Win, Learn, Focus, Adapt, Win Again

Win, Learn, Focus, Adapt, Win Again by GEN Martin E. Dempsey (Editor’s note: This article provides context for ARMOR’s themes for July-August 2011 (the joint fight/the hybrid threat), this edition (operational adaptability) and the November-December 2011 edition (mission command). All three themes link closely together. ARMOR writers’ perspectives in the preceding, this and the next editions are intended to contribute to the Army Chief of Staff’s discussion of these topics.) Ensuring that our soldiers receive the best training, education and equipment to prevail in today’s conflicts will always be our priority. We also have an obligation to our soldiers and to the nation, however, to prepare our Army for uncertainty – the challenge around the corner that we will undoubtedly be called upon to face. This is why we must establish a conceptual foundation that is coherent and provides the building blocks to prepare our Army for what’s next. [We] have an obligation to connect our concepts and doctrine in such a way that they provide the necessary framework to build the force we need for the future. That is why I’ve encouraged our Army to step away from defining ourselves against what an adversary might do to us— regular, irregular, insurgency, major combat—and focus instead on the two principal operational competencies we must provide for joint force commanders: wide-area security and combined-arms maneuver. In so doing, we begin to build a coherent narrative about the capabilities necessary for us to confront the uncertain challenges that lie ahead. I’d like to offer some considerations as we continue our efforts to cultivate a culture of learning throughout our Army. Before I do that, let me set the context by further elaborating on the central idea behind our concepts [in the Army Operating Concept and Army Capstone Concept]. The central idea within the Army Operating Concept is that success in the future security environment requires Army forces capable of defeating enemies and establishing conditions necessary to achieve national objectives using combined-arms maneuver and wide-area security to seize, retain and exploit the initiative as part of full-spectrum operations. These two activities are neither separate nor separable. We must be able to execute both – and often simultaneously – within the context of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts. In addition, to accomplish these two activities and provide forces capable of achieving speed of action, of identifying and exploiting opportunities, and of protecting against unanticipated dangers, we need forces capable of exercising mission command by decentralizing authority to act faster than the enemy. So let me share some considerations on how these foundational concepts and emerging doctrine must influence our thinking about how we will operate in the future. First, our forces must be able to operate in a decentralized manner to conduct and sustain operations from and across extended distances. Consistent with the tenets of mission command, commanders consider the experience and competence of subordinate leaders and units, and their ability to integrate additional forces, enablers and partner capabilities. They then organize command structures and empower decisions as far down the chain of command as practical to conduct operations in a decentralized manner and ensure the greatest possible freedom of action. Consistent with mission command, commanders apply design as part of the operations process to understand complex, ill-structured problems and develop a clear concept of the operation. This concept allocates resources and guides the actions of subordinates to enable them to accomplish the mission within the commander’s intent. Second, commanders seek to “empower the edge” by pushing capabilities to the lowest level appropriate for a particular mission. Commanders at lower echelons require access to a wide 6 September-October 2011 array of capabilities (Army, joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational) to confront and solve complex problems. Army forces communicate with and integrate interagency, intergovernmental and multinational partner capabilities at the lowest practical echelon. In addition, Army leaders understand both the capabilities and limitations of partners to integrate them effectively in the planning and execution of operations. They must also be able to work collaboratively when necessary to leverage the capabilities of those actors who operate outside their direct authority and control. Third, commanders emphasize continuous reconnaissance to gather information on which they base plans, decisions and orders. Effective reconnaissance requires persistent vigilance, the ability to fight for information in close contact with populations and enemies, and available reserves to reinforce units once they gain contact with the enemy. In this regard, it is important to emphasize the distinction between the warfighting function of intelligence, the tactical task of surveillance, and the various forms of reconnaissance operations. Recognition of the differences among these terms— intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance— stands in contrast to current practice, which collapses the terms into the acronym ISR, thereby diluting their unique meaning. We must also examine closely how well the Army is organized to conduct effective reconnaissance and security operations at the corps, division and brigade combat-team levels and make the necessary adjustments to doctrine, organizational design training and leader development. Fourth, the success of the future force requires effective integration of land, sea, air, space and cyber operations. We’ve come a long way and accomplished much in this regard over the past 10 years, but more remains to be done. Such integration is necessary to expand the operational reach of future forces and enable them to operate successfully over wide areas while securing extended lines of communication against hybrid threats. We should seek to establish and develop habitual relationships to gain a common understanding of our capabilities so that we can overwhelm the enemy with disciplined and discriminate force. Fifth, prevailing in the 21st-Century security environment with our joint partners requires Army forces simultaneously to inform allies, partners and indigenous populations while influencing the attitudes and actions of adversaries. Army forces inform the American public and civilian leaders, allies, partners and foreign publics to inform decision-making, strengthen mutual trust, achieve unity of effort and establish favorable conditions to sustain support for operations. Army leaders and soldiers also inform indigenous populations to clarify the intent of Army operations, combat disinformation, isolate adversaries from the population and build relationships to gain trust and support. At the same time, Army forces influence adversaries and potential partners to bring about changes in behavior or attitude consistent with military and political objectives. Sixth, commanders build cohesive units capable of withstanding the demands of combat. Leaders prepare their units to fight and adapt under conditions of uncertainty. In the conduct of operations, Army forces and leaders always exhibit moral behavior while making critical, time-sensitive decisions under pressure. At higher echelons, we seek to synchronize the training, readiness and deployment cycles of corps, divisions and lower-echelon units to build cohesive teams, mentor subordinate leaders and establish the level of trust necessary for successful decentralized execution. Commanders also adapt to changing conditions and “build in” flexibility that allows them to disag-gregate and reaggregate capabilities as the situation dictates. This is particularly critical when leaders are planning operations in a complex and fluid operating environment that requires units to seamlessly, and often rapidly, change from wide-area security to combined-arms maneuver as the situation demands. Finally, to enable all of these actions, we must conduct effective transitions. A senior leader once told me that it is the responsibility of general officers to manage transitions. Given the complex nature of the security environment and the fact that we’ve deliberately pushed responsibility and capability to the edge, managing transitions is now the responsibility of leaders at all levels. We must develop leaders who understand both the “art” and the “science” of managing transitions. Our Army is capable of doing a lot of things, and we have to be prepared to do whatever the nation asks. Success in future armed conflict requires the Army to sustain the expertise we’ve developed in wide-area security, rekindle our expertise in combined-arms maneuver and develop leaders who understand and embrace operational adaptability. We need to win, learn, focus, adapt and win again on a continuing cycle. GEN Martin Dempsey is Army Chief of Staff and was commanding U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command when he wrote this article. Previously he served as acting commander, U.S. Central Command, and commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he holds master’s degrees in English, military art and science, and national security and strategic studies. From ARMY magazine, March 2011. Copyright 2011 by the Association of the U.S. Army. Limited reprint permission granted by AUSA. GEN Martin Dempsey on Operational Adaptability “Despite the changing character of conflict and the increased capability of potential adversaries, the challenge of conducting military operations on land remains fundamentally unchanged. Unlike in other domains, actions have meaning on the ground because of the interaction of people and as a result of the interdependence of societal factors, including religion, race, ethnicity, tribe, economy, judicial system and political system. As a result, military operations on land are manpower-intensive, subject to frequent and often unpredictable change, unforgivingly brutal and intensely demanding of leaders. “Humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and major combat operations are all part of the spectrum of conflict and, therefore, equal claimants to a position along the full spectrum of operations. So, too, is military support to civil authority. By choosing one or more of them to define ourselves, we obscure that which we know we must be able to accomplish: maneuver and security against whatever threat presents itself.” September-October 2011 7