A New Combined-Arms Approach for the Armored Brigade Combat Team Steven A. Yeadon

Summer 2020 A New Combined-Arms Approach for the Armored Brigade Combat Team by Steven A. Yeadon A new way of integrating the com bined arms of the armored brigade combat team (ABCT) when it’s com bined with the deployment of the Joint All-Domain Command and Con trol (JADC2) network is needed to maximize unit capabilities during a war against the major powers in an era of all-domain operations. JADC2 – the emerging term senior De partment of Defense (DoD) officials are using to describe linking military sensors to all warfighters across all services and domains – will provide decision-makers with the most accu rate situational awareness possible. To make JADC2 a reality, the Pentagon will first need to identify and leverage a highly flexible, scalable common data platform that can accommodate DoD’s vast amount and types of data from across the service branches. A successful JADC2 program will also in fuse data across domains with artifi cial intelligence and machine learning to allow machine-speed analysis and real-time situational awareness, help ing funnel the right data to the right commanders or operators at mission speed.1 This article makes the case that JADC2 changes armored warfare because de tected indirect-fire weapons can swift ly destroy detected enemy units. The best way to implement this tactic is for all forward armored units to possess indirect-fire weapons. No longer must the battle tank be the main foil through direct-fire engagements. ‘Battle of signatures,’ ‘ascendancy of fires’ This analysis bases itself on two con cepts called the “battle of signatures” and the “ascendancy of fires.” The Ma rine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century states that the future of warfare will depend on a “battle of signatures”: “Tomorrow’s fights will involve conditions in which ‘to be de tected is to be targeted is to be killed.’ Adversaries will routinely net together sensors, spies, unmanned aerial sys tems (UAS) and space imagery to form sophisticated ‘intelligence, surveil lance, reconnaissance (ISR) strike sys tems’ that are able to locate, track, target and attack an opposing force. In complex terrain, adversaries will col lect targeting information through eyes and ears and spread it through social media. No matter the means of detection, unmanaged signatures will increasingly become a critical vulner ability.”2 Thus a decisive factor for land warfare is to stay undetected because detect ed forces face swift destruction by en emy fires. As the war in the Donbass region of Ukraine shows, this idea of a battle of signatures may already be in effect against the Russian military due to the combination of Russian massed area fires assisted by overhead surveil lance. This reconnaissance-strike mod el was central to the Zelenopillya rock et attack that destroyed most of two Ukrainian mechanized battalions that were in the open in July 2014.3 4 Second, the concept of an “ascendan cy of fires” originally stems from a statement in Field Artillery Journal by GEN Glenn K. Otis in 1995.5 As the Fed eration of American Scientists ex plains: “The ascendancy of fires is a concept that describes the combined results of the improving ability to ‘see the battlefield’ while simultaneously attacking at depth with precision le thality. The ascendency of fires de scribes a potential trend where land warfare is becoming more like sea and air warfare – i.e., forces will fight at in creasingly greater ranges in ‘demassed formations.’ In this setting, combat

Summer 2020 elements conducting superior infor mation operations and employing state-of-the-art smart/brilliant muni tions, robotic vehicles and swarms of unmanned aerial vehicles can conceiv ably shape the battlefield and conduct decisive operations, possibly without coming in visual contact of each other. This would produce a dispersed com bat situation where small, powerful, highly mobile tactical units employing precision fires fight almost indepen dently over incredibly large distances. The national mandate to win quickly with minimum casualties remains the driving factor in the emerging ascen dancy of fires.”6 A serious question to raise in 2020 is, “Are we approaching an ‘ascendancy of fires’?” This concept, first explored in the 1990s, will soon apply to cur rent battlefields against a near-peer power. The development of the JADC2 network will allow a maturation of both the battle of signatures and the ascendancy of fires for U.S. forces against potential enemies. U.S. ground units should organize around the pre dicted principle of small, lethal, highly mobile tactical units employing preci sion-guided indirect fires as they fight almost independently over incredibly long distances. This article analyzes the necessary changes in doctrine to improve ABCT combined arms. It will then examine the current and necessary materiel to improve ABCT combined arms accord ing to this new doctrine. It will con clude by finishing the rest of the doc trine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) analysis on this new concept. New concept for ABCT combined-arms doctrine To begin, the need for mobile protect ed firepower and infantry to engage targets at direct-fire ranges will not go away. This analysis assumes the best way forward is to alter the weapons on Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) and main battle tanks (MBTs) to take ad vantage of information dominance while retaining their direct-fire capa bilities to directly engage and defeat an enemy should there be a need for an armored fist. Armored formations are best for an ascendancy of fires due to their mobility, survivability and le thality, which can be repurposed for indirect fires. Also, this analysis sees a use in supplying armored and mecha nized-infantry battalions with new units that can take advantage of a su perior ability to “see” the battlefield. This future can be enabled for U.S. forces through the acquisition of spe cific weapons that will add greater agility. The most important are indi rect-fire weapons capable of destroy ing enemy armored vehicles for both MBTs and IFVs. Thus, they will be indi rect-fire platforms that can also excel in direct-fire engagements. There will also be a use for units of indirect-fire anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) tank destroyers, such as those in-develop ment by Poland,7 to add volume of fire to anti-armor firepower. When combined with long-range pre cision-fires, the goal will be multiple layers of lethality against enemy ar mor before a direct-fire engagement. This will ensure that detection means death before an enemy can engage with direct-fire weapons. The goal is to reduce casualties and provide a higher operational tempo for U.S. mil itary forces against the militaries of major powers. This goal is enabled by Joint connec tivity through JADC2 that enables mas sive data-gathering through all shoot ers partnering with Joint ISR assets and swarms of unmanned ground ve hicles (UGVs) and UAS. With the aid of artificial intelligence and machine learning, this data turns into action able information rapidly disseminated to commanders. A commander can then choose to act on the new infor mation to engage an enemy unit with fires or indirect-fire weapons pos sessed by nearby armored units. A logical sequence for understanding this concept is as follows:

1. Joint connectivity created through the JADC2 network;

2. Shooters, Joint ISR assets and UGV and UAS swarms feed the JADC2 network with massive amounts of data;

3. Rapid analysis and dissemination of intelligence, aided by artificial intelligence and machine learning, provides information to commanders at mission speed;

4. Judgment by commanders in the loop as to whether to use force;

5. Indirect-fire by armored units or long-range precision fires; and

6. Enemy unit destroyed. Figure 1. A Russian UGV based on the BMD armored chassis. Russia’s armed forces will likely integrate UGVs with motor rifle battalions because of the Ministry of Defense’s “Weapons Robotizing 2015” program.

Summer 2020 However, as retired COL John Antal concluded, “Precision strikes that are not backed up with a continuous bat tle of decisive maneuver are merely artillery raids set out to punish, not defeat, an opponent.”8 This is an im portant reminder and caution for the tactic of massed, precision-guided fires proposed in this analysis. Attri tion while in a battle of signatures does not necessarily lead to victory. That requires a broader all-domain op eration and decisive action. Understanding current anti-armor materiel for ABCT It is important to understand current U.S. military anti-armor capabilities before offering recommendations for new materiel. To begin, direct-fire an titank firepower for U.S. military forc es currently includes Javelin missiles; tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) 2 missiles; an Abrams MBT’s M256 120mm tank gun; and the M242 Bushmaster 25mm cannon on Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs). The Javelin missile has a maximum range of 4.5 kilometers.9 The TOW 2 missile’s range is 3.75 to 4.5 kilome ters.10 The BFV’s M242 cannon has an effective range of two kilometers and can penetrate the armor of many ar mored vehicles it will encounter, in cluding some MBTs.11 As for an Abrams’ main gun, M829A3 Armor-Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sab ot with Tracer (APFSDS-T) projectiles are the current large-caliber projec tiles used to destroy enemy heavy ar mored vehicles.12 These projectiles have an effective range of three kilo meters.13 However, given the classified nature of modern MBT armor,14 it is unknown how many APFSDS-Ts are needed to defeat a modern MBT. That said, the first Gulf War shows that a single APFSDS-T regularly defeats old er tank designs, such as the T-72, T- 72M and T-72M1, from any angle.15 The Javelin missile is a fire-and-forget weapon allowing for mobility immedi ately after launching the missile. This compares to TOW-2 missiles that re quire Soldiers to aim at a target until the missile strikes. As for the monetary cost of these anti-armor weapons, the fiscal year (FY) 2018 unit cost for a Javelin missile was $206,705.16 The FY18 unit cost for a TOW 2 missile was $83,381.17 The next-generation M829E4 depleted uranium APFSDS-T costs $13,061.58 per unit as of FY17.18 Lastly, as a point of reference, the Air Force plans to purchase Small Diame ter Bomb IIs to destroy moving tar gets. The unit cost of this ordnance as of December 2015 was $243,000.19 New long-range precision fires are in development to achieve parity or su periority against other major powers in terms of technology. First, there is the Extended Range Cannon Artillery program that will increase the range of the M109 Paladin 155mm self-pro pelled howitzer from 30 kilometers to 70 kilometers.20 This will allow preci sion-guided 155mm projectiles to per form the same role as more expensive precision-guided rockets and missiles. Future hypersonic precision-guided munitions may push this capability out to 100 kilometers.21 There is also a new anti-armor 155mm artillery round being procured in the BONUS antitank artillery projectiles, each armed with two precision-guided top-attack Figure 2. A Battle Group Poland U.S. Soldier participates in Javelin ATGM training near the Bemowo Piskie Training Area during Saber Strike 17 June 11, 2017. (U.S. Army photo by Charles Rosemond, Training Support Team Orzysz)

Summer 2020 antitank munitions.22 23 Another solu tion for defeating armor with tube ar tillery is the in-development precision-guided 155mm Cannon-Delivered Area Effects Munition (CDEAEM).24 Next, the Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) guided rock ets have a range of 70 kilometers. GMLRS-guided rockets can use an ar ea-fires alternative warhead, which af fects as large an area (0.23 square ki lometer)24 as earlier sub-munition-equipped rockets.25 Thus, the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System can strike an area of around a square kilo meter. To extend the range of U.S. guided rockets against near-peer guid ed rockets, there is a program to ac quire the tail-controlled GMLRS guid ed rocket, a next-generation guided rocket that can hit stationary targets at a range of up to 136 kilometers.26 Current GMLRS-guided rockets have a unit cost of $129,226 in FY18.27 This cost is less than a Javelin missile. New materiel needed to enable concept There is a need for deploying weapons on U.S. MBTs and IFVs that can destroy armored targets with indirect fires. One way to do so is by arming U.S. ar mored vehicles with longer-ranged ATGMs. Another course of action is to develop rounds fired from MBT can nons that can destroy enemy armored targets with indirect fire. An interim solution is to arm Abrams tanks and BFVs with ATGMs mounted on a remote turret to provide anti-ar mor indirect fire. An ATGM tank de stroyer – such as those in develop ment by Poland, created using the hull of the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) – could serve this role or pro vide extra volume of fire when needed for Abrams and Bradleys. Such an AMPV variant may be much faster to deploy than a next-generation combat vehicle that replaces the Bradley or Abrams. Two ATGMs may be useful in the role of providing indirect fires to current armored vehicles: the Hellfire missile and the United Kingdom’s Brimstone missile. Hellfire missiles have a direct-fire range of seven kilometers, an indirect-fire range of eight kilometers and a minimum range of .5 to 1.5 kilome ters.28 Longbow Hellfire missiles use a millimeter-wave radar guidance, and Hellfire II missiles use laser guidance to destroy enemy armored vehicles with an antitank warhead.29 These missiles had a weapon-system unit cost of $94,997 per missile (all vari ants) in FY18.30 Hellfire missiles cost less than half as much as shorter-ranged Javelin missiles. Thus, given that the Javelin missile is an effective means of destroying enemy armor, then Hellfire missiles represent a su perior, though vehicle-mounted, antiarmor capability at a lower unit cost. Brimstone missiles are the United Kingdom’s version of the Hellfire.31 With a range of more than 40 Figure 3. U.S. Army soldiers load an AGM-114 Hellfire missile on an AH-64E Apache helicopter in Kunduz, Afghanistan. The Joint Air-to-Ground Missile will replace Hellfire. (U.S. Army photo by CPT Brian Harris)

Summer 2020 kilometers, Brimstone II missiles have a much longer range than Hellfire mis siles. They also possess both millime ter-wave radar guidance and laser guidance.32 One drawback to the use of Hellfire or Brimstone missiles will be a limited number of shots before a crew needs to reload the missile launchers with the very heavy (roughly 100 pounds) missiles.33 34 Another drawback of this idea is the .5 to 1.5 kilometer mini mum range of the Hellfire missile, which means that Hellfire missiles would best be used in combination with the Javelin missiles used by infan try deployed with U.S. IFVs, which have a minimum range of 150 me ters.35 TOW-2 missiles have a minimum range of 65-200 meters.36 Thus, a com bined-arms approach that uses all three ATGMs will allow troops with lightweight equipment to strike enemy armor from 65 meters to seven to eight kilometers. A longer-term materiel solution is to create a Bradley replacement that has the flexibility to mount a variety of missile or drone launchers on either side of its turret in addition to a 50mm cannon. This could be like the flexible missile platform developed by Moog. This will allow the use of Brimstone missiles, Hellfire missiles, TOW-2 mis siles and Javelin missiles by the Op tionally Manned Fighting Vehicle while providing a capability for the use of Coyote drones and Stinger missiles for air defense.37 As for the Abrams replacement, a fu ture MBT could fire precision-guided rounds able to defeat enemy armored vehicles with indirect fire. This would need to be a precision-guided armor-defeating projectile that can fire out of a battle tank’s main gun. Essentially it is a smaller version of the in-devel opment 155mm CDAEM.38 However, indirect projectile fire by battle tanks will require installing new targeting systems on all MBTs to allow precise indirect fire, installing cannons on new battle tanks that can elevate higher than the current 20 degrees39 and including the Advanced Field-Ar tillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). AFATDS is the fire-support command-and-control system employed by U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps units to provide automated support for plan ning, coordinating, controlling and ex ecuting fires and effects.40 Also, the right mix for each type of round in bat tle tanks will require simulations and wargames to determine. Organization, training, leadership, personnel and facilities Because of the nature of this propos al, the organization of tank companies and mechanized-infantry companies is unchanged. I propose adding a tank-destroyer platoon to the headquarters and headquarters company of all ar mored battalions and mechanized-in fantry battalions. Each tank-destroyer platoon will include three sections of two tank destroyers each, providing flexibility for the battalion command er to attach, assign or use them inde pendently of the battalion’s tank or mechanized-infantry companies. This new tank-destroyer platoon will be a fires battery, not unlike the current mortar platoon in the role of direct-fire support to front-line forces. Training for the crews of armored ve hicles will need to include the use of indirect-fire weapons, including ATGMs and certain projectiles fired from a battle tank’s main gun. Gunners of all armored vehicles will need train ing in how to hit targets beyond line of sight. Battle-tank commanders will also need training on using AFATDS, leaving other crew to perform their re spective roles of driving, loading and gunnery. Leaders at all levels will need training on how to quickly ascertain and take advantage of short-lived opportunities to destroy enemy units with indirect fires. This training cannot be lopsided toward field-grade officers with a more informed view of the battlefield. Mission command will require initia tive by all levels of command. Howev er, the use of force will need a stream lined kill-chain process with rapid au thorizations as needed. This is espe cially true in a contested electromag netic-spectrum environment. This tactic should not require new tank crew or IFV crew members. That said, this proposal requires a new military-occupation specialty for tank-destroyer crew members and officers. If tank destroyers have three crew members (driver, commander and gunner), there will need to be 12 more Soldiers per headquarters and head quarters company of each armored battalion and mechanized-infantry battalion. This assumes no need for more logistical personnel. Given there are 16 ABCTs with three maneuver battalions each,41 this will require add ing another 576 Soldiers to the U.S. Army. Facilities will need ranges for tanks large enough to provide training for gunnery using indirect fires out to a possible 40 kilometers. This will re quire new ranges simulating a variety of terrains for tanks and IFVs to train. Caution on protecting armored units This only drives home the fact that de tection on future battlefields means destruction. An important point to make for the protection of armored forces going into the future is to plan for artillery barrages, long-range pre cision-guided fires and massed cluster or thermobaric munitions against any U.S. armored forces detected by an enemy. This will require a new way of thinking about protection in terms of masking signatures. Masking is the active and passive abil ity to make military systems difficult or impossible to identify, locate and target. Masking is more than camou flage and stealth. It employs next-gen eration active and passive means to reduce the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) signature to render the system difficult to locate and hard to target. Some of these technologies could in clude:

• Advanced profile design to lower a vehicle’s radar cross-section and reduce its thermal, electronic and acoustic signature;

• Low-tech, passive systems such as next-generation camouflage netting;

• Color-changing materials and radar-absorbing paint;

• Intelligent, multispectral camouflage systems to rapidly blend a vehicle into its surrounding EMS background;

• Decoys and portrayal of false actions and locations;

• Cognitive electronic-warfare systems employing machine learning to counter the enemy’s radars;

• Electronic jamming to protect the emissions of friendly communications and electronic systems against enemy detection;

• Electronic-warfare support measures and signals intelligence; and

• T h e u s e o f e l e c t r o n i c countermeasures and digital radio-frequency memory to hide beneath the blanket of enemy or friendly jamming.42 There will be a requirement for such measures for the foreseeable future to provide protection for armored vehi cles. Masking signatures could be come more central to the survival of armored vehicles than even armor plating as the raw lethality of war in creases. The alternative is to turn to costly attrition warfare using extreme ly large ground forces as occurred in both world wars. Conclusion This article analyzed the changes in DOTMLPF needed to improve ABCT combined arms. The crux of this con cept is through Joint connectivity pro vided by JADC2. Massive amounts of data gathered by all shooters to part ner Joint ISR assets and swarms of UGVs and UAS lead to rapid analysis with the aid of artificial intelligence and machine learning. This results in the rapid dissemination of actionable intelligence to commanders at mission speed. A commander can then choose to act on the new information to en gage an enemy unit with fires or indi rect-fire weapons possessed by nearby armored units. Central to this concept is new materi el that will allow both anti-armor di rect fire and indirect fire from all bat tle tanks and IFVs. Armored vehicles aided by new tank destroyers must also play a role. That said, the future of precision-guid ed ordnance presages a broader ques tion: “How will precision-guided weap ons change the future of war?” For instance, is the invention of preci sion-guided weapons like the inven tion of the rifle – something that changes warfare slowly at first but that dictates the battlefield later? The rifle was able to attack strategic tar gets using snipers and to harass troops from relative safety. However, it rap idly changed warfare as it became ubiquitous and technology evolved, causing very different battlefields to be only a few decades apart. The evo lution of warfare from the American Revolution to the Civil War and through World War II shows this. The cutting edge of modern war since World War II is arguably the precision-guided munition. This in cludes advanced air defenses able to reach the stratosphere, to ATGMs, to bombs that increase the lethality of fixed-wing aircraft by orders of magni tude. Even modern anti-access/area-denial technologies are ultimately the result of advancing precision-guided ordnance (often bombs or rocket mo tors). Modern war has changed inexo rably with the invention and evolution of precision-guided munitions, al though directed-energy weaponry, cy berwarfare, space superiority, infor mation warfare and networks such as JADC2 may give the precision-guided munition a run for its money in the 21st Century. A further consideration is that preci sion-guided weapons are another tool for commanders among many, yet which will eventually need their own unique doctrine as a decisive arm of warfare. An example would be the in vention of heavy cannon. Heavy can nons excelled at the ancient task of penetrating the walls of fortifications and by offering powerful defensive ca pabilities. Later, as their size, expense and weight decreased, cannons evolved into various types of field ar tillery such as the mortar and howit zer. They became weapons that even tually accounted for the most battle field casualties in land warfare and have highly refined doctrine.43 Another consideration is whether the invention of precision-guided weap ons is like the invention of firearms: something that forever changes every way in which war happens – ways that were poorly predicted – over a very long period. From the cannon to the harquebus to the musket to the rifle to the machinegun, war was never the same after the invention of the fire arm, although it took centuries for firearm technologies to mature. Regardless, continued innovation among all components of DOTMLPF will be decisive for present-day com manders facing a time of great uncer tainty as to what warfare may look like in just 20 years. Steven Yeadon is an “independent scholar” living in Florida. He has been published in several military-related publications, including “sister” Figure 4. An example of blending: a Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Type73 Ouga ta light truck camouflaged into its surrounding background.

Summer 2020 professional-development bulletins MCU Journal, Fires, Army Aviation Di gest and Infantry. He holds a bache lor’s degree in political science from the University of Central Florida. Notes 1 Frank Dimina, “Why a common data platform is the first step to JADC2,” C4IS RNET, Feb. 26, 2020, https://www.c4isr net.com/opinion/2020/02/26/why-a- common-data-platform-is-the-first-step-to-jadc2/. 2 Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Ma rine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century, September 2016, https://www. mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/ MCCDC/young/MCCDC-YH/document/ final/Marine%20Corps%20Operating%20 Concept%20Sept%202016. pdf?ver=2016-09-28-083439-483. 3 Phillip Karber and Joshua Thibeault, “Russia’s New-Generation Warfare,” As sociation of the U.S. Army, May 20, 2016, https://www.ausa.org/articles/ russia%E2%80%99s-new-generation-war fare. 4 “Ukraine conflict: Many soldiers dead in ‘rocket strike,’” BBC News, July 11, 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-eu rope-28261737. 5 Glenn K. Otis, “Ascendancy of Fires: the Evolution of the Combined-Arms Team,” Field Artillery Journal, June 1995, http:// sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ar chives/1995/JUN_1995/JUN_1995_FULL_ EDITION.pdf. 6 John Pike, “Indirect Fire,” Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Net work, Feb. 6, 2000, https://fas.org/man/ dod-101/sys/land/indirect.htm. 7 Kyle Mizokami, “This Destroyer Concept Is a Tank Battalion’s Worst Nightmare,” Popular Mechanics, Sept. 5, 2019, https://www.popularmechanics.com/mil itary/weapons/a28928680/tank-destroy er-concept/. 8 Retired COL John F. Antal, “The Ascen dancy of Fires,” Defense Technical Infor mation Center, April 7, 1998, http:// www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/ a346267.pdf. 9 Kris Osborn, “New Army Infantry Missile Tech Destroys Tanks at 4.5 Kilometers,” Warrior Maven, Dec. 16, 2019, https:// defensemaven.io/warriormaven/land/ new-army-infantry-missile-tech-destroys-tanks-at-4-5-kilometers-n4xua7SF-ECP9d nITY-3Mg. 10 “TOW-2 Wire-Guided Anti-Tank Mis sile,” Army Technology, accessed Oct. 15, 2018, https://www.army-technology. com/projects/tow/. 11 “M242 Bushmaster 25mm Automatic Gun,” Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network, Jan. 5, 1999, / https://fas.org/man/dod-101sys/ac/ equip/m242.htm. 12 “120mm M829A3 APFSDS-T Armor Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot with Tracer,” Northrop Grumman, 2018, https://www.northropgrumman.com/Ca pabilities/LargeCalAmmunition/Docu ments/M829A3APFSDST.pdf. 13 Ibid. 14 Steven J. Zaloga, M1 Abrams vs T-72 Ural Operation Desert Storm 1991, New York: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2009. 15 Ibid. 16 DoD FY19 budget estimates, Army Fi nancial Management and Comptroller, February 2018, https://www.asafm.army. mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMate rial/2019/Base%20Budget/Justifica tion%20Book/Missiles.pdf. 17 Ibid. 18 “Cartridges Tank, 105mm and 120mm, All Types,” Defense Technical Information Center, February 2016, http://www.dtic. mil/procurement/Y2017/Army/ stamped/U_P40_E22203_BSA-35_BA-1_ APP-2034A_PB_2017.pdf. 19 “Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) Small Diameter Bomb Increment II (SDB II) as of FY 2017 President’s Budget,” Ex ecutive Services Directorate, March 23, 2016, http://www.esd.whs.mil/Por tals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20 Room/Selected_Acquisition_Reports/16-

F-0402_DOC_23_SDB_II_DEC_2015_SAR.

pdf. 20 Lauren Poindexter, “Picatinny Engi neers Seek to Double Range of Modified Howitzer,” Picatinny Arsenal Public Af fairs, March 17, 2016, https://www.army. mil/article/164462/picatinny_engineers_ seek_to_double_range_of_modified_ howitzer. 21 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Will Field 100 Km Cannon, 500 Km Missiles: LRPF CFT,” Breaking Defense, March 23, 2018, https://breakingdefense. com/2018/03/army-will-field-100-km-cannon-500-km-missiles-lrpf-cft/. 22 “U.S. Army to procure BAE Systems’ 155mm BONUS precision-guided muni tions,” BAE Systems, Oct. 9, 2018, https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/arti cle/us-army-to-procure-bae-systems- 155mm-bonus-precision-guided-muni tions. 23 https://www.baesystems.com/en/ download-en/20181018192053/1434555555732. pdf. 24 Kyle Mizokami, “The U.S. Army Is Creat ing Artillery Rounds Guided By AI,” Popu lar Mechanics, Aug. 15, 2019, https:// www.popularmechanics.com/military/ research/a28702450/ai-missiles/; “Bofors 155mm BONUS Anti-Armor, Top Attack Artillery” BAE Systems. 25 Lockheed Martin, “First Lockheed Mar tin GMLRS Alternative Warhead Rolls Off Assembly Line,” CISION PR Newswire, Sept. 12, 2016, https://www.prnewswire. com/news-releases/first-lockheed-mar tin-gmlrs-alternative-warhead-rolls-off-assembly-line-300326194.html. 26 Joseph Trevithick, “Army Plans To Dou ble Guided Artillery Rocket’s Range By Putting Control Fins On Its Tail,” The War Zone, The Drive, June 22, 2018, http:// www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/21708/ army-plans-to-double-guided-artillery-rockets-range-by-putting-control-fins-on-its-tail. 27 DoD FY19 budget estimates. 28 U.S. Army Weapon Systems Handbook 2012, Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network, 2012, https:// fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/ wsh2012/132.pdf. 29 “HELLFIRE Family of Missiles,” U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center, https:// asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/hellfire-family-of-missiles/. 30 Program Executive Office-Missiles and Space, “U.S. Army Successfully Fires Mis sile from New Interceptor Launch Plat form,” March 30, 2016, https://www. army.mil/article/165106/us_army_suc cessfully_fires_missile_from_new_inter ceptor_launch_platform. 31 Missile Defense Project, “Brimstone,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Dec. 6, 2017, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ brimstone/. 32 Ibid. 33 U.S. Army Weapon Systems Handbook 2012, Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network. 34 Missile Defense Project, “Brimstone,” Missile Threat. 35 Field Manual (FM) 3-22.37, Javelin - Close Combat Missile System, https:// fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-22-37.pdf. 36 FM 3-21.91 (FM 7-91), Tactical Employ ment of Anti-Armor Platoons and Com panies, 2008, https://www.globalsecuri ty.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3- 21-91/appa.htm. 37 Moog, Inc., “Flexible Missile Platform,” accessed April 21, 2020, https://www.

Summer 2020 moog.com/products/weapons-platforms/ flexible-missile-platform.html. 38 Mizokami. 39 “M1A2 Abrams American Main Battle Tank (MBT),” O[perational] E[nvironment] Data Integration Network, https://odin. tradoc.army.mil/mediawiki/index.php/ M1A2_Abrams_American_Main_Battle_ Tank_(MBT). 40 Raytheon, “Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS),” https:// www.raytheon.com/capabilities/prod ucts/afatds. 41 U.S. Army Public Affairs, “Army an nounces conversion of two brigade combat teams,” Sept. 21, 2018, https:// www.army.mil/article/211368/army_an nounces_conversion_of_two_brigade_ combat_teams. 42 John Antal, “Mask or Die, Surviving on the Long-Range Precision Fires Battlefield of 2040,” Sept. 15, 2019, https://www.ac ademia.edu/42734798/Mask_or_Die_ Surviving_on_the_Long_Range_Preci sion_Fires_Battlefield_of_2040_by_ John_Antal. 43 James F. Dunnigan, How to Make War, 4th edition, New York: HarperCollins Pub lishers, 2003. ABCT – armored brigade combat team AFATDS –Advanced Field-Artillery Tactical Data System AMPV – Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle APFSDS-T – Armor-Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot with Tracer ATGM – anti-tank guided missile BFV – Bradley Fighting Vehicle CDAEM – Cannon-Delivered Area Effects Munition DoD – Department of Defense DOTMLPF – doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities EMS – electromagnetic spectrum FM – field manual FY – fiscal year GMLRS – Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System IFV – Infantry Fighting Vehicle ISR – intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance JADC2 – Joint All-Domain Command and Control MBT – main battle tank TOW – tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided UAS – unmanned aerial system UGV – unmanned ground vehicle Acronym Quick-Scan TRADOC G-2 newsletter U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com mand’s G-2 has just released a month ly newsletter, unclassified and ap proved for public release. Its inaugural edition highlights many of G-2’s most recent products. The newsletter “seeks to arm leaders and Soldiers with re sources to understand the operational environment [OE] and succeed when operating in it.” “One of the challenges associated with the changing character of warfare comes not just from the emergence of disruptive technologies and our adversaries’ embrace of them, but also from the ways in which they adopt hybrid strategies that challenge tradi tional symmetric advantages and conventional ways of war,” writes LTG The odore D. Martin, TRADOC deputy commanding general and TRADOC’s chief of staff – and former commandant of the U.S. Army Armor School. “It is cru cial to understand what the OE looks and feels like to warfighters to shape our application of combat power and how we train our formations to meet these challenges. [A] deep look at the future allows us to examine our as sumptions about warfare, force structuring and capabilities requirements. This assessment is vitally important to every member of the Army team, from the brand-new Soldier, to general officers, to career Army civilians. Shared understanding of the environment is essential to preparing our peo ple, setting the context for readiness, informing our modernization efforts and guiding us in reforming our processes to meet new challenges.” Specific country products:

• Iran products: https://community.apan.org/wg/gckn/p/irandproducts

• China products: https://community.apan.org/wg/gckn/p/chinaproducts

• Russia products: https://community.apan.org/wg/gckn/p/russiaproducts

• North Korea products: https://community.apan.org/wg/gckn/p/ northkorealibrary See also TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92-1, The Changing Character of Warfare: the Urban OE, https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-92-1. pdf.