ~ 2 r y divisions. n e average number of men killed per tank destroyed was 1%. An a m r e d engagement wherein 30 tanks were destroyed was a terrific fight, yet the total killed in action averaged @K) men. In a similar action, an infantry division's losses probably would be in the neighborhood of .100500 mea. Thus, since the U.S. is faced wirh a manpower shortage at a time when we must contrib Ute to the defense of Western Europe. the desirabilic of taking advantage of our superior indusaial capacity and. at the same time, consesing manpower by using annored divisions 16.053 men) instead of infantry divisions (18.894 total strength: is readily apparent. =\mor was the master of the battlefield in World LVar I1 and its accom-plishmenis must not be forgotten. Romels actions m the desert of North .Vrica, Patton's mad dash to Palermo. Harmon's breakour at -4nzio and Patton's race across France are historical facts today. So is the Gr-man use of annor during the early days of the war when their panzen raced through Western Europe. Pe land. Greece and into the Ukraine. The Nazi anack m Poland was begun by an a l h t effort to eliminate the Polish Air Force by air action. The Germans accomplished this feat quickly and immediatelv sent their panzen and mechanized units racing into Poland. The pan= bypassed any strong resistance, leaving the mopping up of these units to the infan-divisions which followed. The German armor smashed deep enough to

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1951 dtrqCk the Palish miha? forces in the rear. -4s a lesult the Poi& fighting machine disintegrated. This use of inobilit). in the form o€ air power and armor surprised the world. In 18 days the fighting was over. The total depth of armor penetration was Mo miles. .%in. in 1W. the pattern was repeated in the West. German p"zers plunged 180 miles in 6 dais . b d again, German amor did not attempt to disrupt civilian governments: it merely contented itself with disrupt. ing the rear areas of the militan. forces opposing it. The Polish Campaign was tbe rip-& that linear defense s y - tern were outmoded: the German successes in the \Vest confirmed the fact. The attack against Russia in 1 9 1 started off in the same way. German armor penetrated 200 miles in 10 days. The panzer units were used to effect surprise, to attack new objectives from different directions. and always to execute the pincer double envelopment. .hially. Geaman armor had the war practically won. -4t one time. the Russians in the southem sector began to cease fightin . Then Hit& entered the planning and directing picture and the victo? which was within German grasp w z lost irretrievably. Hider wanted all of Russia within the line Leningrad- 3 loscow-StalingradCucasus lloun-rains. .+s a result of his decision. the German armies had to penetrate deeper into Russia instead of destroying Russian armies nearer ro the border. and this move used up a lot of infan:? di\-isions. necessitated that fighting units be used IO hold the counm. and overextended the lines of communl-cation. Supply for the mechanized units became a huge problem and Y)OR the Rwrans could q u a l thL- b 5 in amor. In Poland and France. the panzen Hen[ after the enem! forces-and got them. In &J%d t h e were ordered to go after a far-8 boundav and failed. Perhaps the Germans protided one of the best examples of the use d ar. mor defensively when + ern&& it againsr our kdgement on the Coten-rjn Peninsula. It was German w r that slowed up the 'Ud timerable. especially the British progress at Caen. k. after the St. Lo breakout when t h e 2nd and 3rd U. S. .+red Divisions \%ere given the mission of pushing out and cutting of€ the Ger-nun .+my in Nvestem France and sealing the Falaise Packet. C;erman armor in the form of tans at ever\. juccessiae road junction forced our own armor to continuall? deploy. often call for air suppon. and inva~- ably waste precious rime while the bulk of their units were exrricating themselves from the planned trap. German use of she inberent mobilip and fire pow-ol their armor saved the day for :he bulk of their \ikru-aII units. The Bade of the Bulge also provided a good example of how armor can be used decisively One must r e member that. just prior to the German attack. the -4llies were on the densire. S o doubt the most heroic action in the Bulge was the holding of Bastope by the lOlst .%rhome Division. How-mer. the fact still remains that. when Yon Rundstedt did smash through. fortunately .Ulied a m r e d divisions were available and were rushed to the rene and choked off the threat. The 4th .4rmored broke through to the surrounded paratroopers. The . U e d attack against the shouMers of Ihe Bulge the First .%my from the 43