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ARMOR · May-June 2011

National Training Center Best Practices

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Mackey and Major Ernest Tornabell IV
pp. 26–35Features2011

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National Training Center, Fort Irwin, has a website, www. us.army.mil/suite/page/594828, which is accessible through AKO and captures the best products from every unit. Spend a few minutes searching the website for unit-specific information that better suits your unit. Similar to most other situations, there exists no single right or wrong answer; however, regardless of the type of information put in place, every soldier, right down to the lowest ranking member of the unit, has to have a good grasp on shared situational awareness and understanding. The longer a unit waits to implement systems, the more difficulty it will have integrating change into its operations, which results in missed opportunities throughout the area of operations and, ultimately, the unit’s ineffectiveness. Major Clint E. Tracy is currently an exchange officer and battle group observer controller, Canadian Maneuver Training Center, Canadian Forces Base Wainwright, Wainwright, Alberta Canada. He received a B.S. from Texas A&M University at College Station. His military education includes Armor Officer Captain Career Course and Combined Arms Services Staff School. He has served in various leader and staff positions, to include “Bronco 3A,” brigade staff trainer, Bronco Team, Operations Group, National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA; “Cobra 3A,” reconnaissance squadron staff trainer, Cobra Team, Operations Group, NTC, Fort Irwin; commander, Alpha Troop, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, S1, S4, and S6 trainer, Cobra Team, NTC, Fort Irwin; commander, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX; and commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Baghdad, Iraq. also be a priority for each of these assets as they become available to the unit. Again, if the unit is not tracking events that trigger decisions, the ability to meet the commander’s intent is diminished, thereby decreasing mission success. Synchronizing operations. Operations synchronization is the final step of knowledge management, and if all previously discussed systems are in place and working, this is actually the easiest step. Synchronizing with the staff begins with the shift change brief, which outlines what happened over the past 8 to 12 hours. Many units require outgoing shift personnel to brief the incoming shift, but what methods are in place to verify all data/operational details have been handed off? The most effective method, the incoming shift briefs during shift change, is somewhat counterintuitive. However, this practice accomplishes two things: it ensures each shift reads current fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) and understands events that occurred over the past 8 to 12 hours; and that all documents for the time period have been handed over. If this is accomplished, the shift-change brief actually confirms each shift understands the current status of its area of operations. At a minimum, shift change briefs should be in the form of a checklist and include the following topics: Task organization changes. Changes to mission, FRAGOs, execution of branches/sequels. Current CCIR/answers to CCIR received during previous shift. Friendly situation one level higher. Subordinate unit current status (combat power, Class I, III, and IV, and ongoing operations).

Significant activities (local government, local military, local police, enemy and friendly) during last shift. Current enemy situation.

Activities scheduled during the next shift (timeline).

Unresolved actions (by warfighting functions).

Current communications status. Location of key leaders.

Timeline for next 24 hours. Command post work priorities. As an additional requirement for synchronization, the entire staff is expected to read current operational and intelligence summaries prior to coming on shift. This requirement not only fully develops the picture for the entire staff, but it aids in developing a clearer understanding of recent events and those in progress, which prevents unintentional lethal and nonlethal friendly fire situations throughout the area of operations.

Knowledge management is critical to warfighting functions; however, most units do not have effective plans or SOPs in place to handle the vast amounts of data that flow into tactical operations centers. This failure results in missed opportunities; in fact, 70 to 80 percent of the time, the brigade or battalion TOC is searching for critical information that someone in the formation has. Realistically and unfortunately, units fail to put in place the right systems, capable of rapidly and accurately pushing out critical data to the right people, which prohibits units from engaging high-value targets. This type of situation occurs within a 7- to 9-day full spectrum operations period during every “As with any mission, the S6 shop needs time to order, receive, and distribute cables, crypto, and other equipment to the right units to enable them to effectively send and receive data.” 42 May-June 2011

End of indexed article

Citation

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Mackey and Major Ernest Tornabell IV. “National Training Center Best Practices.” ARMOR, May-June 2011, pp. 26-35.

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