We Should Still Fight Like Napoleon

GEN Richard Myers, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, implied that the U.S. Army wasn’t prepared for full-spectrum operations in the 21st Century when he said in a 2008 speech at Fort Belvoir, VA, that “our military is perfectly suited for Napoleonic warfare.”1 It is my intent in this article to argue that the combined-arms maneuver capability Napoleon mastered is, and should remain, the Army’s core competency in the 21st Century. By discussing three historic examples – a limited war in Korea, an unconventional war in Vietnam and a hybrid war in Lebanon – I demonstrate that Napoleon’s legacy is highly relevant and critical to full-spectrum operations in the 21st Century. However, first I’ll outline the importance of what Napoleon established. Napoleon’s wars: combined-arms maneuver warfare The Napoleonic Wars heavily influenced U.S. Army doctrine in the 19th and 20th centuries. Western military leaders have studied the lessons of the Napoleonic Wars since the wars ended in 1815. In fact, when Sylvanus Thayer and D.H. Mahan first introduced the Napoleonic Wars to the U.S. Military Academy during the 19th Century, it became mandatory for all West Point cadets to study them.2 Napoleon’s true genius as one of the greatest military minds was that he refined organizational structure and doctrines to create a concept of combined-arms maneuver.3 When he seized power in 1799, he didn’t make fundamental changes in the existing French army’s organization and tactics, which had been adopted during the French Revolution of 1789-1799.4 Rather, Napoleon simply modified the organizational structure based on his belief that “infantry, cavalry and artillery cannot do without one another.”5 For infantry, he regularized the use of the corps, which ranged from 17,000 to 30,000 men.6 The corps contained from two to four divisions, a brigade or division of cavalry and 30 to 40 field guns.7 It was designed to “march independently and fight on its own” and to initiate and “sustain major engagements until the rest of the army arrived.”8 Napoleon also expanded the artillery corps and reorganized the cavalry corps. He created an artillery reserve under his personal command for commitment at the decisive moment.9 For cavalry, during the campaign of 1796 in Italy, he distributed “a cavalry division to each army corps and formed the remainder, principally the heavy cavalry, into a virtual corps of its own as a part of the Army reserve.”10 This cavalry corps was exclusively under Napoleon’s command for commitment at the decisive point of the day of battle.11 Overall, these reorganizational changes greatly improved the French army’s efficiency. Napoleon formulated his warfare doctrines based on “speed and mobility,”12 “boldness and flexibility in battle … overwhelming and concentrated firepower… and pursuit in the wake of victory.”13 To implement his doctrines, Napoleon “devoted much time and effort to training his forces that officers and men (under his command) would fully understand his tac-We Should Still Fight Like Napoleon by MAJ Young S. Kang Battle of Wagram. Horace Vernet. 1809. Public domain.

tics and operational techniques.”14 For example, Napoleon emphasized the professional military education of his officers by urging them “to read and reread the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Eugene and Frederick.”15 Special inspectors visited regiments to check on maneuvers and test sergeants on their knowledge of the drill regulations between 1801 and 1803.16 However, Napoleon “did not insist on rigid adherence to every detail of the 1791 drill book,” but he wanted the Grand (French) army to be able to “operate in the flexible spirit embodied in the regulations.”17 The Grand Army’s capabilities “to move rapidly with a minimum of logistic support and their tactical proficiency on the battlefield enabled Napoleon to transfer his plans into action.”18 In battles, Napoleon “constantly retained the initiative, striking boldly and ruthlessly, and never gave his foes the opportunity to gather their forces or their senses.”19 As a result, in 1805-1806, the French army “reached its height during the battles of Ulm, Austerlitz and Jena.”20 Although Napoleon was ultimately defeated, Napoleon’s war imposed dramatic changes on warfare.21 Korean War: Inchon Landing and Chipyong-ni During the Korean War (1950-1953), the combined-arms maneuver that U.S. armed forces employed played a critical role in spite of the restricted terrain and political restraints civilian leaders imposed. By executing combined-arms maneuvers, United Nations forces achieved a decisive victory at Inchon in September 1950 under GEN Douglas MacArthur and successfully countered the Chinese offensive in Spring 1951 under GEN Matthew Ridgway. Thus, the U.S. military achieved the overall national strategy of rescuing the Republic of Korea, ultimately stabilizing the Far East region in the 1950s. Following a series of defeats in the war’s early days, the U.S. Army won its first major victory against the North Korean People’s Army with an amphibious landing at Inchon in September 1950.22 Just as Napoleon advocated “striking at his enemy with deep, rapid, slashing maneuvers that threatened their communications and threw them off-balance strategically and psychologically,”23 MacArthur during the first week of July 1950 envisioned striking the NKPA at Inchon and capturing Seoul quickly for strategic, political and psychological reasons.24 In spite of the extreme tidal range at Inchon,25 the X Corps landing force arrived off Inchon Sept. 15 with a strength of more than 70,000 combatants, including 1st Marine Division, 7th Infantry Division and South Korean Marine Corps regiments. It was a brilliantly executed joint and multinational operation that enabled “the liberation of Seoul, the breakout of Eighth Army, the destruction of the NKPA, the restoration of the 38th Parallel and the re-establishment of the Republic of Korea.”26 If Chinese Communist forces hadn’t intervened later in 1950, the Inchon landing “would almost certainly have resulted in the decisive defeat and collapse of the North Korean government, effectively ending the conflict.”27 However, when 485,000 CCF troops launched their first offensive Nov. 26, 1950, against UN forces of 365,000 troops, UN units began a long retreat. Many UN units feared encirclement by the enemy, and therefore they “lost all sense of cohesion and organization when they discovered the CCF blocked their lines of communication to the south.” The CCF pushed UN forces back to the 38th Parallel.28 When Ridgway arrived in Korea in January 1951 to stop the CCF’s offensive,29 he wanted a decisive battle to seize the initiative from the CCF. He wanted the UN forces to end their “mystical sense of Chinese superiority, perhaps even invincibility.”30 Ridgway’s long-awaited decisive battle finally came when 23rd Infantry Regimental Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, commanded by COL Paul Freeman, decimated the CCF by defending the village of Chipyong-ni Feb. 13-15, 1951. The RCT consisted of infantry units (both American and French), artillery units with 105mm and 155mm howitzers, plus 14 tanks and 10 antiaircraft artillery vehicles.31 According to David Halberstam, the Battle of Chipyong-ni was decisive because “American forces finally learned to fight the Chinese.” More importantly, this battle validated tank-infantry-artillery-airpower cooperation in mountainous terrain and was declared by Ridgway to be the most important combined-arms battle of the war.”32 Tactical lessons from this battle changed the nature of the fighting until the end of the Korean War and “ended the fear that UN forces would be pushed off the Korean Peninsula.”33 In addition, by using tanks at Chipyong-ni, the U.S. Army found that “armor remained an indispensible part of ground combat, regardless of any limiting conditions under which it had to operate.”34 Although the immediate outcome of the Korean War was stalemate due to limitations imposed by the U.S. government, the Republic of Korea and its people validated our strategy to intervene by developing their economy and establishing democracy later in the 20th Century. Vietnam War: Easter offensive Throughout the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese Army and the local insurgents in South Vietnam – the Viet Minh, also known as Vietcong – waged highly polit-icized and unconventional guerrilla warfare.35 Responding to perceived failure in countering this warfare, the U.S. government had pulled its last combat troops out of Vietnam by 1972 because of domestic pressure.36 However, in March 1972, the NVA surprised the world by launching a massive conventional invasion to destroy South Vietnam.37 The NVA intended this invasion to be its decisive battle.38 Unlike a previous offensive in 1968, the NVA conducted a combined-arms maneuver operation with 14 divisions, armed with hundreds of howitzers and T-56 tanks.39 Initially the offensive seemed to be successful for the NVA.40 By mid-May, the NVA had attacked three areas in South Vietnam: Quang Tri near the Demilitarized Zone, Kontum City in the Central Highlands and An Loc near Saigon.41 However, the NVA underestimated two elements: the South Vietnamese government’s and military’s resolve, and the United States’ logistical and fire support.42 As the U.S. military began to provide logistics and close-air support to the South Vietnamese army, President Richard Nixon ordered the U.S. Air Force to launch a strategic air campaign against North Vietnam’s territory.43 During Operation Linebacker I, the Air Force dropped 155,000 tons of bombs on North Vietnam using B-52 bombers, while the U.S. Navy’s airplanes destroyed bridges and oil depots with the new “smart bomb” technology and laced Haiphong Harbor with 2,000 pounds of sea mines.44 In a matter of weeks, the U.S. military “destroyed much of the enemy’s economic infrastructure.”45 The South Vietnamese army “wrested the initiative from the invaders” by June.46 After many months of counterattacks by South Vietnam’s army and consistent air strikes, the NVA suffered from high casualties, lack of supplies and disease.47 The anti-tank weapons operated by South Vietnamese infantrymen48 and close-air support – including B-52 tactical strikes and helicopters with tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missiles – destroyed most of the NVA’s tanks.49 How- 40 September-October 2011 ever, in spite of heavy losses, the NVA continued to resist South Vietnam’s counteroffensive campaign for months by sheer will.50 Finally, the NVA’s Easter offensive collapsed after eight months. When the South Vietnamese army reclaimed Quang Tri in September, President Nguyen Van Thieu ordered the South Vietnamese army to end its counterattacks.51 Although the enemy continued to occupy 10 percent of the South Vietnamese countryside after the Easter offensive,52 the NVA lost almost half the 200,000 troops it had initially committed and all its armor fleet. Combined with the heavy casualties suffered from the Eastern offensive and the renewed strategic bombing campaign (Linebacker II), North Vietnam finally agreed in December to resume peace negotiations in Paris.53 During the eight long months of the Easter offensive, the Republic of Vietnam’s armed forces severely tested the North’s “Vietnamization”plans.54 If, prior to 1972, South Vietnamese army units hadn’t been trained and armed for combined-arms operations,55 and if the U.S. military’s logistics support and air campaign hadn’t been available during the Easter offensive, the NVA could have achieved its victory in

1972. This was a valuable lesson that an unconventional enemy is fully capable of launching a conventional, combined-arms offensive. Second Lebanese War: battle in southern Lebanon The Israelis learned similar lessons in 2006 from its non-state enemy, Hezbollah – lessons that Americans should take to heart. “No conflict in the recent past provides a more illuminating study for the U.S. Army than the 2006 Lebanese War,” according to Matt Matthews.56 When the second al-Aqsa intifada began in late 2000, it forced the Israeli Defense Force to focus on operations to stop terrorist attacks inside Israel.57 In addition, the war in Kosovo, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom “spurred a belief in the Israeli defense establishment that standoff attack by fire (principally by air power) was an effective means to affect the will of the adversary and determine conflict outcomes.”58 As a result, Israel made significant cuts in defense spending for ground forces, both active and reserve. The cuts, of course, affected training, procurement and logistical readiness, particularly for Reserve ground units and active heavy units.”59 Therefore, by 2006 the IDF was “largely incapable of joint combined-arms fire and maneuver. The operations in Gaza and the West Bank were highly centralized, small-unit actions conducted almost exclusively by active-infantry formations and special-operations forces.”60 In addition, the IDF pulled tactical-air-control capabilities out of ground brigades.61 While the IDF was reforming its tactics and organization, so was Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s leaders, such as Hassan Nasrallah, correctly assessed that the Israeli Achilles’ heel was “Israeli society itself.”62 During this period, Hezbollah reorganized its long-range rocket units of the 610mm Zelzal-2 and other systems. Overall, it procured 12,000-13,000 rockets by 2006.63 As Hezbollah prepared a strategic campaign against both civilian and military targets in Israel, its engineers also prepared for the IDF’s anticipated counterattack by building an array of underground tunnels, bunkers and explosive-ridden areas in the region south of Litani.64 Hezbollah also improved its logistics systems (ordnance, food, medical) by pre-stocking supplies in well-fortified bunkers. It trained troops to integrate mortars and rockets with anti-tank weapons. It improved underground command-and-control systems and intelligence such as its human and signal network. Hezbollah made all these changes under North Korean and Iranian advisers.65 Above all, Hezbollah changed its doctrine by combining guerrilla war with conventional war, therefore a new model of “hybrid threat” was created.66 In many ways, this mirrored the approach the NVA and Vietcong had adopted during their long war against the United States. In fact, one source suggests that “Hezbollah leaders studied the historic model of the Vietcong as inspiration for establishing an advanced tunnel network, extending through the main approach into southern Lebanon.”67 Hezbollah had assembled a well-trained, well-armed, highly motivated and highly evolved army on Israel’s northern border by Summer 2006.68 The Second Lebanon War broke out July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah fighters crossed from southern Lebanon into northern Israel, killing three Israeli soldiers and ab-ducting two others. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert called the incursion “an act of war” and proclaimed “Lebanon will suffer the consequences of its actions.” Convinced that it could force Hezbollah to disarm and withdraw from southern Lebanon by initiating an air campaign, the Israeli air force began to strike targets across Lebanon. Although initially taken aback by Israel’s fierce air strikes, Hezbollah launched an extensive rocket barrage from southern Lebanon into Israel within 24 hours.69 As days went by, it became increasingly apparent to both Israel and Western military analysts that the Israeli air campaign was having little effect on Hezbollah’s rockets.70 Finally, when the IDF reluctantly moved its ground forces into southern Lebanon, the apparent ineffectiveness of the ground operation and the stubborn resistance of Hezbollah fighters stunned military observers worldwide.71 The fighting revealed the IDF’s deficiency in training and equipment, and senior officers’ unpreparedness to fight a “real war.”72 One senior Israeli intelligence officer remarked that Hezbollah fighters had “gone to school” on IDF ground forces and described Hezbollah as “an infantry brigade with modern weapons.”73 By the time the UN cease-fire resolution (UN Security Council Resolution 1701) went into effect Aug. 14, 2006, many military analysts were convinced the IDF had suffered a significant defeat.74 Hezbollah had launched 3,790 rockets into Israeli territory. Less than 25 percent (901) of these rockets hit Israeli towns and cities, killing 42 civilians and wounding 4,262 more. An additional 2,773 Israeli civilians were treated for “shock and anxiety.”75 The UN resolution also marked the first time in Israeli history that the nation had sought a UN resolution to end a war in which Israel was involved.76 In the end, “the strategic follies and operational deficiencies resulted in a faltering indecisive war” for Israel.77 John Antal, who has extensively studied combined-arms maneuver operations in post-World War II conflicts, said that no armed force should assume that superior firepower guarantees victory. After the 2006 war, the IDF re-emphasized “joint combined-arms fire and maneuver training”78 by adopting and practicing “procedures to integrate artillery and air fires into maneuver brigades” and by assigning “air controllers into maneuver brigades.”79 The lesson is that defeating a hybrid threat such as Hezbollah requires joint combined-arms fire and maneuver.80 Conclusion U.S. military doctrine was “focused on maneuver warfare, a concept that involves combined-arms operations, bold, deep attacks and flexible operational methods” in the 1980s.81 This was rightly and clearly a reflection of “maneuver doctrine and strategy, which is based on swift, unex-September-October 2011 41 pected strikes coupled with a relentless exploitation of initial success.”82 We should still learn maneuver doctrine and strategy, as maneuver-warfare genius Napoleon regarded “the combination of experience plus reflection upon the immediate and distant past as essential guideposts for military professionals.”83 Therefore Napoleon’s wars may provide valuable lessons, despite vast changes in the technology of warfare. Our enemies in the past proved to be adaptive, creative and agile – and they were also inspired by historical lessons, as Hezbollah proved. Therefore I maintain that the Napoleonic Wars still offer valuable lessons in the 21st Century. Napoleon’s “use of bold, slashing strokes and his ability to combine all the service arms effectively” still apply to contemporary military organizations.84 As evident in the Korean, Vietnam and Second Lebanon wars, the Army must retain its core combined-arms maneuver capability to prepare for future full-spectrum operations. Defeating our potential hybrid threats demands integrated joint air-ground-intelligence capabilities “similar to those used against conventional adversaries, but at a reduced scale.”85 As David Johnson, who analyzed the Second Lebanese War, says, the Army needs “balanced Army forces, capable of joint combined-arms fire and maneuver, to provide the range of capabilities needed to prevail in future conflicts.” MAJ Young Kang is an active-duty Army prosthodontic resident stationed at U.S. Army Dental Activity, Fort Gordon, GA. He dedicates this article to the memory of CPT George A. Wood, who inspired his interest in military history; Wood, an armor officer, was killed in Iraq in 2003. Notes 1I first heard this statement during the History 100 class of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Gordon, GA, in Spring 2011. 2Ross, Steven T. U.S. Air Force Academy Harmon Memorial Lecture #28, “Napoleon and Maneuver Warfare.” Accessed May 30, 2011, at http://www.au.af.mil/au/ awc/awcgate/usafa/harmon28.pdf. 3Ibid. 4Ibid. 5Ibid. 6Ibid. 7Ibid. 8Ibid. 9Dean, Peter J. “Napoleon as a Military Commander: the Limitations of Genius,” The Napoleon Series, International Napoleonic Society. Accessed May 23, 2011, at http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/napoleon/c_genius.html. 10Ibid. 11Ibid. 12Ibid. 13Ibid. 14Ibid. 15Ibid. 16Ibid. 17Ibid. 18Ibid. 19Ibid. 20Ibid. 21Ross. 22Builder, Carl H., Bankes, Steven C., and Nordin, Richard. Command Concepts: A Theory Derived From the Practice of Command and Control, Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 1999. Page 73. 23Ross. 24Builder, Bankes and Nordin. 25Ibid. 26Mamaux, David H. Operation Chromite: Operational Art in a Limited War, Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1987. Page 2. 27Ibid. 28Antal, John. “28 Busting Through,” Military Review, January-February 2000 English edition. Accessed May 30, 2011 at http://www.armchairgeneral.com/ articles/ PDF/Busting ThroughMilitaryReview.pdf. 29Summers, Harry G. Korean War Almanac. New York, NY: Facts on File, 1990. Page 233. 30Halberstam, David. The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War. New York, NY: Hyperion, 2007. Page 541. 31Summers. 32Antal. 33Ibid. 34Ibid. 35Parker, Geoffrey. “The Post-War World 1945-2004,” The Cambridge History of Warfare, ed. Williamson Murray and Geoffrey Parker, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Press, 2005. Page 366. 36Ibid. 37Ibid. 38Truong, Ngo Quang. Indochina Monographs: The Easter Offensive of 1972. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980. Page 175. 39Daugherty, Leo J., and Mattson, Gregory L. A Photographic History: NAM, New York, NY: Metro Books, 2001. Page 488. 40Truong. 41Ibid. 42Ibid. 43Parker. 44Daugherty. 45Parker. 46Truong. 47Daugherty. 48Truong. 49Daugherty. 50Truong. 51Daugherty. 52Ibid. 53Ibid. 54Truong. 55Parker. 56Matthews, Matt M. “We Were Caught Unprepared: the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War,” The Long War Series occasional paper

26. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2008. Page 2. 57Johnson, David E. “Military Capabilities for Hybrid War: Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and Gaza,” occasional paper, Arlington, VA: Rand Arroyo Center, 2010. Page 2. 58Ibid. 59Ibid. 60Ibid. 61Ibid. 62Matthews. 63Ibid. 64Ibid. 65Ibid. 66Ibid. 67Ibid. 68Ibid. 69Ibid. 70Ibid. 71Ibid. 72Ibid. 73Ibid. 74Ibid. 75Ibid. 76Inbar, Efraim. “How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War,” Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2007, Vol. XIV, No. 3. Middle East Forum Website, accessed May 30, 2011, at http://www.meforum.org/1686/ how-israel-bungled-the-second-lebanon-war. Page 5. 77Matthews. 78Johnson. 79Ibid. 80Matthews. 81Ross. 82Ibid. 83Ibid. 84Ibid. 85Johnson. Acronym Quick-Scan CCF – Chinese Communist forces IDF – Israeli Defense Force NKPA – North Korean People’s Army NVA – North Vietnamese Army RCT – regimental combat team UN – United Nations 42 September-October 2011