TANK ECONOMY: Analysis of Combat and Operational Losses

i I !

TANK ECONOMY:

Analysis of Combat and Operational Losses by -MER

P. M. ROCUNm T-L.X€i is a very expemsive the m o s ~ expensive item of eqrupmmtissudtohegmundtroops. knpovements aTe COonanEly making -&.is inaenringly so. collecti\-C1y. rhrrefore rads amstitute not only a -.-err great financial drain on the na- a d ecmoxny. but a drain m essen- 4 resources as well. This is true be- -of the amount of nntegkal law materiakrrquirrdtobuiMtanlcsand bgause of their vulnerability to enem? acrion in bade!. certain p u p s Jf silimry men have overrated the t m withtheresultthatthe &ebpment of defensive weapons has 'hen unduly emphasize& This ten-iuq- toward the &fensive. though not ma& con-if held within limin is not in keeping with the people or the traditional American adherence to the principle d the &en-sive in che conduct of war. FhiIe economy is \id it should not be ar the expense of decisive otknsive u-eaponr The principl; of ec0aom)- of force is casht m all our m i l i ~ schools and permeates our . b y , but the im- =.iicarions of the pMciple apparrntly j, fuUIt; appreiated. The prin- a p l e d econcnny of meansor of equip. seat is an element of the broeder +&pIe which is cOmmOPlp undet- d i n m m s o f m a n p o w e r . O f ,-ourse lnan is. by all oddr the moQ important ekment Thi~ should be apparent men to tk illodt brutal realia. fa quite obvioudy tbme is a Iimited soulce of supply d i t takes a@teen a more )rrsm to grow a sol- a t a p t - Butepcnifequipment d az-+blv mechanical genius of the ArneriiCan dier phs OM to two-torrain him Tank losses m M out of tom-bat msst be tbe twbjrct of C o d d u g d y s i s as a basis for comedive action on :be user. Here ii a dircwsriorr of some most impintat meas-wes. part of tbe maker d tbe can be made and put into Senice in lers time, it has become so inmcate and expensive that the strictest care and attention must be taken to insure maxhpm results in operations. There are strategical, organizational, cal. tactical, and tethnical matters to be considered in developing a sound progrrm for utilirauon of tanks or any other mapr weapon. -At the end of World War 11. .merican tanks iar outdassed the of Idy, Japan. and Great Britain but still compared unfavorably with those of Germany and Russia. However, there was a pnounced tendency during the war to cover up OW d & i e n c i ~ by propapdistic statements to the &t that American tanks were the k t in the world. Certain high-rankhg field commanders and technical specialins did much to spread this idea. The statements might have been adequate for the uninformed public at home, but were recognized by the fighting men at the front for what they were -mere bunk. If evidence is needed to show what their attitude was consider the words of Lieutenant F. A. Daubin. 1st .Annod Regiment, who was one of the first .Gnericans to face the long barreled 75mm gun of the German Mark N tank. He was shot tell the story- "mcer-tailed armo~ piercing bolts streaked out of the .American's m d e and bounced like mashie shots b out of his hf-3 light tank and lived to the plates of the Mark IV. The German shed sparks like a power driven grindstome. la a frenzy of desperation and fadin faith in the highly touted weapon, t%e M-3 crew pumped more than eighteen rounds at the Jerry tank %We it came in. Through the scope sight the tracer could be seen to hit and glance straight u . Popcorn balls been just as ektive. . . . Death, un-on& struck as the light tank backed out. . . . The slug struck the vertical surface OC the h a w armoral driver's door and literally caved in the front of the 51-3. With its driver instantly dead, the bow er. blind stunned. machinegun fire as he sought cover. the little tank, though sheathed in h e , backed on through the battle until stopped by friendly hands. Safely in a ditch, his thoughts were on two things; how long would it be before the German tanks wept past him and finished him 0% and how was the loss of faith in their chief weapon, the 37mm cannon, going to afFect the future battle performance of his platoon, company, and battalion?" Victory, however, cove^ up all failures and inadequacies in war. and did in World War 11. To the fighting man weapons are the ~mbols of power. It is worse than useless to to convince a soldier that his weapons are the best in the world when his own experience t& him otherwise. Ctnnmande~ who repcatd the pmpagandistic statements to the men at the front only tended to de-rtrov the respect in which the ddiers held them. It is best to tell a soldier how to get the most from his weapons. thrown by Little Bo B eep would have explainedly defemd t h e m a n ~ SX-and bleeding, r e leader cut down by

A R M O I - J ~ U W - F ~ W ,

1951 On the ocher hand, a commander should not speak well of the enemy or of his weapons to his men; it is better to take the advice of Frederick the Great and damn them. General Patton practiced this principle assidu-ously. It is the part of uidom. however, to adopt and teach a tactical doctrine that is appropriate to the equip ment and to the circumstances under which it operates. This requires great fiexibilit); on the part of commanders since new or improved weapons first appearing on the benle6dd come as a surprise. Failure to adjust tactics to operational conditions might well lead to defeat. This point is illustrated over and over again both in World W a r I and in World War 11. But MY adjustment made to meet a surprise is merely a temporq solution. .A real solution can only be found in bener-handled. superior weapons. The basic problem is. therefore. technical rather than organizational or tactical. This article will deal primarib with the technical aspects of the problem. largely from the point of view of the combat troops. New I&-New Pmblemm Coincident with the inuoduction of a new tank, new roblerns of tactics. maintenance, an1 operation arise. These are anticipated, as far as possible. in field manuals, in maintenance cham and regulations, and in technical manuals. All rhee should be developed and issued with the equipment. Even when available, these first instructions are always incomplete or faulty-the tank itself, in spite of all efforts to the concra~, still has certain bugs to be eliminated. This is undentandable as it is impossible for even the most intelligent and imaginative individual or group of individuals to antiapate e v ~ possible condition or situation. It is therefore necessary that most accurate infarma-tion concerning mahanica shortcomings or failures be maintain4 transmitted, collated, and a+ned. Based on this analysis a p e a t e @c, corrective instnrtions should be given to both theuser and the manufacturer. andconcansalle& Z2EZZ. At tbe bighest bel, it is nesesary that: (1) comparative studies of Amaican and breign tanks should be made and kept current; (2) integration of tanks in military organi-ARMOR-Janu~-February, 1951 Operational analysis is d the hi h- zation bhould be constantly m-iewed with regard to pro5pectlve theaters of operation; :3; maintenance and rating techniques suitable to the rmatic and terrain conditions of p- sible theaters of operation be antid-pated: 14; proper insrmcrions be issued to insure the accumulation d adequate operational and combat data relative to the perfcamance of the tank: :SI informatiam coocaning OUT owa and foreign rank and tank Operations be disseminated to the . b r e d School and the Ordnance Corps: and :6: adequate inspection controls be maintained to insure execution of the program in all lo\vea echelons of command. -bm The technical senices parcicularl!- the Ordnance Corps. should be the final repository of operational and combat data conceming tank equipment. It should also be the agenq to make the technical analysis necesary for the improvement 4 equipment. Severtheless. the .hnored School should also studs the problem from the standpoint of the user and shouId. nent data. This wor Tesofdpari-should help in therefore. receive developing t a c k suitable to our equipment and in reducing operational failures. It should thus fa-.= the maximum e&tiveness of rank at the fighting front. It should also establish the causes of tank 1- by enemy action and suggest measures to be taken to reduce tfiese losses. In a theater of operation, all com-sscious of the principle of emnomy of means and should exert their influence to insure that ground wops get the maximum advantages from their equipment. This requires a mental reOnentatiQn by all commanderr if mechanized warfare is to be conducted in the most &ent manner. and will entail an attitude of mind very similar ways been ship chschs. , h v o&- cers must become tank conscious. Thy should ovefully husband the tank strength but not hesitate to go all out or to take risks when the prize ual to the expend~ture dmeans. that all rank units maintain the &en-sive spirit and the will to assault and overthruw the enemy. Tbey should take due precautiom to insure that co- -dm should bc m t l y conto that Of M8d 086arS Who have d- is At ?h e tame time they h d insure ordinarion and c k trmworL be-ween the various arm.-.+. In. fan?. .Gull-. and Air-15 c d u l l \ p'e~en'ed. However. there m a Se times in the pursuit where this cxetul cmdmation may be tempxmh abandoned in order to wmhehn and destro! a beaten force. In such cdse'l. it is approprixe ro aaept ha\? lose. of quipmen: for h e d e of the dd- \.xitapes 10 be gained. In t h i s a n - nection ir is :o be noted that :he ph!-sical m i o n of the banlefield \ u s never so i x n p m t as i: IS today. because our oun h g e d and a h n - doned equipment is not only recovered but the enem!'s falls into our hand3 well. Elen rhe most ser-erely dam- ~ged rank is a mine for repair parj And the less damaged tanks tan quick]! be put back into operatiorul condition. Special recovery equipmen: should be developed for the uirh-draual of disabled tanks for repair. Regulations for a tank remount or replacement service should be repared and all plans should i n c l u ~ prmi-sions for replacement equipment. Data on wbch to make the computa-rions for replacement tanks should accumulated in the course of even w3r. just as it was for horses in the past. Emkaim To recapitulate. the pnncjple of emnomy of means should be understood all commanders in mechanized ground warfare. This princjple should be given careful consideration in developing strategical plans and or-ganizarion. and in the a d conduct of operadons. It is possible to accumulate much operational data in peacetime that u+ll be applicable in war. but this wdl require the emplo!menr rain conditions and the carrful ac-data gained from these operarions. In wamme data should include failures from both operational and combat c a w . .hal?ris aad studs of the data should facilitate an immediate ad-iun-ment of tactical docnine to tbe situa-tank superior to rbase d the enem!-. Procedures should be,&tablisbed at all echeh h e k to insure tbe x- cumularion ot neesary data. Firm&. inspgtioD conpds sbould insure the exemom of the program at all heIs of command. 31 of tank unda all climatic and tm-cumulation. collatioa. and aaalpsis of tion and. ultimately. tbe prOduction of toruizpecLhers used for Fsycbological War fare pored efectire when used against N o d Korean troops. Many suttenders uere directly attributable to tbe front line use of this propa-pan& medium-From various news sources. -.= by A. T. HADLZT

\.*EKY

armored soldier know that one of the essential char-acreristics of all tank action Shock, that strikes at the en-emis mind. - his anxic':! and paral!z?a his abilic to.fight. Psycholo@ca1 warfare is that branch of the .%my whose primary concern is la- e g , the enemy's abili? to fight through action on his mind. One :vould think because of this $imilaritl; -&at Ps)-chokgral warfare and .+mor would be constantly working topher. Set, probably because of the \voefully hi ted use made d bade propagandt Juring \\-odd U'ar 11. the nvo hale not trained togerher during this un-Properly used combat propaeanda ex>loits the violence and sur-prse inherent in e~? well planned tmored attack 10 uemendously increase :he shock &. The effect of :his shock causes the enemy such anx- i q :hat he can M) l o n p fight &E- tively and m a y even surrender. This saves .-\merican lives and gets the cnm-msnc?er on :he objective that much TJ aid the combat soldier. battle ~ o ; c ~ - ~ n d a e m p l ~ s two \veapons: the pere. mor€ quickly. 32 Tcr IZ k tactical lealiqt anc the tank mauntec combat loudspeaker. This latter is the mast important to the tanker. The new light (25 Ibs.: loudspeakers just crjminy into producrion can throw the human voice wi:h understandable clarity for a range of two miles. They are mounted on tanks so that they can go into action along with the assault wave. exploiting the initial shock caused by the appearance of tanks before. or even better. behind. or on the flanks d a position. Because so little is known about the operations of tank mounted loud- s p k e r s a glance at a World U'ar 11 operation is ipstructive. The tank mmnted loudspeaker was operating with an advance column of the 2nd . h o d Bvision. .+riving before a fortified town the column deployed. a - Some fire was received from the town. The hdspeaking tank informed the garrison ol the town that a large armored task force stood on the out-skim. The broadcast also informed the people that the commander didn't want to destroy the town. The garri son was then informed that ;\merican miller). was ranged on them. Over the t3nk communciarions >! v tem. word was sen: b x k to the ar:i1. lev. Six leaflet shcllj, con:ainine sur render instructions for towns. burst over the village. The occuptn:s of :he town were then informed that ;\mi.:i can fighter-bombers were 01 erh:..id. The Forward Air Controller called down a P-17. that laid a leaflet bomb yuarely over the center of the town. Ihe tanks then moved fonvtrd with out firing, while the loudspeaker con. tinued to call on the town to surrender. As the tanks brushed through 3 light curtain of fire, the firing s t o p d and white 0ags appeared. A garrison of m e 800 men with antitank weapons surrendered. Admittedly, this was an ideal operation. Usually the results achieved are not so spectacular nor is the coordina- :ion so perfect.. However. several important aspects of battle propaganda can be gathered from this operation. Most important of these is the realization that no one is surrendering to the propaganda. U'hat they are surrendering to is the military force, the tank attack. However, that force has been exploited by the battle propagandist for its fullest psychological effect. Sothing could be more. wrong than the idea, unfortunately preyalent- in many quarters, that psychological warfare is a wonder weapon operatino, by itself to achieve spectacular results. It Tkouaamds of Gerrms surrendered to this mmit rltb 7th Armored Dir. is merely another supporting weapon, though of overlooked power. and like 3ny supporting weapon its fullest results are only achieved through cooperation. In this particular instance the tanks and supporting infant? never returned the hostile &. This is a customary battle pro aganda device that the fullest. Once the fire fight has been joined the enemy gets some relief from his anxien. in action and it becomes harder to get the maximum pycholngical result. This points up the need for peacetime training in :his held. It takes a well disciplined unit to hold their fire. During \\'odd \V3r I1 it would take on the average of ten t o fifteen loudspeaker missions before troops learned to make the adaptations necessary for psychological warfare to he a success. Some outfits that had had initial e.y&ences with loudspeakers never learned. The intricacies of tank-infantryloudspeaker cooperation should be forged now in training. -1hc individual tanker and a m r e d inf3n:yman also has to be trained to think in terms of psychological ~ 4 r - fare. .4t the time the enemy f i r s stars t o iurrender. any single soldier can chinxe the owcome of a battle by shooting down the surrendering soldiers. This makes the enemy feel be-traved and he settlrs down to really fight. Also the belief that it is "sissf to take prisoners must be eradicated. It is a far more soldierly course to get on the objective quickly with few casualties through taking prisnners. than to reach the objective after a hard battle in which no prisoners were taken. so heavily hurt yourself that ezcploits the shoc P action of tanks to A R M O R - J ~ ~ - F h ~ , 1951 you cannot e.xploit your gains. .iftcr all. ;\rmor.is the arm of s p d and vie ence and taljng prisoners often will increase !our speed a hundred fold. There are a host of other questions that should be ironed outin training. \\'hat is the best pinon for the loud-speaking tank to take in an attack? llow should its radio set be h d e d up? LVho should command i t ? Through what chain of command? Then there are the technical questions of the best form of power supply. the best position for the budspeaker on the tank. the exact distances the speaker can k heard in different terrain and weather? There are also to be investigated the numerous supplemental beneiia that derive from the presence of a loudspeaker tank. The mos: smking ofthevistbeuudtbeMspakcr in thc c o a d of danv during an attack. The loudspeaker can rtach t.- rnfantpman a: U I : ~ : havins IO go :hruugh the radm ne: For elumpk. after the t3nL h n e bn i3ht.d putung hrr MI J *:r,tnpun:. the infantn L m he inf~mnL-J $4 :hi. 1li.r :hL !tlud*pAlc.r. Th:. ..ti\ :h:T LJn .i::-cL :hc .:-#*nqun: .mm:di J:c~\ \~::!I.u: ~ h - : !.+- :hj: ILY. :ht. enem! r e q a n im. The 11 \rmQ red UUJ :b.- ~ c . 5 2 \*.!:h L - L ~ : *U.L:>\. par:iculdrt\ in :c*i\ns uhcrz Lmmrr!ql Tht, ju~*'z:ion ( , I ha,w man\ I8B[d N i * i ! \ \ J \ > d1ffirul:. *;xALt.: :mL thcrr ,h BUM h. And !ht. c u m m n d chrnneI should br, 3 ,nu :nt 1. Ihe ci.~mbt 3m have a i n : ~ ~ c s t in :hi, q u a m . yet fe\r- ar. m r c d e?rpens ha\e riven the pr& ]ern more &an pauing atrenuon. . ~ t the ri5L of wunlng like that famed of future \cars "the old e-.'. I p o p r belicve rjtin t h e of l o u d y e a h . f o l h m g to be the There bhould be one orpanic loud. s;pealer rank with tank ba:talion in the a m e d division. Thme &wld be nvo such tanL with the separate armored mechanued reconnaissance regiments that operate WI of C-.arp. There should be a Ply &-er in Dcvi-sion HQ responsible for training the crews in PLV techques and leadme the k q loudspeaker unit in combat. The lardspeakers mus be organic. \\'odd U'ar I1 proved that YOU cannot attach than to a division for an openrion any more than you could anach a tank banalion to an infmr? division on the me of an rpra:jon and expcc: real results. Loding briefly into the fu:ure. loudspeakers are due to pla! a :re. mendously important pa" in airborne armor units. In the air head. which is shock action at its highest. the m bile loudqxakers will range 'round the perimeter. Eren-where confusion is found the? will emloit it. calling on the enemy to surrender. enhancing his fears wi:h battle noises. incrasino, :he confusions throueh phony orders IO his To rroop. fucher its mission .+mor needs the tank moun:ed Ir)udspealier and the techniques of bank propaganda. T o be etfective. battle propaganda must \cork with .%mor and the other ma-bile combat forces. The lateness of the hour almost demands that the marriage take place soon. 33 i

A R M O R & U ~ - F ~ - ,

D I S C U S S I O N

sh#rg points in the mobile M u m e &o organized on &tical m a i n fwtura which domina-lib.ly mr# of .cwmy approach. into th. defended 0i.a. Th. mission of units ot sftow points b 10 rh. m y , )O Jow him down, to forc. him to &plot/, and, if pouiblo, to stoQ or d.llroy him. Tanks and automatic weapons are p l o d on th. position SO as to provid. a maximum d u n w of fin eovoring onomy avenues of approach. Porsonnd carrion, k c a m of thoir mQthiru guns, may bs used in organizing th. position; 0th.mh t h y aro assombled ?- poririon within th. strong point. Rango cards aro p r c r p d for each poriti~n. Road bbdcr and mine fi.lds are atablirhd and c o v r d by tank and rmallsms fin. Those 0brtd.r dmdd bkcakd rothot theydo not hindor the counterotiack by rh. rosorvo. Advontag. is ldan d d natural 0brtad.r to delay, slow down, and hororr th. m y . Obsowath portr m during daylight houn, and listdng portr ot night whm obsorvotion ports am po(kd in. Contact kh.n ttroq points is mainioinod primarily by radio. H o w m r , pokdr m w i l y opuated botwem strong points during hours of darkness, and an usod during doytighc to s&guard MOI mered neithor by tho tkong points, nor by obwnotion. At night, 01 visibility is limited, tanks and automatic weapons should bo sited to fir. down mads or dmikr likdy ovonuos of approach in order to miuro hits on oporoachiq ummy vohid.r and ponmrwl. Armored idanw normally will dig in along forward s b p ~ ~ of stroq-point positions. 1 W e mnst b e integration of -01, integration "*in tbe , sense tbat we are prepared utcntrJJI as u*eU as pbysicdly and in etmy 0 t h way for mobility . . ."

INTEGRATED ARMOR

by COLONEL RO6€W J. U K S IIE impression gained from Lieutenant Colonel Pickett's article "Tanks in Korea." in :he Sovember-December 1950 issue I f ARMOR was that our o&ea stiU ail to understand the use of tanks. IXs is amazing at first glance and yet, n the light of Brigadier General Riley

F. Ennis' "Statement on Armor" in he same issue, it is understandable. General Ennis may be surprised at .uch an i n t y t a t i o n of his remark JS well as to earn that I received my irst tank wining from him when he sas a Fiat Lieutenant. But that is be- .ide the point. General Ennis summarited bridy h t very well, without intending to do a. the reasons for this failure in our .raining. Armor was, as he says, the mduct of men of vision. but leader- .hip in this field passed from hand to 'land and from counv to countr_\. The reason is that there hare been. *ram the beginning, two schools of : hought and one or the other has been n the ascendanq- at different periods. There was and is one school made up ,f officers and civilians with imagina- .ion. those who grasp the possibilities I f this type of warfare. The other is nade up of those w h o fail to see the wibilities in anything new or who qpssirely resist change. He pointed out that the pendulum ,f the theory of armor employment ids swung first one way and then the Ither. \i'orld War I developed the iew that armor was but an infan@ upport weapon. Thinking changed n 1925. principally due to British in-hence which we followed. as later lid the Germans. During the earlier lhases of World N'ar 11. the concept f armor was as an independent enti?. ARMOR-Jonuary-Fobruwy, 1951 Then the pendlblurn swung again to d midpoint. General h n i s says that this is the reason that today "annor forms a hard coie in our arm! which extends in deptb through all of the major tactical units." It seems to me that this continuaI swing has failed to develop in our army a comspadmg "bard core" of tactical thought. Regardless of the T 0 & E, we do not seem to have been able to d e up OUT minds. There still are evidences of the in-tluences of the past thirty yean in each posirion OC the pendulum and many of them are negative iduences. It is not to be wmdered that many of our combat o&rs fail to understand the use of tanks. The same thing could be said about many wff and general &en. Prior to June. 1950. the ofkial view was that Korea was unsuitable for tank use but the SICS apparently were not familiar with that doctrine and used tanks without knowing any better. That forced us to do likewise. I sa! forced beaause. on the basis of &cia1 doctrine, the terrainavas unsuitable for their use. Lflere \vas the "hard core" of tactical thought amono, the officers who made that decision? llilita? menl are greatly inzerested in the war in K o k and the lessons to be learned from it. Colonel Pickett's ariicle poin:ed ou: nine of them. Those lessons could k v e been winen dudnq U'orld War I. during the p- nod benveen both World \Van. during \Vorld \Var I1 and the period Cdocr( -1. kks, Ordnance I-. is o recognized autkority in *e field of armor. Nor ,n private business tn Chocogo. he 1s the outkor of the book Tonls md * u m d Vehdes. since IVorld lf*ar U. as w - d as a h t K ~ r e k if one s u ~ t u t a earlier 5~ of antitank weapons and communica- O O ~ S equipment for those in use in each correspondmg earlier penod. Here the\. are:

I. Failureon tbepanoiour& cers to apprrdate the crass-between infana-y and rank

3. The -t of rank in numbers rather than units

4. Use of persome1 lacking tank training.

5. Pax maintenance resulting from inarperience.

6. The need far maintenance dong the axis of ad\-.

7. Theimponanceofcamau8age.

8. The sense o€ security the "N- per bazooka" gives to infan?.

9. The d i h l t i a of F!il radio communication in hilly coun a?-. .\11 during the penod from 1918 to 1950 the statement has been made b? the consenatires that the tank had had its day. that in an! battle ben\-een tank and gun. the gun w d d be \-k- tor. It is just as sensible to u y that in any duel beor-een a man with a gun and one withour the latter uiIl always be defeated. This is a surface con. clusion. The fac: that large numbers of infanv do sunire a war is p d of that. \Yere it not true. wars would hare ceased long ago. It is a surface conclusion likeuise to say the tank has had i s day. Such categorical ~onclu-sions fail to consider the imponder-ables of mah's adaptabili?. his in-genuitl; and hs fmagination. 37 counq d t ) . of tank L The 'Kcmi? for teamwwli

.it an! rate the peidulum has s u u n g , not )us a few. times. but many times and our docnine have swuna wxh it. .Ut- World \Var I. the French became imbued with the doc-

--UNDERSEATANK-

4 I trine of fire power and we aped them. Then. after the Brirish experimental armored force was established. we s a d of€ in that directian as well. The i&a was to retain the fire power t;i .he infantry-actill-team and to gvr cavalry a new highly mobile smk-ine power. but it had rough going. & e d ChaEee and others succeeded :n creaiing some enthusiam for using a k s with i m p a t i o n . in spite of may heartbreaks and the pinchpenny amtudes so frequent in peace-dme. G e n d Ennis goes on to point out that the opening of World War I1 a v e this idea b-ery considerable sup +. TheinitialsauxessesdtheGer-mans in their use of axmur caused us to copy them and theirmectbods-or SO we thought. The British and ourselves even went so far as to copy their or- - r i d setup. bdiming that to be the sglpt of their .success. Then. as the Germans h g e d their organi- z a h due to poktidand logistical Ldderadons and we began to take parr in the war under vaning condi-donr we became confused. ha\ing failed to see that we had copied the The cnrmans' armored force came hro h q in 1933. In Germany. as :n other counmes. there were disputes betcveerr tbose with imagination and :he conservatives. Many of the Ger- m n p e r a h wanted to tie armor down :o infan? but were not com-plesely successful. The brilliant use *d amor the Germans early in the war was poz foUowed up and the pendulum there also swmq back. Since \\-odd N'ac II we have gone thnwgh the same sort of thing. Th~s erne &ugh. the consemaaves received :he bachg of a famous scientist who was held in awe our military and z:\ikan leaders. He said tarks were 3bsolete as part of the general "one-weapon, easv war concept" which he I w m p things EeI+d to mike popular.- -it any rate. OUT o&cial riew followed this line and 1: t v s 3ot until 1948 that the pendu- :urn s u n g bgck to the present riew af an mcepted tank-infantry-artillery team. which puts us right back to where we were in the early 'twenties. Is it any wonder that our of6cecs do 3a nat realize the capabilities and potentialities of armor? How can the). be anytlung but confuied? Our concept of fire power is fine. Let us keep it all means. With our limited manpower. fire p e r will become of increasing importance. Major General Christmas' article "Effective Development and Use of .\mor" made a plea for evaluating machines and manpower so as to overcome our handicap in the latter should we meet in out-and-out war a potential enemy w i n g unlimited manpower. Such an evaluation should. in my opinion. let the pendulum of thought on armor wing back again in the direction of mobility. Fire p v e r has demonstrated its importance in Korea and its retention is not in question. But. since it is ap parent chat our present docmne con-ceming armor has not seeped through completely to all concerned, if we do decide to rmise that doctrine. why not take a look at the doctrine of m e bility too as a means of consa-ing manpower? And then by every educational m e n s at our disposal. pound home our revised "hard core of tactical thought" to all ranks from . b y ,

COT

and Division Cornmanden down to the last private soldier. \I%? not give consideration to this evaluation of machines v m s manpower? \[%? should we not think in terms of ingeenuit)- tacticall:? W h y have we become \Iontgomvs in-stejd of P~ttons? \Ve have never tried 3n armored force as such or even dn armored division. Seither have the British or the Germans even though we though: they did. U'hy don't we t? i:? The Russians have come closer to it th4n any of us because of conditions inherent in their militar); and economic snucture and because they have become adaptable and militarily ingenious. Back in 1919. the .Ulied General SAT planners had in mind the pos-sibiliy that the war might go on into

1919. The plans for 1919 have been consistently overlooked since then. undoubtedly because the levons from :he four ye315 of war as they were icrujlly fought transcended any lessons from plans which were never carried out. Yet the four years of the war as fought had led directly to the plans intended for 1919. Those plans contemplated tank-infantry self-pr-lled-artillery teams plus a separate armored. force to exploit the breakthrough. That annored force was, I contend, the only genuine armored force that was ever visualized as a d&nite part of a plan for war. Why? Because it was to consist entirely of tracklaying vehicles. In the anicle "Tie-In in Korea" in the \o- vember-December issue of .\R.\IOR. w~hicb was based on a report by Lieutenant Colonel James ti. Lynch. there was the following sipficant statement: "With orders to move aggressively . . . the three lead tank shortly outdistanced the slower moving truck column, despite attempts to control them by radio." That in a nutshell is fie problem we have kicked around for thim years without a real attempt at solution. W e have completely ignored that 1919 plan.U'ith about 300 tanks in a socalled armored division, we have many times that number of wheeled and half-track vehicles. What is the good of developing a tank with 3 speed of t h i q miles an hour if we intend to use it as an infantry accompanying vehicle? Why tie down its mobilit). by wheeled vehicles unable to keep pace with it? Ctrhy organize a division, ostensibly an armored division, if it is our intent to parcel out its tanks in driblets to accompany infantry. Now we intend manufacturing the new light tank T41. It is even faster than the 31.16. \?la[ a curious para. dox. Li hter. faster. more mobile tanks w i i great fire power, intended for-what? Mobility? Where will we use it if we are committed to a slug-gingpolicy tactically, or are tied down to roads with the present wheeled transport of the Irision. or with the muddled thinking which exists among our otfcers. high and low? If all we want is an infantry-accompanykq tank why are we having difficuly making up our minds regarding the manufacture of one of the several models of hear? tanks which are available in pilot form? There is a related point. too. which was mentioned by General Christmas. fie made a plea to the Using Sereices to stop being so "gadget conscious" in their demands for the perfect vehicle. S o potential enemy has a perfect tank but one of them has a hell of a lot of tanks that will sene his purpose just as well. One of our industrial e n g i n m ARMOR--Janu~-Februa, 1951 working an a contract for a new tracklaying combat vehide e@ this thought to me d y when he said that the Army has gotten to be "a bunch of onepercenten." What he meant was tbat every contin-imaginable is dreamed up a possibil-itv and must be provided for. When he complained about the installation of a bilge pump which t h e , , b y wanted in tbe vehicle because it might be needed some time, not only was the bilge pump retained but the design was changed to add another one as a spare. in case the first one should get out of order! Perhaps this is representative OF our problem-that we think in terms of one perfect tan'k innead of annor as Jn integrated force of broad and mobile consequence. I do not consider myself a prophet but for many years my view has been consistent in believing that the 1919 plan is still a good one and worth con. sideration. Armor shadd be integrated with infantry and artilley but inte qration is needed over all. Sot inte- -tion in the sense that everything is subordinated to slugging, hard hitting fire power but in the sense that we are prepared mentally as well as physically and in every other w.3: for mobility: in the sense that we develop a true armored force containing a minimum of overhead and no vehicles but tracklaying vehicles that we develop crmscountty tracklayers for cam-ing infantry and supplies; that we develop 3 tactical air force for the hard hitting combat team and another trained to cooperate with a true armored force: that we really evaluate machines and manpower. On the other hand if we are going to continue Hith a "hard core of armor" throughout all our tactical units with fire power and more fire power the end goal. let's sav so and quit de-luding ourselves with talk about m e bility. because we won't have it. Then at least our troops will not be caught mentally in between the swing of the pendulum. Today there should be clear concepts resulting from hi? yean of experience. Let's have integration of thought as well as integration of Cre power. kt's really integrate annor so it can never be said about the new -+my now building that "our of&er~ still fail to understand the use of tanks."

M M O R ~ O S W ~ - F . ~ ~ ~ O ~ ~ ,

1951 ,/