Training Your Company Intelligence-Support Team

Many factors must be considered when establishing and training your company intelligence-support team. It is very important that you have your battalion or squadron commander’s support. The first factor to consider is your CoIST’s modified table of organization and equipment. It is crucial that you have the right Soldiers for the job. The Soldiers selected must have analytical, briefing and quick decision-making skills, a penchant for working with computers and technology, and other desired skills the troop commander deems necessary. The second factor to consider is CoIST capabilities. You have to determine what you want your CoIST to routinely accomplish. The simplest way to do this is to establish subtasks during prebriefs, mission phases and debriefing that the CoIST will be able to follow every time, thus creating consistency. Figure 1 is a suggested checklist to help establish consistency. The last factor to evaluate during CoIST training is resources. As we shift toward a decisive-action environment, it is essential that we resource the CoIST with the proper tools to accomplish their mission. Using analog systems to back up digital capabilities is a must. A dedicated radio and Blue Force Tracker will allow the CoIST to mitigate communication issues and operate over large distances until on-the-move digital communications are part of your MTOE. What should your CoIST look like? To have an effective CoIST, you will need to select quality Soldiers who have longevity in the unit and will be apart of the CoIST for at least one year. The Soldiers selected as analysts should have no other duties other than CoIST. To facilitate this requirement, Soldiers should come from the company/troop headquarters platoon since these Soldiers will most likely man your command post. During our National Training Center Decisive-Action Rotation 12-05, the 3-1 Cavalry Squadron S-2 shop successfully used six-Soldier CoIST teams. The CoIST officer in charge was the troop executive officer, and the noncommissioned officer in charge was a sergeant from Headquarters Platoon. The troop also provided three more Soldiers to the CoIST to serve as analysts. What made this CoIST different from the all the CoISTs I have worked with was the addition of a 35F Soldier (military-intelligence analyst). Although resourcing the troops with intelligence Soldiers from the squadron S-2 shop severely degraded manning, providing the troop with an intelligence subject-matter expert produced results well worth the cost. Another requirement is that all your CoIST members at a minimum possess a secret security clearance. This allows your CoIST access to sensitive and secret information. The CoIST’s ability to maintain constant communication with and provide progress reports to the company/troop commander is essential. What should your CoIST be able to accomplish? This may vary due to the type of unit (infantry, Armor and Cavalry), mission, etc. Being in a Cavalry unit, I wanted my CoIST to be experts on intelligence preparation of the battlefield. I also wanted them to conduct prebriefs, debriefs, battle tracking, tactical questioning, and lethal and non-lethal targeting, and to know how to operate all our organic systems (Distributing Common Ground System-Army, Tactical Ground Reporting Net, robotics systems, One-System Remote Video Terminal, Biometric Automated Toolset and Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment). Being part of an armored reconnaissance squadron also meant that the CoIST had to learn about “passive” infrareds. We spent the first couple of months teaching priority information requirements, infrareds and indicators, and how they link to information collection. We also developed reporting formats that led to effective reporting the CoIST used to obtain information from their platoons to answer and develop new PIR for their prebriefs. The big training should be well Pre-mission (these must be briefed to platoon leader prior to his mission planning): 5 5 Define area of operation/area of interest 5 5 Modified combined obstacle overlay 5 5 Weather assessment 5 5 Town assessments or area assessment (ASCOPE) 5 5 Define and describe threat capability in your AO 5 5 Determine enemy’s most likely course of action and most dangerous course of action 5 5 Develop additional NAIs if necessary Mission prep: 5 5 Work with Fires to set targets up according to enemy COAs 5 5 Participate in the platoon rehearsal and act as enemy 5 5 Brief each NAI during rehearsal and what assets are covering NAI and at what time 5 5 Ensure that platoons have all required items prior to LD (SSE kits, apprehension forms, BATs and HIIDEs) During the mission: 5 5 Provide SPOT reports when necessary through squadron O&I net or BFT 5 5 Use CoIST SPOT report when answering PIR 5 5 Provide total roll-up of BDA once mission is complete Post-mission: 5 5 Conduct debrief in accordance with CoIST SOP 5 5 Update enemy situational template and COAs 5 5 Summarize all information using the GRINTSUM format and submit to squadron S-2 via CD (logpac) Figure 1. CoIST checklist.

resourced, and the schedule should be discussed during battalion / squadron training meetings (Figure 2). Our squadron trained our CoIST during sergeant’s time training – every Thursday we trained from 7:30 a.m. to 3 p.m. I was fortunate that my brigade has a Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Integration Cell. Their training capabilities included CoIST, Human Intelligence Control Cell, Al Taqa-ddum Airbase, biometrics (BATS, HIIDE, Secure Electronic Enrollment Kit), site exploitation, robotics, field-training-exercise support, IED/homemade-explosives awareness and handheld detectors. We used the C2IC team significantly and conducted joint training with other battalions as well. The best training for your CoIST is hands-on at the company/ troop level. CoIST should be involved in all your operational orders and rehearsals, not only in afield environment but in garrison as well. Use them to brief weather effects for ranges, gunnery, live-fire exercises and terrain analysis for road marches. Having them brief and prepare products as often as possible will only improve their skills. After training the CoIST, ensure they are involved in as much collective training as possible using your standard operating procedures to validate them. Employ them in all gunnery and field-training problems with specific training objectives nested with the company/troops. This will allow you to finalize your SOP and have a quality product. Equipping your CoIST For your CoIST to be successful in any environment, it must have the proper equipment. This should be a mixture of analog products and other equipment that will allow your CoIST to maintain communication with all their elements. If your company/troop can acquire secure and nonsecure router-access-point terminals or Harris 117G radios – which will allow you to send and receive data while maximizing your frequency-modulation capability – you can rectify these problems. If this is not a feasible option, all you can do is optimize your current systems. Planning with your S-6 for re-transmit capabilities is necessary. In an effort to cut down on radio traffic on the command net, we created an operations and information net. The operations and intelligence net should be used as the primary method of communication during operations for the CoIST. Another great organic asset you have available is BFT. BFT is going to be your most reliable source of communication while on the move or out of FM communication range; the CoIST should own a BFT or have access to one at all times. DATE: Nov. 29, 2012 Time Location Task Trainer Asst. Trainer References Uniform 0800-1130 Squadron classroom CoIST refresher Mr. Kobayashi SFC Marquez TC 2-19 ACUs 1130-1300

Lunch N/A N/A N/A ACUs 1300-1500 Squadron classroom CoIST refresher Mr. Kobayashi SFC Marquez TC 2-19 ACUs Future training:

• Dec. 3-7, 2012: CoIST 40-hour certification course, Mr. Kobayashi (squadron classroom)

• Dec. 13, 2012: S-2 Hybrid Threat Class, Mr. Kobayashi (squadron classroom)

• Dec. 18-19, 2012: Robotics (Fastac), Mr. McHugh. This will certify all attendees on the system (ERCOE yard)

• Jan. 3, 2013: IED awareness, Mr. Munoz (squadron classroom)

• Jan. 10, 2013: Virtual trainer, SFC Marquez (ERCOE yard)

• Jan. 31, 2013: HIIDEs, Mr. North (squadron classroom)

• Feb. 5-8, 2013: SE certification training (6x slots per troop for CoIST and Soldiers), Mr. Raines (TBD)

• Feb. 28, 2013: CoIST refresher, Mr. Kobayashi, one-day class (squadron classroom)

• March 7, 2013: Virtual trainer, SFC Marquez (ERCOE yard)

• March 14, 2013: Awareness, Mr. Munoz (squadron classroom)

• March 28, 2013: SE refresher training, Mr. Raines (squadron classroom)

• April 2-5, 2013: CoIST 40-hour certification course, Mr. Kobayashi (squadron classroom) Figure 2. CoIST training schedule example. What When Where With whom Pace Troop graphic intel summaries due 0200 Squadron S-2 Squadron S-2/CoIST

Table 1. CoIST PACE plan.

BAT – Biometric Automated Toolset BDA – battle damage assessment BFT – Blue Force Tracker CI2C – Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Integration Cell COIN – counterinsurgency CoIST – company intelligence-support team DCGS-A – Distributed Common Ground System-Army FM – frequency modulation GRINTSUM – graphical intelligence summary HIIDE – Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment IED – improvised explosive device LOGPAC – logistical package MTOE – modified table of organization and equipment NAI – named area of interest O&I – operation and information PACE – primary, alternate, contingency and emergency PIR – priority information requirement SOP – standard operating procedure SSE – sensitive site exploration Acronym Quick-Scan CoIST should be able to create overlays, continuously populate significant activities and send reports and information. Furthermore, your SOP or Annex B should address the CoIST primary, alternate, contingency and emergency plan (Table 1). Finally, as we transition into a decisive-action environment, revisit the analog tools. Your analog products should include maps, acetate, markers, notepads and site-exploitation equipment so you can transition to counterinsurgency operations. We gave our CoIST lapboards (Figure 3), which allowed them to conduct all their duties without relying on digital systems. As our focus shifts from COIN to decisive action, you want to ensure that all levels, especially company/troop, have clear situational awareness and understanding of not only the present but what lies ahead as well. The fastest and most effective way of communicating this is through the CoIST. There is no right or wrong answer when it comes to training your CoIST. With the right Soldiers, clearly defined CoIST standards, proper equipment and tough, realistic scenarios in a time-constrained environment, your CoIST will achieve success and enable the company or troop to perform at its full potential in any environment or mission. CPT Juan Feliciano is the S-2 for 3-1 Cavalry Squadron, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Benning, GA. He previously served at Fort Hood, TX, as assistant battalion S-2, 2-8 Cavalry, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division; tank company executive officer, Delta Company, 2-8 Cavalry, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division; and tank company platoon leader, Charlie Company, 2-8 Cavalry, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. His military schooling includes Cavalry Leaders Course, Military Figure 3. Battalion S-2/CoIST lapboard – “away.” Intelligence Captains’ Career Course and Armor Basic Officer Leader Course. CPT Feliciano holds a bachelor’s of science degree from Florida International University in criminal justice. He is the recipient of a Bronze Star medal for serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom during 2009-10.

‘I’m Here Because We’re Leaving’ Continued from Page 18 influential NDS officer mentioned was actually the highest-ranking individual in the room, although he was not chairing the meeting. Personal connections, family status, service history and personal reputation all play apart in determining influence level as well. Some may have influence only over certain sections of Afghan society or the ANSF; some may be universally respected. Should the adviser be able to identify and leverage key influential personalities, it will greatly enhance the adviser’s ability to improve ANSF performance. (11) “They’re really not that different. … They’re country folks and use the same parables we do to explain things.” – 7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 Kandak adviser team. The effective adviser is a storyteller who uses parables and stories to convey his point. Much is made of the differences between American and Afghan communication and learning styles, but Afghans, like Americans, are more likely to remember or take something away from a conversation if they can form a personal connection with the message or messenger. The U. S. military relies heavily upon lessons-learned documents, written accounts or vignettes from combat, etc. – these tools are simply professionally written and edited stories. The marginal difference lies in that perhaps Afghans are slightly more accepting of the use of stories or parables in a professional setting as a form of communication. The effective adviser leverages this to his advantage in getting his point across. The first step in using parables and stories is to learn some of the Afghan sayings from one’s interpreter. While some sayings have slightly different Afghan equivalents (i.e., “You can’t take hair from your beard and make a moustache” is the rough equivalent for “You can’t mix apples and oranges”), many – like the story of the “Boy Who Cried Wolf” – are held exactly in common.42 Communicating through Afghan sayings and parables will not only expedite the process of explaining a concept in an intelligible way but will gain the adviser his counterpart’s respect. Secondly, the effective adviser is ready to improvise by creating stories or parables of his own that fit the situation or concept the adviser is trying to describe. When describing how to accomplish a certain task, it is significantly more effective for the adviser to describe how he accomplished or failed to accomplish this task in the past, rather than describe step by step how this task should be or could be accomplished. Creating a story with the adviser as the protagonist creates a personal connection between the Afghan counterpart and the situation or task being described. These stories need not be entirely factually or historically accurate. There is nothing wrong with fabricating a believable story or parable to get one’s point across.43 Primarily, though, the stories should signal that the adviser is open and has experienced the same difficulty/situation the Afghan is facing; thus believability and genuineness is key. Finally, encouraging Afghans to exchange their own war stories or life experiences is an effective tool for helping them work through an issue or learn anew skill. For example, when teaching a class to Afghan soldiers on counter-improvised-explosive-device techniques, encouraging the soldiers to describe their own experiences with IEDs can lead to a meaningful discussion on IED defeat, which the Afghan soldiers are more likely to remember than a stock CIED class.44 Generally speaking, exchanging war stories, especially if the adviser and the Afghan counterpart have combat experience in the same region of Afghanistan, is one of the best techniques for trust-building and advising throughout one’s rotation.

35 (12) “Know how to communicate like an Afghan. … This means knowing how to actually use an interpreter.” – 3/2/201st ANA Kandak adviser team. The effective adviser understands that to communicate clearly to his Afghan counterpart, he must know how to correctly use an interpreter. Much of using interpreters comes with practice, but to use an interpreter correctly, one must both ensure the interpreter understands what the adviser is trying to express and that the Afghan counterpart is receiving from the interpreter what the adviser is intending to say. Ensuring the interpreter understands the adviser is best accomplished by briefing the interpreter on the purpose of the meeting before meeting with one’s Afghan counterpart. This includes going over any relevant terms, key phrases or numbers, as well as the general tone and purpose of the meeting.45 Trying to explain a concept or a word to an interpreter during the meeting often will break the natural flow of the conversation. While not necessarily catastrophic, and obviously not entirely avoidable, it is advisable to brief the interpreter beforehand. This can also be accomplished by matching interpreters with knowledge of a particular specialized lexicon to particular meetings. For example, a local-national linguist who previously served with the ANA as an artilleryman would be likely to perform well in meetings that deal with fires. Ensuring the Afghan counterpart is receiving what the adviser is trying to say is more difficult. This involves the adviser understanding both how his interpreter translates (whether he speaks generally word for word or conveys the concept), and how Afghans themselves speak. English has a vast and technical vocabulary with a great number of synonyms, each conveying different nuances. Dari and Pashto both have a much smaller and less technical vocabulary. For example, the English words “reconnaissance” and “intelligence” are expressed in Dari using the same word, kashf. Thus, especially when using technical terms or English styles of speaking that rely on some of this nuance (like dry humor or downplaying for effect), it does not translate as intended in Dari or Pashto.46 Exaggerating (by English standards) is often necessary as well to overcome some of the differences between English and Dari/Pashto and convey one’s true message to one’s Afghan counterpart.47 Similarly, indicating meaning by providing context can ensure that the interpreter is conveying an understandable message in Dari/Pashto.48 For example, “intelligence drives operations” could be given context by saying “intelligence we have gained by doing things like talking to our sources drives operations.” Thus, the effective adviser thinks about what he is trying to say before speaking, using context, exaggeration and his knowledge of Afghan speech patterns to give his interpreter a message that will be clear when translated into Dari/Pashto. As stated, using an interpreter effectively requires experience with interpreters and knowledge of the specific interpreter’s capabilities. Briefing the interpreter beforehand and understanding the differences between American military English and Dari/Pashto can assist the effective adviser in communicating to the interpreter and conveying a clear message to his Afghan counterpart. (13) “Sometimes it comes down to convincing them to do what they don’t want to do.” – 2/1/201st ANA Kandak adviser team. While the effective adviser understands that compelling behavior is not the same as advising, sometimes an adviser must convince the ANSF to accomplish a certain task or undertake a certain activity. Circumstances like security during CF retrograde operations in particular require the ANSF’s assistance, and it often falls on the adviser to convince the ANSF to behave in a particular CF-desired fashion. While in many cases the ANSF recognize that assisting CF is in their long-term best interest, some may be unwilling at first, particularly if they do not see what their organization is receiving “in return” for their compliance. Thus, the effective adviser employs a number of strategies to convince the ANSF to comply, none of which include tricking, threatening or extorting the ANSF. Throughout, the effective adviser attempts to ensure that the final decision is an Afghan one. This means helping the ANSF leader develop the idea/compromise/plan so that when the ANSF leader executes what CF is asking him to do, the way he accomplishes it is “his” idea.49 The first and most simple method is to lay out the “pros” and “cons” of complying for the involved ANSF organization. This will help ANSF personalities understand how the adviser sees the issue and vice versa. Often there is information one party has that changes the calculus for the other.50 Secondly, if the pros-and-cons comparison indicates the ANSF is giving up more than they are receiving from participating in the operation or completing the task, the adviser can seek to offset the cost for the ANSF. As discussed previously, this can be done by providing materials (sandbags to build an observation post the ANSF is being requested to construct on short notice for route security) or even personnel (while not a maneuver force, adviser teams have on occasion manned ANSF OPs to free up ANSF combat power for offensive operations).51 Finally, if the preceding methods have not worked, the adviser can try a personal appeal by telling the ANSF leader that the adviser’s higher-headquarters is pressuring the adviser, or simply ask for a favor based on the strength of the relationship.52 While many advisers may be uncomfortable with the idea of putting stress on the relationship in this manner, or even uncomfortable with the idea of personal appeals in the first place, this strategy is quite effective, given a healthy relationship between the adviser and the ANSF leader. While at the risk of over-generalizing, Afghans are more comfortable with “favors” and “personal appeals” in a work-context than Americans. Thus, what an American adviser might see as an inappropriately forward request that mixes work with personal connections, the Afghan counterpart might see as a perfectly normal request that he feels required to carefully consider for the sake of the relationship. Thus, the effective adviser recognizes that fundamentally, convincing the ANSF to behave in a certain way is tied directly to the strong personal relationships between advisers and the ANSF. If an adviser “knows his audience,” has created a relationship built on respect with his counterpart, and on occasion has done small “favors” for his ANSF counterpart, the adviser is much more likely to be able to convince the ANSF to behave in the particular way CF desires. (14) “They just have to decide if they’re going with the old Soviet style (no NCO empowerment) or the American style (NCO empowerment). … They can’t be somewhere in between.” –7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 Kandak adviser team. The effective adviser recognizes that most ANSF organizations are currently struggling with defining the role of NCOs within their ranks. The effective adviser, especially if he is an NCO himself, understands that it is of critical importance the adviser assist the ANSF in defining the roles and responsibilities of the NCO within the organization, whether this means embracing the old “Soviet model” or the new “NATO model.” Currently, in most ANSF organizations, NCOs are higher-paid privates. Officers do not rely on them as repositories of experience and organizational knowledge. They are not delegated authority to accomplish tasks and are not empowered with the ability to take initiative within officer-defined guidelines. This is closer to the “Soviet model” level of NCO empowerment. Many ANSF officers are more comfortable with this model because empowering NCOs would force these officers to be accountable for what their subordinates did or did not do without direct officer oversight.53 Given that the trust of the NCO corps is lacking across the ANSF, this is seen as unadvisable. Some of the lack of faith in the NCO corps is justified, given that most combat-arms NCOs are functionally illiterate and have a much lower educational level than their officers. Yet, some of the readily apparent inflexibility of the ANSF can be traced directly back to the lack of NCO empowerment. Some commanders are more inclined toward the “NATO model” of NCO empowerment. Many commanders see the benefits of moving their organizations towards the “NATO model” but are unsure of how to guide their organization in that direction.54 Regardless, the issue of NCO empowerment comes back to the organizational commander at every level, and the adviser must assist the commander in guiding his organization towards the level of NCO empowerment dictated by the ANSF organization’s higher headquarters.55 The current state of non-uniform levels of NCO empowerment within ANSF organizations is unsustainable, and it is the responsibility of the effective adviser to help guide ANSF organizations at all levels towards one model or the other, and assist the ANSF organization in enforcing these guidelines with subordinate organizations. (15) “Criticize privately but praise publically.” – 2/1/201st ANA Kandak adviser team. The effective adviser always criticizes his Afghan counterpart privately but praises him publically, while simultaneously remaining humble throughout. While shame plays perhaps an even greater role in Afghan culture than in American culture, the concept of “public praise/private criticism” is not alien to the U. S. military. Publically criticizing a superior is almost never acceptable, and publically criticizing a subordinate is a strong rebuke. The main difference between Afghan and U. S. military cultures is that the Afghan military culture is even more polarized – public praise or criticism is stronger in Afghan military culture than in U. S. military culture. The effective adviser leverages this for his advantage while understanding the implications when Afghans criticize or praise one another. If an adviser wishes to praise his counterpart to positively reinforce good performance, doing it privately is not as effective as doing it publically.56 Almost universally, CF opinions are respected, and when an adviser praises an Afghan, it reflects particularly well on that Afghan. Since CF opinions are held in high regard, when criticizing, the adviser should understand what CF criticism can do to an ANSF officer or NCO. In one case, after being publically criticized by advisers, an ANA officer went to the trouble of collecting every certificate of appreciation or training that he had ever received and presented this paperwork to the adviser team in an attempt to convince them to reverse their opinion of him.57 When criticizing, even in a private setting, the effective adviser is humble but honest.58 An adviser is not fulfilling his responsibilities if he is not able to constructively criticize his counterpart and help the counterpart learn from his failings. Thus, the effective adviser knows how to criticize without offending. First, the effective adviser does not begin to criticize his counterpart until he has developed a relationship with his counterpart.59 Much like in American military culture, one is unlikely to take the opinion of a newly met individual seriously and may even become offended. Second, an adviser can attempt to highlight the failings of the counterpart indirectly by drawing the attention of the counterpart to failings the counterpart and a third party share.60 For example, the adviser could say “look at 2nd Kandak, they’re doing ‘X’ and it is not working at all,” implying that “X” is incorrect and drawing the attention of the counterpart to “X,” which he happens to be doing as well. By speaking through context and inference, the adviser can criticize without shaming or embarrassing his counterpart. Alternately, the adviser can use a more direct route by periodically giving the counterpart a task-based counseling using measures of performance from the counterpart’s chain of command.61 Doing this not only helps the adviser understand how well the counterpart is performing from the Afghan perspective (rather than the adviser perspective) but limits the embarrassment experienced by the counterpart. Since the adviser is helping the counterpart understand his success/failure as judged by a third party, the adviser and the counterpart can move to correct the failures and reinforce the success as “teammates.” In summary, the effective adviser is capable of providing constructive criticism to his counterpart either directly or indirectly, but always in private. Likewise, he leverages public praise to reinforce success or highlight models for others to emulate. Throughout, the adviser is humble and respectful, ensuring the ANSF does not lose respect for themselves or feel shame due to the adviser’s comments. (16) “Very few actually feel like they need your help.” – 1/1/201st ANA Kandak adviser team. The effective adviser understands that to a certain degree, his Afghan counterpart feels he does not need the adviser’s help. Many senior ANSF officers and NCOs have been at war off and on for the last three decades. Even the younger generation of ANSF leaders have experienced conflict on a day-to-day basis since childhood. Except on rare occasions, the ANSF leader has more combat experience, is higher ranking and has more time serving within his warfighting function than the adviser. Thus, in most cases, while the ANSF leader may feel that his ANSF organization requires CF assistance, he may personally feel he does not need the assistance of his adviser in improving his own performance. Thus, given that the ANSF counterpart does not feel he needs assistance in improving his performance, what does he expect to receive from his adviser? Some expect to use their advisers to raise issues/problems to their ANSF highers the counterpart feels uncomfortable raising himself. Some expect their adviser to provide them with material assistance – be it supplies, equipment, air support, etc.62 There are even some who attempt to convince their advisers they need extensive assistance so as to lessen their own workload (assuming their adviser is willing to not see them fail).63 Most are convinced, due to their pride and extensive combat experience, that they do not require advice, mentorship or training from their junior American mentor.64 Knowing this is the starting mindset of his counterpart can help the effective adviser begin to become value-added for his ANSF counterpart. Simply starting by earning the trust of the ANSF counterpart and becoming a “sounding board” for his ideas, or being available to provide an opinion when asked, is an excellent way to demonstrate the adviser has something to add to the discussion. Playing “devil’s advocate” for one’s ANSF leader can also be useful to the ANSF leader who believes he does not need advising, since ANSF personnel rarely provide that for one another. Furthermore, asking the ANSF leader to teach the adviser is an excellent avenue for guiding the ANSF leader to discuss his thoughts on warfighting with the adviser, thus opening the ANSF counterpart to discussions on best practices.65 While a strongly entrenched senior ANSF leader may never believe he personally requires advising or improvement in his performance, taking some of the preceding routes may assist the adviser in subtly helping the ANSF leader improve. Furthermore, by becoming a trusted “sounding board” or friend, the ANSF leader will be more likely to take more straightforward advice later in the relationship based on the friendship alone. In summary, most ANSF counterparts believe they do not need advising (at least the way CF envisions advising), and by recognizing this from the outset, the adviser can take action to subtly improve ANSF performance rather than coming across as “out of touch” by the more senior and combat-experienced ANSF leadership. (17) “Don’t let the insider threat put up barriers between you and your counterpart. Draw your counterparts in close. Make them be your host. Tell them you feel safe because they are securing you.” – 7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 Kandak adviser team. The effective adviser, while accepting that insider threats are real and seeking to mitigate them, does not let the insider threat either separate him from his counterpart or prevent him from accomplishing his mission. This means understanding both as an organization and as an individual that “risk is what right looks like,”66 because the insider threat risk can never entirely be mitigated, and attempting to do so only inhibits mission accomplishment. Instead, the effective adviser embraces the fact that his security is not entirely in his own hands, and he must rely on his Afghan counterparts to take some responsibility for securing him and his team. Essentially, creating distance or standoff between advisers and the ANSF, rather than eliminating barriers and building collective security solutions, is the incorrect method for dealing with the insider threat. First, it is the responsibility of the adviser team to mitigate some of the insider threat by not allowing “unforced errors.” It is the responsibility of each adviser to ensure he doesn’t create any personal vendettas or grievances between himself and any Afghan.67 Minor disputes, misunderstandings or arguments should be promptly resolved so the involved Afghan feels he has satisfaction. Cultural or religious faux pas should not be allowed to linger, and advisers should take care to address any of these issues as soon as they come to their attention. While some advisers may feel it unnecessary or even insulting to have to apologize for acceptable stateside behavior, it is vital to do so to avoid allowing personal issues to fester. Second, advisers should assist the ANSF in solving some of the root causes of insider attacks.68 ANSF leadership are equally at risk for insider attacks and thus are usually amenable to working with advisers to address root causes of insider attacks when they are identified. Some root causes include soldiers not being paid on time; soldiers not being allowed to go on leave regularly/being stationed at remote sites without being relieved for long periods; soldiers not regularly being fed/watered; and the remains of ANSF fallen not being processed in a timely manner. While none of these factors might be the deciding factor that causes an ANSF service member to kill, they are contributing factors that create environments that breed intra-ANSF and possibly anti-CF violence. Third, advisers should cultivate “informers” within the ANSF organization with which they work.69 By being friendly and open with all ANSF personnel encountered, and taking the time to converse with and develop a relationship with large numbers of ANSF personnel, the adviser can develop a network of personnel who see the adviser as a human being rather than a generic ISAF soldier. This regularly results in the ANSF service member actively seeking out the adviser to alert him to danger.70 Simply put, as with counterinsurgency operations, the more an element knows the people of an area and has good relations with them, the more the local population is willing to assist the element in securing itself. ANSF service members, in addition to the adviser team’s direct counterparts, are the “local population.” Fourth, advisers should take an ANSF-inclusive systematic approach to identifying potential insider-threat perpetrators before they attack.71 By working with the CF BSI S-2 section and the ANSF element S-2 and NDS sections, the adviser team can serve as a conduit of information as well as an intelligence customer. Soldiers going on leave to insurgency-dominated areas are particularly susceptible to insurgency efforts to “co-opt” the service member and influence them to conduct an insider attack. Helping the ANSF synchronize their counter-intelligence, personnel-management and force-protection efforts to prevent/mitigate occurrences like the “post-leave insider attack” not only assists in professionalizing the ANSF but also improves security for the adviser team. Finally, advisers should not make themselves a fixed target when visiting their ANSF counterparts, changing their weapon and equipment load, number of personnel moving together, and arrival and departure times.72 Identifying a designated shooter or “guardian angel” is also prudent, yet this designated shooter should not be overt. The designated shooter should not be clothed differently from the rest of the team, nor should the designated shooter be in an obviously aggressive posture. The designated shooter should sit facing entry points and should not be engaged whatsoever in the dialogue going on. Having an overt or aggressively postured designated shooter brings only marginal (if any) added security but adds a layer of tension to the proceedings, degrading the advisers’ ability to accomplish their mission.73 An effective adviser team trains continually throughout its deployment on how to engage targets in confined areas, areas with large numbers of civilians or after having to quickly draw one’s weapon.74 Effective training for the designated shooter will make him effective at securing the team without the designated shooter having to be in a rapport-degrading aggressive stance during adviser-counterpart interactions. In the event of an insider attack or high-profile international incident (i.e., 2012’s “Innocence of Muslims” inflammatory video release), the effective adviser team does not disengage from its counterparts; the team pulls them in closer. Often, after insider attacks, even if they take place in a different ANSF organization or province, adviser teams are pressured to pull back from their Afghan counterparts. This is precisely the worst time to do so. The adviser team should visit its counterparts and observe the ANSF organization. The adviser team likely has the best idea of what “normal” looks like, and to secure itself and other CF personnel, it is the responsibility of the adviser team to see if the situation remains normal with the ANSF organization or if the environment may have changed, possibly indicating unrest or sympathetic insider attacks.75 Furthermore, the ANSF counterparts must be reassured that the attack or international incident has not changed the relationship between the adviser and the counterpart. Instead of ignoring the issue, advisers should address it openly, relying upon higher-headquarters-approved messaging and one’sown knowledge of one’s Afghan counterpart. It is also the adviser team’s responsibility to leverage the ANSF leadership to ensure that this CF messaging reaches the service member level of the ANSF organization. In the event the ANSF leadership advises the adviser team not to visit, the adviser team can accomplish some of the above goals (maintaining the relationship, determining the threat level and correctly messaging the situation) by inviting the ANSF to visit the adviser team at the CF facility. In summary, the effective adviser team, while taking steps to mitigate risk on its own, invites the ANSF to act as its host and secure the team. This means working together to identify potential risks before they directly or indirectly cause casualties. Yet the adviser team recognizes and is comfortable with the fact that not all risk can ever be entirely mitigated. If a trustworthy and familiar Afghan service member suddenly decides to kill an American, tells no one, secretly obtains a firearm and is able to get close to the team, there is very little that can be done except ensure he is only able to get one shot off before he is killed. If an adviser team has taken all the preceding steps, is engaged in collective security with the ANSF and is only open to trading “man for man”76 in a random killing, the adviser team has successfully mitigated risk. (18) “Know the ethnic-political history of your Afghan counterpart because this impacts how he will interact with you and other Afghans.” -2/201 ANA Brigade adviser team. In addition to being a student of Afghan history, generally defined, the effective adviser is a student of the personal experience of his counterpart and his counterpart’s colleagues with Afghan history. A Westerner will never entirely understand the complex ethno-political milieu that is an Afghan kandak or brigade staff; however, by understanding the history and background of key players, and how those backgrounds relate to one another within the context of post-Taliban Afghan society, one can minimize the risk of sparking intra-ANSF personality conflict, leverage the correct leadership personalities to influence other ANSF personalities and, to a certain degree, understand the motivations of one’sown and other ANSF counterparts. While it is obviously a generalization to say there are only three dimensions to analyzing the background of an ANSF personality, the following three dimensions are relatively easy for the adviser to identify, are simple to comprehend and, in many if not most cases, best help the adviser approximate the way other Afghans view the ANSF personality. The model described is less a scientific tool than a simple rule of thumb for advisers. The first dimension is “ethnicity.” What is the ethnic background and birthplace of the ANSF personality? While the differences among members even of the same ethnic group hailing from the same district in Afghanistan can be vast, for the most part they share some defining characteristics (accents, dress, history and reputation) recognizable by other Afghans. The more fidelity an adviser has on the exact background of ANSF personalities, the better, but in general understanding basic ethnic and regional background is enough. The second dimension is “with which side the ANSF personality fought during the jihad against the Soviets.” Did the ANSF counterpart fight with the mujahideen or with the Soviets? Did he receive any training in Pakistan or in the USSR? What was his position within the Communist regime or the mujahideen? Again, if the adviser can determine with which mujahideen party or Communist regime units the ANSF counterpart served, the better, but generally knowing with which side the counterpart fought is sufficient. The third dimension is “where the ANSF personality spent the years of the Taliban regime and what he did.” Did the ANSF personality stay in Afghanistan as a civilian? Did he stay in Afghanistan and actively resist the Taliban? Did the ANSF personality flee to Pakistan or another country? Or, in the more rare occasion, did he work with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan? One can analyze an ANSF personality and how other ANSF personalities view the first personality using these dimensions. Generally speaking, and all things being equal, ethnic groups will self-segregate for linguistic, cultural and historical reasons. Similarly, ex-Democratic Republic of Afghanistan officers will have more affinity toward other ex-DRA officers over persons with a mujahideen background. Those who stayed in Afghanistan and resisted the warlords and the Taliban or suffered as civilians under their tenure will naturally gravitate toward those with similar experiences, over those who fled Afghanistan and vice versa. Persons who share none of the three dimensions are very likely to be antagonistic toward one another. Persons who share all three are highly likely to view each other positively. Surprisingly, often it appears that common allegiance during the jihad is the determining dimension when it comes to how Afghans view one another, trumped only by common ethnic subgroup (tribal or familial) affiliation.77 Understanding these three simple dimensions to Afghan officers can help the adviser in a variety of ways. First, by analyzing the ANSF organization using these dimensions, the adviser can map the social network of the organization with which he works. By mapping the social network, he can more effectively influence individuals within the network by using individuals the individual respects. Second, understanding the dynamics of the social network can help the adviser navigate its interpersonal rivalries and pitfalls. This isn’t to say there are no rivalries or personality conflicts within a group of Afghans with a similar background. Yet, by understanding the potential historical reasons behind inter-organizational conflicts, advisers can better apply resources to correct staff friction rather than vainly attempting to resolve long-standing historical-personal conflicts. Thus, the effective adviser takes time to understand and map the personal history of ANSF personalities with whom he works. Armed with this understanding, the effective adviser can apply influence and pressure more diplomatically. The observations made by the combat advisers of 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry, should be familiar to those who have read the historical literature on advising, particularly the works of T. E. Lawrence. While the observations may differ in the details due to the vast differences between 21st Century Afghan culture and 20th Century Hijaz-Arab culture, both identify that the key to advising lies in fostering a healthy relationship with one’s counterpart. Crafting this relationship is not the product of “cultural awareness” but of social intelligence. Socially-intelligent ad- visers are honest, respectful, humble, calm, observant, adaptive and consequently effective advisers. Knowing the history and culture of Afghanistan is critical, but acting consistently in ways that reflect social intelligence is the deciding factor in being an effective adviser. Yet even the most socially-intelligent adviser cannot be effective on his own. The most effective advisers are part of teams that work together, building relationships, leveraging them in concert and communicating to the ANSF with a synchronized and consistent message to assist the ANSF in developing their own ways to affect organizational change. Every member of a team must be a relationship-builder rather than a compeller of action, capable of communicating that he is there because we are leaving. CPT Spencer French is the assistant intelligence officer with 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), at Fort Campbell, KY. He also served in B Company, 2nd Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne, as signals-intelligence platoon leader and battalion intelligence officer. The Bronze Star recipient (one oak-leaf cluster) served two tours in Afghanistan. His military schooling includes Air Assault School, Campaign-Continuity Language Operators Course (Dari), Antiterrorism Officer Basic Course, Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Unit Commander and Staff Officer Course, Basic Officer Leadership Course II, Officer Candidate School and basic combat training. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree from Georgetown University in international politics. Notes 1 Between September and December 2012, the author conducted about 20 hours of interviews with 85 combat advisers with 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment; three United Kingdom civilian intelligence trainers; and two UK civilian Afghan cultural advisers/linguists. These advisers, trainers and linguists had worked at the kandak (battalion) and brigade level in Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar, Laghman and Kapisa provinces for at least five months as of the time of their interviews. Some, including the UK civilian intelligence trainers, had worked in Afghanistan for more than four years. The UK civilian cultural advisers/linguists had been born and raised in Afghanistan. CPT French annotated trends (i.e., if more than two teams made a similar observation). The 18 points that comprise this article are a summary of the most commonly mentioned and salient trends described in the interviews. 2 Team First Strike deployed to the N2KL region, part of Regional Command-East, under Team Strike (2/101st Airborne Air Assault), Task Force Mountain Warrior (4-4 IBCT) and Combined Joint Task Force-1 in April 2012 with the mission of advising and assisting the ANA and ABP. The 1-502 Battalion team advised the 2/201st ANA Brigade at Jalalabad Garrison in Nangarhar Province and at FOB Joyce, Kunar Province. Team First Strike and Team Strike’s mission as a whole was unique in that 2/101 deployed advisers exclusively to N2KL while 4-4 IBCT conducted the battlespace-owner mission. Given that future BCTs will deploy advisers organic to the deploying BSI brigade, Team First Strike and Team Strike have accumulated lessons-learned and experiences unlikely to be duplicated during the rest of Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan. 3 Author’s interview with Company A, 1-502 Infantry, 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) (Team Hardrock), Nov. 2, 2012, FOB Tagab, Kapisa Province, Afghanistan. A/1-502 advised 1/1/201st ANA Kandak at COP Kalagush, Laghman Province, and then 2/3/201st ANA Kandak at FOB Tagab. 4 Author’s interview with Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1-502 Infantry, 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) (Team Regu-

ANA – Afghan National Army ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces APB –Afghan Border Police BCT – brigade combat team BSI – battlespace integrator BSO – battlespace owner CF – coalition forces CIED – counter-improvised explosive device COP – combat outpost DRA – Democratic Republic of Afghanistan FOB – forward operating base HHC – headquarters and headquarters company IBCT – infantry brigade combat team IED – improvised explosive device ISAF – International Security Assistance Force N2KL – north of Kabul NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCO – noncommissioned officer NDS – National Directorate of Security OP – observation post UK – United Kingdom USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Acronym Quick-Scan lators), Oct. 26, 2012, FOB Bostick, Kunar Province, Afghanistan. HHC/1-502 advised 3/2/201 ANA Kandak and 3/1/ANA Kandak at FOB Bostick. 5 Author’s interview with Company C, 1-502 Infantry, 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) (Team Cobra), Oct. 22, 2012, FOB Fenty, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. C/1-502 advised 7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 Kandak at FOB Bostick, Kunar Province. 6 Author’s interview with Team Cobra. 7 Author’s interview with Company B, 1-502 Infantry, 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) (Team Bulldog), Oct. 18, 2012, COP Mehtar Lam, Laghman Province, Afghanistan. B/1-502 advised 2/1/201st ANA Kandak at FOB Mehtar Lam. 8 Author’s interview with Team Bulldog. 9 Musashi, Miyamoto, The Book of Five Rings, Boston: Shambhala Publications, Oct. 19, 2010 (originally written about 1645; other publishers are available). 10 Author’s interview with Team Cobra. 11 Author’s interview with Headquarters 1-502 Infantry, 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) (Team Talon), Nov. 5-26, 2012, FOB Joyce. 12 Author’s interview with Team Regulators. 13 Author’s interview with Team Talon. 14 Author’s interview with Team Cobra. 15 Ibid. 16 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock. 17 Author’s interview with Team Cobra. 18 Author’s interview with Company D, 1-502 Infantry, 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) (Team Wardog), Oct. 24, 2012, COP Monti, Kunar Province, Afghanistan. D/1-502 advised 2/ABP Zone 1 Kandak at COP Monti. 19 Author’s interview with Team Talon. 20 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock. 21 Ibid. 22 Author’s interview with Team Talon. 23 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock. 24 Author’s interview with Team Talon. 25 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock. 26 Author’s interview with Team Regulators. 27 Author’s interview with Team Talon. 28 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock. 29 Author’s interview with Team Talon. 30 Author’s interview with Team Cobra. 31 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock. 32 Ibid. 33 Author’s interview with Team Cobra. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock. 38 Author’s interview with Team Cobra. 39 Author’s interview with Team Wardog. 40 Author’s interview with Team Bulldog. 41 Author’s interview with Team Talon. 42 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock. 43 Author’s interview with Team Cobra. 44 Author’s interview with Team Bulldog. 45 Author’s interview with Team Regulators. 46 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock. 47 Ibid. 48 Author’s interview with Team Talon. 49 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock. 50 Author’s interview with Team Cobra. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Author’s interview with Team Wardog. 54 Author’s interview with Team Talon. 55 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock. 56 Author’s interview with Team Bulldog. 57 Author’s interview with Team Talon. 58 Author’s interview with Team Bulldog. 59 Ibid. 60 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock. 61 Author’s interview with Team Bulldog. 62 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock. 63 Author’s interview with Team Cobra. 64 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock. 65 Author’s interview with Team Talon. 66 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock. 67 Author’s interview with Team Cobra. 68 Ibid. 69 Author’s interview with Team Bulldog. 70 Author’s interview with Team Talon. 71 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock. 72 Author’s interview with Team Bulldog. 73 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock. 74 Author’s interview with Team Wardog. 75 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock. 76 Author’s interview with Team Cobra. 77 Author’s interview with Team Talon. Note: This information is not the result of an empirical study but the result of a series of observations.