Future Thrusts

Future Thrusts . The former Chief of AnnoJs guidance to the Mounted Warfighting Battlespace Laboratory for future thrusts regarding reconnaissance and security, the cavalry scout, and cavalry regiments and squadrons. by Lieutenant General Paul E. Funk PURPOSE This Whiie Paper provides the Chief of Armor's guidance to the Mounted Warfighting Battlespace Laboratory for future thrusts regarding reconnaissance and secunty, the cavalry scout, and cavalry regiments and squadrons. The intent is to better focus the exploratory process required for preparing for 21st century war in a timely and evolutionary manner. All must be accomplished within a constrained force structure with limited fiscal outlays for RDA. BACKGROUND The national military strategy of power projection, the technology advances adaptable to warfighting, and the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and modem watfighting materiel have profound implications for the U.S. Army and the mounted force. A smaller force that mirrors the current structure is not the answer. The wide variance in the potential threats to US. national interests will require a capabilities-based force. The mounted force must fine-tune structure by integrating technolagy that will enhance watfighting capabilities and provide the best return on the investment. FM 100-5, Amy qDerarions (1993), provides the Army guidance for preparing for 21st century war. The emphasis placed on reconnaissance and security and the economy-of-force principle makes cavalry and the cavalry scout suitable focal points for commencing the process. RECONNAISSANCE Reconnaissance is a focused information collection effort to reduce the unknowns concerning the enemy and terrain. It is conducted prior to, as well as during, all combat andor combat-related operations to provide the near-real-time information required for the planning and decision process and to preclude surprise. In cavalry reconnaissance operations, information is acquired by scouts and immediately reported. Elapsed time from the acquisition of the information by a platoon to receipt should be not more than two to five minutes for a battaliodsquadrowbrigade commander and not more than two to ten minutes for a divi-siodcorps commander. The purpose of reconnaissance will be to reduce the unknowns of battlespace by gathering information upon which tactical and operational level commanders may base plans, decisions, and orders. Reconnaissance will require the capability to maintain continuous surveillance. visually and electronically, to SEE the battlespace and the enemy under all conditions. The intent will be to preclude a friendly force entering battle unwamed. improperly deployed, or with its maneuver combat striking power dissipated for reconnaissance and secunty. Equally important, reconnaissance, by reducing unknowns and providing near-real-time information as it is obtained, will help ensure the best use of decisive combat power. Analysis of National Training Center data shows that 90 percent of successful combat operations are based on successful reconnaissance. Reconnaissance is. and will continue to be, an essential prelude to and a part of all combat operations. Reconnaissance must be conducted at the distance required and focused on a specific objective to provide the information desired. Reconnaissance will require mounted, dismounted and, frequently, a combination of mounted and dismounted action. When possible, air and ground cavalry should be employed together to capitalize on the strong points of each to most rapidly expand battlespace, develop a situation, and increase operational tempo. The three types of reconnaissance missions - route, zone, and area - will remain viable. Route reconnaissance will often be required to obtain detailed information of a specific route and all adjacent terrain from which movement along that route could be influenced. Route reconnaissance will be oriented on either a road or a general direction of advance. Route reconnaissance may be conducted as a prelude to movement of a friendly force. Occasionally in the future, when the situation is fluid, the purpose may be to obtain information of an enemy force moving along a specific route or to locate sites to impede enemy movement. Zone reconnaissance will be conducted to obtain detailed information of all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries. Area reconnaissance will be conducted when information of a specific area is desired. Generally an area reconnaissance is conducted the same as a zone reconnaissance. The primary differences will be movement to and from the area of interest, which involves bypassing enemy and obstacles enroute and avoiding enemy outside the area of interest. SECURTTY: Whereas the purpose of reconnaissance will be to reduce the unknown and provide near-real-time information concerning the enemy and the battlespace andlor to develop the situation, the purpose of secunty operations will be to do that and provide a force early warning and thus some reaction time (screen) or, reaction time and maneuver space in addition to early warning (guard, cover). All security operations will require reconnaissance and continuous surveillance by visual and electronic means. A security force must deploy and operate at the distance from the secured force required for mission accomplishment. Its orientation is on the force being secured, whereas, a reconnaissance force is oriented on the reconnaissance objective. If the secured force moves, the security force must also move. In general, the three types of security missions - screening, guard, cover - will remain viable. The purpose of a screen operation will be to provide early warning, impede and harass the enemy with indirect and standoff firepower, and to destroy enemy reconnaissance elements within its capability. Reconnaissance and continuous surveillance by visual and electronic means are the central functions around which all other activities revolve. Screening operations should be viewed as defensive in nature. They will be conducted to the front, flank, or rear of a stationary force but only to the flanks or rear of a moving force. In the future, screening operations may frequently be required during initial entry operations when few troops are available. Once visual and electronic contact with the enemy is gained, it must be maintained to preclude the force being surprised and/or observed. A screen should not be expected to do much beyond providing early warning and impeding and harassing the enemy with indirect fires if the commander so desires. The purpose of guard operations will be to prevent enemy observation of, and direct fire against, a force. They will normally be conducted within range of divisional artillery. Guard operations will be offensive or defensive in nature. They may be conducted to the front, flank, or rear of a moving or stationary force. A guard force must ammplish all functions of a screen, plus fight as required to accomplish the mission and ensure more reaction time plus some maneuver space. As in a screen operation, reconnaissance and continuous surveillance by visual and electronic means are the central functions around Wich all other activities revolve. The purpose of a covering operation will be to develop the situation early, and to deceive, disorganize, and destroy enemy forces at a considerable distance from the force being secured. In the future, this may involve distances of a hundred-plus kilometers. A covering force must be tactically and logistically capable of prolonged independent operations and capable of fighting very hard for mission accomplishment. Covering operations may be conducted to the front, flank, or rear or a moving or stationary force and may be offensive or defensive in nature. A covering force must ammplish all functions of a screen and guard and be capable of accepting decisive engagement to provide the desired reaction time and maneuver space. As in screen and guard operations, reconnaissance and continuous surveillance by visual and eleo tmic means are the central function around which other activities revolve. CAVALRY FM 1065: The basic missions of cavalry units are reconnaissancx and security.... The ability of cavalry units to find the enemy, to develop the situation, and to provide the commander with reaction time and securily also makes them ideal for operating in an economy-of-force role .... Cavalry regiments and squadrons must continue to be uniquely organized, trained, and equipped units designed to conduct reconnaissance and security missions for corps and divisions and to attack, defend, and delay in an economy-of-force role. The central functions of reconnaissance and sew-n'ty operations and the basic requirements for economy-of-force roles are rewnnaissance and continuous visual and electronic surveillance. This requires uniquely trained and equipped soldiers expert in mounted and dismounted reconnaissance and security activities. Thus, cavalry scouts are the heart and soul of cavalry around which activities of their parent unit revolve. The same cavalry scout is the reconnaissance specialist, "the eyes and ears" of maneuver battalions and brigades. THE CAVALRY SCOUT: Cavalry scouts must be carefully selected, conditioned physically and mentally, and uniquely trained and equipped for 21st century war. This will be a prerequisite so that the Army can best capitalize on the economy-of-force principle during structuring of the force and execution of the power projection strategy and combat operations. In general, cavalry scouts will be organized as platoons in cavalry units or in maneuver battalions and brigades. Although all cavalry smut platoons will be basically identical, their employment will differ significantly because of their parent unit's structure and needs. Cavalry unit structure and doctrine will be oriented on supporting and facilitating activities of the organic cavalry smuts. The purpose of cavalry smut platoons organic to maneuver battalions and brigades will be to facilitate activities of their parent unit by conducting reconnaissance and screening to provide early warning. All cavalry scouts must be expett in reconnaissance and security operations and trained to capitalize on stealth to avoid decisive engagement. All cavalry scouts must be expert in the use of all organic weapons while mounted or dismounted; employment of close air support and indirect fires of all types, to include NLOS; use of demolitions to create and reduce hasty obstacles; communications, navigation mounted and dismounted; identification of all battlefield systems; use of advanced sensors and electronics to include the Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3); and other detection, ranging, and targeting aids. All cavalry scouts must be imbued with the spirit and elan of the cavalry and mentally and physically suited/conditioned for prolonged, highly stressful independent operations depending in large measure on stealth and cunning for survival. The 21st century cavalry scout must be expert regarding all mounted scout crew stations and related functions and in the use of standoff and indirect fire for reconnaissance by fire. Cavalry scouts must be exceptionally knowledgeable of all facets of reconnaissance and security tactics and techniques. All cavalry scouts must be expert in the selection of routes and/or axis of movement for all different type units and equipment and the classification of bridges. Additionally, scouts should be expert in traffic control. In the future, more emphasis must be placed on terrain reconnaissance and the use of brigade and battalion cavalry scouts to guide or direct friendly forces to the enemy. National Training Center data shows that the current tendency in battalions is to focus scouts on target acquisition at the expense of other reconnaissance objectives. Interestingly, this data also shows that battalion scouts are used for terrain reconnaissance less than 20 percent of the time and that the battalions achieve overall mission success only about 20 percent of the time. Thus, the associated training task for the future is to train maneuver battalionlbrigade commanders and staff officers in how to get the best retum on their cavalry scout platoons. Concurrently, we must focus on all smut tasks equally and move away from the current trend to f m s on the easy to evaluate tasks performed by other mounted soldiers, such as gunnery. The training given to a very few specifically selected scouts, in pursuit of the Cavalry Cup and the Boeselager competition, must be the standard for all cavalry scouts. Scout NCOs must be thoroughly knowledgeable of armor, mechanized infantry, airmobile, and light infantry operations 48 and thoroughly trained in rapid strategic deployment requirements by air and sea. Scout NCOs should also be expert in liaison, chemical detection, and radiological survey monitoring operations. Scout NCOs must be capable of explaining what their reconnaissance unitheam is doing and why. They must also be capable of providing information as to the capabilities of their unitheam. Scout NCOs must also be able to pass on to their commander or other entities the desires, concerns. and intent of other commanders.

FUTURE THRUSTS FOR CAVALRY UNITS AND CAV-

ALRY SCOUTS: Rapid power projection from CONUS and forward bases will require that the organizational structure and training of cavalry regiments, squadrons, and maneuver battalionbrigade cavalry scout platoons facilitate the rapid no-notice formation of capability-based force packages. The required flexibility is inherent in the current structures but must be fine-tuned through training, experience, and doctrinal refinements. In the future, a ClNC may desire cavalry scouts early on in a contingency operation for far-ranging reconnaissance but may lack the strategic deployment means for moving them and their parent organizations concurrently. Thus, all cavalry scout platoons must be adaptable for rapid force packaging and deployment. In general, the scout platoons will adapt very well. The problem will be in the administrativeho-gistical support tail. Once we have determined the specifics, we can probably deal with this challenge, in large measure through institutional instruction and frequent practice in the field. We should emphasize more training in tailoring cavalry units to provide for grouping like things (e.g., tanks, mortars, scouts, artillery, and air assets) in specific packages. These 'specific packages" would be formed for specific combat situations and to facilitate deployment in order of most urgent need. It would also facilitate deployment of a capabiliiies-based contingency force. The increased distances away from the main force at which cavalry regiments and squadrons will operate, and the fluid nature of cavalry operations in different theaters, will place unique requirements on cavalry organizations. They will require extended self-sustainment. Cavalry will also require longer range communications, both externally and internally, to ensure adequate command and control and the capability to pass information over extended distances. Cavalry scouts urgently require a reconnaissance platform that emphasizes stealth and that will facilitate their reconnaissance and security activities on the 21 st century battlefield. Cavalry regimental and squadron organizational structure must continue to be based on a combined arms approach through a combination of assigned, attached, and OPCON arrangements. We must evaluate the dismount requirement. Cavalry regiments or squadrons, which may be deployed to close terrain such as Bosnia, may require a greater dismount capability than they currently possess. In view of national interests, and probable frequency of employment in close terrain and/or urban areas, should such a capability be organic, or simply attached or OPCONed as the need arises? In the early 1980s, one-third of the reconnaissance and security power of cavalry regiments and squadrons was stripped away to form the divisional MI battalions. Since then, experience gained in extensive maneuver exercises and in war shows that the promised return on investment was not realistic. In view of declining force structure, it is probably time to address the issue and redistribute some of the MI battalion assets and spaces to the cavalry structure, to elements of the divisional staffs, and to the maneuver brigades. This will increase efficiency, simplify coordination, reduce time lags, and eliminate unnecessary structure. T R A D E and HQDA actions to restore tanks and a significant ground scout capability to the divisional cavalry squadrons are of great significance to the tactical and operational health of the force. The divisional cavalry squadrons with three ground troops and two air cavalry troops will provide for the routine integration of air and ground cavalry operations required to rapidly expand battlespace and operational tempo.' Therefore, we must quickly develop digital common links between air and ground for present as well as future equipment. From time to time, a thought appears that air cavalry can do everything that ground cavalry can do. That simply is not true. Based on history, most cavalry regiments and squadron op erations may, at some point, require close combat. When close combat is required, there will be no substitute for the combat power and protection provided by armored protected combat vehicles such as MBTs, the AGS. and other armored protected systems. It is probable that there will be periodic attempts to lighten the force. We must plan to do so by introducing new systems which are based on more efficient technologies. Lightening the force by reducing or eliminating armored combat vehicles would have the undesirable effects recently corrected. Due to the expansion of battlespace. it is imperative that maneuver brigades be provided with cavalry scouts other than those organic to maneuver battalions for reconnaissance and screening as well as a myriad of other functions. How best to do this should be determined by the battle laboratory process as a top priority effort. A significant future organizational goal must be cavalry scouts throughout the force mounted in a unique scout vehicle designed to emphasize stealth and facilitate reconnaissance and surveillance by both visual and electronic means. The danger which must be avoided is the thought that, since all cavalry scout platoons are equipped, mounted and trained in the same basic reconnaissance and secunty tasks, they can all do the same thing. That simply will not be true. It is not true now. Cavalry scout platoons, backed up by the combat power inherent in the cavalry unit structure they operate in, can participate in all reconnaissance, security operations, and other combat operations conducted by their parent unit in an economy-of-force role. But the cavalry scout platoons of a maneuver battalion or brigade operating basically on its own, without the supporting structure of a regimental or divisional cavalry squadron and troop, are somewhat limited. Without reinforcement, they will be suitable only for reconnaissance missions which do not require close combat to develop a situation, and to screen and to accomplish other scout functions which do not require close combat (such as liaison). The sooner all cavalry scouts can be provided a platform optimized for reconnaissance and surveillance, and the sooner the AGS is fielded for the 2d ACR and other light cavalry components of the reconnaissance and security structure, the greater the capability of the force as a whole. Although, in the near term, cavalry scouts must continue to be able to operate from any platform, a vehicle specifically

January-February 1994 49

designed for reconnaissance will enhance scout survivability and mission success of the parent unit. The HMMWV, although its mobility is reasonably good, does not provide the requisite degree of protection. The CFV provides an acceptable degree of armor protection but is not a suitable reconnaissance and sulveillance platform, and does not permit the required degree of stealth. The TRADOC Unique Scout Vehicle Mission Needs Statement, recently validated by HQDA DCSOPS, reflects significant vehicle characteristics which may impact doctrine and organizational concepts, particularly when put in context with the horizontal integration effort. For example ... 0 Elevated multi-sensors suite to indude thermal, acoustic, radar, and LADAR (laser radar) designed to interface with manned and unmanned ground and aerial sensor platforms. 0 A jam-resistant, secure, difficult-to-intercept communications system with a range of at least 100 km. 0 A unique vehicle design integrating low observable technologies to make the vehicle difficult to see. hear, or otherwise detect. 0 A rnobilii differential provided by a swim capabilii without preparation, extended range, sustained cross-country capabilities, self-recovery, and high speed. 0 An integrated defensive suite which will indude warning receivers and automatic countermeasures. OAdvanced crew stations for a crew of three with provisions for a fourth scout. 0 A self-defense weapons system capable of suppression and reconnaissance by fire. 0 Modular design to permit the vehicle to be mconfigurable from approximately eight tons to 15 tons. 0 Air transportable in C130, C141, C17, and CH47D, and capable of low velocity air drop. The routine use of UAVs and all other available see-over-the-hill technologies will be an essential element of cavalry operations. Some of these technologies should be integrated into cavalry organizational structure to increase battlespace, operational tempo, and the ability to use standoff firepower. However, the cavalry scout will remain the essential element around which cavalry organizational design and doctrine must pivot. NLOS and LOSAT should be viewed as maturing systems for inclusion in the cavalry organizational structure. Both will extend close battlespace significantly by providing standoff firepower. The NLOS, in particular, is well suited to supplement and complement cavalry scout activities by providing very long range indirect standoff firepower. The LOSAT will supplement and complement armor support provided by MBTs or AGSs for cavalry scouts. The LOSAT will also provide an anvil around which a defense can be solidified by buying time with long range direct fire attrition. Cavalry units must strive to kill with standoff firepower whenever possible to protect their highly trained and skilled personnel whose value will increase significantly as battle experience is gained. The cavahy scout is the heart and soul of reconnaissance and secunty activities essential to successful maneuver and combat operations. Thus, an enhancement of cavalry scout activities and the synchronization of those activities with corps, division, maneuver brigade/battalion activities will produce a force multiplier effect. The enabling technology to achieve this is the Hill effort linking IVIS, CVC2, POSNAV, and, eventually, IFF. The end result will be a force capability to fight much more efficiently and win, even when greatly outnumbered. We need to examine the payoffs of the unique cavalry scout reconnaissance platform in concert with the horizontal integration effort. Perhaps considerably more emphasis can be placed on the use of ambush tactics and the use of standoff firepower. BOlTOM LINES: Reconnaissance and security doctrine is in good shape. All in all, doctrine for cavalry operations and employment of the cavalry scout is fine for the present and at least the near term. However, discussions with commanders in the field, analysis of National Training Center data, as well as insight gleaned during simulations-supported exercises all reflect that often scouts do not provide the necessary information. The central problem we real/y need to focus on is how to improve the quality and timeliness of the reconnaissance information provided by cavalry scouts. Reconnaissance is the common thread that permeates all cavalry and the preparation for and execution of all combat maneuver/op erations. If we can improve the quality and timeliness of reconnaissance information, we will have significantly helped commanders and their staffs and enhanced force capabilities. Therefore, we must focus on how best to fix the problem. The immediate requirements are: 0 Well trained scouts. OCommanders better prepared to employ scouts during 0 State-of-the-art information acquisition systems for our 0 Bringing the horizontal integration effort to reality, to include state-of-the-art, reliable, rapid, secure communications for scouts. 0 A scout vehicle designed to capitalize on stealth and to facilitate reconnaissance and extended surveillance of the bafflespace. preparation for and conduct of battle. xouts. 0 Integration and testing of emerging technology. 0 Determinations of how new technology, when fielded, will impact on unit structure. The Armor Center, as the Army proponent for mounted warfighting bafflespace, must address the above in the battle laboratory process in accordance with the applicable precepts of the new FM 100-5. "...Doctrine must be the engine that drives the exploitation of technology." Only through the Battle LaborataryAouisiana Maneuvers process can we ensure a timely, efficient, evolutionary, affordable preparation and the modernization required for 21st century war. The field, TRADOC, and the Armor Center must continue to work in concert to ensure the force is properly prepared through the Battle Laboratory/Louisiana Maneuver process. It is the best way to get the job done. 50