The Roots of Insurgent Warfare

The Roots of Insurgent The Roots of Insurgent by Captain Christopher L. Center Insurgencies have existed as a means of change in political and social situations since the beginning of time. Instructional and intellectual methods have allowed for these vehicles of change to evolve in their asymmetric concepts of warfare for the state and the insurgent. This article discusses the “roots of an insurgency” and how the military of the state has countered insurgent warfare through intellectual and instructional methods.

Warfare Warfare

the areas of technology or instructional learning.3 This gap must be bridged; therefore, insurgents must use asymmetric tactics of terrorism and guerrilla warfare. More often than not, insurgencies are confused with the tactics used to further their objectives. Terrorism and guerrilla warfare tactics are commonly used; insurgents may use both or neither of these tactics, however, they are not the overarching principle of the conflict. Terrorism is described as “the threat or use of physical coercion against noncombatants to create fear to achieve political objectives;” guerrilla warfare uses hit-and-run tactics against police, military, and physical infrastructures that support the legitimate government.4 The tactical success of an insurgency depends on the strategic plan of the insurgent, which depends on five key factors for success. Robert Tabor defines these factors as the “will to maintain the revolt; the mindset to avoid the state’s strengths and attack its weaknesses; the metamorphosis of the protracted armed struggle from the strategic defensive, to the strategic stalemate, to the strategic offensive; the role the political organization plays in gaining and maintaining support for the insurgency; and the government’s counteraction against the insurgency. Does the government use discriminate force or indiscriminate force when dealing with the enemy? The center of gravity, or the civilian populace, that is on the fence could decide to support the insurgency if the government uses violent means against them.”5 The five strategic aspects of this particular struggle show that the typical insurgent needs to be endeared to the general public to proliferate. The internal conflict needs to be balanced between guerrilla, terrorism, and political tactics to be successful. The ordinary civilian caught in the middle between government and insurgent forces should be the main objective of insurgent or counterinsurgent operations. Civilians are the center of gravity and the aspect of this particular struggle that can tip the favor from one side to another, thus enabling insurgents to recruit local citizens to join the insurgency, and encouraging the local populace to support the insurgency by providing a base of operations or hospitality to the insurgent, as well as financial and other means of support. Support is vital to any insurgency, as proven during the Vietnam War when South Vietnamese villagers provided support to the Viet Cong. This insurgent army blended in with the population, which allowed them to recruit from within villages and maintain power, even when they were decisively engaged by government forces. Weapons and supplies were easily cached in villages and stored in intricate cave systems. In turn, this meant that logistics and medical support came from these villages, thereby fueling the insurgency. The fact that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army won over the center of gravity led South Vietnamese and U.S. forces to begin a campaign of clearing villages known to harbor such insurgents. This campaign effectively denied the insurgency its center of gravity. The center of gravity, or people, support insurgencies because they see the government failing them in two key areas: security and basic services. These two key fac-Evolution takes analysis and relies on the military historian to provide the analysis and research in any conflict. Conflicts or war can be grouped or categorized in various ways. My instructional education has taught me the difference between “total war” and “limited war.” “Total war,” as described by Dennis Showalter in Lecture 9 of Introduction to Military History, is “generally understood as war in which resources, human and materiel, of the combatants are committed to a conflict, admitting neither rules nor restraints in military operations, and the outcome of which places the defeated entirely at the mercy of the victor.”1 In this short definition of total war, we see two sides committed to a particular conflict who will stop at nothing to accomplish their aims. There is no operational, logistical, or human expense that will be spared to accomplish either participant’s desired end state. An example of this particular type of warfare is World War II. Conflicts, such as Vietnam and the Revolutionary War, take on many traits of “total war,” but in many ways, it is a contest of “David vs. Goliath.” Insurgent warfare is a limited war, a contest of the weak versus the strong. The struggle is seen as an internal conflict, which involves a conflict between a government and an opponent who wants to bring about change in the current political setting through political or violent means. As Robert Tabor discusses in War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare, there are four political aspects that insurgents attempt to challenge during any particular insurgency: integrity of the borders and composition of the nation state; the political system; authorities in power; and the policies that determine who gets what in society.2 The insurgency is asymmetrical in nature and the tactics used to bring about change need to be understood — both sides in this type of warfare have differing capabilities. Dennis Showalter, in Lecture 10 of Introduction to Military History, describes it as one opponent trailing the other because it cannot match its enemy in “In this short definition of total war, we see two sides committed to a particular conflict and will stop at nothing to accomplish their aims. There is no operational, logistical, or human expense that will be spared to accomplish either participant’s desired end state. An example of this particular type of warfare is World War II. Conflicts, such as Vietnam and the Revolutionary War, take on many traits of “total war,” but in many ways, it is a contest of ‘David vs. Goliath.’ ” 28 — November-December 2007 tors become prevalent when human beings identify their most important needs. Abraham Maslow’s “Hierarchy of Needs,” clearly identifies these two factors as the base of the triangle.6 The two key factors are integral to human existence and can cause alliances to waiver if they are not met by the government, but are provided by the insurgent. Hezbollah, an insurgent group from South Lebanon that has menaced the Israeli Defense Force, has established themselves not only as an insurgent group, but also a political party. Under the leadership of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah has been one of the major political parties in Lebanon since 1992. They provide education, security, medicine, food, and other basic necessities to the Shia people of Lebanon.7 These basic needs are provided to the people in exchange for their popular support to help undermine the government’s counterinsurgency operations. The only way for a western power to defeat an insurgency is through a detailed study of intellectual and instructional methods during peacetime. During peacetime, a western military reverts to training periods that incorporate lessons learned from past conflicts. Western military instructional and intellectual lessons in history typically revolve around high-intensity conflicts, using fire, maneuver, and air power against an enemy of near equal size and tactical ability, which tends to be the focus of study whether it is instructional or intellectual. An insurgency is a low-intensity conflict that pairs government forces against an internal enemy that cannot replicate the force structure or logistics capabilities of its opponent. In western militaries, insurgency is usually considered an afterthought or an additional consideration and seldom considered the main conflict, thus classified as low-intensity conflict; however, government forces will typically commit maximum resources to chase down a nearly invisible enemy. The only means for a western power to tackle low-intensity conflict is through professional military education that encompasses all aspects of war and includes nonwestern thought. Insurgency can only be defeated by a professional military and government that understands, through instructional and intellectual means, how to counter such a subversive group. The military must have an appreciation for cultures other than its own. Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria in his article, “The Trouble with History,” supports such professional development within a professional military environment. Echevarria discusses “historical consciousness” and “historical mindedness,” which educate the politician that votes to send armies to war or provides the professional soldier with the knowledge and appreciation of nonwestern thought that typically goes into fighting an insurgency. Echevarria further discusses the consciousness and open-mindedness to incorporate the subfactors of social, political, and economic conditions that contribute to a conflict.8 Social, political, and economic conditions are three major factors that contribute to an insurgency. These factors are typically not the exciting or heroic parts that the military professional pays much attention to, unless they sit inside some type of strategic planning cell. The fact is these factors allow the military profes- “More often than not, insurgencies are confused with the tactics used to further their objectives. Terrorism and guerrilla warfare tactics are commonly used; insurgents may use both or neither of these tactics, however, they are not the overarching principle of the conflict. Terrorism is described as “the threat or use of physical coercion against noncombatants to create fear to achieve political objectives;” guerrilla warfare uses hit-and-run tactics against police, military, and physical infrastructures that support the legitimate government.” November-December 2007 — 29 sional to understand the intricate details that drive a countryman to turn away from his government for ideological purposes. Social reasons could involve anything from religion to race, which create deep divisions among all parties involved in the conflict and become sectarian in nature. If it were an internal conflict involving a government force against a sectarian group, then we would possibly find insurgents and government forces crossing lines to support the sectarian group with whom they have a religious or ethnic alliance. This was very common during the Balkan wars in the 1990s, after the former communist state of Yugoslavia divided into six independent states. Political friction also tends to spark an insurgency. These political causes range anywhere from a particular group wanting to live under the rule of a monarch, or in the case of Fidel Castro and Cuba in 1959, a socialist movement that ended up ejecting the corrupt Batista government from power. In the case of Castro, this is very similar to the earlier discussion of the Islamic political organization of Hezbollah. The Castro movement sought to discredit the Batista government through propaganda or information operations, which was used to target the center of gravity or local populace. The main objective of this campaign was to inform the center of gravity that the Batista government was not providing basic needs to the local populace. Sustenance, medical needs, education, and basic social services would be given in return for support of the revolutionaries. This propaganda led to materiel, manpower, and sanctuary support to the revolutionaries.9 Economic reasons tend to coincide with political reasons. Poor economic conditions can cause people to give up on their government, or as a member of the bourgeoisie, can significantly impair a state’s economy. In an industrial society, the bourgeoisie (middle class) would cripple a state’s economy through refusing to work or consume the goods that an industrial nation produces. The Russian Revolution is an example of a bourgeoisie insurgency — the government and economy fell to the wrath of communism because the bourgeoisie was not represented and not treated fairly in the industrial complex.10 The economy causes a nation to appear viable or broken. If other nations cease to have faith in the market of a certain country, this might spur a revolution. The disgruntled worker has every opportunity to become an ideologue, social or political insurgent. Dr. Echevarria believes that the military professional should understand the more intricate political and social situation in a country. This allows the military professional to understand a potential enemy and grasp all aspects of warfare, not just high-intensity conflict. The problem is this type of warfare does not appeal to the military professional because it is not just instructional; it requires an intellectual mind to figure out what is causing the internal strife — the tougher issue is developing an exit strategy from such a conflict. During high-intensity conflicts, the combatants can always sign peace accords and return to their countries. They can also cede control of the terrain they have occupied, if it no longer appeals to their strategic interests. The insurgency does not allow for such a retreat or peace accord; the fight is personal because it usually involves countryman against countryman. These feuds normally reignite century after century, and potentially can only be prevented through the use of peacekeepers. Serious intellectual thought, coupled with instructional methods, are the only way to fight these small-scale wars. Most western countries and militaries have taken part in trying to extinguish the flames of insurgent conflict, but why have they failed more times than not? The United States, Russia, Great Britain, and France have, at one time or another, been faced with an insurgency. The problem is that armies do not plan for this phase of combat operations, and tend not to be focused on a civilian enemy that rejects their occupation of the country they have no right to occupy. The key term is “occupy” because it highlights the fact that occupying forces are not welcome and are forced to occupy a country through the means of invasion, whether sanctioned, or not, by the world community. The western world has typically had difficulty containing or eliminating insurgencies. Jeffrey Record in Beating Goliath, Why Insurgencies Win, presents 12 characteristics the United States and other western countries exhibit. These characteristics, which equate to 12 “tragic flaws,” continuously cause western countries to struggle when dealing with insurgencies. These countries tend to be: apolitical; astrategic; ahistorical; problemsolving, optimistic; culturally ignorant; technologically dependent; firepower focused; large scale; profoundly regular; impatient; logistically excellent; and sensitive to casualties.11 To facilitate a successful counterinsurgency, one must understand the usefulness of Record’s 12 characteristics, for starters: apoliticalness describes how a country ventures into war without considering the political outcome of the country occupied; and astrategic is the bridge between the war and post-war rebuilding operations, which requires developing a plan of how to get from combat operations to stability operations. Record agrees with Dr. Echevarria’s assertion that military professionals need to study all aspects of military history (ahistorical) during peacetime. He also believes that western countries do a poor “The ordinary civilian caught in the middle between government and insurgent forces should be the main objective of insurgent or counterinsurgent operations. Civilians are the center of gravity and the aspect of this particular struggle that can tip the favor from one side to another, thus enabling insurgents to recruit local citizens to join the insurgency, and encouraging the local populace to support the insurgency by providing a base of operations or hospitality to the insurgent, as well as financial and other means of support.” 30 — November-December 2007 job of studying all aspects of war, especially small-scale wars such as insurgencies. Problemsolving takes an approach of attempting to find a quick fix or engineering strategy to solve the problem (optimistic). Western countries do not understand that in a culture where there have traditionally been conflicts that involved groups with different ideologies, such as in the former Yugoslavia, there is no “quick fix.” Likewise, being culturally ignorant does not allow the western country to gain an appreciation of its nonwestern enemy. These characteristics are social in nature. The characteristics of technologically dependent, firepower focused, large scale, and logistically excellent are examples of how western countries use their technological and materiel-based strengths to preserve their dominance over nonwestern countries. Western countries are technologically dependent on weapons that engage an enemy at long range. This presents a dilemma during an insurgency because the enemy is not easily distinguished in a crowd of civilians. Soldiers should be able to engage this same crowd nonlethally; firepower amplifies the problem of being technologically dependent. As discussed before, we tend to focus on our lethal means of engaging the enemy while ignoring nonlethal means to win the hearts and minds of the center of gravity. Western countries fight wars that are large scale and logistically dependent. This presents the problem of fighting an enemy that is not as logistically strong, but free of the operational demands that come with securing a “logistics snowball.”12 Finally, the final two of Record’s 12 characteristics remind us that the United States and other western countries are impatient societies that demand results; they want a quick solution to a problem. Insurgencies are conditions based and take dedication to a strategy and final objective before initiating planning for an exit strategy. Western countries are impatient and sensitive to casualties. Impatience is an “Achille’s heel” to most western countries; their citizens demand results and decisive victory. Record uses the example of Vietnam and the lack of counterinsurgency techniques used because the political objectives would not be met within the timetable prescribed by U.S. strategy.13 The other characteristic that drives impatience is the western world’s sensitivity to casualties. In Beating Goliath, Record compares western militaries to their predecessor, the Roman Legions. These armies are small (compared to their strategic responsibilities), volunteer based, and expensive to train, and their soldiers are not easy to replace. The news media, which operates 24 hours a day, has brought the reality of casualties into our living rooms. The insurgent understands this and uses it to project his strategic objectives on an unwilling public. The price of human life can force withdrawal from a conflict. After reviewing these characteristics, one must consider the words of General Douglas MacArthur’s address to the U.S. Congress in 1951. “When war has been forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring the war to a swift end. War’s very object is victory, not prolonged indecision. In war, there is no substitute for victory.”14 This very quote highlights the western attitude, which exemplifies the above-mentioned characteristics. Conversely, another western general cautioned against this attitude: Carl von Clausewitz asserted that “War is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.”15 The rejection of swift victory is evident in this quote and it needs to be understood that politics and war intertwine. One must make political concessions to end war and when con- “The fact that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army won over the center of gravity led South Vietnamese and U.S. forces to begin a campaign of clearing villages known to harbor such insurgents. This campaign effectively denied the insurgency its center of gravity.” November-December 2007 — 31 cessions are not readily available, war might be the extension of politics. Political strategy must be part of the planning process in war. Instructional and intellectual thought on the part of officers, such as MacArthur, would prompt realistic strategies and objectives, post-invasion or occupation. These characteristics provide the reader with a sense that western countries, especially the United States, do not always consider the political implications of post-invasion strategy. This strategy requires coordinated input from any country’s state and defense departments. This is the period when the invaded and occupied country is politically weak and needs some type of strategy to prevent a “grab for power” by various groups within the country that have a stake in its political future. Insurgents, on the other hand, must also continue to be educated through instructional and intellectual means in order to succeed. However, their studies must be asymmetrical because they are not funded by a state that has an interest in making them a trained and professionally educated army. Therefore, their instruction must come through other means such as other popular insurgent leaders and conflicts. They must learn how David successfully beat Goliath, and the way to do that is to follow the nonwestern teachings of famous military strategists such as Sun Tzu, Mao Tse Tung, or Ho Chi Minh. John Keegan, in A History of Warfare, supports the difference in instructional and intellectual thought concerning war between western and eastern cultures. Nonwestern armies have been taught to fight using tactics such as evasion and delay. They were taught to wear an enemy down and fight from distance.16 Sun Tzu describes this type of warfare in The Art of War. The Chou kings fought the Shang dynasty because the dynasty failed to lead the people in a fair and just way. Sun Tzu describes the Chou tactics as evasion and delay, which is how they were forced to fight because the Shang dynasty was superior in both resources and manpower. Sun Tzu also stresses that the logistics support from other people and states also helped the Chou.17 The Art of War has transcended generations and has been used by nonwestern warriors to learn how to fight and be successful in an insurgency. Post-World War II set the conditions for this type of warfare to proliferate from 1945 to 1972 in East Asia, leaving the colonies there in a power vacuum. Colonies, such as Burma, Indochina, and Malaya, followed the example of Mao Tse Tung and his insurgent army’s defeat and overthrow of the legitimate Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek during the civil war of 1948-50. Mao learned how, through traditional nonwestern means, to defeat a superior enemy. Mao titled his method of making war as “protracted war.” This concept was based on ambush, piecemeal offensives, and rapid disengagement.18 The Viet Minh and their leader, Ho Chi Minh, learned instructionally and intellectually from the example of the Chinese communists. Through the study of history and instruction, the Vietnamese were well versed on how to defeat the western Goliath, France. The terrain of Indochina supported ambush, piecemeal offensives, and rapid disengagement.19 The war raged on for nearly 10 years. The French eventually fell victim to the insurgency because they had just fought a conventional war; this elusive enemy’s tactics were directly opposite of those with which they were most familiar. The Viet Minh defeated the French because they controlled the center of gravity. The will of the common people was behind them; the will of the French people did not support continued counterinsurgency operations in Indochina. Our insurgent enemies are not funded directly by a government; they do receive instruction or intellectual thought to fight a war from a central government. They have plenty of examples on how to defeat a western enemy and they continue to master the techniques that make them successful. Western countries have participated in their own insurgencies such as the American Revolution. Instructional and intellectual study teaches students that the American Revolution is an example of an insurgency. The colonists of the original 13 colonies rejected British rule because of issues such as “intolerable acts” and notions such as “taxation without representation.” Do we consult these lessons when studying insurgent methods? Yes, we do. Professional U.S. Army journals solicit articles from the Army community on issues that affect the branch or the study of military art. These topics cover everything from emerging doctrine and new weapons systems to the study of previous conflicts. The American Colonies established militias to fight against the French and the Indians in the frontier areas of the new British Colony. During wars, such as the French and Indian, which occurred in the middle of the 1760s, American Colonists learned tactics such as ambush, piecemeal offensives, and rapid disengagement.20 These practices were learned through fighting with and against Native Americans. This nonwestern style of fighting is not typically the standard for western armies or people, but is it western or nonwestern in nature? I believe it is simply a means to an end. The smaller army, with minimal logistics support, that fights a conventional army must practice these techniques to survive the larger army’s constant and unrelenting offensives. The insurgent army must put the conventional army on the defense and force a political decision. This is what American Colonists did against the British army. “Instructional and intellectual study teaches students that the American Revolution is an example of an insurgency. The colonists of the original 13 colonies rejected British rule because of issues such as ‘intolerable acts’ and notions such as ‘taxation without representation.’ ” 32 — November-December 2007

The word “insurgent” leads to negative connotations within our western culture, but we need to understand that this is how we attained our independence from Britain. Leaders, such as George Washington and Francis Marion (the swamp fox), fought the British by using the tactics mentioned above. The term “swamp fox” in itself alludes to the fact that he was a rebel leader who used his homegrown knowledge of South Carolina’s countryside to continuously ambush and wear down British forces by preventing his forces from being decisively engaged. Johann Von Ewald describes the American insurgency in Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal. The Hessian officer was trained in the traditional western style of war. The tactics he observed of the colonists were very nonwestern and he could not understand how such a force could beat one of the best armies in the world. After the war ended, he paid visits to the American garrisons that lined the Hudson River Valley. Upon his visit to the garrison at West Point, he witnessed an American force that was shoeless and not well supplied. This was the force that had defeated the British army. He was amazed and knew that this insurgent army would instruct other people across the globe on how to create similar conditions to gain their own independence.21 The American Revolution would become an instructional and intellectual lesson to other western insurgents. The colonists of South America and the bourgeoisie of France would execute their own revolutions.22 Western countries have experienced insurgencies internally and externally; many have served as examples for nonwestern insurgencies. Instructional and intellectual study must consider these examples when studying this aspect of war. Technology has a devastating effect on war: it may allow one force to subdue another, or it may hinder that same force if it is overly reliant on its benefits. The only thing that technology can assure in war is “mutually assured destruction.” The creation of the nuclear weapon after World War II delivered this world into a new era of fighting wars. In some ways, we have entered a second age of military revolution with the presence of nuclear weapons. The insurgencies that erupted in Malaya, Algeria, Vietnam, and South and Central America after World War II put the ultimate military weapon, which assured immediate victory, on the shelf. Technology can be used as a force multiplier in counterinsurgency, but the conflict must be fought by winning a political advantage over the insurgent. As mentioned before in this article, government forces must have the support of the local populace to succeed. The use of weapons of mass destruction or even basic indirect fire weapons does not guarantee that innocent civilians will not be killed. The military terms this as “collateral damage,” but it needs to be seen as creating favorable conditions for the insurgent. Collateral damage results in government forces committing to long-term counterinsurgencies.23 The center of gravity, or the average person, caught in the middle of an insurgency does not understand that laser-guided bombs are more precise than the firebombing that occurred in Dresden, Germany, during World War II. The only thing they see is a western power using its technology to kill fellow countrymen, friends, or even family members. This causes people to join an insurgency out of shear revenge for the intolerable acts committed. Be reminded of the Boston massacre and the nationalistic fever that spread due to this type of action. This situation is no different — when a government force committed to fighting an insurgency creates collateral damage, in the eyes of the populace, they have failed to provide security, which creates an even stronger demand for change. Technology will never be the absolute answer to fighting wars. Soldiers on the ground are the main weapons against an insurgency; if they act as ambassadors to the local populace and understand cultural norms, they will win the center of gravity. The insurgent’s main objective is a drawn-out conflict in an attempt to prevent a technically superior government from having any impact on their purpose. The insurgent must hold out and win small victories, which give credit to an insurgency in the eyes of foreign states. In this case, the foreign state will provide logistics support to assist the insurgent fight against a common enemy. Machiavelli said, “the prince who has more to fear from the people than from the foreigners ought to build fortresses, but… the best possible fortress is — not to be hated by the people, because although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not save you if the people hate you, for there will never be wanting foreigners to assist a people who have taken up arms against you.”24 This quote highlights the importance of outside assistance in an insurgency. Examples of foreign interference include the American War of Independence, the Chinese Communist defeat of the Nationalist Government, the French-Indochina War, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet-Afghan War. The insurgent must have outside help because guaranteed materiel fuels an insurgency. Political will and overall strategy do not guarantee that the conflict will continue. Insurgencies are complex struggles that require significant amounts of intellectual thought and instructional methods to “We need to understand the intricate parts of an insurgency and counterinsurgency. Goliath needs to understand what effects technology and outside interference by other nation states have on this type of conflict. Western countries need not go far to study these conflicts because many of these countries have, at one time or another, participated in one. They are not glorious or even highly intensive conflicts, but they have shaped our world today.” November-December 2007 — 33

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The fact is: historical analysis and proof show that whether the insurgency occurs in the west or the far east they use similar methods to fight and defeat a stronger enemy. We need to understand the intricate parts of an insurgency and counterinsurgency. Goliath needs to understand what effects technology and outside interference by other nation states have on this type of conflict. Western countries need not go far to study these conflicts because many of these countries have, at one time or another, participated in one. They are not glorious or even highly intensive conflicts, but they have shaped our world today. The current insurgent warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan exemplify all characteristics of insurgent intellectual and instructional thought. These two current insurgencies were not specifically mentioned in this article because military history provides many examples of these conflicts. The west’s refusal to grasp this type of conflict intellectually or instructionally, prior to the conflict occurring or even during strategic planning, has led to the situation we find ourselves in today. Notes 1Professor Dennis Showalter, “Total War,” Introduction to Military History, Lecture, Week 9, Colorado College. 2Robert Tabor, War of the Flea, Potomac Books, Washington, D.C., 2002, p. VIII. 3Dennis Showalter, “State of the Discipline,” Introduction to Military History, Lecture, Week 10, Colorado College. 4Tabor, War of the Flea, p. IX. 5Ibid., p. X. 6Abraham Maslow, “The Hierarchy of Needs,” Thinkers, Chartered Management Institute, 28 July 2005, available online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maslow’s_hierarchy_of_needs. 7Wikipedia Internet Encyclopedia, available online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hezbollah. 8Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria, “The Trouble with History,” Parameters, U.S. Army War College, Summer 2005, pp. 84-85. 9Tabor, War of the Flea, pp. 29-32. 10Ibid., pp. 14-15. 11Jeffrey Record, Beating Goliath, Why Insurgencies Win, Potomac Books, Washington, D.C., 2007, pp. 104-107. 12Ibid. 13Ibid., p. 106. 14Ibid., p. 108. 15Ibid., p. 107. 16Professor Dennis Showalter, “Alternate Perspectives,” Introduction to Military History, Lecture, Week 8, Colorado College. 17Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Translated by Ralph D. Sawyer, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, January 1994, pp. 38-39. 18John Keegan, A History of Warfare, Vintage Books, New York, 1993, p. 380. 19Ibid., pp. 379-381. 20Ibid., p. 347. 21Johann von Ewald, Diary of the American War. A Hessian Journal, Volume I: First and Second Campaigns, 1776 and 1777, translated and edited by Joseph P. Tustin, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, Chapter 1: From the departure from Hesse to the expedition in Chesapeake Bay, Parts Six, Seven, and Eight; and Supplement: From the beginning of the year 1782 up to the arrival in Hesse in 1784,” pp. 17-45 and 347-361. 22Keegan, A History of Warfare, pp. 348-349. 23Professor Dennis Showalter, “Industrialization and Military Historiography,” Introduction to Military History, Lecture, Week 7, Colorado College. 24Record, Beating Goliath, pp. 24-25. Captain Christopher L. Center is currently an observer controller, Operations Group (Tarantula Team), National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA. He received a B.A. from Norwich University. His military education includes Armor Captains Career Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, and Infantry Mortar Leader Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, including adjutant, 1st Squadron, 71st Cavalry, 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY; squadron maintenance officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT), 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), Fort Irwin, CA; XO, D Company, 1/11th ACR, Fort Irwin; tank platoon leader, A Troop, 1/11th ACR, Fort Irwin; and mortar platoon leader, HHT, 1/11th ACR, Fort Irwin.