Push-Pull Logistics

Push-Pull Logistics by Captain William Hedges The heavy task force crossed the LD/LC at O c i l hours on the movement to contact. By 1300 hours, the unit had attacked over 30 kilometers. The MIS' fuel tanks were down to 114 full; on-board ammunition was at 3-5 percent. The battalion would seize the objective within the hour, and a counterattack was expected by nightfall. Resupply was on the way. The prohlem was that the brigade support area (BSA) had not moved and was more than 50 kilometers away. It would take the supply trucks a good 2-1/2 hours to reach the logistics release point (LRP), and a total of 5- 1/2 hours until resupply was completed. The S2 said that the enemy counterattack would occur within three hours of consolidation. Is this an unlikely scenario? Probably not. At the National Training Center (NTC) this is an all-too-realistic situation, particularly during the livefire portion ol t he exercise. The simple fact is that the supply of Class 111 (fuel), and Class V (ammunition) immediately available to the This article outlines a technique, developed by the Third Battiilion, 66th Armored Regiment, 2nd Armored Division, that successfully suslained operations during its lY86 rotation. Background 3-66 Armor is a fully-modcrnized, J-series, M1 tank battalion. Prior to rotation, the unit had received and fully integrated the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck teams for the duration of the exercise. Prior to rotation, all the unit's leaders recognized that logistics would play a key role in task force Newly issued HEMMT trucks played a role in unit's "push-pull logistics." task force from the combat trains is not sufficient to resupply the unit. It is merely intended to be an emergency resupply available at critical moments. A wealth of information is available concerning the difliculties of sustaining the heavy task force in the attack, particularly at the National Training Center. This information does not appear to give any easy, workable solutions to the problem of timely resupply in such situations. (HEMTT) fleet into the support platoon. The support platoon (after task organization with an infantry battalion) had ten M998 fuel H EMTTs (2,500-gallon capacity each) and ten MY97 cargo HEMTTs (12-ton load each). The support platoon command and control vehicle was a Wton M151A2 with AN-VRC 47 radio set. 3-66 Armor would cross-attach with an intantry battalion for the rotation and would primarily consist of two tank and two mechanized operations even with the modern H E M n fleet. The two major obstacles to overcome in successful resupply operations would be: 0 Extendcd supply lines from the BSA to the Forward Line of Troops

(FLOT)

(in some cases 50 + km.). 0 The impact that continuous opcrations would have on resupply. Both of these factors would impact heavily on timely resupply of ARMOR - November-December 7987 13 the task force. To solve these problems, and to insure adequate and timely resupply, a concept called "push-pull" logistics was developed. Push-pull logistics is a relatively simple concept. The battalion S4 pushes supplies forward from the TF trains prior to receiving consolidation reports from the units. These same consolidation reports, when received, serve to pull additional supplies forward and to reconcile quantities of supplies already received. The main idea behind this concept is to resupply as much as possible, as quickly as possible, without having to wait for reports or requests from the units. 3-66 Armor's primary concern was with the time factor involved in logistics requests. That is, the time consumed (lost) as units formulated requests, as the Admin-Log Center (ALC) collated them, and the time involved as the support platoon leader or sergeant configured the request and brought it forward from the BSA. The push-pull logistics system designed by 3-66 Armor went a long way towards solving that problem. The standard Logistics Package (LOGPAC) system, as outlined in chapter 8 of FM 71-21, calls for the support platoon leader to build LOGPAC in the ficld trains, after the ALC has consolidated company/team requests. FM 71-2.l emphasizes that LOGPAC are for routine resupply, and that "special LOGPAC" would serve to meet other needs. A key point here is that, given the nature of h i d actions on the Airland Battlefield, the need for routine resupply diminishes as the task force participates in continuous operations. The supply systcm then shifts emphasis from routine operations to the sustainment of the task force and to the preparation for the next battle. A push package is normally located in both the combat and field trains. It is configured according to the specific mission that the hattalion is conducting. In general "...The major advantage of this system is that no time is lost downloading and reconfiguring the load to correspond to an exact request for ammunition ..." tcrms, the push package consists of a generic load of Class V, configured to a mech- or tank-heavy team or a scout/mortar platoon mix. In the case of 3-66 Armor, during the conduct of the attack, three cargo HEM'ITs were positioned in the combat trains for immediate resupply. One was configured for each of the elements outlined above. Specific loads are not discussed here, hut a typical push package for a tank-heavy team on one HEMTT might consist of roughly five pallets of 10-5-mm ammunition, two pallets of TOW ammunition, and the rest a small arms and 25- mm mix. The battalion S4, undcr the guidance of the battalion CO/XO, would dclivcr this push package to a forward LRP and lo the element with the most critical need. It is evident, under this system and with this mix, that the possibility exists that class V delivery to a company team may be short on one item and over on another. This problem would Ti itself with the delivery of the next push package and an ALC reconciliation. But remember, the central idea is that resupply must reach the teams as quickly as possible. The reconciliation between a company team's request for Class V and actual delivery in a push package is done at the ALC and transmitted to the support platoon leader/HHC commander. This is done primarily for accounting purposes, as, ideally, all HEMTT loads of Class V are configured exactly the same for all mechanized teams and armor teams. The major advantage of this system is that no time is lost downloading and reconfiguring the load to correspond to an exact request for ammunition. It requires that the unit and the support platoon leader ensure that only the quantity of ammunition requested is unloaded. This system also demands that the ALC, the unit, and the support platoon leader reconcile the request with the delivered amount. The push systcm also requires a change in thinking as to the location of the support platoon leader and his vehicles. Recognizing that the BSA may locate some 50 or more kilometers I 1 14 ARMOR - November-December 1987

"...Positioning the support platoon leader and his assets midway between the combat trains and the BSA makes resupply much more responsive to the units ....I' leader and his assets midwav he-evcnt that he must "run" the routine from the lront, 3-66 Armor moved the support platoon leader to a loa-tion hctween the combat trains and the BSA. Given that the 50 + km. distance may exist, the support plittoon leader and his available assets might locatc 15 to 30 kilometers from the FLOT, just outside artillery range. Immediately after the Class I11 and V in the combat trains is released or delivered to company teams. the ALC notifies the support platoon leader. The support platoon leader then begins his march from the intermediate location to the LRP. Being much closer to the FLOT than to the BSA proper, the liming of this resupply is much better. Stopping by the combat trains briefly, the support platoon leader drops off fully-loaded vehicles to replace the ones that recently moved forward, and then proceeds to the LRP himself. After resupply at the LRP is complcted, thc support platoon leader goes back to the BSA to reconligure the remainder of his loads to "generic" packages. This system, when tactically employed, will solve the major resupply problems associated with units in the attack. To position the support platoon tween the combat trains ani the BSA makes resupply much more responsive to units. The vast majority of Class V packages need to be standard load packages, even though the HEMTT allows for more rapid loading and unloading than the oldcr -5-ton series of trucks. The standard load (for mech-heavy, tank-heavy or scouVmortar) allows the support platoon to configure the loads rapidly and to reach that "midway" location to be responsive. IC the units allow the support platoon leader to remain in the BSA and to configure loads to suit actual requests, then resupply 14411 occur at the mercy of the location of the BSA, so to speak. If the BSA is out of position, then timely resupply may be out of position also. There are two additional areas of concern with the implementation of this system. Thc first is that the support platoon lcadcr and his vehicles represent a lucrative target. As a minimum, it will require some type of air dcfensc to protcct it. The second area is that this system requires that either a second command and control vehicle with radio bc allocated to the support platoon, or a HEMTT be outfitted with a radio set. This permits communication with the support platoon sergeant in the (Class I) LOGPAC. Consideration must be given to the Fact that once the support platoon leader departs for his "midway" location he is a "shot fired" and not easily recalled to the BSA. Commo with the support platoon sergeant fixes that problem. Units can easily train to this concept during normal field training exercises. It requires key leaders to do some additional planning and a realimtion by all that timely resupply is paramount to the success of continuous operations. Captain William Hedges is a 1982 graduate of the USMA currently assigned as the 3-66 Armor's battalion motor officer. He has also sewed as a tank platoon leader, battalion S1, tank company XO, and battalion S4. He is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic Course, the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, the Junior Officer Maintenance Course, the M3 Scout Commander's Qualification Course, the Airborne School, and Jungle Warfare Training Center. I ARMOR - November-December 198 7 15