What’s Missing in Your Leader or Self-Development Program? The Answer is Probably Military History!

Winter-Spring 2024 What’s Missing in Your Leader or Self-Development Program? The Answer is Probably Military History! by MAJ Shameek De Lancey “Let him read and meditate upon the wars of the great captains: It is the only way to learn the art of war,” said Napoleon.1 Military professionals have debated the usefulness and value of studying military history for centuries. The de bate within the U.S. Army has ebbed and flowed depending on the Army’s operating tempo (OPTEMPO) or on se nior leader emphasis and beliefs about the “practicality” of studying military history for the average military profes sional. I believe the study of military history is critical and mandatory for the development of well-rounded and effective Army professionals. The study of military history informs the long-term development of military professionals in three ways. First, studying history nurtures and culti vates critical- and creative-thinking skills. It is imperative that military pro fessionals possess these skills, espe cially as military operations become more complex, and the time available for leaders to make decisions decreas es. Second, the study of military histo ry allows military professionals to de velop, adapt, and evaluate current doc trine. Lastly, military history develops military professionals by exposing them to prior examples and experienc es before they are personally tested in combat. The positive benefits of exploring mili tary history allow leaders to learn the art of war and learn from others’ expe rience, which is critical for the military profession and the success of our force in future conflicts. Michael Howard de scribed the nature of the military pro fession and the frequency with which a military professional might exercise his or her duty in war as it “is almost unique that he may have to exercise it only once in a lifetime, if indeed that often. It is as if a surgeon had to prac tice throughout his life on dummies for one real operation; or a barrister ap peared only once or twice in court to wards the close of his career; or a professional swimmer had to spend his life practicing on dry land for an Olym pic championship on which the for tunes of his entire nation depended.”2 Future wars rarely go as predicted, but as military professionals we owe it to our organizations and the nation to be ready when called upon. No other army trains as often, as realistically, or as demanding as our Army or even the joint force. In addition to training, one missing or often neglected element of our preparation for future war is deep er and richer understanding of military history in our Army professionals and within our Army organizations. What follows is an argument for including the study of military history in the op erational force to build leaders’ mental preparation to execute future military operations. Critical and creative thinking skills Our Army should use the study of mil itary history to challenge and develop officers, over the length of their ca reers, in these three areas. Without a doubt this initiative should be driven by the institutional Army. However, in dividual military professionals should strive to improve in these areas through their own self-development plans as well. An easy way to begin this journey is to start with your current unit’s organizational history. We owe it to our Soldiers to tie their current ser vice to that of those who came before us, and knowing, teaching, and explor ing our unit history is a way to make those connections. This builds pride in the force and inspires Soldiers to live and work to the high standard of those who served in their unit before them. Knowing and talking about unit lineage is an excellent way to discuss military history in the operational force. Histo ry in the institutional Army is also a dif ficult subject to teach and study. Many professional military educational (PME) programs superficially cover mil itary history and miss the mark on tru ly gaining the benefits of deep military history study. Military history in PME usually consists of disjointed and brief wave-top discussions of battles, cam paigns, and military leaders focused on data and information. This approach that covers decades and centuries in minimum classroom blocks of instruc tion does not allow students to truly understand historical events or the full context in which the events take place. Additionally, students do not have the time or opportunity to make meaning of what they are learning. In “Military History, Is It Still Practica ble,” Jay Luvaas lists several prominent military leaders who believe that mili tary history needs to be studied deep ly. Luvaas cites Field Marshal Earl Wavell as saying, “the real way to get value out of the study of military his tory is to take particular situations, and as far as possible get inside the skin of the man who made a decision and then see in what way you could have improved upon it.”3 Wavell’s approach takes time and a deliberate effort, but it allows students to truly exercise their critical- and creative-thinking skills. These skills are required to de velop successful commanders and staff officers capable of winning on the modern battlefield. Wavell’s approach should be imple mented at every PME by every student attending the course. Techniques such as requiring students to conduct a thorough battle analysis like the re quirement at the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course (MCCC) are excellent opportunities that require students to study the decisions and actions made by prior commanders to learn from those experiences. Additionally, con ducting staff rides is another opportu nity to learn from military history and get firsthand context to the conditions previous commanders experienced as they participated in a military opera tion. These techniques exist in our modern PME system but should in crease to allow students more oppor tunities to participate in these educa tional events. Additionally, focus on the self-development domain

Winter-Spring 2024 regarding military history should be a requirement for leaders in the opera tional force. This requirement would ensure these skills are continuously de veloped throughout the length of an officer’s career and not just occur while the Soldier is a student enrolled in PME. Develop, evaluate doctrine The consistent and deep study of mili tary history equips military profession als to better understand, implement, evaluate, and develop U.S. Army doc trine. In the shadow of our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and as we shift to large-scale combat operations (LSCO), it is the perfect time for the Army to reflect, learn, and review our current doctrine. In 2010 Robert Scales warned against the failure to maintain a learn ing organization by stating, “my sense is that the military has begun to circle X its officer seed corn. A bias toward active service in our protracted small wars is making our military an institu tion too busy to learn.”4 Scales warned against an emphasis on action over ed ucation and offered ways the Army could promote and reward scholarship for military professionals. The continu ous exploration of military history will equip military professionals to develop more effective doctrine and provide leaders with additional lenses to view the effectiveness of our current doc trine. Studying the evolution of our military doctrine will provide context for mili tary leaders currently trying to under stand the Army’s new operating con cept – multidomain operations (MDO).5 Military history will equip leaders with an appreciation of the his torical consistencies within MDO and better illuminate what is new and dif ferent in the doctrine. This under standing will allow leaders to better analyze if and how our MDO concept addresses the current operational en vironment or the challenges our pac ing threats pose to our ability to con duct successful military operations. This could require military profession als to progressively work on a thesis project throughout their career, peri odically publish in professional jour nals, or require top performers to teach, observe-coach, or develop doc trine periodically throughout their ca reer. The need to evaluate and develop bet ter military doctrine is not the sole re sponsibility of Combined Arms Doc trine Directorate doctrine writers and developers. All Army professionals owe it to their units and the force to evalu ate doctrine’s effectiveness when con ducting home station collective-level training or a combat training center (CTC) rotation. Feedback from the force of doctrine applied to training or while operating allows leaders to strengthen our doctrine by under standing what does and doesn’t work. Additionally, CTC observer/coach/ trainers (O/C/T) and PME instructors should be heavily grounded in military history to better assist them in their of ficial duties and should actively pro mote historical examples as a way of relating and connecting experiences of their training audience to the greater historical legacy their operations origi nated from. Learn from others Lastly, and more commonly, military history is a great tool to train military professionals without having to con duct military operations. This benefit can be implemented as an annual training type requirement or like the mechanisms discussed in previous paragraphs. Military professionals should have an area of expertise that assists them in better understanding the complex character of warfare and exercises their judgement by replicat ing future situations they may find themselves in. Clausewitz’s concept of coup d’oeil, or inward eye, refers to the “quick recog nition of a truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection.”6 All Army professionals should develop and cultivate their individual coup d’oeil re gardless of their duty position as a commander, staff officer, or functional area officer. Deep and deliberate study of military history is one of the best ways to develop your individual coup d’oeil. Studying military history and ex ploring what others have done in simi lar situations builds your ability to rec ognize “the truth” in any military context. It is important that Clausewitz highlighted “long study and reflection” as the means to develop coup d’oeil and not training or practical experi ence. Long study and reflection can come after training and personal expe rience, but the unlimited opportunity to learn from others through the study of military history is what the great theorist was referring to. Conclusion The study of military history to em power the current Army professional is an underappreciated tool that should be emphasized and leveraged in every unit’s leader development program and in individual self-development programs. Studying history can be in timidating for some who may not know how to begin their journey or may be hesitant in not wanting to draw the wrong lessons or insights from histori cal experience. Antulio Echevarria II ex pertly cautioned against some of the troubles and pitfalls of studying mili tary history in his article titled “The Trouble with History.”7 However, his warning is no excuse not to incorpo rate deep and meaning study of mili tary history in PME. Nor does Echevar ria’s warning abdicate our leaders’ re sponsibility to leverage the benefits of studying military history throughout their careers. The long-term study of military history will benefit military professionals by improving their critical- and creative-thinking skills, improving their ability to evaluate, implement, and develop doctrine and act as a training and edu cation tool during periods of low OP TEMPO. The study of military history is greater than the ability to recall histor ical facts or extrapolate solutions from previous historical examples to solve current military problems. The promi nent professor Michael Howard said it the best: “It must never be forgotten that the true use of history, military or civil, is, as Jacob Burckhardt once said, ‘not to make men clever for the next time: it is to make them wise forever.’”8 MAJ Shameek De Lancey is an Infantry officer who is currently a student at the Command and General Staff College. His previous assignments include serv ing as a rifle platoon leader and com pany executive officer in the 1st

Winter-Spring 2024 Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks, HI; battalion assistant operations offi cer and company commander in 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Fort Drum, NY; aide-de-camp for the 10th Mountain Di vision commanding general; small group leader at the Maneuver Cap tain’s Career Course at Fort Moore, GA, where he instructed two seminars of future company commanders. He earned instructor of the cycle honors, and his passion for teaching inspired him to start Kansas State University’s certificate for Adult Learning and Edu cation. Advanced Military Science Pro gram student at the School of Ad vanced Military Studies at Fort Leaven worth, KS. MAJ De Lancey’s military schools also include U.S. Army Ranger School, Cavalry Leader Course, Stryker Leader Course, Pathfinder School, Air Assault School, and Airborne School. He earned a bachelor’s of arts degree in history from Old Dominion Universi ty and a master’s of arts degree in in ternational relations from the Univer sity of Oklahoma. MAJ De Lancey’s awards include the Bronze Star Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, and the Meritorious Service Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster. MAJ De Lancey completed two deployments to Afghan istan in support of Operation Resolute Support. Notes 1 Jay Luvaas, “Military History: Is It Still Practicable?” Parameters 12 (March 1982). 2 Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” Parameters 11/1 (1981). 3 Luvaas, “Military History.” Acronym Quick-Scan CTC – combat training center MCCC – Maneuver Captain’s Career Course MDO – multidomain operations O/C/T – observer/coach/trainers OPTEMPO – operations tempo PME – professional military educational 4 Robert Scales, “Too Busy to Learn,” Army History, No. 76 (Summer 2010). 5 Field Manual 3-0, Multidomain Opera tions; October 2022. 6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ, 1976). 7 Antulio Echevarria, “The Trouble with History,” Parameters 35 (Summer 2005): 78-90. 8 Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History.”