Planning, Preparing, and Executing Your Role as the Platoon Sergeant

Planning, Preparing, and Executing Your Role as the Platoon Sergeant by First Sergeant Dennis White, U.S. Army, Retired To be a successful noncommissioned officer and leader, it is your responsibility to mentor subordinates to an even greater success than your own. The awesome task of platoon sergeant is demanding and requires planning and preparation to successfully execute this challenging role. In today’s ever-evolving Army, the noncommissioned officer (NCO) is continuously reacting to changes and transforming soldiers to meet current mission essential requirements. Because of what seem to be endless days, NCOs are finding it more and more difficult to prepare for leadership positions. One of the first leadership positions an NCO will completely assume is the role of platoon sergeant. Adopting some practical tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) can make the difference between successful leadership positions and unsuccessful leadership positions. Below is a list of practical TTPs that have aided in the success of many NCOs. Planning During the planning process it is imperative to learn how to be a successful platoon sergeant and leader. Some of the most effective techniques are:

• Seeking out successful platoon sergeants and first sergeants and ask questions — keep notes.

• Imagining yourself as a successful pla toon sergeant — daydream a little.

• Designating someone to be your mentor and let that person know you are watching.

• Starting a reading list and include The Platoon Sergeant and The Mentor by Command Sergeant Major Bobby Owens; Warriors Words by Peter Tsouras; Small Unit Leadership by Colonel Mike Malone; The Three Meter Zone by Command Sergeant Major Dave Pendry; and all applicable field manuals, technical manuals, and Army regulations. Make Tentative Goals Setting and attaining goals are imperative to planning and preparing for any leadership position. Helpful goal-setting ideas include:

• An average physical training score of 260.

• Attaining 50 percent expert with weapons systems.

• Maintaining 95 percent readiness rate with assigned equipment (maintenance programs).

• Building strong team-oriented squads, crews, and platoons.

• Updating and validating platoon SOPs as necessary. 44 — May-June 2004

• Planning for educational opportunities for your soldiers (Army Knowledge Online is great!).

• Maintaining a high state of readiness.

• Having a system that prepares soldiers for local boards.

• Sending highly motivated and capable NCOs to be master fitness qualified.

• Having a good billet SOP and uniform standards.

• Remembering that all goals should be realistic and attainable. Platoon Neat and Fun Stuff Esprit de corps builds teams, raises morale, and fosters trust and loyalty between unit members. Some ideas for leader development may be:

• A platoon motto.

• If you have assigned vehicles, devise a marking system with pennants or small flags that helps you visualize how your platoon is arrayed or where it is located. This increases pride within your platoon.

• When a soldier leaves your platoon, ensure he receives more than just a piece of paper with the battalion commander’s signature. Whatever you choose, it should be an item the soldier will cherish for years to come — use your imagination. We used sabot petals with the soldier’s name, bumper number, and position painted on them. Good soldiers deserve recognition from their subordinates, peers, and leaders.

• Planning a quarterly hail and farewell with soldiers and families, possibly at your home, ensuring it is closely supervised.

• If a soldier beats your APFT score, lunch is on the platoon sergeant! This will motivate both of you. Prepare Your Mind, Body, and Soul This cannot be overemphasized. Soldiers depend on leaders for intellectual, physical, and emotional support. If you cannot deal with your own issues, you will be of little use to your soldiers. Here are a few tips:

• Know and learn current doctrine and TTPs.

• Build a sensible leader’s book with useful information (not fluff) and make it the platoon standard.

• Know your unit’s mission essential task lists (this is a great place to find individual training tasks that are often neglected).

• You must be very physically fit!

• If you happen to be a person of faith, seek guidance daily!

• If possible, visit a national memorial or battlefield (this is a humbling and sobering experience and will help you fully understand the awesome responsibly you have or will assume — if you’re taking this job only to “punch a ticket,” seek other employment!

• Talk with your family, prepare them for long hours, phone calls in the middle of the night, and the possibility of frequent deployments.

• Develop your own philosophy or rules to live by; use Army Values as a base. May-June 2004 — 45 Execution To undertake the duties and responsibilities of a platoon sergeant, you are expected to be at the top of your game. Anything less will certainly cause unnecessary turmoil within your platoon. To be an effective leader:

• Foster a “warrior spirit” within the platoon.

• Have a tactical mindset in all operations.

• Truly care about soldiers and their families (go to family readiness group meetings).

• Be a team player within the company (remember there are 3 more platoons on your flanks, stay in your lane).

• Grow accustomed to tireless activity (first one in, last to leave).

• Be a mentor; willingly share experience, knowledge, and wisdom.

• Ensure that maintenance is a priority — put that technical manual on the front slope!

• Know your soldiers — be observant, listen, and communicate.

• Be involved in all aspects of platoon operations (this does not mean micromanage).

• Form good professional working relationships with the commander, first “In today’s ever-evolving Army, the noncommissioned officer (NCO) is continuously reacting to changes and transforming soldiers to met current mission essential requirements. Because of what seem to be endless days, NCOs are finding it more and more difficult to prepare for leadership positions.”

some “ratcheting” or scaffolding that could enhance learning, but there is precious little time in the rotation do “gradual” anything. Potential solutions may be to lengthen CTC rotations, which increases costs and reduces the number of opportunities available to the total force, or proved mobile training teams for OPFOR to home station training events to increase the rigor of home station training. The CTCs fulfill the purpose for which they were designed — all services have seen a decrease in combat casualties after the implementation of world-class CTCs. We have not made training too difficult. The first and most important stage of learning is learning what we do not know. War is difficult and unpredictable, so too should be training. Training research literature (much of it sponsored by the Army) is replete with evidence to support that training transfer is directly related to the faithfulness of the training environment to the employment environment. That does not mean that “bells and whistles” make good training. As Major Salas points out in his own anecdotes, “creative commanders can conduct enlightening training opportunities in pretty austere conditions, if they do not sacrifice performance standards in the process.” There is nothing in Army training doctrine that prevents leaders from conducting crawl- and walk-level training events that are most beneficial to the skill levels of their units. However, learners should be challenged to the highest level they can be and still have the capability to absorb and practice new skills. To the extent that the three features identified by the ARI study are compromised, the overall transferability of the training event to the real world will be compromised. The best performers in every endeavor are those that are overtrained to the task to be performed. Teaching the test can be excellent training, if you have a robust enough test. Teaching the test is superbly efficient if the test is sufficiently robust to represent the full set of demands that will be faced by the learner in application. Teaching the test becomes hazardous if the test is only a sample of behaviors needed in combat, or cannot replicate the full range of conditions that will be found in employment. If a sample test must be used, or the environment is not known well enough to faithfully reproduce it at the CTC, then units need to be provided multiple attempts with the conditions changed each time to capture as much of the environment as possible. Units will learn how to handle the ambiguity in specific environments and create solutions to cope, but mistakes made in training are a legitimate part of the learning process. I encourage CTCs to remain the closest surrogate to the most demanding combat conditions we might face on contemporary battlefields. I think that the philosophy of the CTCs combined with mission rehearsal training has been validated over and over again. Our soldiers and units have taken on more complex and diverse missions than ever before in our history, and excelled. Admittedly, we always have more to learn, especially about how to make and keep the peace. Of course CTCs need to be continually reviewed and updated to ensure that their ver-LETTERS from Page 4 sion of war does represent the most challenging contemporary and emerging capabilities we might face. After repeated exposure to those standards, individuals and units will elevate their competency after each exposure, but they have to “know what they don’t know” first, and that should be faced on friendly, if demanding, turf. As Major Salas implies, “perhaps we need to focus more attention and effort on how to conduct quality home station training.” This is not going to be achieved by more regulations and job performance aids, but by an in-depth look at how to train units as cohesive effects-producing entities, and backward building that into our unit training programs and training institutions. We have to stop disaggregating units into branches and MOS specialties, and look at how the pieces contribute or retard overall unit performance, and train units to compensate when broken or disabled.

DR. STEVEN L. FUNK

COL, U.S. Army, Retired Kudos to Kojro Dear ARMOR, Kudos to Colonel Kojro’s letter in the January-February issue of ARMOR, “Army Transformation Done Right.” He is absolutely correct in his assertion that transformation is easily accomplished if we would just stop wasting time trying to reinvent the wheel. The armored cavalry regiment does indeed represent an almost perfect combined-arms organization and 46 — May-June 2004 sergeant, peer platoon sergeants, and other battalion leaders.

• Understand the commander’s intent, vision, and what he expects from his platoon sergeants.

• Build an excellent relationship with your platoon leader, remembering to coach, teach, and mentor to ensure the platoon leader’s success. “To undertake the duties and responsibilities of a platoon sergeant, you are expected to be at the top of your game. Anything less will certainly cause unnecessary turmoil within your platoon.”

• Examine goals quarterly, adjust, and refocus as needed with the platoon leader’s assistance.

• Delegate — this is critical.

• Counsel NCOs on a regular basis; ask to see their goals.

• Continue to grow and learn!

• Enjoy what you are doing! This article suggests a few ideas that have helped many platoon sergeants be successful. It is our task to prepare for combat, win decisively, and bring our troopers home. 1SG Dennis W. White, U.S. Army, Retired, currently resides in Texas. During his distinguished career, he served in various command and staff positions, including first sergeant, B Company, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX; observer controller, Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany; platoon sergeant, B Company, 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood; and platoon sergeant and tank commander, A Company, 3d Battalion, 68th Armor Regiment, 4th Infantry Division.

should be the basis of our future mounted warfare doctrine and organization. I would go further, however, and return the entire Army to the real regimental system we used before the Pentomic reorganization of the late 1950s. Make the regiment an administrative and operational entity. Not only would this rid us of the confusing and all but meaningless regimental affiliations that currently exist within the Army, it would greatly facilitate cohesion among units within the regiments and encourage a far more profound sense of unit loyalty and pride in our soldiers. This last consideration has significant implications now that the Army envisions fewer changes of station for individual soldiers. Let’s not be cynical. Unit pride does contribute to combat effectiveness and soldier retention. Erwin Rommel correctly asserted that greater battlefield dispersion requires greater cohesion, not less. Yet, everything I see involving transformation seems to be leading us away from this fundamental truth, from potential “plug and play” tables of organization to the current infamous Army recruiting slogan, “An Army of One.” I don’t care what some civilian consulting firm says about attracting recruits. The Marine Corps has no problem filling its quotas, yet you don’t see them resorting to Madison Avenue double-speak to attract enlistees. So much of our success is based on mindset. That mindset must reflect an urgency and intensity that our soldiers will experience on the battlefield, not the “kinder, gentler” sensitivities we see increasingly undermining institutions and organizations in the civilian world. If we are really serious about Army transformation, removing the debilitating effects of cynicism and political correctness needs to be the first step.

THOMAS A. REBUCK

1LT, U.S. Army Pennsylvania Army National Guard Tankers Deserve Better Dear ARMOR, I am a new member of the Armor Association and still consider myself a tanker. After reading the January-February issue of ARMOR, I was dumbfounded to learn that Armor units are dismounting their tankers and turning them into infantry and military police. Is there a shortage of military police and other personnel better suited to the mission in Iraq? Where were the tanks parked while crews dismounted and performed house-to-house searches? Did they send back the tanks early so they could perform as “dismounted combat tankers?” For armored crewmen, the tank is their strength, identity, and home. I don’t know how this new generation of tankers feel, but if I was going to be dismounted and walk all over hell’s creation, I would have joined the infantry. During my service to my country in the Army, I performed some duties not usually associated with armor crewmen. Once while a driver in a tank company, my beloved tank was deadlined and stripped for parts. My crew and I were issued two HMMWVs and simulated Soviet antiarmor guns on trailers. This hurt deeply, but I performed my duties to the best of my abilities. Secondly, while serving in a tank company during Operation Desert Shield/Storm, my tank towed a disabled M88 back to the boneyard. The M88 broke down while towing damaged and disabled tanks. Now, that’s something you don’t see everyday. I understand the Army is moving forward and maybe this is necessary due to personnel shortages, but it seems tankers deserve much better treatment. I also believe that tankers should be recognized for excellence. We have the Excellence in Armor program, but if a tank crew shoots a perfect score of 1,000 points, there is no badge (CIB) to show that excellence. Finally, I would like to give thanks and respect to the tankers, cavalry scouts, and M88 crews who serve their country proudly.

JOSE A. BARRIO

U.S. Army, Retired Creating a Combat Action Badge Could Put an End to “Badge Wars” Dear ARMOR, I am a late arrival in the Combat Armor Badge discussion. I have silently watched the dialogue in ARMOR and other publications since the issue first surfaced. I feel that I must now throw my views on the Combat Armor Badge into the mix. Bottom line up front — we do not need a Combat Armor Badge. I know that cavalrymen and tankers the world over are now cursing my name! Not so fast brothers! Read on. First, let me assure you that I fully recognize the disparity in recognition between an 11-series combat veteran and a 19-series veteran. I saw it firsthand after my return from Desert Storm. I have often asked the rhetorical question: What was the difference between an 11- series soldier filling an 88M slot in an infantry battalion support platoon and a 19-series soldier performing the same duties in an armor battalion during Desert Storm? Both performed the duties in combat conditions, yet the 11-series soldier received the Combat Infantryman’s Badge (CIB) and the 19-series soldier received nothing. What is the difference between the combat vehicle crew (commander, gunner, and driver) of an M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, an M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle, and an M1A1C Abrams main battle tank? The crewmembers of all three maneuvered their combat systems to a position of advantage and engaged the enemy with devastating results. The crews of all three combat vehicles endured similar hardships and faced comparable dangers. The only difference that I can ascertain is that the M2 crew received recognition for their contributions to the direct firefight in the form of the CIB. I don’t want to beat a dead horse here, but I can think of no better illustration of this disparity than that of Specialist (SPC) Vineyard. Long story short, SPC Vineyard is a cavalry scout assigned to E Troop, 238th Cavalry, 76th eSB, Indiana Army National Guard. Shortly after he and his unit returned from a 6-month stabilization forces (SFOR) rotation in Bosnia, SPC Vineyard volunteered to join a sister unit in the 76th eSB that was mobilizing, but not at full strength. SPC Vineyard was assigned to D Company, 1st Battalion, 293d Infantry, as a driver in a tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile platoon. While I do not know the particulars of D Company’s exploits during Operation Iraqi Freedom, I do know that the company’s soldiers, to include the soldiers on SPC Vineyard’s truck, were awarded the CIB. Despite the fact that SPC Vineyard shared the same hardships and danger of his fellow soldiers, he did not receive the CIB because of his military occupational series (MOS). There is one point that I do not believe has surfaced. The 3d Infantry Division is in the process of transformation. Soon, all of their maneuver battalions will be combined arms battalions with a mix of either two armor companies and one infantry company or two infantry companies and one armor company. A similar combined arms battalion is the centerpiece of the future unit of action. It is time for a change in the way that we do business. Will future CIB award ceremonies in the 3d Infantry Division involve two-thirds of the unit being awarded the CIB, while the other one-third stand in formation and observe? I agree with those who have written that soldiers in direct-fire contact with an enemy, deserve recognition beyond wearing a combat patch on their right shoulder. However, I do not believe that for our 19-series soldiers it should come in the form of a Combat Armor Badge. Don’t get me wrong, I think the designs are great and I am sure that they would be a mark of pride and distinction for our soldiers. In fact, after looking at the designs, particularly the 1986 design, I almost did not write this letter in the hopes that the badge would get approved. But, I believe that it is not in the best interest of our Army to have such a badge. Fellow troopers, I submit to you that our Army would be better served by recognizing our soldiers who have faced an enemy in direct-fire combat with a Combat Action Badge. We are an Army in transformation. A few years ago, we donned the black beret as a symbol of that transformation. It is time for the disparity of the Combat Infantry Badge to end. It is time for the perceived badge wars to end. It is now time to take our transformation one step further. It is time for the Combat Action Badge. What is the Combat Action Badge? Simply put, it is a badge of distinction that recognizes hardships endured by and dangers faced by soldiers who have encountered an enemy in a direct-fire battle. I don’t know the criteria for the Combat Action Badge — there are plenty of smart people who can figure out the particulars. As I envision the criteria, the badge should be awarded to any soldier, regardless of MOS, who has maneuvered in a direct firefight against an armed enemy. How will this new symbol of excellence look? Again, I am not sure. But I ask you, what better existing symbol is there than the present Combat Infantry Badge that could be adopted as the new Combat Action Badge? Your thoughts? MATTHEW R. De PIRRO MAJ, U.S. Army May-June 2004 — 47 (RSTA) squadron recce platoon use the reconnaissance vehicle variant of the Stryker and the long-range advanced scout surveillance system. The RSTA uses a four-vehicle recce platoon and each Stryker is manned by six 19Ds (two crewmembers and four dismounted scouts) with a 97B human intelligence (HUMINT) source specialist attached to the squad. The IBRP uses a four-vehicle setup with the platoon divided into two sections of two vehicles each. One section is heavy with two recon teams (one per Stryker), and the other section is light with one recon team and the headquarters element. The infantry scouts are aligned in three five-man recon teams; a command element that includes the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and medic; and a sniper squad currently experimenting with all-terrain vehicles for increased mobility and stealth. The sniper squad is assigned a squad leader and two threeman sniper teams. The difference in manning reflects the opposing views and experience brought to the SBCT by the two separate branches. The light infantry force (airborne, air assault, and light infantry) supplements its scouts with snipers to enhance the platoon’s effectiveness, simplify training, and increase its ability to shape the battlefield. The IBRP continues this habitual association of scouts and snipers, as is reflected in new doctrine. The IBRP manual is well thought out, doctrinally sound, and written in clear, simple, concise language without any vague doctrinal buzzwords. The manual currently used by the recce platoon and all other 19D scout platoons, FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, is loaded with buzzwords and is simply too jam-packed with tactics for three different types of scout platoons using various vehicles in one all-encompassing book.4 The Fort Benning manuals, dealing with the three different units responsible for performing reconnaissance, LRS, IBRP, and light infantry scout platoon, are tailored to each element. While these manuals, FM 7-92, Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad, FM 7-93, LRS Unit Operations, and FM 3- 21.94, SBCT IBRP, do have overlapping material, nothing is omitted by trying to make one be-all and end-all manual.5 19Ds and 11Bs perform the same tasks in a variety of units. While the majority of 11Bs perform traditional infantryman tasks, more and more are working as the commander’s eyes and ears. The opposite can be said of 19Ds, as evidenced by the 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment during its drive north out of Kuwait and on to Baghdad, and the 2d ACR’s battle of 73 Easting during Desert Storm. While these units fulfilled a traditional cavalry role, the individual cavalry scout engaged and destroyed targets from Bradleys just as did their 11B, and at that time, 11M counterparts. Those troopers became decisively engaged closing with and destroying the enemy, completing a traditional infantry task. “Cavalry is a state of mind!” I’ve heard that on more than one occasion. I have always believed that cavalry filled the maneuver forces need for reconnaissance and security on the battlefield, which took a specific soldier trained, ready, and able to accomplish that task. If cavalry oper- “The infantry leader has realized that scout and sniper roles and training are so closely related that not only are they organized together in the same platoon in the light infantry force, but many mechanized infantry battalions are attaching their 11B snipers to 19D-manned scout platoons. 11Bs in LRS and light infantry scout platoons attend Pathfinder School, Ranger School, and Sniper and Long-Range Surveillance Leaders Course, or a combination of these courses, to be trained for their current duty positions.” 48 — May-June 2004 Reconnaissance Professional from Page 25 ations are just a doctrinal approach to the employment of force on the battlefield, rather than a function of specially trained and led soldiers performing unique tasks on the battlefield, then tankers and infantrymen can do these jobs as an ad hoc combined arms team at the company or battalion level to replace cavalry soldiers, or at the very least, assign tankers and infantrymen to troop and squadron positions. Tankers are already in cavalry units as well as armor units. Since 19Ks crew the M1 Abrams in both organizations, why is the BFV crewed by two separate MOSs to do one job? Isn’t it a waste of manpower and resources to have two different soldiers, trained at two different locations by two separate branches, fill two different MOSs and perform the same tasks? Is being cavalry really a leadership function of employment of troops and equipment rather than a trooper’s display of skills that define how reconnaissance and security are performed? Reconnaissance is performed mount ed and dismounted. While mounted, it is conducted in vehicles that are armored and unarmored. The tasks are not fundamentally different; it is the way and the mindset in which they are performed that are different. The infantry branch has recognized this, and has adjusted and instituted changes in doctrine, training, and tactics, techniques, and procedures to successfully give scouts the edge they need on future battlefields. The Armor community still has a narrow view of how to conduct reconnaissance. Armor leaders have placed their faith in electronic means to conduct reconnaissance. Sensors and optics enhance the scout on the ground capabilities; it does not supersede them. By perpetuating this view of mounted, armored reconnaissance, the scout is limited and hampered, handicapped by short sightedness and exposed on tomorrow’s battlefield. The Army, and the armor branch specifically, need to reassess the necessity to keep an MOS like 19D in the armor community. Is it beneficial for the soldier and the Army to keep it as is or combine it with 11B? If it is not, consolidating the MOS needs to be fully supported by the Armor Center with better training, manning, doctrine, specifically defined tasks, and dedicated platforms with a mission statement that demands all reconnaissance from corps to battalion, across the full spectrum of the force, light, medium, and heavy, current and future, be dedicated to the 19D. With scouts, both cavalry and infantry, using the Stryker reconnaissance vehicle, shooting the same TOW and Bradley tables, and approaching the same coordination point, while leading a dismounted patrol conducting reconnaissance and security for the force, I see something at the beginning of the 21st century that happened early in the 20th century, proud members of the cavalry put out to pasture — this time instead of four-legged mounts, it is the 19D cavalry scout. Notes 1U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 17-12-8, Light Cavalry Gunnery, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C., 16 February 1999. 2FM 17-98, Scout Platoon, U.S. GPO, Washington, D.C., 10 April 1999, superseded by FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, 2 December 2002. 3FM 23-1, Bradley Gunnery, U.S. GPO, Washington, D.C., 18 March 1996, superseded by FM 3-22.1, Bradley Gunery, 28 November 2003. 4FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon U.S. GPO, Washington, D.C., 2 December 2002. 5FM 7-92, Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad, U.S. GPO, Washington, D.C., 23 December 1992, Change 1, 13 December 2001; FM 7-93, Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations, U.S. GPO, Washington, D.C., 3 October 1995; and FM 3-21.94, Stryker Brigade Combat Team’s Infantry Battalion Recon Platoon, U.S. GPO, Washington, D.C., 18 April 2003. SSG Brendan F. Kearns is a 19D cavalry scout assigned to the divisional tactical command post, 4th Infantry Division. He has served in the New York Army National Guard and in armor and aviation units. He was awarded the Draper Leadership Award for his performance during 19D Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course. “Reconnaissance is performed mount ed and dismounted. While mounted, it is conducted in vehicles that are armored and unarmored. The tasks are not fundamentally different; it is the way and the mindset in which they are performed that are different. The infantry branch has recognized this, and has adjusted and instituted changes in doctrine, training, and tactics, techniques, and procedures to successfully give scouts the edge they need on future battlefields. The Armor community still has a narrow view of how to conduct reconnaissance.” May-June 2004 — 49