Route Ownership versus Route Concession

Route Ownership versus Route Concession by Captain Robert B. Gillespie Logistics operations are simultaneously the least sexy, yet most fundamental, of combat operations. Without the efficient and rapid movement of supplies and combat service support (CSS) elements throughout a theater of operations, the U.S. Army would be incapable of even the simplest tactical operation. Yet, combat arms leaders often place secondary emphasis on planning and executing logistics operations. From the curriculums of the Armor Officers Basic and Armor Captains Career Courses onward, logistics are given only cursory attention in comparison to the intense focus given to tactical combat arms operations. The end result of this shortchanging of logistics planning is poorly executed CSS operations that constrain friendly tactical operations to a far greater degree than do the effects of enemy action. This is especially true on the nonlinear battlefields we see in Iraq and Afghanistan, where support units are as much on the front lines as combat arms elements. There are effective methods for conducting CSS operations in these high-risk areas that often go unused. We must own the routes we decide to use and view CSS operations in the same light we view com bat operations: with the goal of maintaining the initiative and friendly freedom of maneuver. As the executive officer (XO) of A Troop, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 82d Airborne Division, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, one of my unit’s primary missions was convoy security in the Al-Anbar region. Our forward operating base (FOB) also served as the 82d Airborne Division’s rear command post (D-Rear) and we completed over 150 missions in support of D-Rear, averaging over 10,000 miles per high mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). While our platoons routinely traveled to the Jordanian border crossing in the west and to Baghdad in the east, our primary security concern was the area between the cities of Ramadi and Fallujah in the heart of the Sunni Triangle. All of our enemy contact took place between Ramadi and Baghdad, and the overwhelming majority solely between Ramadi and Fallujah, a distance of less than 40km by highway. Despite the best intentions, we had fundamental failures in the division’s planning and execution of CSS operations. We had an underlying defensive and reactive mindset that granted the enemy a steady stream of psychological victories and allowed him to gradually restrict our movement throughout our area of operation (AO). We conceded our routes instead of owning them, a mistake from which other units can learn. Once established in our AO, we conducted a thorough pattern analysis of the main supply routes (MSRs) and alternate supply routes (ASRs) throughout our AO, dividing each route into distinct segments between villages or key intersections. We then assessed each segment as green, amber, or red, based on the number of incidents of enemy contact that had occurred along that segment in the past week. Any convoy was authorized to travel a green route, while amber routes required a convoy to have an armed security element. Only authorized combat arms units on specific missions, such as patrols, cordon and searches, or raids, were permitted to travel red routes; CSS convoys were not authorized. This system was designed to minimize the risk of CSS convoys making enemy contact. This seemingly simple process had one fatal fallacy. Since only combat arms elements could travel a red route, and most combat forces remained in the cities where their FOBs were located, there was virtu- 18 — September-October 2005 ally no coalition presence on a red route, as long as it was red. With no friendly forces traveling the route, no enemy contact was possible and none was reported; therefore, the route would automatically revert back to amber within a week of its turning red. Yet nothing in terms of enemy locations or activity changed; only our traffic on the route. The result was that problematic routes would constantly alternate between amber and red. Once we had changed a route’s status back to amber due to a lack of recent enemy contact (while no one was traveling on it), the first several convoys to take the route would frequently encounter improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that had been emplaced while the route was red. The route would revert back to red and the cycle would repeat. The key routes between Ramadi and Fallujah continuously alternated between red and amber due to the sustained level of insurgent activity in the Al-Anbar region. In a search for green routes between the two cities, we planned new routes that would be green by default as they had never before been used. Instead of continuing to travel through known hostile areas, we shifted our routes to areas that were seemingly free of enemy activity. Unlike relatively well-built Highways 1 and 10 that easily handled heavy vehicles and minimized travel distance between cities, these new routes were usually rural two-lane roads that were often not paved, adding considerably to travel distance and time. For example, traveling the highway that ran between the adjacent towns of Habbaniyah and Ramadi took less than 30 minutes. The replacement route involved traveling broken-up pipeline roads that more than tripled the distance, increasing travel time to over two hours. Traffic between Ramadi and Baghdad that had originally taken the highway directly between the two cities was forced to go southeast to Iskandariyah and then north to Baghdad. This again not only increased the distance, but took convoys over some very poor-quality roads. The M915-series tractor-trailers and their civilian contracted equivalents had a difficult time over many of these new routes. These new routes increased travel time for convoys and increased class-III and maintenance requirements from the increased dis tances and more austere roads. More seriously, these routes increased the amount of time that soldiers were exposed to enemy contact. Even a cursory consideration of the enemy could have predicted these results. The number of attacks on these new routes quickly matched the levels seen on the old routes, despite the onerous increases in distance and travel time, as well as the additional hazard of taking heavy trucks down narrow, poor-quality roads. This led to a continuous cycle of new routes, each longer and more detoured than the last, in search of a route that would remain free of attacks. Yet, every new route would only remain green for a few weeks before the number of enemy contacts returned to previous levels. We were facing a highly mobile and decentralized enemy whose task was to locate and attack soft targets — CSS elements. It was obvious that insurgents would quickly identify new logistics routes by the sudden surge in supply convoy traffic and shift their attacks accordingly. The enemy would move to where he could be most effective — where he could find a large number of exposed CSS elements. The new routes only served to take convoys further away from the FOBs and increase the amount of time they spent traveling through seldom-patrolled areas. We had collected a great amount of data about what the enemy was doing, but we never conducted the fourth step of IPB — determining the threat courses of action. We failed to factor in the enemy’s objectives and desired endstate.1 His obvious endstate was to deny us access to the areas in which he was active — and we let him achieve it. We did not think realistically about how the enemy would fight, and this omission resulted in us creating new routes that unintentionally increased the risk to our soldiers. Our mission statement emphasized offensive operations to create a secure environment, yet our CSS operations continuously served to give the enemy the initiative. We encouraged and motivated the enemy to further attack our logistics convoys by allowing ourselves to be repeatedly “chased” off of supply routes. As the enemy saw his efforts being rewarded by our routes being displaced further out into rural areas, he could do nothing but view his attacks as being successful and having tangible effects on coalition operations. We allowed the insurgents to determine where we went, instead of imposing our will on them. We gave them the initiative and they used it to deny us access to highways and major arteries. It was obvious to local inhabitants (sympathetic or otherwise) that we were not in control — insurgents owned these areas. Without local confidence in coalition forces, our ability to collect intelligence and improve security in these areas was severely limited. Morale throughout the troop sank as even the lowest-ranking soldiers could discern why the routes they were driving were changing, which caused frustration to grow, knowing that we were giving in to the insurgents’ goal of denying us use of the MSRs. We could not maintain freedom of maneuver in our own AO. “Our mission statement emphasized offensive operations to create a secure environment, yet our CSS operations continuously served to give the enemy the initiative. We encouraged and motivated the enemy to further attack our logistics convoys by allowing ourselves to be repeatedly “chased” off of supply routes. As the enemy saw his efforts being rewarded by our routes being displaced further out into rural areas, he could do nothing but view his attacks as being successful and having tangible effects on coalition operations.” September-October 2005 — 19

In retrospect, the methods A Troop used would have been much different. We would have conducted a continuous route security operation over key routes. During several screening missions, we observed that it takes several hours to emplace an IED; a well-executed route security mission would prevent that opportunity. U.S. Army Field Manual 17-95 discusses in detail how a cavalry squadron should conduct such a mission.2 Due to lack of available maneuver forces, a squadron-sized security element may not be feasible in many situations. A troop-sized element could secure a short, but critical, route segment, such as Highways 1 and 10, which ran between Ramadi and Fallujah, assuming another unit provided a sufficient (company-sized) reaction force. Engineer support is invaluable for clearing and grading road shoulders. Improving road shoulders makes rapidly identifying IEDs much easier, since it is difficult to mask the disturbance of graded sand or mud that occurs during IED emplacement. Troop scout pla toons would have continuously patrolled the route, preventing the emplacement of IEDs and maintaining freedom of maneuver over the extent of the MSR. When we were able to conduct a route reconnaissance mission prior to convoys passing over a route, our platoons found IEDs emplaced on the route each time and secured those locations prior to a convoy striking them. The constant combat arms presence on the route would deny IED placement opportunities. A sound pattern analysis of attempted and successful IED emplacement would route security a priority; not an afterthought to the “sexier” missions they would prefer to perform. This offensive approach to CSS operations ensures units maintain freedom of maneuver in their AO. It minimizes exposing support units to enemy contact. It gives local coalition sympathizers confidence that we control the terrain in which we operate, and therefore enhances intelligence collection. In conjunction with properly executed IPB, to include an honest look at the situation from the enemy’s perspective, this is a powerful, yet simple, paradigm for ensuring the security of CSS convoys. It works; it saves lives and sends the right message to the enemy. Notes 1U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington D.C., 8 July 1994, p. 2-40. 2FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, Department of the Army, U.S. GPO, Washington D.C., 24 December 1996, p. 4-46. Captain Robert B. Gillespie is currently the assistant S3, 3d Battalion, 502d Infantry Regiment (reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition), 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Officers Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, Jumpmaster Course, Ranger School, and Basic Airborne Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include XO, A Troop, 1st Squadron 17th (1-17) Cavalry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC; and scout platoon leader, A Troop, 1-17 Cavalry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg. “It was obvious that insurgents would quickly identify new logistics routes by the sudden surge in supply convoy traffic and shift their attacks accordingly. The enemy would move to where he could be most effective — where he could find a large number of exposed CSS elements. The new routes only served to take convoys further away from the FOBs and increase the amount of time they spent traveling through seldom-patrolled areas.” 20 — September-October 2005 identify where and when to most effectively conduct cordon and search or ambush operations. The troop would emplace observation posts (OPs) overwatching key intersections, cloverleafs, or areas of frequent or likely IED activity. The sniper teams organic to Stryker and light brigade combat team (BCT) reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadrons are ideal assets for this mission. While making a stand on a route might temporarily spike insurgent activity, persistence in maintaining the route would pressure insurgents to find a more vulnerable target. Proactively ensuring freedom of maneuver along an entire route is more effective than reactively protecting individual convoys. The end result would be coalition forces maintaining the initiative, sending a signal to local nationals (both friendly and hostile) that we have both the will and means to control routes in our AO. CSS elements would be free to move rapidly from FOB to FOB along high-quality roads free from IED threats. Soldier morale and confidence would be stronger and insurgents would not be encouraged by our apparent retreat from areas in which they operate. From A Troop’s collective experience, the only effective means to secure lines of communications in an area of heavy insur gent activity is to actively secure the route, using screens, patrols, OPs, cordon and searches, and ambushes as appropriate. MSRs and ASRs must be seen to be key terrain, and securing them from enemy interdiction must be made a priority when allocating forces to various missions. Combat arms units must make