Zone Reconnaissance – Why Don’t We Do It?

Fall 2020 Zone Reconnaissance – Why Don’t We Do It? by MAJ Jeffrey W. Jennings April 1, 2020: You’re a cavalry-troop commander deployed to the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA. Two enemy boyevaya razvedyvatelna ya dozornaya mashina (BRDMs), or Russian-made scout vehicles, have just destroyed your entire troop. You received a fragmentary order (FRAGO) at 10 a.m. to execute zone re connaissance west to provide freedom of maneuver for the brigade, expand the security area and establish a screen in the vicinity of Brown Pass (Phase Line (PL) Panther). At noon, you issued your own FRAGO to your platoon leaders, walked through a quick map rehearsal, and then you closed your eyes to sleep for the first time in two days. You woke from your nap at 4 p.m. to participate in a commander’s update brief, in which squadron ordered you to your line of departure (LD) at 6 p.m. and to make your reconnaissance pace rapid: “You need to move fast and es tablish your screen at PL Panther no later than 10 p.m. to avoid desynchro nizing the brigade.” At 6 p.m., your troop executed LD and began its zone-reconnaissance mis sion, departing Columbia Wash and moving (in column) generally north west toward Main Supply Route (MSR) Ia Drang. A little while later, as the sun set behind the Sawtooth, your night-vision goggles washed out, and you ducked down in your hatch to check your Joint Capabilities Release (JCR). You saw your troop’s icons traveling west in close-column on MSR Ia Drang. You thought you should deploy – after all, the terrain to your south looked trafficable for your troop’s vehicle platform. Where exactly was your troop bound ary to the south, again? On your JCR, you could see there was not much dispersion between 1st and 2nd platoons. The phrase “ducks in a row” flashed across your mind. Where exactly was your probable line of contact, again? Just as you finished that thought, your gunner began to read to you a flash, immediate, priority, routine message from squadron that ordered you to in crease your rate of march. The com bined-arms battalion you were sup porting needed you to hurry up so they could LD on time. You radioed 1st Platoon and told them to pick up the pace. Then, as your vehicle (tucked safely between your 1st and 2nd platoons, still traveling in column) passed the Pizza Hut on MSR Ia Drang, Red One burst onto the troop net. “Contact! Tanks! (but they weren’t tanks …) North! 1,000 meters! Out!” Five minutes ago, your troop’s last sur viving vehicle was destroyed. You re ported with your dying breath to squadron, and you now sit in your ve hicle staring at your map – studying a place called The Race Track. You scratch your head. What just hap pened? Common scenario Scenarios like this are commonplace among cavalry troops at NTC. All too often, the enemy engages and de stroys the cavalry troop as it travels down an MSR in a convoy or, slightly better, traveling while “deployed” in a very tight wedge or line with very lit tle dispersion between vehicles. How ever, this painful learning experience can be avoided before your unit de parts home station. This is a fight you can win before LD. Here’s how. Understand the scout mission profile and the missions you will execute. Was the unit described in the opening nar rative really executing zone reconnais sance? Zone reconnaissance is the most com mon mission assigned to cavalry troops at NTC, yet it is almost never executed to standard. The troop com mander, in conjunction with the Figure 1. A “Donovian BRDM” engages friendly-force vehicles with its Hot-3 anti-tank guided-missile weapon system at NTC. (U.S. Army photo by PVT Aus tin Anyzeski)

Fall 2020 squadron commander, determines the priority of tasks that best answer pri ority information requirements (PIRs) and then focuses the troop’s collection efforts against these requirements. In other words, they establish reconnais sance objectives. According to Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-20.97, tasks associated with zone reconnais sance include:

• Find and report all enemy forces within the zone;

• Determine the trafficability of all terrain in the zone;

• Inspect and classify all bridges in the zone;

• Locate and report all mines, obstacles and barriers in the zone; and

• Locate bypasses around built-up areas, obstacles, etc. These tasks are completed to answer PIR in named areas of interest (NAIs) and target areas of interest, or to iden tify and mitigate an enemy system on your high-payoff target list. Did the unit described earlier accom plish any of those things? Did they even attempt to? Perhaps the unit in the opening narrative was uninten tionally executing something more akin to a movement-to-contact. A movement-to-contact is a mission ex ecuted by armor and infantry forma tions to develop the situation and to establish or regain enemy contact when the tactical situation is not clear. It’s also used when the enemy has broken contact. A movement-to-con tact, by design, may result in a meet ing engagement or a transition into a deliberate attack. It usually does not adhere to the principle of making con tact with the smallest element. The goal, once in contact, is to maneuver quickly to overcome enemy forces be fore they can react. A movement-to-contact is not a doc trinal reconnaissance task; it does not adhere to the fundamentals of recon naissance. Often cavalry troops at NTC simply maneuver in a specific direction (to ward a limit of advance) focused al most entirely on making enemy con tact. Once contact is made, cavalry troops usually attempt to maneuver against the threat (becoming decisively engaged) and are often de stroyed in the process. This occur rence constitutes zone-reconnaissance failure, is more similar to a movement-to-contact and does not achieve the squadron’s requirement to collect and provide information to the customer unit. To successfully conduct zone recon naissance, troop commanders must develop a concept of operation (and a detailed scheme of maneuver) that clearly incorporates and delineates re connaissance and security (R&S) guid ance (focus, tempo, engagement cri teria, disengagement criteria and dis placement criteria) as described in Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, Page 4-8, Paragraph 4-38. Commanders must consider the supported commander’s PIR and the last time information is of value, and then shape maneuver ac cordingly. Commanders must integrate reconnaissance methods such as dis mounted, mounted, aerial and recon naissance by fire in conjunction with deployment methods and movement techniques that support the desired tempo of operations. Commanders must clearly understand (and coordinate with adjacent units) boundaries identifying the troop’s and platoon’s area of operations to ensure effective reconnaissance. Command ers must also ensure that subordinate leaders (at the team, section and pla toon level) understand the indicators that will allow them to answer PIRs in a timely fashion. Commanders must fully understand and incorporate high er headquarters’ reconnaissance ob jectives and R&S guidance, and must engage in commander-to-commander dialogue to confirm that understand ing. Commanders must leverage the squadron S-2’s intelligence prepara tion of the battlefield (IPB) to assist with mission analysis. These are the elements that constitute effective zone reconnaissance (ATP 3-20.97). Leaders must understand their forma tion’s doctrinal missions. Build check lists into your standing operating pro cedure (SOP) to ensure you accom plish the tasks necessary for each mis sion. Plan your scheme of maneuver accordingly. To execute effective zone Figure 2. Cavalry-troop zone reconnaissance. (From Figure 3-1, ATP 3-20.97)

Fall 2020 reconnaissance, you must first under stand what it requires. Execute proper maneuver, dispersion Was the unit in the opening narrative using the correct formations, move ment techniques and operating dis tances (dispersion) for effective zone reconnaissance? No. The troop in the opening narrative was traveling in close columns while tasked to execute zone reconnaissance (a common occurrence at NTC). In do ing so, the troop simultaneously failed to operate at proper dispersion dis tances, to use the appropriate formation(s) and to employ the correct move m e n t t e c h n i q u e ( s ) . These failures not only reduce the troop’s ability to execute its zone-reconnaissance mission but also provide the ene my with easy di rect-fire engage ment opportuni ties. To effectively per form zone recon naissance, cavalry troops must operate at their maximum achievable dispersement. They must also transition between movement techniques and formations as appro priate, based on probable lines of en emy contact (by weapon system / ca pability) and the commander’s recon naissance guidance (tempo and focus). Properly dispersed, a Stryker brigade combat team’s scout platoon, for ex ample, can achieve a “frontage” of up to four kilometers. This is calculated (and adjusted) based on enemy-fires capability, friendly-fires coverage, mu tual direct-fire support between vehi cles, unit boundaries, terrain and oth er mission considerations. References for developing operating distances specific to partic ular missions is at Appendix B of ATP 3-20.97, Cav alry Troop. In the opening narrative, the troop command er wondered “where is my probable line of contact?” Know ing where the en emy will likely be gin to engage you, and with what weapon sys tem, is essential to transitioning between move ment techniques. T h e r e f o r e , commanders must conduct IPB (and leverage the squadron S-2 to assist) to determine the probable line of contact to determine the probable line of de ployment. If enemy contact is unlikely, traveling may be appropriate. When enemy contact becomes likely, scout troops/ platoons must transition to bounding overwatch. When squadron wants a quicker pace/speed, the cavalry troop must adjust its movement technique rather than its formation. In any case, one truth remains constant: regardless of the likelihood of enemy contact, a scout formation traveling in a column cannot properly execute zone recon naissance. Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP): At NTC during reception, stag ing, onward-movement and integra tion week, platoons and troops can ex ecute drivers’ training/terrain familiar ization, incorporating movement tech niques and formations. This sort of training should also be executed as a part of all training at home station. Prepare, rehearse, build playbook now It’s Training Day 5 in your NTC rota tion; you’ve been awake for close to 40 hours. You’ve just received a FRAGO to execute a zone reconnaissance. Would you rather …

• Put on your thinking cap, pull out a sketchpad and develop your plan from scratch; or

• Refer to the “playbook” (SOP) your team developed together, discussed, implemented and trained at home station? Have you ever watched a National Football League game in which the coach and quarterback huddled on the sideline to design every play from scratch immediately before they exe cuted it? Unlikely. Develop your “play book” now when you are rested, have time, can plan collaboratively and can practice (rehearse) your plays (SOPs). Figuratively, know that in a given situ ation you are going to execute “56 Trap Right” or “88 Y-Option Wheel.” TTP: Using maps and micromachines on a conference room table, your team can collaboratively design what zone reconnaissance (and other Figure 3. A scout platoon traveling in column with 20 me ters of dispersion between vehicles cannot effectively ex ecute zone reconnaissance and is vulnerable to enemy di rect- or indirect-fire engagement. Figure 4. A scout platoon bounding by section with 1,000 feet between vehicles can effectively reconnoiter a zone and is less vulnerable to enemy direct- or indirect-fire en gagement.

Fall 2020 missions) looks like in garrison. You can establish which platoon/section is responsible for which tasks, and you can make those enduring assignments. You can rehearse (have the executive officer play the enemy) those “plays” to work out points of friction early. Then, once you’re executing in the field, you simply adjust your “play” (SOP) for terrain and enemy, adapt and execute. It is much quicker than designing your play on the spot when time counts and you’re in contact. Endeavor to reach a point of shared competency so well developed that when you tell your team, “We’re exe cuting zone reconnaissance to estab lish a screen at PL Panther” at NTC, ev eryone knows exactly what that means and the part he/she will play in it. Bat tle drills are only well rehearsed and effective once the whole team under stands and incorporates the associat ed pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections associated with each R&S mission in your unit’s profile. That’s why these items must be codified into SOP checklists. Well-rehearsed and fluidly executed battle drills enable your unit to achieve the quick pace and effectiveness higher headquarters demands. Before departing home station, strive to achieve a level of core mission-es sential task-list proficiency so high that everyone in your formation could do zone reconnaissance in his/her sleep. This will require you to be cre ative with your training opportunities – you don’t need to be in the field to practice zone reconnaissance. You can do it on a map (of NTC, preferably) with miniature vehicles. You can do it during physical training. You can do it during brownbag lunches with your team. Wargame and rehearse now. Refer to Chapter 5 (specifically Page 5-22) of ATP 3-20.97 for a zone-recon naissance vignette (which includes a full operations order and graphics) that you can use for planning and re hearsing. If you prepare now, you’ll simply be executing well-rehearsed battle drills at NTC. Simply put, if you wait until Training Day 4 to sketch what you think your (insert mission here) will look like, you may find your self in the same position as the troop commander in our introductory narra tive. Conclusion If you are a cavalry-troop commander or platoon leader, you can rest assured that most of your missions at NTC will brief a lot like this: “Comanche Troop executes zone reconnaissance of Area of Operations Carolina, clears Objec tive Falcon and establishes a screen at PL Panther no later than [time/date group] to provide freedom of maneu ver and early warning to the brigade. …” Units (leaders) that execute zone reconnaissance (and other missions) to standard come prepared.

• They develop, rehearse and execute SOPs at home station (they come with a playbook).

• They know, understand and use proper dispersion, movement techniques and formations.

• They know, understand and abide by their commander’s reconnaissance guidance.

• They follow the zone-reconnaissance task list and understand the priority of tasks.

• They reconnoiter.

• They develop and refine NAIs to answer PIRs.

• They use smoke and suppressive fires to facilitate maneuver (both mortars and field artillery).

• They fly their Raven.

• They use their enablers and attachments.

• They report accurately and with timeliness, based on observation of NAIs to answer brigade PIRs.

• They expand the general themes of t h i s a r t i c l e b e y o n d zo n e reconnaissance and practice the same TTPs when executing security missions as well. In short, units that are successful at NTC do all these things routinely. They adhere to R&S fundamentals. Units that do none of these things simply learn the hard way. Start now. Come prepared. The BRDMs in the vicinity of The Race Track are waiting for you. MAJ Jeff Jennings is a cavalry-troop trainer with Cobra Team, Operations Group, NTC, Fort Irwin, CA. His previ ous assignments include commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Com pany, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regi ment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), WA; com mander, Comanche Company, 1-23 In fantry (Stryker), JBLM; Stryker infantry battalion assistant operations officer, 1-23 Infantry, JBLM; and aide-de-camp to the 1st Cavalry Division deputy com manding general of sustainment, Fort Hood, TX, and Kandahar, Afghanistan. MAJ Jennings’ military schools include Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Stryker Leader’s Course and Cavalry Leader’s Course. He has a bachelor’s degree in business administration from Georgia Southern University. Acronym Quick-Scan ATP – Army techniques publication BRDM – boyevaya razvedyvatelnaya dozornaya mashina (Russian scout vehicle) CP – checkpoint (Figure 2) FRAGO – fragmentary order IPB – intelligence preparation of the battlefield JBLM – Joint Base Lewis-McChord JCR – Joint Capabilities Release LD – line of departure LoA – limit of advance (Figure 2) MSR – main supply route NAI – named area of interest NTC – National Training Center PIR – priority information requirement PL – phase line R&S – reconnaissance and security RP – release point (Figure 2) S – screen (Figure 2) SOP – standard operating procedures SP – start point (Figure 2) TTP – tactics, techniques and procedures