Improving Tactical Reconnaissance – Back to Basics

Observations at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA, indicate our task-force scout platoons have lost some basic skills that must be retrained and regained to ensure the Army’s continued success in combat. This article provides specific observations from more than 20 brigade combat team rotations at the NTC with subsequent recommendations. Shortcomings start at the top. Many TF staffs fail their scout platoons for the following reasons:

• Improper scout platoon employment;

• Inability to clearly enunciate tactical tasks; and

• Inability to manage reconnaissance and surveillance assets. How we employ scouts Due to the nature of the counterinsurgency fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, most units arrive at the NTC with no intention of using the TF scout platoon for doctrinal purposes (route/zone/area reconnaissance or reconnaissance in force). Typically, the commander or S-3 operations officer tasks the scout platoon’s reconnaissance squads to conduct mounted and dismounted security, or serve as the personal-security detachment for the battalion commander and command sergeant major during their battlefield circulation. The sniper squad’s three sniper sections are then task-organized to support companies. To make matters worse, TF staffs rarely provide the scout platoon good, doctrinal tasks that employ them in doctrinal roles during missions. In fact, most scout platoon leaders and platoon sergeants never work according to their doctrinal roles. Very few scout platoon leaders or platoon sergeants have attended any institutional training courses to learn their craft. Thus, platoon leaders and platoon sergeants do not know how they should be employed. Tasks we give scout platoons TF S-2 intelligence officers and S3s rarely give the scout platoon sound doctrinal tasks – specifically to confirm or deny an element of the S-2’s enemy situational template. Even when tasking the scout platoon to observe a named area of interest, Improving Tactical Reconnaissance – Back to Basics by SFC Bryan E. Lackey and COL Brett C. Jenkinson 32 such as an improvised explosive device hotspot, S-2s or S-3s rarely focus observation times for the scouts or define the specific reporting requirements. A good task might read like: “Observe NAI 3108 from 110400JUL11 to 110700JUL11 IOT PID IED emplacement; O/O conduct CFF Tgt AD 3105 to destroy IED emplacers; BPT conduct TSE on POI.” Regardless, whether the staff tasks the scout platoon to conduct reconnaissance to fill an incident report pertaining to an enemy situation template or an IR to fill an intelligence gap on a personality target, the written tasks must be clear. For example: “Collect a facial photo of Hask Hafiz IVO Ertabat Shar NLT 122100JUL11 IOT assist in PID of TF HVT #4.” Once written, S-2s and S-3s fail to capture the collection task properly. Figure 1 shows the collection synchronization matrix the S-2s typically use as a briefing tool. The CSM typically lists brigade-and-above assets, including national technical means. Worse yet, the TF scout platoon is rarely included in the CSM. TF S-2s would do well to avoid using the CSM as a planning tool. The tabular R&S matrix, Figure 2, or an information-collection matrix is better for planning (orders). These matrices are simpler and more descriptive for junior leaders who lack exposure to most of the reconnaissance platforms shown on the

CSM.

Solutions Solutions to fix problems at the TF level. Most TF staffs improve their use of the scout platoon during a rotation at the NTC. However, to the scout platoon, the staff’s inefficiency and experimentation with them is frustrating. Barring formal train-LEgEnd 52nd Infantry division 1/52 Heavy Brigade Combat Team

87/52 Infantry Brigade Combat Team TF Lafayette TF White Eagle Opn Flame ThrOwer Figure 1. Sample of the top of a CSM report. Priority nAI Start

Instruction RECOn CO A CO B CO C

SnIPERS

Coordination Remarks Stop dTg: Mission: Reconnaissance and surveillance matrix Figure 2. Sample of a R&S matrix. 33 bat inspection and, later, the pre-combat check. Leaders seem hesitant to force scouts to lay out required equipment for a mission, a practice snuffed as “old fashioned” or beneath the expertise of the “special men” of the scout platoon! Later, leaders fail to execute PCCs prior to movement. The results are troopers who carry non-essential equipment and forget the essential equipment. Batteries are dead; navigational aids are not prepared with waypoints; leaders leave paper maps and fires overlays; etc. Scout leaders must have separate PCI and PCC checklists. We also get lazy following issuance of our warning order. Leaders do not use available time to prepare and rehearse individual scout tasks. They do not maximize use of company intelligence-support teams or the battalion S-2 shop, where there are invaluable computer-software tools to help scouts select the optimal OP prior to leaving the wire. Blue Force Tracker, Speed software, Falcon View, Arc GIS and many more have line-of-sight analysis tools. At the tactical level, LoS is undeniably the single most important factor affecting scout-platoon performance. Equipment woes – the best kit in the world. We also observe trends in units’ failure to use available time during TLPs to prepare mission-essential equipment, including Global Positioning System equipment, lightweight laser-designating range finders and night-fighting equipment: night-vision goggles, aimpoint lasers, thermal sights, etc. If we are successful in preparing this equipment, we are not especially adept at employing it, especially in the dark. These are all the tools that can make scouting remarkably more pleasant. A scout can avoid dirty work and the infiltration if he uses his route-selection tools properly. Because we have lost much of our ability to read a map well, specifically our ability to identify intervisibility lines, computer software has become especially important. If used properly, it can allow a scout to walk upright ing, S-3s and S-2s should task the scout platoon leader and platoon sergeant to provide the staff a capabilities brief. Such a brief might remedy the staff’s failure to assign doctrinal tasks in accordance with Field Manual 3-20.98, Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon. The finer points of reconnaissance management may require some formal training. The solution for staff shortfalls is attending one of many intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance top-off courses offered by the Intelligence and Security Command’s Foundry Program. An ISR management course provides students planning guidance to overcome shortages in reconnaissance holdings. Instruction includes tips on cueing, mixing and reconnaissance redundancy. Clearly enunciating reconnaissance tasks also helps intelligence officers. Shortcomings at the scout-platoon level. Combining the staff’s inability to focus collection times, poorly written tactical tasks to the scout platoon and weak individual skills in the platoon, a simple task to confirm or deny an action inside an NAI results in ineffective persistent surveillance. Scouts are generally weak at infiltration of an observation post. Thus, persistent surveillance from that OP results in terrain denial; the enemy watched our scouts occupy our OP. Hence, we fail in objective reconnaissance. This is failure in the basics of reconnaissance: find the enemy, obstacle or route and report it. At the scout-platoon level, we routinely observe atrophied basic skills:

• Poor troop-leading procedures;

• Lack of proficiency with organic equipment (specifically radios, computers and navigation aids);

• Poor fieldcraft; and

• Lack of doctrinal knowledge TLPs – the start of something good. Specific shortfalls lie in scout-section and team-leader skills in conducting the pre-com- 34 almost entirely to his OP, yet remain completely undetected. BFT, Speed, Falcon View and Arc GIS are all programs that can help us plan routes. If we do occupy a hide site effectively, we often have trouble sending reports back to the TF S-2. A good baseline understanding of wave theory can help scouts maximize the use of multiband radios like the PRC-117G. Once mastered, the 117G provides a digital-communications capability that has eluded scouts for years. It allows long-haul communications and the ability for scouts to transmit more than voice reports. Now photos, tactical chat and even short videos of reconnaissance objectives are available for sharing. Fieldcraft – expertise earned, not taught. Mostly due to 10 years of combat conducted from a forward operating base or combat outpost, fieldcraft skills are all but lost – an atrophy not sparing of scouts. We seem to have lost the ability to stay “in the woods” for more than 24-28 hours without detection. Priorities of work, personal hygiene and field-sanitation skills are a distant memory. While in an OP or hide site, unhealthy and unsustainable conditions are due to scouts failing to conduct weapons maintenance, personal hygiene or field sanitation. None of this is due to their being bad or poorly disciplined Soldiers – they have never been trained to a standard. Early detection, sickness and failure to report required information is the result. Nobody is too cool for doctrine. While it smacks in the face of 10 years’ of combat experience, almost all the solutions for scout-platoon shortfalls lie in training doctrinal tasks according to FM 3-20.98. These are tasks taught at the Army Reconnaissance Course or the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader’s Course at Fort Benning, GA. While both courses are enough for the TF scout platoon, the latter focuses more on long-range surveillance units rather than the scout platoon. In either course, leaders from staff sergeant and up can gain the skills required to plan and execute scout-platoon tasks. Training shortfalls are a product of the Army Forces Generation model. Deploying Soldiers often eliminate attendance at formal schools during their unit’s struggle to satisfy pre-deployment tasks. The cost of sending a leader to school is absenting him from completing another “mandatory” task. To prepare ourselves for our contingency expeditionary force requirements, we must get back to our scouting basics. Conclusion This article combines nearly two years of observations that indicate poor trends in scout-platoon performance. Difficulties originate in the task force staff:

• Improper scout-platoon employment;

• Inability to clearly enunciate tactical tasks; and

• Inability to manage R&S assets. Fixes for the staff are relatively simple: read FM 3-20.98; get a capabilities brief from the scout platoon leader and platoon sergeant; attend some Foundry training like the ISR top-off course. Scout platoons are not without fault. Many problems within the platoon originate with:

• Poor TLPs;

• Lack of proficiency with organic equipment;

• Poor fieldcraft; and

• Lack of doctrinal knowledge. Fixes for these are straightforward: carry different PCI and PCC checklists; conduct hands-on training with organic equipment prior to field training and during any down time; go to the field and stay out more than 72 hours without external support; and, most importantly, go to school! Once leaders get our scout platoons and TF staffs back to the basics, our scout platoons will demonstrate their collective greatness. TF S-2s, S-3s and commanders have everything to gain when scout platoons become the hyper-performers they have always been! MSG Brian Lackey is relocating to 7th Battalion, 10th Cavalry, Fort Carson, CO, after serving as a combat trainer for Tarantula Team, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA. He also served as a platoon sergeant and senior scout for 6th Battalion, 8th Cavalry, 4th Brigade, Fort Stewart, GA; and in-Scouts in an OP. (Photo by COL Brett Jenkinson) 35 structor, 1st Battalion, 16th Cavalry, Fort Knox, KY. His military schooling includes Airborne School, Fort Benning, GA; Air Assault School, Fort Campbell, KY; Rappel Master, Fort Campbell; Tactical Tracking Operations School, Fort Irwin; Electronic Warfare School, Fort Irwin; Primary Leadership Development course, EUSA Wightman NCO Academy, Korea; Basic Noncommissioned Officer’s Course, Fort Knox; Advanced Noncommissioned Officer’s Course, Fort Benning; and Observer-Controller Academy, Fort Irwin. The Bronze Star, Purple Heart and Meritorious Service Medal awardee holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in history from Columbia College, MO. COL Brett Jenkinson is deputy commander, 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC. He has served four combat tours, including two to Iraq and two to Afghanistan (where he is currently deployed), and one peacekeeping tour in Egypt. He previously served as the light task force senior observer-controller, Fort Irwin, CA; light battalion commander, Fort Hood, TX, and Kunar Province, Afghanistan; National Intelligence Support Team chief, Bolling Air Force Base, DC; battalion S-3, Fort Bragg, NC, and Baghdad, Iraq; and battalion executive officer, Fort Bragg, NC, and Baghdad. His military schooling includes the Military Assistance Security Advisor Course, Fort Polk, LA; Joint Planning Course, Fort Leavenworth, KS; Command and General Staff Officers Course, Fort Leavenworth; Joint Firepower Control Course, Nellis Air Force Base, NV; Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Fort Benning, GA; Airborne, Ranger and Jumpmaster schools, Fort Benning, GA; Air Assault School, Fort Campbell; Scout Platoon Leader Course, Fort Knox; Dynamics of International Terrorism Course, Hurlburt Field, FL; and Jungle Warfare School, Fort Sherman, Panama. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree in civil engineering from the U. S. Military Academy, West Point, NY; and a master’s of military arts and sciences degree in military history from the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. He has been awarded BPT – brigade patrol troop CFF – call for fire CSM – collection synchronization matrix FM – field manual HBCT – heavy brigade combat team HVT – high-value target IEd – improvised explosive device IOT – in order to IR – incident report ISR – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance IVO – in vicinity of LoS – line of sight nAI – named area of interest nLT – no later than nTC – national Training Center OP – observation post PCC – pre-combat check PCI – pre-combat inspection PId – positive identification POI – point of impact R&S – reconnaissance and surveillance TF – task force TLP – troop-leading procedure TSE – tactical support element Acronym Quick-Scan three Bronze Star Medals, one Purple Heart, one Defense Meritorious Service Medal, five Army Meritorious Service Medals, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Meritorious Service Medal and three Army Commendation Medals for valor. Scouts provide security after performing an assault on local area role players at nTC. (Photo by SSG Austin Pritchard) 36