‘I’m Here Because We’re Leaving’: 18 Points for Combat Advising in Eastern Afghanistan

While many of the experiences of Team First Strike (1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment) are unique to the time, place and circumstances of advising in N2KL (north of Kabul) during Spring through late Fall 2012, some experiences are universal to advising in Afghanistan as a whole. Primarily when advising Afghans, personal relationships, either positive or negative, trump lessons-learned about effective advising techniques one might practice. The purposes of this article are to provide key points for how to build that relationship with one’s Afghan partner, how to effectively communicate with one’s Afghan partner and, finally, how to understand the perspective, actions and motivations of one’s Afghan partner.1 (1) “Your relationship is your greatest asset; cultivate it.” - 2/201 Afghan National Army Brigade adviser team.2 The adviser must first recognize that despite his position as an officer or senior noncommissioned officer in, by any standard, the most capable armed force on the planet, he enters his adviser position in a position of weakness. His ability to deliver results and contribute to overall mission accomplishment is entirely dependent on his relationship with his Afghan counterpart and with the multitude of other Afghan personalities with whom he interacts. Once established, his relationship and access to the Afghan National Security Forces can become a powerful force and contribute to not only the accomplishment of his own mission (professionalizing the ANSF) but also protecting the force as a whole. The first step to establishing and cultivating that relationship is to be a student of Afghan history. This will be dealt with in greater detail in Point 18, but at a minimum, an adviser who does not have a basic grounding in the political/economic/cultural history of the last 35 years in Afghanistan cannot be effective. While The Bear Went Over the Mountain and The Other Side of the Mountain are both excellent starting points, the purely tactical literature is not enough to navigate through in working with the ANSF. Similarly, while it is not cost-effective to make every adviser both a Pashto and Dari linguist, the adviser must be able to hear the difference between the two tongues. While not necessarily a cultural faux pas, greeting an Afghan in his preferred tongue, and saying thank you using the proper language, implies a basic appreciation for the widely divergent “backstory” of Tajik and Pashtun ANSF personalities. Saying “tashakur” (Dari) rather than “thank you” to a Pashto speaker demonstrates that one is a gifted amateur trying his best. Saying “mannana” (Pashto) instead of “thank you” to a Pashto speaker at least implies that one might be a dedicated student of Afghanistan and thus a se- rious counterpart. Once again, recognizing the sound of the different languages and responding accordingly has nothing to do with one demonstrating one’s linguistic skills; it demonstrates that the adviser knows “the nuance and difference … that one understands Afghanistan and that can help one make inroads.”3 Likewise, use English carefully. Twelve years of war in Afghanistan has given almost every ANSF soldier/policeman at least a basic understanding of some English phrases. Even if they do not understand the words, most Afghans who have worked with North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces know the cadence of English, and many can even tell the difference between various types of English accents (British English vs. “television American English,” etc.). Thus, one cannot babytalk the Afghans without them noticing the difference in cadence and realizing they are being “talked down to.” Having sidebar conversations with one’s English-speaking counterparts is likewise risky.4 With the initial communication conditions set, the first real step is to prove to one’s ANSF counterpart that one does not have “any competing interests/allegiances.”5 Afghans have a generally low level of trust in institutions and persons outside the greater-family unit. Part of this is cultural, but much of it is due to the perception that over the past 35 years, the people of Afghanistan have been constantly toyed with and used by the superpowers and Pakistan (particularly Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence), among others. Furthermore, the constant threat posed both by “legitimate” Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan personalities and the insurgent elements keep ANSF personalities generally wary and suspicious. Proving that one legitimately has no ulterior motive and is “in their [the ANSF counterpart] corner”6 is an often overlooked portion of relationship-building. This “proof” could take the form of anything from sharing personal information to demonstrating a measurable degree of care over the well-being of the counterpart, his family or his subordinates. Finally, “the Afghan stereotype of Americans is that we are brash and overbearing.”7 Defying expectations is critical to separating the adviser from whatever negative experiences the Afghan has had with Americans, and aligning the adviser with whatever positive experiences the Afghan has had with Americans. This can be done by saluting superior Afghan officers (implying that the adviser sees the ANSF as an allied military rather than a client military to be bullied); establishing “two-way” communication with the Afghan counterpart from the beginning (“we will teach each other and I can be an honest sounding board for your ideas”), rather than “one-way” communication (“I am here to improve your performance”); and generally taking one’s time before making any major recommendations to one’s Afghan counterpart.8 In summary, one’s relationship with one’s ANSF counterpart depends on trust, a trust continually reinforced by the adviser’swords and actions. One’s ANSF counterpart must trust that the adviser is at least somewhat knowledgeable about Afghan history and society to believe that some of the advice the adviser provides is valid within the Afghan context. One’s ANSF counterpart must trust that the adviser has no ulterior motive and legitimately is seeking the betterment of the ANSF counterpart, both personally and from an institutional perspective. Finally, one’s ANSF counterpart must have trust that the adviser sees the counterpart as an “equal” and that the counterpart’s experiences and thoughts are valid. Ensuring this happens falls squarely on the adviser’s shoulders. (2) “Know the Afghan rhythm.” – 3/2/201 ANA Kandak adviser team (Team Regulators). “It is especially important to know the background timing [the way another structures their actions in time], otherwise your strategy will become uncertain.”9 The adviser must understand the Afghan rhythm and, instead of fighting it, work at the same pace and rhythm. Typically the adviser has completed at least one other combat tour. During this tour, the adviser spent nine to 15 months working 16-18 hour days (if not more), communicating instantly with email, chat and telephone. Following his tour, the adviser returned to the United States and took about one month of leave and returned to the garrison schedule for a time before making a permanent-change-of-station move for professional education or anew position. This is not the Afghan rhythm. The ANSF are “in garrison” at the same time as being “at war.” Expecting one’s ANSF counterpart to match the adviser’space from his “last tour” is unreasonable.10 Due to the inefficiency of their personnel system, many ANSF personalities have been in the same position for multiple years; many of the higher-ranking personalities have been at war for almost 10 years straight.11 Thus, while not excusing laziness, the adviser must recognize that many commanders and their staffs are exhausted, both mentally and physically. ANSF counterparts will periodically take multiple weeks of leave during what the adviser sees as “important combat operations.” While every situation is unique, the adviser must ask himself, “Is this absence a product of legitimate laziness/dereliction of duty, or would my counterpart never get time with his family if he was around for every one of these ‘vitally important’ events?” Furthermore, the Afghan daily “battle rhythm” is very different from the American daily battle rhythm. Afghan days are built around prayer, the same way the Afghan year is built around eids (religious holidays). For example, expecting one’s ANSF counterpart to be available between 1 p.m. and 3 p.m. (prayer and post-prayer personal time) is unrealistic. Forcing the issue by visiting one’s Afghan counterpart during that time marks the adviser as inept. It would be as if the adviser went to visit an American counterpart at 6:30 a.m. on a weekday in garrison. The American counterpart would see the adviser as inept for attempting to visit during physical-training hours. Similarly, eids (particularly Small Eid after Ramazan and Eid-al-Adha about 1½ months later) are important social and religious “battle rhythm” events. Much the way the U. S. military would experience significant stress if Christmas block leave was cancelled every year for 10 years running, expecting the ANSF not to observe these holidays and their associated leave periods in their “war-garrison” environment is unrealistic.12 The adviser, instead of becoming frustrated over these periods of seeming “inactivity,” should embrace the Afghan rhythm, recognizing that attempting to coach change to something as basic as the religious-cultural way an Afghan structures his day is both outside the scope of the adviser’s mission and impossible. Instead, the adviser should structure himself and his initiatives with an eye to the Afghan rhythm. Proposing new training, initiatives, methods and practices before the start of Ramazan, for instance, is not the correct timing. Coaching one’s Afghan counterpart on some new practices or new methods after Big Eid (Eid-al-Adha) is more in keeping with Afghan rhythm. Seeking out one’s Afghan counterpart early in the morning, and making oneself available throughout the afternoon and early evening, is much more appropriate than visiting during the morning, breaking for lunch and coming back in the early afternoon. In summary, it is very easy for the adviser to fall into the trap of associating ANSF failures with their battle rhythm. One might present a strong argument that the timing of prayers throughout the day hurts the ANSF’s ability to press home its operations and to plan meetings or training sessions, and that the periodic absences of ANSF counterparts for the various eids and other family events lead to a certain degree of “attention-deficit dis- order” on the ANSF’s part. Nonetheless, the adviser’s ability to affect this situation is very limited. Instead of fighting the current of the Afghan rhythm, the adviser should look to rectify other problems within his scope of control (i.e., working through the ANSF personnel system to assist in rotating out exhausted staff members instead of trying to encourage one’s counterpart not to take leave during a major operation). (3) “Visit your counterpart like an Afghan.” – 7th and 1st Afghan Border Police Zone 1 Kandak adviser team (Team Cobra). As with battle rhythm, when visiting his counterpart, the adviser must recognize that the Afghan style of conversation and culture of “visiting” is quite different from the American or Western style. All would-be ANSF advisers have heard the mantra “have three cups of tea before getting to work” or “open your conversation with talk of family,” but this, while effective as a starting point, is not the full story of how Afghans typically visit and interact. Americans, particularly military Americans, hold a meeting or conduct a visit with an agenda or a list of specific points for discussion. Upon discussing each topic and coming to some resolution, the American moves on to the next point on the agenda and repeats the process. After business is concluded and the meeting closes, Americans are comfortable shifting topics to personal, non-business talk. Americans typically begin to feel that “time is being wasted” or some “unease” if the conversation stalls, if there are audible pauses, or if progress is not being made toward resolving one of the issues on the agenda. Afghans, on the other hand, while having an agenda or a list of things they need to accomplish, rarely if ever proceed in this fashion. Generally, they are more comfortable skipping from one topic to another, backtracking to a previous topic and allowing audible pauses in conversation to occur, while interspersing all this with personal talk. Sometimes they will change location midway through a conversation to allow the conversation to continue over lunch or tea, or simply for a change of scenery. Participants in the meeting may come, go and come back again, depending on their schedule. In the end, like American conversations or business meetings, resolution is eventually reached on each issue or it is decided to table the issue for another meeting. The effective adviser is one who is comfortable being “uncomfortable” with the (from a Western perspective) rambling nature of Afghan conversations. In fact, being slightly “uncomfortable” and feeling like time is being “wasted” is likely a good indicator that the conversation is proceeding in away that is comfortable for one’s Afghan counterpart.13 Unfortunately, many Americans attempt to visit Afghans in the American fashion of having an agenda and not moving on to another topic until resolution is reached on each issue in turn. This causes most Afghans to “turn off,” or become disinterested or tired by the conversation.14 Often attempting to press on a certain topic until resolution is found results in the Afghan simply agreeing or providing “what they know you want to hear” to end the uncomfortably direct conversation. The effective adviser does not have to open with personal talk and tea (sometimes the Afghan counterpart will open with work-related topics) but embraces the flow of the conversation as the Afghan moves the conversation to another topic. The adviser should have confidence and embrace the opportunity to take conversations off on a related tangent (especially if it is a personal or non-work-related tangent), trusting that eventually the conversation will return to the main topic. The effective adviser does not “fill” pauses in the conversation too quickly if it appears the conversation has tapered off. But again, and most importantly, the effective adviser has tactical patience and is comfortable spending 80 percent of a conversation chatting about personal topics and 20 percent of the conversation revolving around work-related topics intermixed with the personal topics and storytelling. Spending two weeks of rapport-building before working with an Afghan as one would work with an American, or starting a visit with three cups of tea then having an American-style meeting, are not effective techniques. Instead the effective adviser understands the circuitous nature of Afghan conversations, has spent time observing how his counterpart meets with other Afghans, and is generally comfortable “wasting time” with his counterpart and allowing the conversation to progress in away that is natural for the Afghans involved. (4) “Both in fighting and in everyday life, you should be determined though calm. … An elevated spirit and a low spirit is weak. Do not let the enemy see your spirit.” - Miyamoto Musashi (16th Century master swordsman and teacher). The effective adviser is always patient, calm and relaxed around his counterparts. He never displays a heightened emotional state, never demonstrates a lack of composure, never appears uncontrollably frustrated, and rarely if ever appears to be hurried or anxious. He is friendly, open and personable by Afghan standards of conduct. This includes body language, tone of voice, content of speech and general demeanor. As one team leader put it, “I can’t think of one instance in which I had to raise a voice or get upset; a logical explanation at an even tone worked best every time.”15 As an adviser, one’s patience is tested daily. The effective adviser stays calm and understands the background and reasons behind the conversations or events that are testing his patience and never rushes to action without bettering his understanding and letting the situation develop. Many times what is petty to the adviser is greatly important to the Afghan, while conversely, what is of great importance to the adviser is petty to the Afghan. One example is casualty reporting. From the American perspective, it is incredibly important to know the type of injury, how it was caused and what treatment the casualty has already received. Americans often are disgusted and frustrated by the seeming lack of Afghan interest in tracking casualties, and read it as a flippant disregard for human life. The lack of medical training at lower levels and rapid/capable medical-evacuation assets mean that for the Afghans, detailed casualty tracking is unfortunately relatively useless, given their inability to truly assess the casualty and care for him until he arrives by ground casualty evacuation.16 In this case, and many others, the effective adviser is patient and mature and does not leap to conclusions or demonstrate frustration. The effective adviser is generally positive, friendly and warm. By Afghan standards, this includes hugging, holding hands and what Americans would define as “flattery.” Telling an Afghan that he is a wonderful man, that you love him and that you are in awe of his many achievements is not hyperbolic or flattery by Afghan standards.17 Similarly, these “over the top” words, along with hugs and tearing-up of the eyes are not seen as a lack of emotional control by Afghan standards and are acceptable, whereas shouting or cursing (acceptable in some military situations) are seen as a lack of emotional control. Finally, the effective adviser is not prideful. He does not demonstrate an undue sense of entitlement or superiority due to his nationality. Consequently, the effective adviser is as good a listener as he is a talker. He shows respect when Afghans are talking and is raptly attentive, even while waiting for a translation.18 The effective adviser practices this emotional balance not only to inspire his ANSF counterpart’s confidence but to maintain his own mental health throughout his time working with the ANSF.

15 (5) “Islam isn’t the entire story of Afghan culture.” – 2/201 ANA Kandak adviser team. The effective adviser recognizes that while Islam is a pervasive force within Afghan culture that touches almost every part of Afghan society and daily life, it is not the entire story. For almost two decades, Afghanistan was ruled by a Marxist-Leninist government. For the better part of another decade, the country was essentially occupied by the Soviet Union. As was typical within the Eastern Bloc during the 1970s and 1980s, the best and brightest of Afghanistan received schooling in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. There they learned not only Marxist-Leninist ideology but valuable skills. And perhaps most importantly, as impressionable young men from a poor rural country, they saw the “progressive” and “modern” USSR. Many of these young men are now the senior leaders of the ANSF, and while they may have developed a more nuanced view of the USSR over the intervening years, the effective adviser cannot underestimate the effect these formative experiences had on many ANSF personalities. Typically these “Soviet-influenced” officers are easy to identify. They are typically majors or higher in rank. Many wear a “Stalin-style” moustache and can still understand if not speak Russian. Beyond the superficial indicators of Soviet influence, some are much more substantial. For example, one ANA intelligence officer in N2KL watched Russian-language television on a daily basis. A National Directorate of Security officer explained at length to the author how he viewed the conflict in Kunar as a Marxist resource-conflict between the people of the province and anew bourgeoisie consisting of the insurgent leadership, local warlords and regional malign actors.19 Thus, even 20 years after the fall of the Communist regime in Afghanistan, the legacy of Communist and Soviet institutions/training remain within certain sections of the ANSF. For an adviser to be effective, he needs to expand his “cultural awareness” beyond Afghan culture and Islam to include Marxist-Leninist ideology. The Soviet influence is particularly evident in the ANSF’s military culture and among many of the senior leaders in particular. In general, the Soviet-trained officers are centralized and uncomfortable delegating power to lower echelons, particularly to noncommissioned officers. They are very bureaucratic as well, interested more in things being done the “right” way.20 For example, a Soviet-trained officer would deny a request for supplies if the form was not filled out correctly and with signatures obtained in the proper order, regardless of the urgency of the request. Furthermore, they are extremely hesitant to follow an order or take any initiative or action, for that matter, unless it is in a written order (a cipher). This is likely away to “avoid blame” if something goes wrong. While this background does make some of these officers extremely rigid, many are very professional and doctrinally knowledgeable within their particular functional areas. The centralized system with which the Soviet-trained officers are more comfortable is also more conducive to maintaining operational security within an ANSF unit wracked with leaks and enemy collection. There is a significant divide between these older officers and the younger Kabul Military Academy officers.21 These new officers are trained in the Western/NATO style of military leadership. Typically they are more comfortable with subordinate leaders taking initiative, relying on their staffs and empowering NCOs. Generally, they are also more focused on problem-solving over process. Many of the Soviet-trained officers have a hard time seeing the difference between problems within their scope of control and problems out of their scope of control, and in many cases blame problems within their organization on national or ANSF-wide systemic problems. This could be due to their “top-down” military culture that sees solutions/orders/information flowing from top to bottom. Regardless, providing recommendations or feedback to higher headquarters is entirely out of the question for the vast majority of these Soviet-trained officers. Neither is soliciting bottom-up feedback from their subordinates seen as useful or acceptable, since they feel that they should know more than their subordinates at all times.22 Publically, these new-generation leaders defer to their Soviet-trained and mujahedeen elders, but privately they criticize them and see them as outdated. Thus, even new Kabul Military Academy graduates are hesitant to provide input to their highers in mission planning or constructive criticism (or after-action review comments) after an operation. When their highers are not present, many of the younger leaders will perform more in the Western/NATO style. The effective adviser recognizes that while it may be easier to work with the younger, Kabul Military Academy-trained ANSF leaders (because their military culture is more similar to the adviser’s), he still must work through the older Soviet-trained officers to achieve success. To interface with them productively, he must first understand that many of these officers may still have a deep attachment to the Soviet system and way of thought that produced them. While Islam may be the guiding force in their life, Marxist-Leninist thought may continue to shape many of their opinions or remain the “lens” through which they view the world. Their military training under the Eastern Bloc system continues to inform the way they act as military leaders. To work with these older ANSF personalities effectively, the adviser is not only a student of Afghan/Islamic culture but of Eastern Bloc and Marxist-Leninist culture. (6) “Having a relationship with you should bring honor and prestige to your Afghan counterpart, not shame or embarrassment.” – 1/1/201st ANA Kandak adviser team. The effective adviser understands that simply having an adviser assigned to him can be a point of pride for his ANSF counterpart, and that at no point should the adviser do something that would bring dishonor, shame or embarrassment to his Afghan counterpart. Having an adviser implies that the ANSF officer or senior NCO has a critical role within his organization and demonstrates to other ANSF personalities that he is deserving of respect due to the fact that he has direct access to coalition forces – and, more specifically, to the U. S. military. In addition to seeing an adviser as a status symbol, the ANSF rank-and-file believe that having an adviser confers upon the advised ANSF personality the ability to leverage CF assets, thus increasing the perceived power of the advised-ANSF officer/NCO. Thus, whether or not the advised Afghan believes he needs mentoring/advice, he is usually very positive about the increased status that having an adviser confers. The effective adviser reinforces these feelings by ensuring that his ANSF counterpart feels like he has access and influence with the adviser and with the CF. This not only helps the advised Afghan take himself seriously, but causes other Afghans to take the advised Afghan seriously.23 This can be done in a variety of ways, including saluting one’s higher-ranking ANSF counterpart; using “commander sir (comandan sahib)/deputy sir (mu’awin sahib),” “staff primary sir (amir sahib),” “brigade command sergeant major (breedmal-e leewa),” “battalion command sergeant major (breedmal-e kandak),” “first sergeant (breedmal-e toolay),” etc., when appropriate; and generally treating one’s ANSF counterpart like one would an American officer/NCO of similar rank.24 While the effective adviser never allows himself to be bullied into “working for” his ANSF counterpart, he does ensure that both his ANSF counterpart and other ANSF personalities understand that he both respects and is dedicated to assisting his ANSF counterpart. The effective adviser is also continually on guard against actions/ situations that could bring dishonor or shame to his ANSF counterpart. This includes never publically criticizing his ANSF counterpart (this will be dealt with in more detail in further points) or publically implying that the ANSF counterpart does not have influence or access to you. While some ANSF personalities may attempt to “ambush” their adviser publically (i.e., “reminding” the adviser during a public meeting that he promised something he never promised), special care must be taken not to imply the ANSF has low influence with the adviser when denying their requests. Sometimes this can mean the adviser must publically accept responsibility for making a mistake or for being unclear, rather than publically saying the counterpart is incorrect. Most importantly, the effective adviser never publically insinu-ates, implies or gives the impression that he controls his Afghan counterpart or forces him into action/inaction. The simplest way to accomplish this is by being at one’s most aggressive or persistent in private with one’s Afghan counterpart, but at one’s most passive or quiet in public settings. Large meetings with multiple personalities are the incorrect setting for the adviser to encourage his counterpart toward a course of action, because ideally the adviser has discussed the issues with his counterpart privately beforehand. In general, though, the effective adviser understands that when Afghans are publically shown to be weak, to be under the influence of others, or without the “power” of access to or influence with others, they lose standing vis-à-vis their peers. The effective adviser is never a source of such loss of standing or face. While force-protection standards should never be compromised, the effective adviser takes the time to understand the procedures in place and what steps can be taken with the CF base-security personnel. For instance, does the base allow ANSF to carry weapons? Drive on the base? Move unescorted? Enter morale, welfare, recreation/USO facilities? Discussing these issues before they arise with the ANSF counterpart can reduce the number of “loss of face” situations and thereby reduce the degree to which the ANSF counterpart feels that having an adviser brings him shame. The effective adviser also works in advance to reduce the intrusiveness of force-protection procedures for trusted ANSF personalities. This could mean getting badges, passes or vehicle reg-istrations for one’s trusted ANSF counterpart, providing photos of one’s ANSF counterpart to entry-control points, or simply ensuring that one’s ANSF counterpart knows to call his adviser if he needs access to the CF base at any time. Afghans recognize the “double standard” applied to their access to CF facilities as compared to CF access to ANSF facilities.25 While most understand the reason behind the “double standard,” reducing it when feasible can bring honor to one’s Afghan counterpart and improve one’s relationship with one’s Afghan counterpart. Finally, the effective adviser observes and is cognizant of the preceding because he understands that Afghans typically avoid situations that cause them to lose face. If one’s ANSF counterpart associates interacting with his adviser with losing face, he will minimize his exposure to losing face by limiting his interactions with his adviser or not being open with his adviser. (7) “Their failure is not your failure. Accept ANSF failure.” – 3/2/201st ANA Kandak adviser team. The effective adviser accepts ANSF failure. He allows ANSF organizations to fail rather than forcing them to succeed, and acknowledges that ANSF failure does not necessarily mean his own failure. While this may seem counterintuitive, it is precisely what defines an “adviser” rather than a “patron-client” relationship. Furthermore, almost all learning models agree that progress does not take place unless there is trial and error. Mak- ing failure impossible for one’s ANSF counterpart not only stunts his growth but actually reverses the process of making ANSF organizations independent by inserting the adviser into the ANSF organization as a key component to success.26 ANSF personalities recognize that due to robust digital-communication capabilities and vast resources, CF – particularly the U. S. military – are, from a relative perspective, vastly more efficient than the ANSF are in accomplishing virtually any task. Thus, as a resource/labor-maximizing organization, the ANSF will regularly allow itself to approach the point its CF partners see as “failure” if it believes its CF partners will not allow such failure to occur.27 After some 10 years of working with CF, ANSF personalities generally understand where CF “red lines” are and are willing to allow CF to solve ANSF problems for them. Some believe that due to the perceived “patron-client” relationship between the United States and Afghanistan, this is perfectly acceptable. Only by ignoring those “red lines” and allowing ANSF entities to fail can an adviser force the ANSF to exercise its less efficient systems, grow as an organization and become more efficient over time. Unfortunately, this translates in some cases with accepting the possibility of temporary damage to the relationship with one’s ANSF counterpart. The adviser must be capable of articulating to his highers why he is allowing the ANSF to fail and inculcate in his subordinates the same degree of acceptance of ANSF failure. As an advising organization, it must be understood by all that as ANSF organizations approach independence, there are no red lines for when CF advisers must force ANSF success. By far the best way to mitigate catastrophic ANSF failure and reduce the likelihood of damage to one’s relationship with the advised ANSF organization without forcing success is to set clear timelines for when advisers will stop taking certain actions or performing certain functions for the ANSF organization. In one example, an adviser team’s decision to allow an ANA kandak to fail in the short-term resulted in multiple long-term improvements to the kandak’s warfighting capabilities. Since the adviser team had advertised in advance the date past which it would no longer be requesting air assets for the kandak, the damage to the relationship between the kandak and the adviser team was minimal, despite the ANA taking casualties.28 However, accepting ANSF failure does not mean excusing oneself from advising or “washing one’s hands” of the consequences of ANSF actions. If an adviser can foresee a potential pitfall or danger, he should never hesitate to inform his ANSF counterpart of the potential danger. Ideally, an adviser should attempt to assist the ANSF in avoiding failure by helping his ANSF counterpart think through the consequences of his courses of action beforehand. After failure, the adviser should assist his ANSF counterpart in managing the aftermath of the failure, rebuilding/ repairing/healing the organization after the failure and learning from the failure. At its heart, accepting ANSF failure means not associating ANSF battlefield failure with CF adviser failure. The effective adviser understands that it is neither his responsibility nor place to become a key component in forcing ANSF success. If the adviser is essentially the linchpin in preventing ANSF from failing a task, he is out of place. The effective adviser doesn’t want ANSF success more than his ANSF counterpart. (8) “They will come to you expecting supplies and material support because that is what has been happening traditionally. … Don’t be afraid to say ‘no.’” – 7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 adviser team. The effective adviser recognizes that over the last 10 years, the ANSF has received supplemental supplies, equipment and even real property from their CF counterparts, leading them to expect the same level of support from their advisers. ANSF leaders continue to view the relationship between ISAF (and particularly the U. S. military) and the ANSF as a “patron-client” relationship. Under this system, it is expected that the patron (the U. S. military) will provide protection, services and life support, and ensure the general well-being of the client (the ANSF). In return, the client will be generally obedient to the patron and reciprocate with support.29 CF at all levels do not view the relationship in the same way, and the United States in particular is uncomfortable with the colonial overtones of being a “patron.” U. S. personnel see the relationship as a partnership, one in which both sides can share resources and support one another, but one in which there is no expectation that one side will provide for the other. Unfortunately, the experience of the last 10 years, during which the United States materially assisted the ANSF in establishing themselves, has convinced the ANSF that they are in a “patron-client” relationship with the U. S. military and that they are entitled to receive supplies/materials from their U. S. advisers.30 This can greatly frustrate the adviser, who often has little ability to provide the ANSF with the supplies they desire and also feels that he is being “used” by the ANSF. Thus, the effective adviser prepares himself both for ANSF expectations and to say “no” in a variety of forceful but respectful ways. To get to the point where he can begin to say “no” to ANSF requests and help them stand on their own, the effective adviser starts where the outgoing CF unit he has replaced left him.31 Immediately changing the level of support after relief in place/ transfer of authority leads to direct organizational setbacks as the ANSF experiences supply shortfalls they were not expecting; animosity on the part of the Afghans who see the new CF adviser team as intentionally undermining the ANSF; and the general view that the new advisers have nothing to provide the ANSF (either materially or intellectually). Ideally, the preceding CF adviser team would have followed the campaign plan to wean the ANSF off U. S. systems, and the new adviser team only needs to continue along that path at progressively lower levels of support. If this is not the case, the adviser team must start by generally saying “yes” to the ANSF before it can begin saying “no.” The effective adviser team starts by laying out precise timelines for the ANSF for when various categories of support will be discontinued. This campaign plan for lowering the levels of direct CF support to the ANSF unit should have ANSF “buy in.” Ideally, the ANSF leadership should know the reasons and has been part of the process of deciding the exact date the adviser team will not provide or assist in securing a particular category of support. If the senior ANSF leadership is part of the process, the effective adviser can leverage the ANSF leadership to promote the plan and accompanying positive information-operations messaging to the rest of the ANSF organization, thus better enabling the adviser to say “no” to lower-level ANSF personnel after the cutoff date passes.32 While securing ANSF key leader buy-in can appear a difficult task, generally ANSF leadership understand and respond positively to the argument that CF forces are drawing down. Emphasizing that CF presence below the ANSF corps/regional level will rapidly become less prevalent can help the ANSF senior leadership understand they must become more self-sustaining now or face significant shortfalls in the mid-term future.33 Nevertheless, for the strategy of creating a campaign plan for decreasing levels of support to be effective, the adviser team must ensure that the decreasing levels of support are relatively similar across ANSF formations. For example, if an adviser team is advising an ANA kandak that is co-located with an ABP kandak, the levels of support provided to the ANA and the ABP should not be drastically different.34 This necessitates regular

Continued on Page 34 cross-talk on the issue of support to ANSF on the part of co-located, neighboring and higher-headquarters adviser teams. After the campaign-plan date for discontinuing support passes, the effective adviser remains firm in saying “no” to the ANSF. Yet the effective adviser also employs a number of techniques to assist the ANSF in solving their own support issues; in defusing some residual animosity from refusing to support the ANSF; and in convincing the ANSF of the need to solve their own problems. First, the adviser can directly assist the ANSF by helping them work through their own problem. This could be as simple as helping the ANSF in filling out their Ministry of Defence-14 supply-request form and forwarding a copy to the higher-headquarters adviser team to ensure that it is not lost, or calling other adviser teams to assist the ANSF in locating a particular item they require. This can be highly effective if combined with a straightforward explanation for why the ANSF are not being supplied/assisted by the CF in the manner requested any longer. Remaining firm, treating the ANSF like equals with a reasonable explanation, but offering to help them work through their own system, is most likely to gain the adviser the respect rather than the animosity of his ANSF counterpart. In the event of some lingering animosity or feelings of “betrayal,” the adviser can defuse some of the feelings by acknowledging that the ANSF are not receiving everything they want or need but pointing out that this is not uncommon in the U. S. Army as well. Informing the ANSF about U. S. Army supply shortages in garrison often leads to an eye-opening moment for ANSF leaders, in which they realize that the United States does not have infinite supplies.35 This conversation can be continued by pointing out shortages suffered by the adviser team itself, and how if the adviser team were to give the ANSF items out of hide, it would result in further shortages for the adviser team.36 For example, one adviser team’s personnel, along with members of the battlespace integrator, slept in tents to free up space for ANSF personnel to sleep in hard-stand buildings. By illustrating these points to the ANSF, the adviser can demonstrate that requesting supplies from CF is not a “victimless crime”; in fact, it cuts into a limited stock of supplies. Finally, the adviser can begin to help the ANSF see the necessity and the desirability of solving their own supply or support issues by influencing them to take pride in their independence. By directly linking their decreasing level of support to their increasing level of professionalism and playing on their pride in that status as a “first rate” or “professional” organization, the adviser can help the ANSF take pride in working through their own systems.37 In summary, the effective adviser is comfortable saying “no” to his ANSF counterpart, having already prepared the battlefield by providing the counterpart with a clear timeline for decreasing levels of support. By treating his ANSF counterpart as an equal and providing realistic explanations for the decreasing levels of support, the effective adviser can say “no” and still maintain his relationship with his counterpart, bringing the ANSF closer to self-sufficiency. (9) “Offset the cost of having you around. …” – 7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 Kandak adviser team. The effective adviser understands that while it is essential to the long-term viability of the ANSF to wean the ANSF off CF logistical support, advisers consume ANSF resources themselves, and it is not only unfair but unwise not to compensate the ANSF accordingly. Adviser teams are, often without their knowledge, large consumers of ANSF resources. These resources include primarily food and security, but also may include luxury items and vehicles, not to mention time. For instance, when adviser teams at remote locations eat with their Afghan counterparts, they consume foodstuffs that are carefully rationed due to the weakness of the ANSF logistical system. This can directly translate to an ANSF soldier not getting his daily ration of two eggs because feeding the “honored guests” is seen as more important. Thus, “if all you’re offering is advice, you start to become a drain.”38 While at larger installations closer to ANSF logistical hubs, the effect is less extreme, but the principle remains that CF advisers should ensure they offset their costs. Most commonly, CF advisers will request copies of documents from the ANSF. CF advisers should ensure to offset the “cost of doing business” with paper, ink, etc. While it is important to force the ANSF to exercise their own logistical system, advisers will seem out of touch if all they provide is advice while expecting the ANSF to provide products/items. (10) “The guy in charge is not necessarily the loudest guy in the room.” – 2/201 ANA Brigade adviser team. When meeting with unfamiliar Afghans or judging the relationships between unfamiliar and familiar Afghans, the effective adviser always remembers that “the most influential person in the room might not be the highest ranking nor the most talkative.”39 For advisers who have Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation New Dawn experience, this may require some adjustment given the respect/deference accorded to more “authoritarian” Iraqi leaders.40 At the risk of over-generalizing, Afghans are masters of influencing and persuading, and often go about it more quietly than Americans. While an influential American likely sits at the head of the table, chairs a meeting and makes a decision, an influential Afghan may sit off to the side, speak little and communicate through proxies. Doing so allows the influential Afghan to orchestrate a conversation and decision, rather than become a target for retaliation (physical/verbal/etc.). This phenomenon, well documented particularly in rural civilian Afghan society, is less common in the ANSF but still observable. For instance, the 2/201 ANA Brigade NDS officer proposed having an “intelligence shura” to the 2/201 ANA Brigade intelligence advisers. The NDS officer, with some limited input from the advisers, planned out quite specifically whom he wanted to have in attendance, what he wanted to discuss and what requirements he wanted to place on lower-echelon intelligence officers during the brigade intelligence shura. During the shura, the NDS officer sat to the side while the brigade S-2 parroted word for word what the NDS officer had discussed with the advisers. Multiple kandak NDS officers voiced their support for the brigade S-2’s statements. During the entire meeting, the brigade NDS officer said nothing except to briefly agree with the brigade S-2 and thank the participants for attending. It was obvious to the advisers that the brigade NDS officer had engineered the meeting, using the brigade S-2 and kandak NDS officers as proxies. He was the most influential individual in the room, but had the advisers not met with him a week prior, they would have assumed the brigade S-2 was the most influential individual in the room.41 Understanding who has influence over whom has great benefit to an adviser. With this information, the adviser can leverage influential individuals to assist the adviser in changing the behavior of a counterpart or in negotiating an end to an administrative or organizational dispute. As stated, like any military organization, rank confers a certain degree of influence. The quietly

Continued from Page 18 influential NDS officer mentioned was actually the highest-ranking individual in the room, although he was not chairing the meeting. Personal connections, family status, service history and personal reputation all play apart in determining influence level as well. Some may have influence only over certain sections of Afghan society or the ANSF; some may be universally respected. Should the adviser be able to identify and leverage key influential personalities, it will greatly enhance the adviser’s ability to improve ANSF performance. (11) “They’re really not that different. … They’re country folks and use the same parables we do to explain things.” – 7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 Kandak adviser team. The effective adviser is a storyteller who uses parables and stories to convey his point. Much is made of the differences between American and Afghan communication and learning styles, but Afghans, like Americans, are more likely to remember or take something away from a conversation if they can form a personal connection with the message or messenger. The U. S. military relies heavily upon lessons-learned documents, written accounts or vignettes from combat, etc. – these tools are simply professionally written and edited stories. The marginal difference lies in that perhaps Afghans are slightly more accepting of the use of stories or parables in a professional setting as a form of communication. The effective adviser leverages this to his advantage in getting his point across. The first step in using parables and stories is to learn some of the Afghan sayings from one’s interpreter. While some sayings have slightly different Afghan equivalents (i.e., “You can’t take hair from your beard and make a moustache” is the rough equivalent for “You can’t mix apples and oranges”), many – like the story of the “Boy Who Cried Wolf” – are held exactly in common.42 Communicating through Afghan sayings and parables will not only expedite the process of explaining a concept in an intelligible way but will gain the adviser his counterpart’s respect. Secondly, the effective adviser is ready to improvise by creating stories or parables of his own that fit the situation or concept the adviser is trying to describe. When describing how to accomplish a certain task, it is significantly more effective for the adviser to describe how he accomplished or failed to accomplish this task in the past, rather than describe step by step how this task should be or could be accomplished. Creating a story with the adviser as the protagonist creates a personal connection between the Afghan counterpart and the situation or task being described. These stories need not be entirely factually or historically accurate. There is nothing wrong with fabricating a believable story or parable to get one’s point across.43 Primarily, though, the stories should signal that the adviser is open and has experienced the same difficulty/situation the Afghan is facing; thus believability and genuineness is key. Finally, encouraging Afghans to exchange their own war stories or life experiences is an effective tool for helping them work through an issue or learn anew skill. For example, when teaching a class to Afghan soldiers on counter-improvised-explosive-device techniques, encouraging the soldiers to describe their own experiences with IEDs can lead to a meaningful discussion on IED defeat, which the Afghan soldiers are more likely to remember than a stock CIED class.44 Generally speaking, exchanging war stories, especially if the adviser and the Afghan counterpart have combat experience in the same region of Afghanistan, is one of the best techniques for trust-building and advising throughout one’s rotation.