No Two the Same… One Cavalry Troop Commander’s Lessons-Learned in His Afghan Area of Operations

This article is essentially an after-action review of the tactics, techniques and procedures my unit – Team Blackfoot, 3-89 Cavalry – successfully used in our area of operations in the Mayden Shar and Jalrez districts of Wardak Province, Afghanistan, from October 2010 through October 2011. The terrain we owned began transitioning to Afghan control in December 2011, less than two months following our departure. As a troop, we did nothing new or revolutionary. We nested our mission with the squadron’s overall goal of providing security and stability to allow host-nation forces time to build the structure necessary for transition to Afghan primacy in government and security. My Soldiers and I followed two main principles: respect and empowerment. The focus on respect was universal in relations with our counterparts in the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, local and national police, national Army and citizenry. CPT Jason Lopez talks with a village elder about orchard-management classes. Building relationships on a personal level is arguably the most important tenet of enabling security and stability in a unit’s battlespace. This extends past cookie-cutter questions about bad guys and village wants – it involves knowing the elders and their families and actively seeking to understand what the village needs. (Photo by SFC Glen Bennett) COIN professional development: 28 April-June 2012 No Two the Same … One Cavalry Troop Commander’s Lessons-Learned in His Afghan Area of Operations by CPT Jason W. Lopez and SGT Matthew E. Snow

The empowerment was first aimed at village elders and the local and national police due to the lack of Afghan National Army in our battlespace – and then, with the arrival of ANA elements, at an ANA capable of security primacy. The intent of this article is to show a way – not “the” way – to succeed in the diverse and challenging country of Afghanistan. Different valley, new challenges I must first emphasize that every valley in Afghanistan is unique. This is a simple idea but widely dismissed or ignored. No overarching strategy implemented at the national and, in many cases, provincial level will work. The key is empowering district leadership to determine what fits their district’s specific problem set. Very simple solutions may produce outstanding results in one area, while several terrain features away, it may reap little or no reward. Knowing your battlespace and the people and personalities within is another key element. Understanding the local power structure is crucial to developing lasting security, stability and growth. Our AO had an agriculture-based economy. Its only major export was apples. Most people maintained subsistence crops to support their families and used the income from selling apples to purchase what they were unable to produce on their own. This revenue stream was limited, however, as only the best apples (aesthetically speaking) were for sale. The people consumed the remaining apples, or they discarded them. Through coordination with the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Afghanistan Ministry of Agriculture, we worked to introduce means of using these “ugly” apples for further economic gains. Several classes provided instructions for the construction of juicers, sauce makers and composters. This educated farmers on more avenues for use of these surplus apples, thus allowing for more economic diversity and growth. Empower the future Once you understand the political terrain and balance of power, you must enable (and sometimes force) district-level GIRoA to take ownership of their AO. If the district governor and line ministers are not enthusiastic about a specific course of action, the plan is destined to fail. Sometimes what seems like common sense to us is the opposite in the eyes of our Afghan counterparts. Continue to empower local elders. Their buy-in is crucial. Without it, no matter how much we push an action, it will fail. Cut through the complaining and identify their actual issues. Like Louisiana political legend Huey Long’s promise of “a chicken in every pot” – which made for good radio but was ludicrous – the idea that “a well in every qulat” is much the same. Pinpoint key needs, figure out how to provide for them by, with and through GIRoA, and execute. I would bet a month’s pay the results will be increased peace and security. We accomplished this in our AO by holding weekly jirgas at the district center involving the sub-governor, line ministers, district police chief, local police commander, U.S. Agency for International Development representative, U.S. Department of State representative, ANA commander and International Security Assistance Forces leadership. These meetings allowed us to identify problems, discuss solutions and enact a unified course for addressing them. Eliminating need for ‘us’ ISAF elements present positively due to their level of professionalism and rapport with local elders and citizenry. Nonetheless, these individuals realize we are going to leave. Our solutions, while good in the short term, are temporary. They know this. The “one-tour wars” we’ve fought for the last 10 years have led to widespread cynicism due to unmet promises. Some projects promised by previous units often have gone unfulfilled due to new priorities and difficulties with Commander’s Emergency Response Program funds. The answer is to have GIRoA intimately involved in any development and conduct the resourcing by, with and through them. This will ensure continuity and follow through. ANA and the district sub-governor, with ISAF oversight, should monitor civil affairs plus CERP. The ANA in Jalrez operated at a very high level almost from their arrival in our battlespace. They conducted independent route clearance within a month and took the lead in key-leader engagements in the first few months. Unfortunately, however, when they were tasked to a different district for most of the fighting season, security decreased in the valley. ANP is the solution, and increased resourcing and training is the key. Establishing a competent and functioning intelligence collection and investigative department is also crucial. Identifying, arrest-ing and prosecuting destabilizing individuals will go a long way in increasing security. Removing these individuals will buy time for Afghan National Security Forces and GIRoA to build rapport, confidence and competence in the eyes of the local populace. This will deny the enemy freedom of maneuver and eliminate power vacuums in areas where the GIRoA is seldom heard and is never seen. ISAF forces should assume a “follow and support” role in working with ANSF and GIRoA. All KLEs and line-of-effort meet- 1LT Brad Boone discusses the possibility of starting a sports league in one of our more permissive areas. Empowering junior leaders to take ownership of their respective AOs will allow battlespace owners wider breadth in understanding the dynamics of their district. (Photo by CPT Jason W. Lopez) April-June 2012 29 ings should be driven by our counterparts, not time hacks. ANSF – with ISAF oversight and support – should plan and execute missions. The sooner you take the training wheels off, the sooner the ANSF will take ownership of their battlespace. Negative influencers and incompetent Afghan leaders should be removed as soon as it is evident they present no value to the way ahead. In our AO, we began training Afghan officers and noncommissioned officers in basic skills, which they, in turn, trained their soldiers on. They rehearsed these skills on the combat outpost before putting them into practice on patrols throughout the battlespace. This allowed the ANA to gain competence and confidence in their abilities, while also showing the local citizenry that the ANA was capable of ensuring security and filling the vacuum left when ISAF personnel eventually leave the area. Peace, the Afghan way Once we identified the main powerbrokers in our battlespace, we began to work on establishing a peace council, including pro-GIRoA and pro-insurgent elements. This paid immediate dividends, as significant activities in our battlespace dropped significantly and pro-insurgent elements began to discuss their future involvement in securing their local areas in conjunction with ANSF elements. They were not interested in reintegration yet but with time, this seemed like a genuine possibility. The death of Burhanwaddin Rabbani, the High Peace Council leader for reintegration, may be the death toll for this, and thus the end of reintegration. Looking at it through the lens of common sense, I believe that the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, an Afghan Islamist political party, caught the last train leaving the station. “Reintegration” runs by a rotation of ISAF units who change every year (and soon, in nine months). The promise is not that they will not attack any American or coalition member – they say they will not attack the unit they are sitting across the table from. As the cast of characters change, so do the rules. Every “reintegrate” is one stray bullet away from being your local bad guy again. Everything in Afghanistan is on an individual basis. The only time Afghans band together is to expel outsiders. The same guy who swears on the Koran that he is my brother could be the same “dushman” who launches rockets at your COP. His “peace” is with me. Enshallah to everyone else. This is the reason “reintegration” will not work. Changing the ‘culture of cool’ In our specific battlespace, we saw a predominance of unemployed or underemployed male teenagers acting as instigators for the insurgency. To re-direct their energies, we need to attempt to change the “culture of cool” by redefining exactly what “cool” is for the children of Afghanistan. This one is tough, as we haven’t yet mastered it in the United States. Establishing local leagues of tae kwan do, cricket, volleyball, soccer and boxing will foster family, clan, village, tribal and ultimately, national pride if tied in with other nations such as Pakistan, Iran and India. Most importantly, it will co-opt their desire for jihad, much as soccer does for Ireland vs. England and Croatia vs. Serbia. This will require support of fathers and grandfathers, as these are the people the young “jihadi” attempts to appease through disruptive, and often violent, action. This will also strengthen the nuclear family through the process of a family activity outside of agriculture and prayer. It will also help erase political biases Wardak Provincial Governor Fidai addresses a large audience of civic leaders at the announcement of Afghan local police recruitment in the Jalrez District. The facilitation of an active, transparent government that works by, with and through the constituency it represents is the endstate we strive to reach. (Photo by CPT Jason W. Lopez) 30 April-June 2012 that are born into each family by forcing the teams to accomplish tasks as a team vs. along party lines. Enable the enablers Enablers (DoS, USAID, law-enforcement personnel) should be working by, with and through their prospective counterparts. The enablers should listen to the input and assist them in meeting their intent. They should also help them identify poor and ineffective Afghan government representatives and have them replaced. We involved USAID and DoS personnel in all non-lethal missions planning. This allowed these enablers to chart the course for future development and in turn empower the GIRoA leadership in the valley with providing for the citizens they represent. Conclusion Every valley in Afghanistan comes with its own challenges, problems and elements for success. Fostering outside-the-box thinking and allowing junior leaders to flourish and grow by giving them a clearly defined intent and left-and-right limits will help in understanding these unique problem sets. A keen understanding of local dynamics is crucial to determining a proper and successful way ahead. Allowing Afghan civic and military leadership to guide this planning is the best way for us to gain lasting success. CPT Jason W. Lopez is a cavalry officer who is currently an observer coach trainer with the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, LA. He deployed in leadership positions to both Iraq and Afghanistan for a total of 29 months. He also commanded B Troop, 3-89 Cavalry, 4-10 Mountain (Light), March 2010-March

2012. His other assignments have included mentor/trainer, B Troop, 3-89 Cavalry, Fort Polk; and executive officer and scout platoon leader, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3-73 Cavalry, Fort Bragg, NC. His military education includes the Maneuver Captains Career Course, Fort Benning, GA; U.S. Army Rang-ANA – Afghan National Army ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces AO – area of operations CERP – Commander’s Emergency Response Program COP – combat outpost DoS – Department of State GIRoA – government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ISAF – International Security Assistance Forces KLE – key-leader engagement USAID – U.S. Agency for International Development Acronym Quick-Scan er School, Fort Benning; Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course, Fort Benning, GA; Scout Leaders Course, Fort Knox, KY; and U.S. Army Airborne School, Fort Benning. CPT Lopez holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in history from the University of Louisiana, Lafayette, LA. SGT Matt Snow is the section leader for B Troop, 3-89 Cavalry, 4/10 Mountain (Light), Fort Polk, LA. He previously served as the combat intelligence-support team noncommissioned officer in charge for B Troop, 3-89 Cavalry, during Operation Enduring Freedom 2010-2011, and again as section leader with several units at Fort Polk and Schweinfurt, Germany. SGT Snow’s military education includes the Raven unmanned aerial vehicle course, Fort Rucker, AL; Primary Leadership Development Course, Fort Knox, KY; and Airborne Course at Fort Benning, GA. He was instrumental in developing the Afghan Peace Shura in the Jalrez Valley. He has had several articles on tribal relations in eastern Afghanistan published for the conflict-cultures course at the Naval post Graduate School, Monterey, CA. ARMOR individual subscription form