Cold War Armor After Chechnya: An Assessment of the Russian T-80

The two-man vehicle inspection team had its hands full. Sergei Lebov and Yuri Medved would only be allowed a short visit to the combat zone prior to their return flight to Moscow and the bumpy drive back to the Russian Armor Development Center at Kubinka. The report they were to present had very quickly become one of the highest priorities in the Russian Army. Their mission was to inspect as many of the damaged and destroyed Russian armored vehicles in Chechnya as was physically possible. In addition to the large number of destroyed light armored vehicles, the two inspectors were able to examine 23 various T-72 main battle tanks (MBTs) and 10 T-80BV premium tanks (PTs). While not all the damage done to these tanks by the rebels was severe, some of it was indeed catastrophic. In one case, two Russian T-72A MBTs destroyed during the battle around the presidential palace in Groznyy looked like some strange monument to the fighting with their dis-embodied turrets arranged neatly on the street next to their destroyed hulls. Lebov and Medved had the task of piecing together the cause of these de-capitations. This type of work was not new to the inspectors. They had seen similar destruction on the battlefields of Desert Storm and in the former Yugoslavia. It was clear to both men that what ordnance scientists called a “munitions event” was the cause of the turret-hull separations. The ignition of the Russian tank’s onboard ammunition following penetration of the armor, would frequently cause an explosion powerful enough to blow the doomed tank’s turret off the hull and high into the air. In spite of what was being reported in the West, Lebov and Medved knew the problem was not the design of the tanks themselves. Since the beginning of tank warfare, tanks had been going into battle with ammunition stored in open, unprotected areas within their fighting compartments. It had to be something else. What was dooming Russian tank crews by turning a significant number of hit and damaged tanks into such catastrophic losses? Located approximately 60 miles outside Moscow, the Kubinka military base is the home of what was a very secret armored vehicle development and test facility. According to published reports, a collection of vehicles maintained in a museum at Kubinka includes some armored vehicles that had never been seen before. Additionally, several fully operational Western armored vehicles are also on hand, including a U.S. M60A1 MBT, two U.S. M48 MBTs, one Israeli Patton 105 (M48A5) MBT, and one British Chieftain MK 5 MBT. It was here, on 20 February 1995, that the Russian Minister of Defense, General Pavel Grachev, spoke during a special armor conference. His comments may have a huge impact on the capabilities and development of Russian armor, but they may also encourage reactionaries in the West to mistakenly underestimate current and future Russian tanks. Although a complete text of General Grachev’s comments is apparently not available, it is possible to present an examination of the key points. The focus of his remarks was the reported poor performance of Russian armor during the fighting in Chechnya. According to General Grachev, the Russian Army deployed 2,221 armored vehicles into Chechnya starting on 14 December 1994. Of that total, 225-250 were total losses.1 Western sources reported that Grachev was dissatisfied with the performance of Russian armor in general, and with the T-80 PT in particular. According to the Boston Globe, “The T-80 tank — the army’s main fighting vehicle, which gave Pentagon chiefs nightmares in the last decade of the Cold War — has turned out to be a junk heap on the battlefields of Chechnya.”2 Published sources report that General Grachev specifically identified three areas as shortcomings of the T- 80: insufficient armor protection; the gas turbine engine’s thirst for fuel; and the automatic loading system’s difficulty with semi-combustible ammunition cartridges. While General Grachev apparently did not criticize the T-80 as a whole, or say that it was an unsatisfactory tank, he made it clear that changes would have to be made. Before we examine these reported deficiencies, we must determine the exact tank type and model in question. The Russian Army deployed a wide range of armored vehicles in Chechnya and, from the information available, it is not clear which tanks actually took part in the fighting. Video reports carried by network news services show various T- 72 MBTs, with very little evidence of T-80s. The few T-80s that are known to have participated were photographed in Groznyy, and are in fact T-80BV PTs. This variant of the T-80 is based upon the T-80B PT that entered Soviet Army service in 1978. With the adoption of first-generation reactive armor, the T- 80B became the T-80BV (V=Vzryvnoi, Cold War Armor After Chechnya:

AN ASSESSMENT

OF THE RUSSIAN T-80

by Major James M. Warford 18 ARMOR — November-December 1995 or explosive) in 1984/85. It is important to point out that the T- 80BV is only one of up to 12 different variants in the T-80 series. While some reports claim that the much more modern and improved T-80U PT variant was the target of General Grachev’s comments, there is no solid evidence that any T-80Us took part in the fighting. As previously reported in the pages of ARMOR, specific information concerning the armor protection of modern former Soviet and Russian tanks is very limited. It is known that the T- 80BV is fitted with composite/laminate turret front and front-slope or glacis base armor. Referred to as “multi-element combination armor” by the Russians, it is of an advanced design and is certainly not a weak characteristic of the T-80B. With the addition of first-generation reactive armor, the T-80BV becomes a very tough tank to kill. The capabilities and influence of this “two-tier” frontal armor protection system (advanced composite/laminate base armor and first-generation reactive armor) are well documented and have already been discussed in the pages of ARMOR in some detail. According to International Defense Review 4/1995, “Chechen weapons failed to penetrate the T-80’s armor in direct fire.”3 The one place where the T-80BV (and virtually all other modern tanks) was vulnerable to Chechen rebel fire was the top surface. In fact, fire from RPG-type antitank weapons from positions in the upper floors of buildings may have been the most dangerous threat to Russian armor. Although not a revelation in any way, demonstrations of the Russian response to this battle damage assessment (BDA) was part of the agenda for the conference at Kubinka and will be discussed below. The T-80BV is powered by the GTD- 1000TF gas turbine engine, which provides 1100 hp, a maximum road speed of 70 kph, and an operating range of 370 kms. Reportedly, General Grachev was critical of both this engine’s fuel consumption and the flammability of the fuel used in combat. While the fuel used by this multi-fuel engine is an easy fix, the type of engine is another matter. General Grachev apparently insisted that the tank’s operating range be improved to allow for eight hours of operation between refuelings. To accomplish this, General Grachev announced that the Russian Armed Forces would move away from using gas turbine engines. “I say clearly to everyone, directors and constructors, [that] we are going to switch over to only using diesel. We are not going to work with gas turbine engines anymore.”4 This announcement is very interesting for a couple of different reasons. First, the Russians have been working with gas turbine engines since at least the mid-1960s. In fact, the T-80 Base Model PT was the first tank in the world to be fielded with a gas turbine engine when it was put into service in

1976. The GTD-1250 1250-hp gas turbine engine that powers the T-80U is by all Russian accounts a very efficient and successful engine. Although a newer model than that fitted to the T- 80BV that fought in Chechnya, the GTD- 1250 has been a very strong performer. Secondly, the timing of this announcement seems very suspect. The March-April 1995 issue of ARMOR included an article describing the new Russian T-90/T- 90S Hybrid Premium Tank (HPT). A series of competitive trials were held in June 1993 putting the new diesel-powered T-90/ T-90S up against the gas turbine-powered T-80U. The goal of this competition was apparently the selection of a single “unified tank” for the Russian Army. Since the publication of that article, the Russians have confirmed that the T-90/T-90S was the winner. According to Voyennyye Znaniya #9 1994, the T-90/T-90S “has been selected as the (new) main tank for the Russian Armed Forces.”5 This means that the decision to go with a single, diesel-powered tank for the Russian Army was made sometime prior to September

1994. Based upon the available information, the first combat use of the T-80BV in Chechnya occurred around 31 December 1994. It appears that when General Grachev made his pro-diesel announcement, supposedly based upon the tank’s performance against the Chechen rebels, the decision had actually been made before the outbreak of the fighting in Chechnya. The T-80BV is armed with the well-known 2A46A1 125mm smoothbore main gun, firing HVAPFSDS, HEAT-FS, and FRAG-HE conventional ammunition, and the KOBRA Antitank Guided Missile (ATGM). This main gun-launched ATGM, known as the AT- 8 SONGSTER by NATO, is radio frequency guided and has a maximum range of 4000 meters. The missile is fed to the main gun by a fully automatic loading system. First fielded with the T-64 Base Model PT in 1967, the “Korzina,” or basket autoloader, moves the tank’s ammunition from the 28-round storage carousel located below the turret floor. Diesel-powered T-80U parades in Red Square. T-80U in first public appearance on parade in Red Square. ARMOR — November-December 1995 19