Manning the Next Generation Main Battle Tank

NGMBT’screw size limits a tank company’s ability to sustain continual op erations in a LSCO environment. In the Russo-Ukraine conflict, the Battle of Vuhledar extended for 21 days before the Ukraine ground forces destroyed the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade.5 From my personal experience, I served as a tank platoon leader during exercise Combined Resolved VIII in 2017 at the Hohenfels Training Area (HTA) in Germany. Three out of the four tanks in my platoon had three-person crews, my crew being one of the three-person crews. Sustained combat operations for the 10 days of force-on-force operations put pres sure on our platoon’s fighter management plan. With only a three-person crew, maintenance, sector sketches, camouflage, local security tasks, and rest became difficult to balance within the later battle periods. I assess that sustained combat opera tions with a three-person tank crew results in faster degradation on tacti cal level units to accomplish their pla toon battle tasks and company mis sion-essential tasks when compared to a four-person tank crew due to the in creased stress on fighter manage ment. Tank companies would require the same tasks out of their crews with less time to rest. Furthermore, when tank companies begin combat opera tions, the strain on the three crew members increases as they also ab sorb the loader’s former responsibili ties. While loading the main gun is au tomated, the loader has additional responsibilities like assisting the tank commander with directing the driver and maintaining the communications equipment. A quantitative analysis of the increased workload on three-per son crews versus four-person crews in a combat scenario was conducted showing that drivers in three-person crews had a higher overall workload and gunners had twice as many tasks.6 The Armor community continues to refine the understanding of what au tomations can provide within the NGMBT and how that effects fighter management in continuous LSCO op erations at the tactical level. A delib erate assessment on sustained combat operations must be conducted with the NGMBT’s three-person crews. This assessment will come when the first NGMBT ABCT unit rotates through a CTC and provides the Armor commu nity with an assessment of how long the three-person crews can sustain continuous operations. The assess ment should also identify tasks and training that tank commanders must assume with the loss of a crew member. Organization and doctrine Retired COL Richard Kolasheski wrote about the organization and doctrine change that occurred in 1978 when the U. S. Army transitioned to the M1 Abrams platform, stating how the changes were “designed for better dis tribution and controls of combat pow er” as the U. S. Army tested anew battalion organization in preparation for the incorporation of the M1 Abrams platform from Jan. 17-23, 1977 during field training exercise Polar Gauntlet at HTA, Germany.7 Similarly, three-per son crews in the NGMBT opens opportunities within the U. S. Armor Branch to reassess how we organize our forc es, and it provides an opportunity to change our MTOE to expand the amount of combat power a tank company brings to the fight, while also mitigating the negative effects of less crew members per tank. Company H, 2nd Squadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment at Fort Knox was tasked with the final testing and fielding of the M-1 program, which was finalized as the M1 Abrams MBT, in the Spring of

1980. Simultaneously, the U. S. Army enacted a major change in tank pla toon organization and MTOE for armored battalions as they decreased the number of tanks per platoon from five M60 MBTs in one tank platoon to four M1 Abrams MBTs in one tank platoon. The “Smaller Crews” article by Alfred Bowen discusses that the driving factor for this organizational change was the “combined costs of procurement and operations.”8 This change of tank platoon organization was argued within the Armor commu nity. Retired LTG Arthur Collins be lieved the M1 Abrams tank platoon should be reduced even further to three tanks.9 Retired MG Walter Ulmer supported the four M1 Abrams MBT tank platoon, citing that four tanks were the minimum number of fires and maneuver capabilities to allow a tank platoon to be effective. 10 I believe that another organization change will occur with the NGMBT, and there is potential to transition back to five tanks per tank platoon af fecting the tactical-level echelons across the U. S. Army. Note that this as sessment comes without the knowledge of the cost estimate of what the NGMBT will be compared to the M1 Abrams cost. Referencing the FY23 Figure 2. U. S. Army Soldiers of 1st Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, setup their M1 Abram Tanks during Saber Getica 17 in Romania, July 10, 2017. (U. S. Army photo by SPC Kelsey VanFleet)

MTOE again, the current tank platoon has 16 Soldiers. The anticipated implementation of an autoloader and three-person crews allows tank platoons to field five NGMBTs per platoon with 15 Soldiers. The proper adjustment to the MTOE can be made to organize additional MOS 19K2O and 19K3O Soldiers to serve as the gunner and tank commander for the additional tank. Further changes could be made to alleviate the strains discussed within the personnel aspect of DOTMLPF. I argue that there is little tactical value added with the company executive officer in a tank. In a tactical environment, the executive officer is responsible for re sourcing classes of supply for the company, facilitating operations at the company command post, overseeing maintenance, and supervising the company combat trains. The company executive officer can accomplish all these duties in one of the wheeled vehicles or the M113/AMPV within the headquarters section provided the right mission command and commu nication systems. Overall, this reduction of one tank crew results in the new tank company MTOE of 16 NGMBT tanks per compa ny, three platoons of five tanks and the company commander’s tank. Bigger picture, this is an increase of four tanks for a combined-arms battalion, increasing from 29 M1 Abrams tanks to 33 NGMBTs. Furthermore, this new MTOE would require 10 less 19K series Soldiers to operate all 16 NGMBT when compared to the current MTOE to operate all 14 M1 Abrams. Jump crews can be established within the headquarters sections to mitigate neg ative effects from the personnel loses. These jump crews can be aligned with platoons during garrison operations to assist with maintenance. In a tactical environment, these jump crews can rotate on tanks during security-rest cy cles allowing the tank company some flexibility in its fighter management during continuous combat operations. My overall recommendation is that a minimum of two jump crews, four 19K Soldiers, are considered for any changes to the MTOE associated with chang es from the NGMBT’s manning. Doctrine changes may occur because of the organizational changes. A tank platoon’s durability and capabilities to maneuver are increased with an in crease from four tanks to five tanks per platoon. Tank platoons are no longer rendered combat ineffective with the loss of a tank section. With the in crease to five tanks per platoon, the loss of a tank section means that a tank platoon now has three tanks to maneuver. The remaining three tanks in the platoon can still conduct all the platoon battle tasks associated with a tank platoon with little degradation. An M1 Abrams tank platoon using current doctrine would be assessed as combat ineffective after the loss of a tank section and its ability to conduct platoon battle tasks in support of the company’s mission would be severely degraded. Changes in current doctrine to accom modate five tanks per platoon can mirror old doctrine found in TC 17-15-11 Tank Crew Drills for M60 Series Main Battle Tank published in December

1977. The adjustment back to five tanks per platoons can be made quick ly in aspects such as formation order of movement, standard direct fire con trol measures within formations and platoon battle drills. The most notice able difference is that the platoon leader does not have to commit his/ her tank into the fight with five tanks per platoon. The platoon leader can still have the two tank sections fight and remain uncommitted to fight to maintain command and control of the tank sections. The decision for the platoon leader’s tank to join the fight can be a deliberate action to mass fires on the decisive point of the operation. As a result of doctrine changes to how a tank platoon of five tanks fights, section sergeants retain enough fires and maneuver capability with their two NGMBTs to affect the enemy at the de cisive point while not fully committing the entirety of their platoon. In conclusion, organization, and doc trine changes with three-person crews on the NGMBT provide options to change the MTOE and allow for more combat power at the company and platoon level. These changes can also alleviate the strains that occur when reducing the crew size from four to three while also allowing companies to fully operate more tanks with less required Soldiers from the current

MTOE.

Training The last DOTMLPF factor considered in this article is training. The current tank crew member’straining progression begins at the loader position, then the crew member progresses to the driver Figure 3. Mechanics from Assault Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment’s field maintenance team conduct battle damage assessment repair on an M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tank during Operation Lock, May 2023. (Army photo by 1LT Raven Parker, battalion unit public affairs representative) position, then gunner, and then the fi nal step if to become a tank commander. The mindset behind this progression is that a brand-new Soldier, fresh out of advanced individual train ing (AIT), can be placed in the turret first as a loader. That Soldier’s respon sibility to maintain the radios can be taught easily, and loading a main gun round is already taught at AIT. They are in the turret with their gunner and tank commander who can provide hands on training in the turret and the new loader can see and hear all ac tions that goes on in the turret. This allows for better development of the Soldier’s technical and tactical skills on their MBT platform. That crew member transitions to the driver position knowing everything that the tank com mander and loader does in the turret. The driver’s role is much more impor tant because the driver’s action has implications that can lead to the sur vival of the crew. Referring to the Defense Technology’s article on tank crew’s workload, the driver has the second highest workload in both a three-person and four-person crew behind the tank commander. An expe rienced driver and tank commander who have a relationship working to gether can reduce the workload for both parties with communication that only results from multiple field train ing exercises together. I was lucky enough to have the same driver throughout the collective training pe riod leading up to Combined Resolved VIII in 2017. The effective communication between my driver and myself al lowed me to manage the movement of my tank, assist my gunner with scanning and engaging targets, and communicate with my platoon and company commander. That effective communication is not built without an experienced crew member in the driver’s position. A three-person crew on the NGMBT changes this progression become anew Soldier would move immediately to the driver’s position and their actions can mean the difference between life and death of a crew. Train ing management and crew stability be comes even more important when the NGMBT is operated by three crew members. Retaining crew integrity, to include the driver, results in even more lethal crews who have effective communication while maneuvering. Realigning crews must be done at the onset of collective training and should be avoided once collective training starts. This mirrors what some of our NATO allies apply to their tank crews. In my experience, while I was conduct ing interoperability exercises with NATO allies in 2017 and 2023 in the U. S. European Command theater, it was not uncommon for me to talk to a NATO ally’s Leopard tank crew who have been together for more than two years. One last note to highlight as a poten tial friction point for the NGMBT, train ing must be done on the autoloader and troubleshooting procedures to en sure crews know how to get their tank back into the fight when faced with is sues with the autoloader. The M1128 Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS) provides a reference for the use of auto loaders on U. S. Army platforms. The technical manual for the MGS plat form cites multiple troubleshooting procedures that the crew needs to be proficient on. As prescribed in the TM, the crew can troubleshoot the auto loader based on the stage at which the autoloader failed to load the round. Otherwise, level 20 assessment by unit maintenance is required. The main consideration at the tactical level for the implementation of an au toloader is the limitations and training requirements necessary for operation. Crew members require training so that they can continue to fight the tank when the autoloader becomes inoper able. Like three-person operations in an M1 Abrams platform, the gunner will have to transition to the loader role, and the tank commander assumes responsibility of identifying and engaging targets. The training re quired on the Abrams X is complicated since the crew will have to move from the hull into the turret The crew Figure 4. A tank from Assault Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment conducts a wet gap crossing during Operation Lock, May 2023. (Army photo by 1LT Raven Parker, battalion unit public affairs representative) member will then stay in the turret to manually load rounds. This ability to continue to fight the tank with an in operable autoloader is also dependent on the point in the loading process that the autoloader failed to load the round. The NGMBT may be combat in effective if the capability to shoot is taken away due to an inoperable au toloader. Conclusion Overall, the implementation of three-person crews on the NGMBT has effects at the tactical level that needs to be considered as competition continues to develop between the NGMBT platforms. The cost benefit analysis conducted on the personnel, organization, doctrine, and training from the DOTMLPF frame work strives to highlight changes at the tank company level and below that I believe can shape the development of the NGMBT, while also setting con ditions for the seamless integration of that platform once production begins. Changes within personnel will affect how ABCTs throughout the U. S. Army expand the time necessary for weekly PMCS and services for the NGMBT. Additional stress to fighter management with a three-person crew reduces the length in which a tank company can sustain continuous combat operations. Organizational changes may manifest as MTOE changes increase the number of tanks per tank company and bal ance the shortcomings of personnel changes by adding additional jump crews. Lastly, training changes must occur with the three-person crews to ensure new NGMBT drivers are prepared for the most workload demanding posi tion within a three-person crew. The Armor community needs to continue identifying tactical level effects as the NGMBT is determined to set conditions for the platform’s integra tion into the U. S. Army. The U. S. Army must replace the M1 Abrams before the next LSCO erupts to win on the battlefield against our adversaries who have already identified their new MBT for the long term. CPT Larry D. Tran, commander, Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Cavazos, TX. His previous assignments include assistant S-3, 4th Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd ABCT; command er, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), Task Force Sinai, Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt; executive offi cer, HHC, 1st Battalion, 66th Armor Regiment, 3rd ABCT, 4th Infantry Division; and tank platoon leader, Company A, 1st 66th Armor Regiment. CPT Tran’s mil itary schools include the Cavalry Leaders Course; Maneuver Captain’s Career Course; Army Reconnaissance Course; Armor Basic Officer Leaders Course. All schools were at Fort Moore, GA. CPT Train has a bachelor’s of science de gree in human biology from the University of Texas at Austin. His awards include the Meritorious Service Medal. Notes 1 Dan Heaton, “Combat Vehicles Developments to Propel the Army 2030 – and Beyond,” ARMOR, Fall 2022, https://www. dvidshub.net/publication/issues/66234. 2 Kyle Mizokami, “This Dramatic Upgrade to the M1 Abrams Could Help the Tank Soldier on Until the 2050s,” Popular Mechanics, Oct. 12, 2022, https://www.pop ularmechanics.com/military/weapons/ a41575061/abramsx-tank-concept/. 3 CPT Mike Newell, “Survivability Is the Best Argument For a Two-Man Tank,” AR MOR, March-April 1992, https://www. benning.army.mil/Armor/eARMOR/con tent/issues/1992/MAR_APR/Armor MarchApril1992web.pdf. 4 Robin Fletcher, “The Crewing and Configuration of the Future Main Battle Tank,” ARMOR, May-June 1995, https:// www.benning.army.mil/Armor/eARMOR/ content/issues/1995/MAY_JUN/Armor MayJune1995web.pdf. 5 Andrew E. Kramer, “In an Epic Battle of Tanks, Russia Was Routed, Repeating Earlier Mistakes,” New York Times, March 1, 2023, https://www.nytimes. com/2023/03/01/world/europe/ukraine-russia-tanks.html. 6 Ming Mao, Fang Xie, Jian-jun Hu, Bo Su, “Analysis of workload of tank crew under conditions of informatization,” Defence Technology, Volume 10m Issue 1, March 1, 2014, https://www.sciencedirect.com/ science/article/pii/S2214914713000597. 7 COL Richard Kolasheski, “A Battalion Commander’s View Division Restructur ing,” ARMOR, November-December 1978, https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01. blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Cava lryArmorJournal/1970s/1978Jan-Dec.pdf. 8 Alfred Bowen, “Smaller Crews,” AR MOR, November-December 1980, https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob. core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/CavalryAr morJournal/1980s/1980Jan-Dec.pdf. 9 LTG Arthur Collins, Common Sense Training: A Working Philosophy For Leaders, Presidio Press, April 18, 1999. 10 MG Walter F. Ulmer Jr, “Book Review: Common Sense Training,” ARMOR, November-December 1979, https:// mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgov cloudapi.net/library/CavalryArmorJourna l/1970s/1979Jan-Dec.pdf. Acronym Quick-Scan AIT – advanced individual training ABCT – armored brigade combat team AMPV – Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicles DOTMLPF – doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities FSR – field service representative HTA – Hohenfels Training Area LSCO – large-scale combat operations MGS – mobile gun system MTOE – modified table of organization and equipment NGMBT – Next Generation Main Battle Tank PMCS – preventive-maintenance checks and services

Donovan Research Library Donovan Research Library Maneuver Center of Excellence hosts Armor student papers on various subjects, https://www.moore.army.mil/Library/Virtual.html, and back issues of ARMOR magazine, https://www.moore.army.mil/Library/CavalryArmorJournal/ index.html Back-issue archiving shared with eARMOR (1983 through current edition), http://www.moore.army.mil/armor/earmor/