TOGs: Suggested Solutions

TDGs: Suggested Solutions mander must coordinate with the team commanders he is likely to reinforce, in order to determine the best routes into their defensive sector, with minimum masking of fires. If time permits, the unit should conduct a full-scale task force rehearsal on the ground in order to familiarize every soldier in the task force with the reserve’s likely movement. Conclusions Under the best of conditions, the reserve has the most challenging mission in the task force. In restricted terrain, the mission is further complicated by limited routes, numerous passages of lines sometimes while under direct and indirect fire, and the risk of fratricide. The reserve commander must conduct rapid parallel planning and a thorough IPB (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield). He cannot wait for the task force order to prepare his team. The reserve commander must coordinate with all the commanders in the task force for passage of lines. Leaders in the reserve element must be familiar with the mission of every unit in the task force, all routes in the task force area of operations, and must maintain constant situational awareness. Like most missions, the keys to the reserve’s success are prior planning, detailed rehearsals, and flexibility. As the great Russian General Suvorov once said, “The reserve commander must be capable of conducting a quick visual estimate, attacking with swiftness, and crushing the enemy with the onslaught of his forces.” Notes 1FM 71-1, The Company Team, p. 3-13. 2Ibid., p. 3-13. 3FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, p. 2-15. Captain John Faria is a 1989 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. He has served as a tank platoon leader and tank company XO in 3d Battalion (Airborne), 73d Armor, 82d Airborne Division, to include during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He served as S3 Air and B Company Commander, 2-72 Armor, 2d ID, and currently commands HHC, 2-72 Armor.

activities into a cohesive operation. The key to doing so is to have a firm understanding of the objective. It is often said that “Some cannot see the forest for the trees.” Those who value process over principle have this difficulty. This article could not have been written had not a group of dedicated historians established The Army Military History Institute, appropriately co-located with the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks. Nor could I have done so without its dedicated, cooperative, and helpful staff. The history of battles provide helpful tactical lessons, but so do collections of doctrinal literature, not the least of which is to guide doctrinal development and assist in establishing materiel acquisition priorities. It can save precious resources and time by avoiding “reinventing the wheel.” ARMOR — May-June 1997 43 Forest or Trees... Continued from Page 21 MG Edward Bautz, a 1941 graduate of Rutgers University, began a brilliant career serving in the 4th AD during WWII, including Normandy and the relief of Bastogne, advancing from platoon leader to battalion commander. He later commanded the 25th ID in Vietnam and on a later tour was MACV secretary to the general staff. In addition to combat, his long service also includes assignments in combat development, Army training, and personnel management. He served with the constabulary forces that policed postwar Germany, where he later returned as DCG, VII Corps. A graduate of C&GSC and the Army War College, he has also served on the DA staff, and was an early leader of the then-new Combat Developments Command. He also served as vice director for operations of the Joint Staff, JCS. force the south bridge and forcing him north along Rt 166, I will facilitate the task force’s ability to meet this unexpected threat. Hopefully, my mech platoon will be able to quickly (yet safely) find out some information on the scouts and, as the situation develops, we will be able to act more aggressively in ensuring the scout platoon’s safe withdrawal.

SCENARIO 2

FRAG: “Guidons, this is black six. We have 3 T-72s and 6 BMPs to our north vicinity East Bridge. Also, there is a battalion (-) size element north of the river vicinity Hill 88. I want to stop the battalion (-) north of the West Bridge, so it can be destroyed by the task force. Red, establish a SBF — overwatch from Hill 77 and cover our move to Hill 90. Orient on the enemy company (-) moving down Rt 87. Do not let the T-72s and BMPs interfere with our movement. Blue and White follow me to Hill 90. Once we are set, Red move and tie into our southern flank. Blue, orient TRP 1 which is Hill 88, White orient TRP 2 which is the West Bridge, and Red orient TRP 3 which is Hill 87. FIST move with Red and give me immediate suppression on the enemy vehicles moving down RT

87. XO move with RED and coordinate with higher, we are going to need some serious help up here, OUT.” Rationale. While the most immediate threat to my company is the enemy force vicinity the East Bridge, the biggest threat to our task force (TF) is the enemy battalion (-) which I am assuming is trying to find the safest route south across the river. I see Hill 90 as the decisive terrain and will race to occupy it before the enemy battalion (-) can cross the river. From Hill 90 I should be in a solid position to fix the battalion (-) to allow the TF to maneuver to either destroy or bypass. Having my two tank platoons “follow me” is the quickest way to do this in this situation. When Red suppresses the enemy company in the east, this should make the West Bridge an even more likely AA for the battalion (-). Although I am accepting some risk in the east, indirect fires as well as a few tank platoon volleys should be sufficient to force that enemy company to go to ground. I will then focus entirely on the battalion (-) trying to cross the river. My XO has the most important job since coordination with the other companies and higher is crucial to our success.