Innovative Approaches

many innovative approaches, which the unit describes as “scalable and exportable.” For example, during phase II, marksmanship is taught; at any point, an Iraqi instructor can use the teaching material from phase II to produce a marksmanship class. The first Lion Leader cycle consisted of four phases and 22 training days, which began on 1 December 2010 with 20 students. The 2-7 Cavalry developed a mobile training team from one infantry platoon to serve as primary instructors. The majority of the training materials use U.S. Army tactics. During actual class instruction, there are occasional “under the shelter ranger school” sessions on whiteboards; primarily, however, practical application methods are used. Although 2-7 Cavalry teaches U.S. Army doctrine, instructors are quick to point out that they are showing 2d IA leaders a method, not necessarily a precise method.

During phase III, patrol classes incorporate many qualities found in the U.S. Army Ranger School and other small unit leadership courses. The students begin patrolling exercises within a CSA around 0600 hours and extend into the evening hours of limited visibility. They conduct two combat patrols within the CSAs every 24 hours (one day and one night), which consist of simulated ambush and reconnaissance scenarios. Each student serves in at least one leadership position — patrol leader, platoon sergeant, or squad leader — during one day and one night patrol. For many of these IA enlisted soldiers, this training provides one of the few opportunities in their careers to execute a mission with little guidance or supervision. By the end of the week, the students overcome their initial mistakes and refine their abilities to lead and train. The course provides the added benefit of additional patrols, which creates a safer environment for the CSA residents.

During Phase IV, the Iraqis execute a simple, but effective, buddy team live-fire exercise. Essentially, the training event is a culminating exercise for tasks covered during the previous weeks. Each soldier in training receives 60 rounds and one partner, and moves through a simple range made up of a few Hesco barriers and wooden walls. The partners cover each other’s movements and engage targets that range from 50 to 200 meters. During the 4-week course, students are also required to maneuver through a challenging course, developing the foundation to instruct other members of their division. Clearly, this type of training was conducted in Iraq prior to the 2-7 Cavalry’s arrival; however, 2-7 Cavalry commendably developed an initiative that not only improves the junior leadership within the 2d IA, but further leads to enduring improvements if the Iraqis choose to continue the training model. Had the battalion limited training activities to CCPs and nearby division-level units, such as the 2d IA Division commando battalion (located adjacent to the battalion at an Iraqi base), the battalion could easily argue that they made the most of their available soldiers. Instead, 2-7 Cavalry asked how they could best improve formations with the 2d IA Division’s subordinate brigades and responded with a targeted program that facilitated the development of cadre within those brigades. Micro Training and Micro Partnerships The 4/1 AAB created three distinct STTs from its advisor augmentation, which worked to match ISF training needs with a brigade training capability.14 Task Force Sword partnered with the 2d and 3d IA Divisions, the Ninewa operations center, and combined coordination center; Task Force Shield partnered with the Ninewa directorate of police, the Rabiyah port of entry, and the Erbil Department of Border Enforcement; and Task Force Spear partnered with the 3d Federal Police Division. These STTs became critical components in coordinating training; they quickly 10 May-June 2011 “During Phase IV, the Iraqis execute a simple, but effective, buddy team live-fire exercise. Essentially, the training event is a culminating exercise for tasks covered during the previous weeks. Each soldier in training receives 60 rounds and one partner, and moves through a simple range made up of a few Hesco barriers and wooden walls. The partners cover each other’s movements and engage targets that range from 50 to 200 meters.” established trust with their ISF counterparts and developed a training plan. Often, the training consisted of small classes on a very specific subject, which was appropriately designated “micro training.” Another ATA approach, known as micro partnerships, pairs ISF and U.S. Army soldiers to conduct on-the-job training, but goes beyond classroom or simple exercises as a joint exercise with Iraqi and U.S. Army soldiers. For example, the 3d Federal Police Division and the U.S. Army’s 47th Explosive Ordnance Detachment combined training events on various methods of bomb disposal. To support micro training and micro partnership events, 4/1 AAB’s organic sustainment battalion, the 27th Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) established a logistics train and assist team. The focus of this four-person team is to predominately coordinate medical and maintenance training. In the first 100 days, the 27th BSB conducted 57 meetings with various ISF leaders and conducted 18 different training events.15 Task Force Spear faced significant challenges as it began aggressively pursuing ATA options. In October 2010, the 3d Federal Police Division’s leaders expressed reluctance to commit their Iraqi police for training. The division did not have sufficient numbers of available personnel and the operational requirements to secure western Mosul proved too daunting a task to shift any forces to collective training events.16 To overcome its reluctance, Task Force Spear coordinated brigade elements to conduct classes for small ISF groups and found that reduced class sizes allowed for a better training environment, customized training topics, and increased instructor-student interaction. The U.S. Army’s operations center transition team combined the micro training and micro partnership models when conducting military intelligence ATA activities with the operations center intelligence officer (G2) section. In December 2010, the operations center assumed control of an Iraqi reconnaissance platoon. The transition team and two instructors from Bravo Company, 141st Military Intelligence Battalion, conducted a 20-day basic intelligence course for the IA enlisted soldiers who were assigned to this new platoon. During the course, U.S. Army instructors identified students who displayed an intellectual capacity to analyze data and develop useful staff products. The U.S. advisors mentored the IA enlisted soldiers, which helped the soldiers feel included and accepted as valuable elements within the operations center G2 section. This new development represented a significant mindset shift for Iraqi officers who traditionally view their enlisted soldiers as incompetent and unimportant.17 In some parts of Iraq, the local police assume security responsibilities from the IA or federal police. This provision, transition of responsibility of internal security to police (TRISP), has not been completely achieved in Mosul.18 The Ninewa directorate of police controls only small swaths on the west side of the city (18 total neighborhoods). To assist the government of Iraq and ISF in achieving TRISP, Task Force Shield partnered with May-June 2011 11 “During the course, U.S. Army instructors identified students who displayed an intellectual capacity to analyze data and develop useful staff products. The U.S. advisors mentored the IA enlisted soldiers, which helped the soldiers be included and accepted as valuable elements within the operations center G2 section. This new development represented a significant mindset shift for Iraqi officers who traditionally view their enlisted soldiers as incompetent and unimportant.” the directorate of police and eight police district headquarters. Each district officer supervises between five and twelve local police stations.19 Task Force Shield has 22 civil police advisors assigned to mentor the Mosul IP on detention/human rights, community policing, law enforcement tactics, forensics, and investigative procedures; and five police advisors tasked to conduct ATA activity at the Mosul police services academy. Additional U.S. Army support comes from members of the brigade staff, a military police company, and a rule of law cell from the Ninewa provincial reconstruction team.

Historically, U.S. military police advisory methods involved discussions with a district headquarters commander, which were followed by structured U.S.-led classes on very basic law enforcement tasks. However, Task Force Shield elects to engage other key leaders at district offices in addition to meeting with district commanders. They meet with training officers, logistics officers, and executive officers at the district headquarters to identify weak areas and possible training opportunities. After determining the goals and objectives of the IP leaders and assessing the proficiency level of the police district, Task Force Shield develops and implements an individualized training program for each district. Other brigade IP ATA activities include 4-week crime scene investigation courses at COS Marez; information dissemination operation courses to develop wanted posters; intelligence advising/mentoring activity; and first aid courses. The days of focusing instruction on basic police tasks, such as handcuffing techniques or vehicle searches, are winding down at this point. Today, Task Force Shield places greater emphasis on more advanced law enforcement skills and, by doing so, seeks to improve knowledge and proficiency in IP intelligence officers, detectives, training officers, and critical incident managers. Mentoring Iraqi district headquarters training or logistics officers may not make for compelling newspaper stories, but these are the types of activities that will enable the IP to assume more responsibility from other ISF organizations. The 4/1 AAB conducts a tremendous amount of ATA activity; brigade leaders and STT advisors shape ATA efforts to best match their partnered units. Some forms of ATA activity include class and practical exercises, and other activities include more direct approaches such as on-the-job training. However, all ATA activity begins with U.S. advisors and leaders building relationships with ISF counterparts to identify critical training needs within ISF formations.

Complicating the training plan is the fact that the brigade departs in fall of 2011 and all U.S. forces must depart Iraq by the end of that year. The leaders of Long Knife Brigade realized they had a limited amount of time to impact ISF partners; therefore, they quickly analyzed their mission, searched for training opportunities that led to enduring improvements, and finally, cajoled ISF partners to shift IP and IA enlisted soldiers from active counterinsurgency activities to U.S.-led training events. The ATA initiatives and training ideas arose from junior leaders at CCPs to senior officers at brigade level. Although this article captures a great deal of those initiatives, other ATA activities occur each day. Considering the operational and time challenges, the Long Knife Brigade implemented an amazing number of ATA projects in its first 100 days. Many of these training initiatives and partnership activities will continue for the rest of the year, ultimately ensuring long-term stability and freedom for the Iraqi people.

Major Thomas Sills is currently a liaison officer, Center of Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS, and an intermediate level education instructor, U.S. Army Reserve. In his civilian occupation, he is a deputy sheriff. He received a B.A. and M.A. from University of North Carolina at Charlotte. His military education includes U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advance Courses. He has served in various leader and staff positions, to include commander, 130th Military History Detachment, Raleigh, NC; and fire support officer, 30th Heavy Brigade Combat Team, Clinton, NC. First Lieutenant James Langlois is currently assigned as a platoon leader and key leader engagement officer, Brigade Personal Security Detachment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Mosul, Iraq. He received a B.A. from Fordham University and a M.A. from American University in Cairo. His military education includes Officer Candidate School, Armor Officer Basic Course, and Army Reconnaissance Course. 12 May-June 2011 1United States Forces-Iraq, “USF-I Mission Statement/USF-I Commander’s Guidance (U),” more information available online at http://www.usf-iraq.com. 2Sergeant Benjamin Kibbey, “Advise and Assist Brigade: A familiar unit with a new mission in Iraq,” www.army.mil, The Official Homepage of the United States Army, available online at http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/08/25/44206-advise-and-assist-brigade-a-familiar-unit-with-a-new-mission-in-iraq, 25 August 2010. 3Unlike previous advisor teams in Iraq, STTs conduct predeployment training and participate in a mission rehearsal exercise at a U.S. Army combat training center with the brigade. The early integration of the STTs gives the advisors more time to understand the commander’s intent, form important relationships, and develop ideas to meet this intent. NCOs are not allocated positions; however, 4/1 AAB reassigned NCOs (from its own organization) to assist the STTs to be more effective. The transition team serving at the Ninewa operations center has assigned NCOs from U.S. Forces-Iraq. 4An accurate census has not been taken since 1997, which is a highly sensitive political subject in the country.

5Steven Lannen, “Mosul, the next major test for the military in Iraq,” McClatchy, available online at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/103/story/26032.html, 31 January 2008. 6Major Matthew Konz, “Primer (U), 10-02 Disputed Internal Boundaries,” discussion document during Operational Keith L. Ware, 4 December 2010, p. 1. 7Executive Summary (U), “Iraqi Army Training: A Historical Perspective (S),” Human Terrain System Cultural Report, November 2011, p. 8. 8Under normal circumstances, most IA units are spread throughout a large AO, with many units rotating through leave regularly. This hinders the commander’s ability to not only train, but exercise traditional command and control authority. 9Human Terrain Cultural Report, p. 8.

10Lieutenant Langlois’ notes are based on unclassified comments by ISF leadership. 11Notes based on a conversation on Joint Forces Security Training Center (JFSTC) between Major Tom Sills, 1SG Fernandez, and CPT John Nimmons at al-Kisik base, November 2010.

12The desire of the IA to imitate U.S. soldiers is an enduring quality that trainers at multiple training venues have observed.

13Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, “Unit Historical Summary (U),” October-December 2011.

14The Ninewa operations center transition team is a 13-person augmentation from U.S. Forces-Iraq, which is filled on a joint manning document. They were already in Iraq when the 4th Advise and Assist Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, arrived in Mosul. 15Memorandum for commander, 4th Advise and Assist Brigade, Operational Summary and Assessment, 27th Brigade Support Battalion, 21 January 2011. 16Headquarters, 4th Advise and Assist Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, “Task Force Spear Historical Summary (U),” October-December 2011, p.1. 17Oral Interview (U), Group Interview with Ninewa operations center intelligence trainers by Major Tom Sills, 1 February 2011. 18The strategy behind transition of responsibility of internal security to police (TRISP) envisions that as the IA transitions into its traditional military role, and as U.S. Forces re-posturing is complete, the IP will assume responsibility for securing Iraq’s major cities. The federal police is an organization that has a closer parallel to the Italian Carabinieri. Both are national police organizations that serve as a separate armed force (alongside the Army, Navy, and Air Force). The Iraqi federal police was never intended to be a permanent security force in Mosul.

19Headquarters, 4th Advise and Assist Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, “Task Force Shield Historical Summary (U),” October-December 2011. Notes