Blocked and Bloodied: Lessons from the Combined Arms Breach During the 2023 Ukranian Counter-Offensive

Summer 2025 “I wouldn’t say it was unexpected, but we underestimated it... We conducted engineering and aerial reconnaissance, but many mines were masked or buried. In addition to those by the front line, there were mines deeper into enemy positions. We passed enemy posi tions and encountered more mines where we thought there were none anymore.”

- Lieutenant Colonel Olesksandr Sak On the eve of the 2023 Ukrainian coun ter-offensive, analysts viewed the op eration as at a crossroads: “The next phase of the war will hinge, in part, on the ability of Ukrainian forces to retake territory by moving from attrition to maneuver warfare and to shift the of fense-defense balance in favor of the offense.”1 From June to November 2023, however, multiple Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) brigades failed to penetrate the Russian Surovikin line along the Orikhiv-Tokmak Axis in Za porizhzhia Oblast, advancing approxi mately 20km at the cost of 518 vehi cles, including 91 tanks and 24 engi neering vehicles.2 The wake of the failed 2023 Ukrainian counter-offen sive left more than the loss of life and equipment. It reinforced the notion currently in vogue that maneuver war fare is dead.3 At the core of the current maneuver-attrition debate is the ability - or in ability - of units to successfully execute the combined arms breach. This article uses the 2023 Ukrainian counter-offen sive as a case study to reveal challenges for the Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in applying the US Army’s five breaching tenets on the modern battlefield. The AFU’s experi ence demonstrates the vital impor tance of detailed intelligence and ap propriate task organization. The failed counter-offensive also highlights diffi culties in applying the breaching fun damentals known as “Suppress, Ob scure, Secure, Reduce, Assault (SOS RA),” synchronization, and mass within in the operational environment the AFU faced. Although the ABCT will fight within a different operational context, identifying Ukrainian challeng es in applying the breaching tenets will enable its leaders to develop tactical and technical solutions to succeed in Large-Scale Combat Operations. Russian Obstacles: The Enduring Importance of Detailed Intelligence Following the AFU’s offensives which recaptured Kharkiv and Kherson Oblasts in 2022, the Russian Armed Forces (RAF) began construction of a complex defense system in Zapor izhzhia Oblast. By April 2023, the RAF defense system consisted of three ma jor sub-systems, spaced 10km to 20km apart to prevent another break through. After more than six months of preparation, the first two defense sub-systems were nearly identical.4 The third sub-system, however, resem bled more of a constellation of discon nected fortifications. Here, the RAF prioritized resources to secure key ter rain such as Tokmak, where they con structed defenses along its entire pe rimeter.5 Prior to the AFU’s counter-offensive, open-source reports described the composition of the first two sub-sys tems as: dragons teeth laid out in three rows; 300m to 500m of open area heavily mined; irregular trenches that support both infantry and vehicle fighting positions as well as dugouts and vehicle hide sites; another 300m to 500m potentially mined open area usually containing a woodline or other concealed area to enable resupply, Blocked and Bloodied: Lessons from the Combined Arms Breach during the 2023 Ukrainian CounterOffensive by CPT Austin Bajc Soldiers with the 200th Engineer Company in the 153rd Engineer Battalion conduct Wet Gap crossing training. (Photo by SSG Jorden Newbanks)

Summer 2025 observation posts, and anti-armor fir ing positions; and an anti-tank ditch with a three-layered dragons teeth ob stacle immediately behind.6 These es timates focused on trenches and antitank ditches and only mentioned mine fields. Nevertheless, RAF doctrine stat ed that engineers should emplace an ti-armor minefields “200-300 meters wide and 60-120 meters in depth with four rows per minefield.”7 In the end, positions are held by soldiers, and analysists hoped poor RAF warfighter quality and morale would assist AFU operations. Accordingly, Ukrainian Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi task organized the newly-created 47th Mechanized Brigade as the breach force in part due to its high morale, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) training, and Western equip ment.8 The location for the first breach area lay north of the village of Novodarivka because the minefields were less dense in this sector.9 Although the AFU’s intelligence estimate remains classified, Ukrainian leaders certainly miscalculated. Regarding the battle field situation his unit encountered, Lieutenant Colonel Oleksandr Sak, the commander of the 47th Mechanized Brigade, stated, "Judging by the ac tions taken on 4 June 2023, the breach force maneuvered to the point of breach shrouded by the fog of war." The subsequent failed breach at Novo darivka underscores the importance of detailed intelligence prior to conduct ing a deliberate breach against a deter mined enemy. Terrain analysis remains a fundamental element to maneuver planning, and information collection must holistically account for all aspects of complex obstacles. The depth of Russian obstacles required mixing sev eral collection systems and employing multiple methods of reconnaissance to enable the breach force. Regarding mines in particular, critical information to collect includes location, composi tion, orientation, frontage, depth, types, fuses, and methods of employ ment.11 The AFU could collect on the point of breach but did not adequately collect on the length of the breach area. Although some AFU unmanned aerial system (UAS) operators had suc cess identifying surface-laid mines through UAS electro-optical or thermal sensors, they could not identify buried or stacked mines, mines with non-me tallic casings, mines in areas with con siderable metal battlefield debris, and during thermal-crossover. In response, the AFU procured commercial UAS equipped with ground penetrating ra dar to survey sub-surface areas with some benefit.12 The discussion above only serves to demonstrate a current training and ca pability gap. The ABCT should integrate complex obstacle reconnaissance with in training and experiment with com mercial UAS equipped with ground penetrating radar. Commanders and their staffs at echelon should expect to request and integrate higher head quarters’ assets into collection plans to enable breaching operations. The failed breach is a sobering reminder that the breaching tenet “intelligence” cannot be reduced to obstacle intelli gence, however. Thorough analysis of the enemy capabilities, composition, disposition, and courses of action are critical to support combined arms breach planning. Reconnaissance by fire can validate obstacle intelligence, cause the enemy to unmask assets, and enable the maneuver commander to assess how and how hard the ene my will fight. Most importantly, no unit should cross the line of departure without a near real-time intelligence update. Technology and tactics will continue to evolve, but the problem set of gathering accurate intelligence for the entire length of the breach area will remain. Appropriately Task Organize To apply the breaching fundamentals, the ABCT forms three task organized units to conduct a combined arms breach, namely the support force, the breach force, and the assault force.13 The support force isolates the Figure 1. Breach Area from ATP 3-90.4, Combined Arms Mobility, 10 June 2022 (U.S. Army)

Summer 2025 reduction area and suppresses the en emy with direct and indirect fires.14 The breach force’s main purpose is to reduce, proof, and mark lanes through the enemy obstacle.15 Finally, the as sault force destroys the enemy on the far side of the obstacle and seizes the far side objective (see Figure 2).16 The size and composition of each unit is de termined through reverse planning, meaning units first determine the as sault force requirement, then the re quirements for the breach and support forces, respectively.17 Although the 47th Mechanized Bri gade’s complete task organization re mains classified, Novodarivka and Rivnopil were the initial objectives and Robotyne was the final objective for the brigade to seize within the first 48 hours of the counter-offensive.18 Since the first two breach attempts failed, the planned composition of the assault force is unknown. The AFU committed a company-sized breach force consist ed of two mine clearing vehicles, a sec tion of Leopard 2A6 tanks, a platoon of M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and four Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs) to create a single lane.19 Being wheeled vehicles, the MRAPs struggled to follow the tracked mine clearing vehicles and tanks and “several of the MRAPs bogged in, while the cleared lane was insufficiently wide for other vehicles to pass.”20 When the MRAPs began to become mired in the breach, two RAF tanks en gaged the breach force at 800m. Sur prisingly, there was no support force, and the AFU instead relied upon indi rect fires to suppress the RAF defend ers. Thus, each vehicle was destroyed before AFU dismounts destroyed the RAF tank section.21 With one company team immobilized in the breach, the AFU committed a second company team of similar com position to breach west of the first at tempted breach area. Although the ground was firmer, an additional RAF tank section maneuvered on the breach force. The brigade command post watched the engagement via UAS feeds and employed indirect fires to disrupt the RAF tanks. Attempting to increase tempo, however, the AFU breach force did not proof or stay with in the lane, causing every vehicle to become immobilized.22 As seen above, the AFU did not prop erly assess the enemy or terrain. This led AFU leaders to form company teams with vehicles with different mo bility restrictions, in turn causing these units to lose tempo in the breach. Mine clearing vehicles deployed mine clearing line charges (MICLICs), but the density and depth of the minefield was greater than AFU intelligence esti mates. Thus, the breach force was not properly weighted. The failed breach attempts also highlight the require ment for the support force to effective ly isolate the entire breach area with direct fires. The first 24 hours of the counter-offensive tragically demon strates the importance of appropriate breaching organization. Challenges to Integrate SOSRA Leaders integrate the breaching funda mentals within the planning and exe cution of breaching operations. Fre quently referred to by the mnemonic “SOSRA,” the breaching fundamentals consist of suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault. The Ukrainian seizure of the Rivnopil shows the suc cessful application of the breaching fundamentals to an operation. Never theless, the operational environment, to include RAF adaptation and Western equipment shortfalls, challenges the ability of US forces to successfully in tegrate SOSRA into breaching opera tions. After nearly a week of fighting, the 47th Mechanized Brigade secured No vodarivka. AFU leaders determined that seizing Rivnopil, located due east of Novodarivka, would be necessary to secure IX Corps flank before continu ing to advance south.23 The previous breaching attempts around Novodariv ka had led to two companies’ worth of vehicles, to include 60% of Ukraine’s mine clearing equipment, becoming non-mission capable.24 Thus, the 31st Mechanized Brigade leaders decided on a different approach.25 As the support force maneuvered to the breach area, an AFU artillery bat tery provided suppression. An AFU tank section established an attack by fire position and began to engage RAF fighting positions. The defending RAF company was therefore suppressed both by indirect and direct fires. The 31st Mechanized Brigade then em ployed smoke to obscure two AFU Figure 2. Support, Breach, and Assault Force Responsibilities from ATP 3-90.4, Combined Arms Mobility, 10 June 2022 (U.S. Army)

Summer 2025 infantry platoons maneuvering in squad-size elements along a treeline to the east of the objective. Believing this to be the breaching force, the RAF ori ented on the infantry. Meanwhile, a third infantry platoon executed a co vert breach west of the objective, re ducing obstacles and creating multiple dismounted lanes. By causing the RAF company to orient away from the breach area and increasing their artil lery rate of fire, the AFU support force successfully secured the breach area. After completing the breach, the AFU infantry platoon transitioned from be ing the breach force to the assault force to maintain the initiative.26 The RAF company rapidly retrograded from their defenses, and the 31st Mecha nized Brigade passed forward the 36th Marine Brigade which seized Rivno pil.27 By the end of June, the RAF began to adapt their tactics. First, the RAF de parted from their doctrine concerning minefield depth, increasing the stan dard depth from 120m to 500m. The RAF also deliberately constructed ob stacles to destroy mine clearing equip ment to include stacking multiple antitank mines to increase net explosive weight and placing containers of na palm approximately every 18m across and 40m deep.28 A translated RAF after action report dryly noted that after en countering incendiary land mines, “the [AFU] offensive resumed only after 3-4 days, while its intensity, composition of forces and funds decreased.”29 Ad ditionally, the RAF increased the use of loitering munitions such as the Zala Lancet to target armored vehicles as well as increased the density of UAS to provide redundant sensing.30 Attack aviation was also relocated closer to the forward line of troops and placed on a 30 minute alert status.31 Finally, RAF electronic warfare (EW) assets proliferated to both limit AFU commu nications and protect RAF from AFU

UAS.32

Due to many factors to include multi ple failed breaches, RAF adaptation, lack of air superiority and UAS prolif eration, and finite manpower, ammu nition, and equipment, AFU leaders shifted from company teams conduct ing mechanized combined arms breaches to dismounted sapper teams reducing obstacles.33 Senior Ukrainian leaders such as General Valerii Zaluzh nyi believed the solution to restore maneuver lay in technology.34 Techno logical solutions, however, result in counter-measures. As military analyst Stephen D. Biddle asserts, “Force em ployment had played a more important role than either technology or prepon derance for twentieth century war fare.”35 Therefore, although military hardware matters, doctrine will have a greater role in enabling success on the battlefield. ATP 3-90.4 Combined Arms Mobility states “the purpose of suppression during breaching is to protect forces that are reducing obstacles and ma neuvering through the reduction area.”36 The RAF defense of Novodariv ka demonstrates the need for direct fire suppression throughout the depth of the breach area and the value of counter-battery fire. Perhaps due to the examples listed in doctrine, lead ers tend to focus on direct and indirect fires, neglecting the role of non-kinet ic fires to disrupt enemy command and control. Non-kinetic fires can also fa cilitate the suppression of enemy air defenses, which enables friendly air support during the breach if air supe riority is not achieved. Thus, com manders and staffs must leverage ca pabilities in multiple domains to achieve suppression. More significantly, however, US Army breaching doctrine overlooks the role of shaping actions prior to suppres sion. Between the decision to breach and the execution of the breach, ma neuverists must identify enemy critical vulnerabilities and exploit them. Prior to initiating their attack on Rivnopil, the AFU targeted RAF lines of commu nications. Not only was RAF physical combat power eroded, but so too was their morale. The RAF company imme diately retreated when the AFU assault force appeared on their western flank.37 As enemy defenses gain depth and complexity, the importance of shaping operations also increases. Obscuration is used to prevent enemy observation and targeting.38 During the counter-offensive, however, only 3% of AFU fires missions included smoke. Smoke missions prevented AFU higher headquarters from battle-tracking and coordinating their units via UAS. There fore, as some observers have noted, “Commanders persistently prioritize maintaining their own understanding of the battlefield over laying down smoke and concealing their person nel’s movements.”39 Mission command and proficient staffs enable decentral ized command and control. The larger challenge for the ABCT is to generate sufficient smoke for enough time. In addition to cannon and mortar fired smoke rounds, units must train to Figure 3. B 1-37 AR conducts training with tank mounted mine clearing equip ment in Grafenwoehr Training Area, February 2024 (Photo by CPT Samuel Park er)

Summer 2025 deploy vehicle launched smoke gre nades and smoke pots. Units may also consider converting their M1 Abrams tanks to diesel fuel to safely employ the smoke generator. Significantly, the AFU demonstrated that obscuration re lates not only to the physical dimen sion but also the mental. At Rivnopil, the AFU cleverly used smoke to de ceive the RAF and conduct a covert breach. Thus, both smoke fire missions and deception play an equally impor tant role in preventing the enemy from divining the location of the breach force. The proliferation of loitering munitions challenges the ability for the breach force to secure the point of breach and maintain local security on the near and far side of the breach. Suppression may limit enemy UAS operators and obscuration will degrade UAS first per son viewer capability. Depending upon the frequency spectrum being jammed, counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) systems may impact both friendly UAS and communications sys tems. Therefore, the intelligence esti mate of enemy loitering munition em ployment is critical to enable the com mander to make risk-informed deci sions. Reduction remains a challenge both for the AFU and the ABCT. Even before the RAF started to construct obstacles tar geting the capabilities of mine clearing equipment, both AFU breaching forces had vehicles that were immobilized by mines in the breach at Novodarivka. As the counter-offensive progressed, RAF companies began emplacing hundreds to thousands of anti-tank mines and “stacking three TM-62M mines on top of each other specifically to destroy … the mine-rollers and trawls used by breaching vehicles and tanks.”40 Re gardless of RAF counter-measures, an ABCT would be heavily challenged to reduce and proof lanes given the op erational environment faced by the AFU during the counter-offensive. The restructured US Army Engineer Battalion comprised of three Combat Engineer Company - Armored (CEC-A) brings a total of six Assault Breacher Vehicles (ABVs), each capable of firing two M58 MICLICs and equipped with either a surface mine plow or blade, as well as six trailer-pulled M58 MICLICs. Each MICLIC creates a lane 100m in length. However, if multiple MICLICs are required due to the minefield depth, an ABV moves 25m into the path created by the first MICLIC and fires its charge. This extends the lane approximately 85m, not 100m. There fore, one lane through a 500m obsta cle requires six MICLICs. Additionally, MICLICs have limited effects against multiple types of mines to include prong AP mines, magnetic mines, top-attack mines, and delay-time fuzes.41 According to a US Marine Corps study on breaching during Operation Desert Storm, MICLICs had a 60% detonation Figure 4. U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers from the 449th Mobility Augmentation Company, 478th Engineer Battalion, 926th Engineer Brigade, 412th Theater Engineer Command, based in Fort Thomas, Ky., fire an inert Mine Clearing Line Charge during a GATE III validation exercise on Fort Knox, KY., FEB 12, 2018. (U.S. Army Reserve Photo by SFC Clinton Wood).

Summer 2025 rate and left approximately 25% of the mines intact, making the proofing of lanes necessary. M1 Abrams tank-mounted mine clear ing blades (MCB) and mine clearing rollers (MCR) have their own limita tions. The MCB is capable to both breach and proof lanes. It has three depth settings of 8in, 10in, and 12in, but requires 18in of soil depth to be ef fective; it does not perform well in rocky terrain. When the MCB is low ered, the tank should move no faster than 10 mph, and the main gun should be traversed to the side to avoid dam age should a mine detonate.42 Also, the lifting straps are nylon, so wire obsta cles or explosions can easily sever the straps; manually lifting the plow takes approximately 10 minutes. If the mold board extensions are damaged or miss ing, mines may fall into the path of the tank’s tracks.43 The MCB is a vital piece of equipment which must be mounted and trained constantly for leaders to understand their capabilities and limi tations. The MCR is used to detect the begin ning of a minefield and to proof the lane. Weighing 10 tons, the MCR re quires an M88 recovery vehicle for in stallation onto a tank. Once installed, the tank’s mobility and speed is great ly reduced, and the tank has an in creased likelihood of becoming mired in muddy or soft terrain. After detonat ing four to six mines, the MCR is no longer serviceable. One study found that both of 1st Marine Division’s at tempts to proof lanes with the MCR were unsuccessful during Operation Desert Storm.44 Just like the MCB, op erators must train with the MCR to de velop proficiency. Equipment limitations pose a signifi cant problem for the ABCT to reduce the density and depth of obstacles as seen in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Once the AFU successfully breached, the RAF de ployed “mines with artillery, ISDM Zemledeliye mine-laying systems, and even drones, such as the POM-3 and PFM-1 antipersonnel mines….[which] are used to refill lanes cleared by Ukrainian sappers and to mine roads behind Ukraine’s front lines.”45 An RAF obstacle platoon consisting of three GMZ-3 mining vehicles can lay a 1,200 meter three-row minefield of 624 mines in 26 minutes.46 Thus, units may need to reduce and proof lanes multi ple times. The key issues with tank-mounted mine clearing equipment are that it restricts mobility and firepower, has limited endurance, and lacks mass. Although the US Marine Corps faced the same constraints with mobility, firepower, and endurance in Operation Desert Storm, a number of M1 Abrams tanks towed a Mk 58 trailer containing a single MICLIC.47 Similarly, the Ukrai nian experience demonstrates the need to build additional mass and ca pability with explosive and mechanical mine reduction equipment to enable combined arms breaching. According to one think tank, after the initial failed breach attempts, the AFU transitioned to small-unit dismounted assaults “to maintain a high tempo of ground attacks and attrite Russian forc es in the process to achieve an opera tional breakthrough.”48 Still, the AFU failed to generate sufficient tempo to penetrate RAF defenses. Even during the AFU’s successful breach at Rivno pil, however, the RAF retrograded to subsequent positions, and AFU advanc es remained 700m to 1200m each week. The AFU were unable to success fully breakthrough in part because the assault force did not transition to exe cute a follow-on breach quickly enough to keep the RAF off-balance. Thus, to maintain initiative and tempo when penetrating multiple obstacle belts, sustained breaching may require a unit to rapidly transition from the assault force to the support force. The Ukrainian experience shows that SOSRA remains an essential framework to plan and execute the combined arms breach. Indeed, AFU failures can be traced back to violating a breaching fundamental. The evolving operational environment, however, creates multi ple challenges for the ABCT to apply SOSRA to breaching operations. Al though finding solutions to current tac tical or technical shortfalls is valuable, it is more important for leaders to apply a maneuverist mindset to com bined arms breaching by exploiting en emy vulnerabilities and placing them in a combined arms dilemma. Synchronization: The Key to Combined Arms ATP 3-90.4 Combined Arms Mobility describes the importance of synchro nization as a breaching tenet within the context of the support, breach, and assault forces. Synchronization, which is achieved through detailed reverse planning, clear sub-unit instructions, effective command and control, and combined arms rehearsals, ensures ac tions occur at the appropriate time.49 Synchronization should not be reduced to the timing of suppression and ob scuration, however; it must also relate to the effects of these actions on the enemy. As discussed above, the two breaches near Novodarivka at the be ginning of the counter-offensive failed largely due to the lack of a direct fire support force and no obscuration. Still, despite synchronizing breach force di rect fires with indirect fires, the 47th Mechanized Brigade was unable to prevent the RAF from destroying the breach force. Therefore, rather than narrowly apply ing synchronization to direct and indi rect fires, leaders must consider the synchronization of all friendly warfight ing functions (WfFs), consisting of command and control, movement and maneuver, fires, intelligence, sustain ment, and protection, as well as the desynchronizing of enemy WfFs.50 In telligence is its own breaching tenet, but degrading the enemy’s intelligence capability serves an equally important role. As another example, sustainment has a critical role in ensuring resources are available to the support, breach, and assault forces during all phases of the operation. Additionally, vehicle re covery plans are critical to prevent breach lanes from being blocked by im mobilized vehicles. Shaping operations near Rivnopil which targeted RAF sus tainment had both physical and moral effects on the defending company, and enabled 31st Mechanized Brigade’s as sault. Thus, commanders and staffs

Summer 2025 must look beyond synchronizing friendly action and aggressively tear apart the enemy’s system. The Problem of Mass From July through November 2023, the primary method to reduce obstacles was with dismounted sappers operat ing as small teams during twilight. Since the AFU used armored vehicles mainly in defensive roles to retain ter rain, the RAF began to employ loitering munitions on a larger scale. “At first, our problem was mines. Now, it’s FPV [first person viewer] drones,” said a 47th Mechanized Brigade platoon leader.51 Although the AFU had ceased conducting mechanized combined arms breaches, the operational envi ronment presented an enduring chal lenge of how to mass breaching assets while being constantly sensed and tar geted. The core issue for the ABCT is having the minimum force of explosive and mechanical breaching assets required to reduce obstacles in depth while be ing targeted. The limitations of MI CLICs, MCBs, and MCRs necessitates them being used together. Currently, the ABCT has a limited number of this mine-clearing equipment which sup ports a limited number of lanes and can easily be targeted by UAS. Al though there are intriguing technolo gies to enable force protection, such as vehicle-mounted UAS jammers and an ti-thermal paint, it is more important for units to control their physical and electromagnetic signature. As the AFU experience at Novodarivka showed, the breach force must mass sufficient mine-clearing assets for the length of the reduction area or it will be de stroyed in the breach. Conclusion The 2023 Ukrainian counter-offensive demonstrates that a critical capability to enable maneuver remains the com bined arms breach. The ABCT will fight within a different operational context. Nevertheless, the AFU’s experience suggests that to successfully breach in large scale combat operations (LSCO), the ABCT must 1) build capability and competency to conduct detailed recon naissance for the entire depth of the breach area; 2) appropriately weight the support, breach, and assault forc es; 3) emphasize shaping operations to enable the breaching fundamentals as well as increase the capacity to reduce obstacles in depth; 4) seek ways to syn chronize all friendly warfighting func tions and desynchronize the enemy’s; and 5) increase both mechanical and explosive breaching assets to prevent a mismatch between obstacle depth and equipment. Two hundred years ago, Carl von Clausewitz asserted that although the defense is the stronger form of war, the offense is the most decisive.52 The “maneuver warfare is dead” debate distorts this assertion and overlooks the role of the combined arms breach, which remains as important as it is dif ficult. Today, the ABCT must monitor trends in current conflicts, think criti cally about how it will execute breach ing operations, and strenuously train with the tools it currently has to suc cessfully maneuver. Captain Austin Bajc currently com mands Headquarters and Headquar ters Company, 1st Battalion, 37th Ar mor Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, at Fort Bliss, Texas, previously serving as Tank Company Commander for A Com pany, 1st Battalion, 37th Armor Regi ment, also at Fort Bliss. Prior to these command positions, Captain Bajc served as the Heavy Weapons Troop Executive Officer for Q Troop, 4th Cav alry Regiment in Rose Barracks, Ger many, and as a Scout Platoon Leader for O Troop, 4th Cavalry Regiment, also stationed in Rose Barracks, Germany. He is a graduate of the USMC Expedi tionary Warfare School, the Cavalry Leader's Course, Army Reconnaissance Course, and Armor Basic Officer Lead ers Course, all at Fort Benning, Geor gia, and holds a Bachelor of Arts de gree in History from Virginia Military Institute. Notes 1Seth G. Jones, Alexander Palmer, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Ukraine’s Offen sive Operations: Shifting the Offense-De fense Balance,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9 June 2023, 13. 2David Axe, “On One Key Eastern Battle field, The Russians Are Losing 14 Vehicles For Every One The Ukrainians Lose,” Forbes, 14 November 2023, https://www. forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/11/14/ on-one-key-eastern-battlefield-the-rus sians-are-losing-14-vehicles-for-everyone-the-ukrainians-lose/?sh=2c3351115838 3Randy Noorman, “The Return of the Tac tical Crisis,” Modern War Institute, 27 March 2024, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/ the-return-of-the-tactical-crisis/ 4Seth G. Jones, Alexander Palmer, and Jo seph S. Bermudez Jr., “Ukraine’s Offensive Operations: Shifting the Offense-Defense Balance,” 4. 5Daniele Palumbo and Erwan Rivault, “Ukraine war: Satellite images reveal Rus sian defences before major assault,” BBC News, 21 May 2023, https://www.bbc. com/news/world-europe-65615184 6Seth G. Jones, Alexander Palmer, and Jo seph S. Bermudez Jr., “Ukraine’s Offensive Operations: Shifting the Offense-Defense Balance,” 8; Gerry Doyle, Vijdan Moham mad Kawoosa and Adolfo Arranz, “Digging in: How Russia has heavily fortified swathes of Ukraine,” Reuters, 27 April 2023, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/

UKRAINECRISIS/COUNTEROFFENSIVE/

mopakddwbpa/ 7Lester Grau and Charles Bartles, The Rus sian War of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016), 305. 8“In Ukraine, a war of incremental gains as counteroffensive stalls,” The Washing ton Post, 4 December 2023, https://www. washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ ukraine-counteroffensive-stalled-russia-war-defenses/ 9Dr Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, 8. 10“In Ukraine, a war of incremental gains

Summer 2025 as counteroffensive stalls,” The Washing ton Post. 11ATP 3-90.4, Combined Arms Mobility, 3-7. 12Mingus Pozar, Tony Huggar, and Matteo Muehlhauser, “Russian Large Scale Com bat Operations (LSCO) in Ukraine,” Emer gent Threat, Training, and Readiness Ca pability, 24 August 2023, 5-8. 13ATP 3-90.4, Combined Arms Mobility, 3-10. 14ATP 3-90.1, Armored and Mechanized Infantry Team, (Washington, DC: Govern ment Printing Office, October 2023), C-7. 15Ibid. 16Ibid. 17ATP 3-90.4, Combined Arms Mobility, 3-18. 18Dr Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, 5; “In Ukraine, a war of incremental gains as counteroffensive stalls,” The Washington Post. 19Dr Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, 9. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23Ibid, 12. 24 “In Ukraine, a war of incremental gains as counteroffensive stalls,” The Washing ton Post. 25 “Frontline report: Ukraine takes tactical heights in Rivnopil with minimal engage ment,” Euromaiden Press, 27 June 2023, https://euromaidanpress. com/2023/06/27/frontline-report-ukraine-takes-tactical-heights-in-rivnopil-with-minimal-engagement/ 26 Dr Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, 13. 27 “Frontline report: Ukraine takes tactical heights in Rivnopil with minimal engage ment,” Euromaiden Press. 28 Recommendations For Combat Against The Enemy Operating In Tank And Mecha nized Columns, (Rostov-on-Don, 2023), 48. 29 Ibid, 48. 30 Recommendations For Combat Against The Enemy Operating In Tank And Mecha nized Columns, 35; Dr Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, 19. 31 Recommendations For Combat Against The Enemy Operating In Tank And Mecha nized Columns, 27. 32Recommendations For Combat Against The Enemy Operating In Tank And Mecha nized Columns, 14; Dr Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, 18. 33 “In Ukraine, a war of incremental gains as counteroffensive stalls,” The Washing ton Post. 34David Ignatius, “Ukraine’s counteroffen sive ran into a new reality of war,” The Washington Post, 7 December 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin ions/2023/12/07/ukraine-counteroffen sive-russia-war-drones-stalemate/ 35Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explain ing Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 5. 36ATP 3-90.4, Combined Arms Mobility, 3-8. 37Dr Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, 13. 38ATP 3-90.4, Combined Arms Mobility, 3-8. 39Dr Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, 22. 40Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, “Persever ance And Adaptation: Ukraine’s Counter offensive At Three Months,” War on the Rocks, 4 September 2023, https://Waron therocks.Com/2023/09/Perseverance-And-Adaptation-Ukraines-Counteroffen sive-At-Three-Months/ 41ATP 3-90.4, Combined Arms Mobility, B-6 to B-9. 42Thomas Houlahan, “Mine Field Breach ing in Desert Storm,” Journal of Mine Ac tion: Vol. 5 Iss. 3 (2001), 27-29. 43ATP 3-90.4, Combined Arms Mobility, B-17 to B-19. 44ATP 3-90.1, Armor and Mechanized In fantry Company Team, C-21. 45Thomas Houlahan, 28. 46Michael Kofman and Rob Lee. 47Lester Grau and Charles Bartles, 305. 48Thomas Houlahan, 29. 49Konrad Muzyka, Konrad Skorupa, and Ireneusz Kulesza, “Rochan’s report: Ukraine counteroffensive Initial assess ment (June-August 2023),” Rochan Con sulting, September 2023, 56. 50ATP 3-90.4, Combined Arms Mobility, 3-11. 51FM 3-0, Operations, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1 October 2022), 2-1. 52Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Mi chael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 358.