Uncertainty and the Reserve: Updating a Fundamental of Reconnaissance

A current fundamental of reconnais sance is “do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve.” Taken literally, this would imply that a cavalry squadron should not keep any of its assets, such as a scout platoon, in reserve. Yet in all other offensive, defensive or enabling operations, a reserve is not only per mitted, it is required. Field Manual (FM) 3-90-1, Offense and Defense Vol. 1, highlights that are serve exists to deal with uncertainty: “The size of the reserve is relative to the commander’s uncertainty about the enemy’s capabilities and inten tions. The more uncertainty that ex ists, the larger the reserve.”1 As the force that operates with the most un certainty, why would the cavalry be forbidden from maintaining reserve during reconnaissance operations? To do so would breach the combined wis dom in all other doctrine. The Maneuver Center of Excellence Cavalry Leader’s Course (CLC) propos es that this fundamental of reconnais sance has been framed incorrectly. The issue is not whether the cavalry can maintain a reserve; the issue is maximizing the employment of recon naissance assets on reconnaissance tasks. The fundamental should be up dated accordingly. Problem Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-90, Offense and Defense, defines reserve as “that portion of a body of troops that is withheld from action at the be ginning of an engagement to be available for a decisive movement.”2 It serves as a means to retain the initia tive, take advantage of unexpected success and/or counter tactical re serves.3 ADP 3-90 goes so far as to say “a successful commander retains are serve.”4 So why should cavalry formations be handcuffed? Considering that the cavalry serves as the primary asset for developing the situation, operates in ambiguous envi ronments and has the least amount of time to plan, it is the cavalry that most requires a reserve. For instance, if a squadron is conducting a reconnais sance-in-force to determine an enemy’s strength and reaction, the com mander should allocate a reserve to support a retrograde, reinforce friend ly forces or exploit its success. If the Figure 1. Not keeping recon assets in reserve is a fundamental of reconnaissance. (From the Maneuver Center of Excellence “Fundamentals of Reconnaissance” poster series, https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/fundamentals/RF-2.html) cavalry came into contact with supe rior forces without an internal reserve, it would not be able to extricate itself without external support. Further more, if the squadron identifies a gap, such as a lightly defended portion of the enemy lines, it could use the re serve to penetrate the seam before the enemy has an opportunity to re act. As the Army reorients toward largescale combat operations (LSCO), the cavalry will find itself in greater need of a maneuver unit to quickly react to a rapidly changing and complex oper ational environment. Without such a unit, cavalry will routinely fail to achieve all the other fundamentals of reconnaissance due to its inability to retain its freedom of maneuver. Solution The answer is to update cavalry doctrine to promote the employment of a reserve in reconnaissance and securi ty operations. Cavalry doctrine should also include new concepts for structure. The tank company within the ar mor brigade combat team (ABCT) squadron and the weapons troop within the Stryker brigade combat team provide the squadron with op tions for organically generating are serve. Within the infantry brigade combat team, the brigade commander should consider using a platoon from one of the weapons companies to serve as the squadron reserve to max imize the number of assets available to answer brigade priority information requirements (PIR). Besides updating employment considerations, doctrine should retain the fundamental concept to “not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve.” Doctrine should continue promoting the idea of maximizing the employment of reconnaissance assets through all phases of an operation and through the reconnaissance-management op tions of cueing, mixing and redundancy. The updated description should es tablish that cavalry units should not keep an asset available in case another asset observes something, in case another asset is destroyed or just in case another reconnaissance opportunity presents itself. Instead, cavalry units should maximize their ability to collect information by planning and employing the necessary assets appropriately in time and space, with all assets having a task and purpose. The definition should specif ically differentiate how a “reserve force” is separate from “keeping re connaissance assets in reserve,” and how employing a reserve force may be necessary to facilitate mission accom plishment. Conclusion The current fundamental of reconnais sance “do not keep reconnaissance as sets in reserve” and its description will not facilitate the cavalry’s necessary actions as the Army focuses on LSCO. Therefore the fundamentals of recon naissance need to be rewritten to promote the maintenance of a reserve that enables maneuver options for the cavalry commander while also convey ing the requirement to use all recon naissance assets as needed. This ad justment will help the cavalry answer PIR and aggressively shape the battle field while adhering to the rest of the reconnaissance fundamentals. The other option is to retain the fun damentals as written and risk having the cavalry operate in an overly cautious manner due to the necessary requirement to maintain freedom of maneuver. MAJ Ragan Rutherford is attending the Command and General Staff Officer’s Course at Fort Leavenworth, KS. When he wrote this article, he was an in structor for CLC, assigned to 3rd Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, 316th Figure 2. A Bradley Fighting Vehicle from Troop A, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 2nd ABCT, 1st Armored Division, participates in a training event at Fort Bliss, TX. (U. S. Army photo)

Acronym Quick-Scan Cavalry Brigade, Fort Benning, GA. Previous assignments include com mander, Troop A and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 2nd ABCT, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, TX; plans officer, 2nd ABCT, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss; and ex ecutive officer, Troop N, 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, Rose Barracks, Germany. MAJ Rutherford’s military schools include CLC, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Ranger School, Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course, Army Reconnaissance Course, Airborne School and Pathfinder School. He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in history from Texas A&M University. Notes 1 FM 3-90-1, Offense and Defense Vol. 1, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013. 2 ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. ABCT – armored brigade combat team ADP – Army doctrine publication CLC – Cavalry Leader’s Course FM – field manual LSCO – large-scale combat operations PIR – priority information requirement