Key to Success in Future Battles: Independent Combat Logistics Patrols

Key to Success in Future Battles: Independent Combat Logistics Patrols by Captain Jerry L. Wood Jr. The heavy cavalry support platoon leader’s role in future operations will be dramatically different from its current role in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The days of support platoon leaders linking up with first sergeants at logistics resupply points (LRPs) are over; we now enter the days of support platoons providing logistics support to troops in contact and those deployed to micro forward operating bases (FOBs). Historically, the support platoon depended on the unit that it supported to provide combat power to enable it to move throughout the battle space. This methodology is not effective in the current operating environment. Many logisticians and commanders frown on the idea of independent support platoons providing logistics packages (LOGPAC) because they train to fight linear battles. Operation Iraqi Freedom has changed the way the Army fights and its organization, which requires commanders to change the way their forward-deployed units receive supplies. Most leaders are under the impression that LOGPACs should have an escort. Three months into a combat rotation, my unit conducted its first logistics patrol from FOB Falcon to Baghdad International Airport without a combat escort; ironically, we were escorting combat vehicles that were earmarked to be updated with armadillo armor. This mission proved that not only can independent combat logistics patrols (ICLPs) be conducted, but that they are imperative for any unit’s success on an asymmetric battlefield. Having support platoons that can operate independently provides three critical benefits to the organization it supports: faster distribution of supplies, economy of force, and an increase in maneuverability. Faster Distribution Reaction time is measured by the amount of time required for the support platoon leader to receive a supply request and deliver the supplies to the requesting unit. Using ICLPs significantly decreases reaction time because LOGPACs will not have to wait on combat units to supply an escort. The platoon leader, platoon sergeant, or section sergeant conducts intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), prepares an operations order, conducts pre-combat inspections/checks, and begins the mission, which frees up time for commanders and leaders to devote to planning, inspecting, and preparing for operations. The additional time will expedite the unit’s ability to seize new objectives, because the refit and reorganization time greatly decreases. Economy of Force The second benefit of having a support platoon that is equipped to conduct ICLPs is the ability to provide the supported unit with economy of force. The supported unit will not have to allocate any combat power from its line units to conduct routine resupply/ LOGPAC operations. The support platoon can provide independent LOGPAC operations with four M1114s (HMMWVs), two M978 (fuelers), and two M977 (HEMTT cargo trucks) to permanent patrol bases, micro FOBs, and observation posts. This basic composition of the ICLP can provide enough classes of supply to resupply any company/troop-sized organization and most light infantry battalions. Implementing ICLPs will allow commanders to focus 100 percent of their combat power on developing and shaping their areas of operation. Maneuverability The third benefit of having ICLPs is maneuverability. Units are married to their trains and/or supply lines. If their trains are not moving, they cannot main tain a rapid tempo. Support platoons with the ability to maneuver between supporting units to gather supplies and independently deliver them to forward-deployed units enables battalion-sized units to maneuver more “Units are married to their trains and/or supply lines. If their trains are not moving, they cannot main tain a rapid tempo. Support platoons with the ability to maneuver between supporting units to gather supplies and independently deliver them to forward-deployed units enables battalion-sized units to maneuver more efficiently through out the battle spaces.”

efficiently through out the battle space. Independent combat logistics patrols would no longer be slaved to enemy offensive operations. Currently, support platoons rely on combat escorts to fight their battles; with the implementation of the ICLP, support platoons will have the capability to destroy or suppress the enemy, until relieved, and then continue their mission. Equipping the ICLP As shown in Figure 1, the platoon would need at a minimum four uparmored HMMWVs: one HMMWV lead ing the patrol; one in the center for command and control; one in the rear to provide rear security/herding duties (herding the vehicles without communications abilities); and one conducting services, and serving as a stand-by force multiplier, if the enemy increases his offensive pres sure in the area of operations and the logistics patrol needs an additional gun truck. Due to their speed and agility, the HMMWVs would provide a base of fire during an ambush and retain the ability to fix, close with, and destroy the enemy. Along with HMMWVs, the ICLP should be equipped with four additional crew-served weapons, 7.62mm or greater, to augment the new platforms. Most support platoons are equipped with single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS) radios that provide the ability to securely communicate over long distances. SINCGARS enable the patrol to remain in communication with its higher headquarters and conduct FM link up with the unit it supports. Commanders and soldiers understand the use of SINGCARS, but they must understand that the patrol/platoon needs more than two or three radios. At a minimum, the patrol needs six radios: two each in the command and control vehicles (a total of four) and one in each additional vehicle. Most logistics patrols have a maximum of three radios divided among two vehicles (normally the lead and rear vehicles). What happens if one of these vehicles is destroyed? How will the remainder of the convoy manage command and control with just one radio — using the “follow-me” concept? What if the last vehicle breaks down during black-out operations? Could they use a maximum bit transfer rate (MBTR) radio or a Motorola walkabout radio? The major problem with these devices is they cannot be heard in a moving vehicle. Commanding a patrol is possible under these conditions, but grossly inadequate when the platoon makes contact. The MBTR and walkabout are also susceptible to electronic jamming devices; not only does the convoy commander have to fight through vehicular noises, but he also has to fight electronic jamming. We had to turn off our electronic jamming devices on several occasions to communicate with our logistics patrol vehicles. Commanders who want to maneuver independently throughout the battlefield must look deeper into equipping support platoons with the ability to operate independent logistics patrols. Training the Support Platoon to Conduct an ICLP To conduct ICLPs, support platoons must continue to train on convoy operations so they do not lose their fundamental skills; however, they must now train as hunters. They need to train with the high-intensity “I am a warrior” mentality. Using HMMWVs, the entire platoon negotiates movement to contact, react to improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and react to complex ambush lanes using the same training standards that tank and mechanized scout platoons use to negotiate these same tasks. The support platoon must also master the convoy escort task, which is an implied task of an independent combat logistics patrol, but its importance should not be underestimated. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.15, Tank Platoon, Chapter 5, Section 4, provides the best concept for support platoons to use.1 The battle drills listed below were part of an untitled tactical standard operating procedure (TACSOP) used to train tank and scout platoons how to conduct ICLPs: Independent Combat Logistics Patrol (ICLP) Battle Drills

REACT TO AMBUSH:

1. Engage the enemy with direct fire.

2. Report contact to convoy commander, including enemy location.

3. Vehicles in the kill zone immediately increase speed to clear it.

4. Convoy commander reports contact and requests assistance.

5. Use smoke to obscure convoy from the enemy.

6. The convoy will not leave any personnel in the kill zone; if a vehicle is disabled, the platoon must suppress the enemy and assist the crew of the disabled vehicle.

7. The convoy commander accounts for all vehicles before departing for the rally point.

8. Elements ahead of the kill zone rally at the forward floating rally point (gold), one terrain feature or 1km from the lead of the convoy when attacked. Basic Independent Combat Logistics Patrol

NO SMOKING WITHIN 50 FEET

M978 FUELER

NO SMOKING WITHIN 50 FEET

M978 FUELER

M977 CARGO

M977 CARGO

M1114 (Asst. Patrol Leader/ CASEVAC) M1114 (Gun Truck) M1114 (Patrol Leader) M1114 (Lead Vehicle)

MAY INCLUDE A FIELD LITTER AMBULANCE

AND 10-TON WRECKER (METT-TC DEPENDENT)

●

ASSORTED CLASS V

●

ASSORTED CLASS IV (WIRE, PICKETS,

SANDBAGS, TCP SIGNS, ETC.)

●

ASSORTED CLASS III (P)

●

4,400 GALLONS OF CLASS III (B)

●

500 GALLONS OF BULK WATER

●

1-DAY CLASS I (RATIONS AND WATER)

●

CONTAINS:

Figure 1 September-October 2007 — 43

9. Elements that cannot bypass the kill zone rally at the rear floating rally point (black), one terrain feature or 1km from the trail of the convoy when attacked.

10. Senior man at each location will lead his element in consolidation and reorganization.

REACT TO AMBUSH (ROUTE BLOCKED):

1. Engage the enemy with direct fire.

2. Report contact to convoy commander, including enemy location.

3. Convoy commander reports contact and requests assistance.

4. Vehicles not in the kill zone set a support-by-fire position to cover vehicles in the kill zone.

5. Use smoke to obscure kill zone.

6. Vehicles in the kill zone work to turn the vehicles around and evacuate them from the kill zone.

7. Report casualties and disabled vehicles to the convoy commander.

8. Convoy commander will decide if any equipment must be left behind in the kill zone; no personnel will be left behind.

9. Once all elements have evacuated the kill zone, the convoy commander directs the convoy to set a perimeter at black (rear floating rally point).

10. Conduct consolidation and reorganization inside perimeter.

11. Return to base or use alternate route.

CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION:

1. Establish 360-degree perimeter.

2. Gain accountability of all personnel and equipment.

3. Reestablish chain of command if necessary.

4. Send situation report (SITREP).

5. Evaluate and treat casualties.

6. Cross-level class I, III, and V.

7. Develop course of action (return to base, use alternate route to objective, or maintain current position).

REACT TO IED:

1. Stop convoy.

2. Establish 360-degree perimeter.

3. Scan area for possible triggerman/ambush.

4. Convoy commander will move a team to assist damaged vehicle. Team watches to ensure there are no more roadside IEDs.

5. Evaluate, treat, and medically evacuate casualties as necessary.

6. Stop civilian traffic-hasty roadblock.

7. Convoy commander will develop a recovery plan: a. Recover vehicle with organic assets; or b. Request additional assets, such as wrecker or heavy-equipment transporter to recover vehicle.

8. Continue to secure the area until all personnel and equipment can move.

REACT TO MINESTRIKE:

1. Stop convoy.

2. Establish 360-degree perimeter. “Using ICLPs significantly decreases reaction time because LOGPACs will not have to wait on combat units to supply an escort. The platoon leader, platoon sergeant, or section sergeant conducts intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), prepares an operations order, conducts pre-combat inspections/checks, and begins the mission, which frees up time for commanders and leaders to devote to planning, inspecting, and preparing for operations.” 44 — September-October 2007

3. Scan area for possible ambush.

4. Move up to the damaged vehicle, while staying within its tracks.

5. Evaluate, treat, and medically evacuate casualties as necessary.

6. Stop civilian traffic-hasty roadblock.

7. Convoy commander will develop a recovery plan: a. Recover vehicle with organic assets; or b. Request additional assets, such as wrecker or heavy-equipment transporter, to recover vehicle.

8. Continue to secure the area until all personnel and equipment can move.

DEAD-DRIVER DRILL:

During an ambush, when a driver is killed or wounded and cannot drive:

1. Vehicle in the rear of the convoy with extra personnel approaches stopped vehicle, keeping stopped vehicle between it and the enemy.

2. Notify the convoy commander of the situation.

3. Use machine guns and smoke to cover and obscure the vehicle.

4. The new driver will get in the vehicle from the side opposite the enemy.

5. Both vehicles evacuate the kill zone.

SECURITY HALT:

Security halts occur anytime the convoy must stop outside the FOB. The convoy commander is responsible for choosing an appropriate location based on enemy situation, weapons standoff, weather, civilians, and friendly unit locations. When security halts are necessary:

1. Establish 360-degree perimeter.

2. Establish accountability of all personnel and equipment.

3. The convoy commander ensures there are no gaps in the perimeter.

4. After 15 minutes, sector sketches for all machine guns are complete, dead space identified and compensated for, and rally points are disseminated.

5. After 30 minutes, the convoy commander will ensure that dead space is visually inspected by reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) patrols; and platoon defense plan is complete.

6. Priorities of work will begin once security is established. The convoy commander will manage the security level.

7. R&S patrols will conduct area reconnaissance at regular intervals, to include after begin morning nautical twilight (BMNT). Training these battle drills will increase the lethality and survivability of ICLPs; however, a greater emphasis should be placed on land navigation — all soldiers, especially patrol leaders, should attend a semiannual land navigational program. This program should include mounted/dismounted land navigation courses using only a compass and a protractor and mounted/dismounted land navigation courses using only Army-issued electronic land navigational devices. Successfully training support platoons on these tasks allows units to perform faster and fight more lethally on the battlefield, thus increasing their survivability. Since our Nation’s earliest battles, commanders have always been burdened with getting supplies to their soldiers in contact with minimum effort. The answer is the independent combat logistics patrols. The support platoon can no longer depend on the units they support for protective combat escorts. If commanders are to be aggressive, lethal, and efficient on the battlefield, the support platoon must be able to conduct ICLPs. Notes 1Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-20.15, Tank Platoon, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, February 2007. Captain Jerry Wood Jr. is currently a student at the Cavalry Leaders Course, U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.A. from Cameron University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Maneuver Captains Career Course, Airborne Course, Pathfinder Course, and Scout Leaders Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include XO, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th U.S. Cavalry Regiment, 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO; support platoon leader, 3d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), Fort Carson; and scout platoon leader, tank platoon leader, and headquarters platoon leader, I Troop, 3d Squadron, 3d ACR, Fort Carson. “To conduct ICLPs, support platoons must continue to train on convoy operations so they do not lose their fundamental skills; however, they must now train as hunters. They need to train with the high-intensity “I am a warrior” mentality.” September-October 2007 — 45