Reconsidering Division Cavalry Squadrons Part II

Fall 2018 Reconsidering Division Cavalry Squadrons by MAJ Nathan Jennings (Editor’s note: This is the second in a four-part series that describes the problem, history and potential solu tions for the U.S. Army’s lack of dedi cated division-level ground reconnais sance and security capacity.) Cavalry forces specialize in security ef forts designed to protect their higher headquarters’ operations. This tactical task, along with reconnaissance, has endured since antiquity as a primary function of mounted scouts due to their inherent operational reach. For divisions wielding a panoply of maneu ver and enabling assets, the require ment for dedicated formations to safe guard and facilitate an increasingly complex order of battle remains a crit ical function in the 21st Century. As out lined in Division Operations, such scouting elements “provide early and accurate warning” to “provide the force” with “time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy and to develop the situation.”1 Typical security tasks, as defined by modern U.S. Army doctrine, typically center on observing, reporting and, if need be, neutralizing enemy recon naissance or blunting adversary incur sions during offensive, defensive and stability operations. They may include conducting screen, guard and cover missions where arrayed units provide early warning and fight to allow time and space for higher headquarters to deploy main force battalions and bri gades. These operations may also in clude distributed area security efforts to protect friendly forces and terrain within defined geographical boundar ies. The division-cavalry (DivCav) for mations – and the J and L-Series mod els in particular – usually accomplished these missions through integration of enhanced mobility, firepower, protec tion and aerial reach.2 DivCav in security operations The combat performance of 1st Squad ron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, of 1st Infan try Division in Vietnam offers an illus trative case study on the potential ef fectiveness of division-level cavalry during distributed security operations. From October 1965 to April 1970, the command – informally called “Quarter horse” – conducted diverse tasks that included route patrolling, static de fense, pacification and “search and de stroy” missions against irregular, though highly lethal, Communist oppo nents. Since the Big Red One deployed as a predominantly light division, its cavalry squadron’s complement of ar mored-personnel carriers, scout heli copters and eventually tanks, in addi tion to partnered infantry, heavy armor and host-nation forces, allowed them to provide critical and responsive com bat power.3 The Quarterhorse squadron deployed from Fort Riley, KS, to a volatile sector north of Saigon in III Corps’ tactical zone amid skepticism over the effec tiveness of heavy armor for stability operations in jungle terrain. When Pentagon officials grudgingly allowed III Corps to bring 27 M48A3 Patton tanks, GEN William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), impound ed the vehicles at Phu Loi after criticiz ing that “Vietnam is no place for either tank or mechanized-infantry units.”4 The cavalrymen thus relied on Ar mored Cavalry Assault Vehicles – mod erately protected M113s personal car riers with upgraded firepower and tur ret gunshields – for the first six months. During that time, the division usually dispersed the squadron’s three ground troops and air troop to support infantry units. Armored cavalry proved its value in 1st Infantry Division’s first major engage ment of the conflict Nov. 10-11, 1965. Troop A, then supporting 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment, provided vital mobility and firepower as the task force defended National Highway 13, the main line of communication north of Saigon, against a sudden Viet Cong (VC) attack. Called the Battle of Ap Bau Bang for a small hamlet nearby, the cavalrymen broke 272th Regiment’s sur prise assault with a mounted counter attack that allowed time for the Amer ican infantry to ready defenses. This fight, and many others that followed, rapidly changed the Army’s perception of the utility of armored cavalry in Vietnam. The troop received the Valor ous Unit Award for its actions.5 The squadron continued to conduct search-and-destroy missions, cordon villages during larger clearing opera tions and secure key routes and Part II: 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, in Vietnam Figure 1. Organization of 1-4 Cavalry, Vietnam. (Adapted from John J. McGrath, Scouts Out: The Development of Reconnaissance Units in Modern Armies)

Fall 2018 convoys throughout Spring 1966. By summer it had reconsolidated its troops and repossessed its tanks as the division launched Operation El Paso II to secure a contested area called War Zone C northwest of Saigon. Since 1-4 Cavalry boasted greater road mobility than the infantry battalions, it focused on clearing critical routes with “road runner” reconnaissance-in-force pa trols. This assignment resulted in a se ries of engagements where usually in dependent troops fought through VC ambushes while coordinating joint fires. The squadron’s tanks, though not immune to mines and artillery, allowed the typically outnumbered cavalrymen to react, seize initiative and disperse the unpredictable foe.6 Enabling division success Quarterhorse’s success that summer inspired its new division commander, MG William DePuy, to employ it to bait the elusive enemy into a decisive am bush. When Task Force Dragoon, com prising Troops B, C and an attached in fantry company, accordingly traveled down Highway 13 on July 9, the VC’s 272nd Regiment launched a vicious ar tillery barrage followed by massed in fantry assaults near the small town of Srok Dong. Despite suffering 12 killed and 55 wounded, 1-4 Cav maintained a stubborn defense while the Big Red One’s 1st Brigade counterattacked and defeated the enemy. The squadron’s Presidential Unit Citation attested that it achieved “712 confirmed hostile dead, an estimated 850 additional killed and large quantiles of captured weapons and equipment.”7 Throughout the Vietnam War, division-level cavalry was not the only mounted security force proving its tactical value. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), 1-4 Cav’s corps-level equivalent, likewise demonstrated the potency of independent mechanized firepower during security operations. GEN Donn

A. Starry, who commanded the unit late in the war, believed the ACR de vised “better means of gathering intel ligence” and had “a higher density of automatic weapons, possessed long-range radios and had more aircraft than a mechanized brigade.”8 From 1966 to 1971, the Blackhorse Regiment thus provided a mobile force that MACV repeatedly used for large-scale clearing operations. It also spearhead ed the allied incursion into Cambodia in 1970, which occurred as the largest armored operation of the war.9 The year 1967 found 1-4 Cavalry again conducting traditional cavalry tasks in support of III Corps’ efforts in War Zone C. Beginning with Operation Ce dar Falls, which lasted Jan. 8-26, 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, 11th ACR, 196th and 173rd infantry brigades, and South Vietnamese allies cleared the VC 9th Di vision from the “Iron Triangle” with echeloned search-and-destroy attacks. The squadron initially screened the corps’ eastern flank along Highway 13, then transitioned to blocking key ene my routes, and finally cleared targeted sites. Though they reportedly killed 37 enemy and captured another 96, their protection of lines of communication with Saigon proved most significant.10 Quarterhorse next participated in Op eration Junction City, again in War Zone C, from February to May 1967. The plan called for the Big Red One and several attached brigades to create a “horseshoe” around the enemy strong hold while 25th Division and 11th ACR attacked its center. Returning to its previous site of operations, 1-4 Cav led its parent division into position, seized landing zones for infantry-battalion in sertion, escorted support units, se cured contested routes and cleared en emy positions. Later in May, the squad ron conducted similar actions during Operation Dallas in the same area, where, as ordered, it conducted “com bat reconnaissance” to destroy “[VC]/ [North Vietnamese Army (NVA)] forces and installations.”11 These attacks occurred as the largest American operations in Vietnam thus far. Throughout the escalation, Quar terhorse provided critical time and space for higher commands to clear VC concentrations. The scouts’ efforts in controlling Highway 13 in particular ensured division and corps logistical continuity. In March 1967, after ob serving 1-4 Cav and others during Figure 2. III Corps area of operations, Vietnam. (From Wikipedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:III_Corps_Tactical_Zone_Decem ber_1966.png)

Fall 2018 Operations Cedar Falls and Junction City, MACV reported that “armored cavalry squadrons” had “proven re sponsive” for “aggressive action in [the Republic of Vietnam] because of their balanced combined-arms structure and inherent capability for quick re sponse and independent action.”12 De spite this validation, 1-4 Cav frequent ly lost direct control of its air troop, which limited its potential for service as an economy-of-force asset. Combined-arms value Allied forces across South Vietnam be gan 1968 by repelling the Tet Offen sive. Due to their unique ability to rap idly reposition with survivable lethali ty, division commanders relied on their prized armored cavalries to rapidly re inforce weakening defenses and as sault enemy concentrations. Quarter horse, as the Big Red One’s most agile mechanized force near Saigon, sent its Troop A to reinforce a task force de fending the Tan San Nhut airfield while Troops B and C supported 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, in a hard fight with four enemy battalions over con trol of the town of An My. The troop ers engaged in some of the war’s fierc est fighting as they unleashed heavy firepower against lighter VC forces.13 The squadron, along with attached in fantry units, fought another intense engagement several weeks later at Tan Hiep, near Di An, against an attacking enemy battalion. On May 5-6, it then supported a division effort to defeat retreating VC forces northeast of Di An by first blocking, and then pursuing and defeating, a retreating contingent. Troops A and B saw extremely heavy fighting during the final assault. The troopers reportedly killed about 340 enemy over the two-day fight.14 Throughout the rest of 1968, they ex ecuted continuous security operations as MACV placed greater emphasis on stabilizing civilian areas and empower ing the Army of South Vietnam. Armored cavalry remained high-use of fensive assets as less-mobile infantry units increasingly focused on “Viet namization” of the war effort. On March 30, 1969, Quarterhorse accord ingly joined a multi-division clearing operation called Atlas Wedge in the Michelin plantation fields 70 kilometers northwest of Saigon. Or dered to “detect, fix and destroy VC/ NVA forces in the area,” the Big Red One relied on 1-4 Cav and participating 11th ACR elements to accomplish the task.15 LTC William C. Haponski, then commanding the squadron, assessed that their subsequent victories over the 7th NVA Division revealed that his unit, when task-organized as a com bined-arms force with an additional cavalry troop and infantry company, fought as the “most powerful combat force in the division” against “large main-force units.”16 Even as mechanized cavalry supported ground infantry divisions, their helo centric counterparts enabled air-mo bile divisions with expanded, if less forceful, reconnaissance and surveil lance. As an example, the “Headhunt ers” of 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regi ment, supported 1st Cavalry Division with three aerial troops and a light ground troop throughout the war. The aero-cavalrymen’s swift and far-reach ing scouting abilities complemented their higher command’s use of massed rotary-wing transport to allow infantry to rapidly close with and engage elu sive VC forces in restrictive terrain. At famed places like the Ia Drang Valley, 1-9 Cav repeatedly allowed the “First Team” to seize initiative and position for advantage.17 First in, last out In February 1970, with the U.S. Army’s withdrawal from Vietnam underway, 1-4 Cav assumed rearguard duty – an economy-of-force mission traditionally assigned to cavalry – as 1st Infantry Di vision redeployed to Fort Riley and Germany. Starry later described in his detailed study how, ironically, the ar mored forces who were late to concen trate in Indochina would remain to “anchor the withdrawal of American combat units.”18 Unfortunately for the squadron, they suffered the last Big Red One Soldier-killed-in-action in Vietnam when a Troop A noncommis sioned officer walked over a mine. With their wartime service complete, the headquarters, B, C and D Troops re turned to Kansas, while Troop A joined the division’s 3rd Brigade (Forward) in Europe. Quarterhorse’s experiences in the Viet nam War yielded insights concerning cavalry in security operations. Then-LTC Frederick Brown, the last 1-4 Cav commander in Indochina and a future commandant of the Armor Center, lat er attested that “through demonstra tion of ground and air firepower, mo bility and shock action, combined with expert, flexible commanders ‘fighting forward’ at every level, [4th Cavalry] … dominated ground combat.”19 While seemingly boastful, the future gener al’s suggestion of relative overmatch at places like Ap Bau Bang, Highway 13 and the Michelin plantations indicate that cavalry-centric task forces, when empowered with mission-specific ca pabilities, offer potential to decisively expand a division’s tactical options through distributed security contribu tions. These lessons, though distinct to that conflict, remain relevant to future U.S. Army campaigns. Part III of this series will examine the role of Quarterhorse as a division re connaissance force in Operation Des ert Storm. MAJ Nathan Jennings is an Army strat egist at the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS. His previous as signments include strategic planner in Resolute Support Headquarters, Kabul, Afghanistan; assistant professor of his tory at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY; Headquarters Troop com mander and Troop C commander, 4-9 Cavalry, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX, and Iraq; platoon leader, Company B, 1-34 Armor, 1st BCT, 1st Infantry Divi sion, Fort Riley, KS, and Iraq; and 19D cavalry scout in 2nd ACR (Light) with Operation Iraqi Freedom tours in Bagh dad and Kirkuk, Iraq. His military schooling includes the School of Ad vanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff Officer’s Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Armor Officer Basic Course and Air-Assault and Airborne Schools. MAJ Jennings holds a bache lor’s of arts degree in history from Northwestern State University of Loui siana and a master’s of arts degree in American history from University of Texas-Austin. He won the Perry Prize for the best master’s thesis at Univer sity of Texas-Austin in 2013 and 1st place in the U.S. Army Armor School’s 2015 Starry Writing Competition. He is

Fall 2018 author of the book, Riding for the Lone Star: Frontier Cavalry and the Texas Way of War, 1822-1865. Notes 1 Army Technical Publication 3-91. 2 Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 3-90, Offense and Defense, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2012. 3 History of the Fourth United States Cav alry: Prepared and Loyal, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991; re tired COL William C. Haponski, Danger’s Dragoons, First Division Museum at Can tigny Park, 2014. 4 GEN Donn A. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, St. John’s Press, 2017. 5 James Scott Wheeler, The Big Red One, First Division Museum at Cantigny Park, 2017. 6 Ibid. 7 Annex A, “Battle of Srok Dong Narra tive,” combat after-action report (AAR), Operation El Paso II/III, 1st Infantry Divi sion, June 30, 1966; Fourth United States Cavalry. 8 Starry. 9 John J. McGrath, Scouts Out: The Devel opment of Reconnaissance Units in Mod ern Armies, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Com bat Studies Institute Press, 2008. 10 Combat AAR, Operation Cedar Falls, 1st Infantry Division, March 13, 1967; Fourth United States Cavalry. 11 Operations report, lessons-learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, Nov. 9, 1967, quoted in Robert Peters, “Jack of all trades: the metamorphosis of armored cavalry in Vietnam,” master’s thesis, Uni versity of Louisville, 2005. 12 Report, “Mechanized and Armor Com bat Operations in Vietnam,” Headquar ters, U.S. Army Vietnam, March 28, 1967. 13 Wheeler. 14 Wheeler; Fourth United States Cavalry. 15 Combat AAR, Operation Atlas Wedge, 17th Military History Detachment, 1st In fantry Division, April 19, 1969. 16 Haponski. 17 McGrath. 18 Starry. 19 Haponski. Acronym Quick-Scan AAR – after-action report ACR – armored cavalry regiment BCT – brigade combat team DivCav – division cavalry MACV – (U.S.) Military Assistance Command, Vietnam NVA – North Vietnamese Army VC – Viet Cong