Find the Enemy

Find The Enemy by Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Kirby As a senior task force observer/controller, I am often asked, “What is the one thing you would change during a rotation?” My answer is simple. Find the enemy. The Battlefield Operating Systems cannot be brought to bear effectively until the OPFOR is found, and once found, stays found. Reconnaissance is the fmt essential step successful units take. This article will chronicle some salient observations, gathered from a variety of rotations, employing a variety of reconnaissance assets. These observations apply to tank and mechanized infantry task forces, cav-alry squadrons, and light infantry battalions. While not attempting to yre-scribe a recipe for successful reconnaissance operations, I will propose some techniques that work. The involvement of the scout platoon leader in the reconnaissance and surveillance plan is critical. Too often, scout platoons are sent on missions without knowledge of the task force scheme of maneuver or commander’s intent. They receive a radio FRAGO to conduct a screen or perform a zone recon, are given some phase lines, a limit of advance, and maybe a few Named Areas of Interest (NAI) for orientation. They launch off without the benefits of TF Intelligence &paration of the Battlefield products or fire support plans. They report on the Operations and Intelligence radio net to a TOC consumed with preparing an operations order and are relegated to talking to an RTO with limited understanding of their mission, requirements, or importance of the operation. That’s a description of the typical scenario in which the TF is unlikely to receive timely, accurate, and meaningful reports from their R&S effort. Successful reconnaissance operations _call for face-to-face coordination with the scout platoon leader. Albeit hastily arranged, this meeting between the chief prosecutor of the R&S plan and its developers (TF Commander, S3, S2, Engineer, and Fire Support Officer) need not produce the final R&S plan or TF scheme of maneuver. However, by including the scout platoon leader in the initial wargaming sessions, he is party to, and versed in, the TF plan. It also affords the commander the opportunity to persona!ly communicate his intent for the operation. The time spent in establishing his initial R&S posture is more than made up for in knowledgeable scouts able to do those things the commander needs them to do to provide the critical points of information upon which he will make his tactical decisions.

This initial communication between commander and scout platoon leader establishes a relationship for the operation. The commander must talk di-riodically before contact with the enemy and habitually upon contact. A successful reconnaissance effort can fail to achieve its purpose if the information gained does not make it to the commander. Circuitous reporting does not work; direct reporting does. The commander must talk to his scouts. The most effective net is TF command. A disciplined command net will allow the key players in the organization to monitor the products of the R&S effort as they evolve. A commander unable to talk to his scouts should be nervous.

So, a successful R&S effort entails knowledgeable scouts in communication with their commander. Now, let’s dig a little deeper into what they’ve been told to do. The key feature of the R&S plan will be the network of NAIs designed to answer the commander’s Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR). The assignment of NAIs to the executors (scouts, GSR, COLTS, or line units) must flow directly from the PIR and commander’s intent. Generic PIR, measle-sheeted placement of NAIs, and failure to task and prioritize NAI coverage are the most common shortfalls I see in the rectly to his scouts p-20 ARMOR - May-June 1993 process. Ideally, the S2 should write the spot reports that will confm or deny the enemy activities he envisions at a specific NAI. The commander should prioritize NAI coverage with back-ups, and back-up to back-ups assigned. The TOC should periodically audit the status of coverage to ensure compliance with the priorities and assignments. Successful R&S efforts incorporate all of these features. They provide a disciplined, discernible framework to collect and report information critical to the execution of the TF plan. They are resourced, checked, and rechecked.

Another aspect of the R&S plan that characterizes intelligence gathering operations is depth. Doctrinally, depth can be described in terms of time, space, and resources. Time is a relatively straightforwad imperative: the mner you know what the enemy is up to, the better. Moreover, the longer you are able to maintain the ability to monitor him, the better. Successful R&S efforts are established as won as possible, commensurate with the trade-offs discussed earlier concerning dissemination of the plan and intent to the executors. They are also characterized by an insatiable appetite for information throughout the course of the battle, from pre-contact, contact, and the fight, to consolidation and reorganization afterwards. Too often, a breakdown occurs after gaining initial contact. The old cavalry tenet, “gain and maintain contact,” applies to every combat unit. Once the enemy’s found, keep him found, or pay the price in a greatly constrained decision cycle to find him all over again. The R&S effort must be planned and executed from the Line of Departure to the Limit of Advance or No Penetration Line. The space for worthy R&S plans then is the unit’s entire area of operation. Likewise, the resources available consist of everyone in the task force. All parties, from scouts to the Unit Maintenance Collection Point, and everyone in between, are potential R&S executors. Again, NAIs assigned must be clearly understood, audited by the responsible headquarters, and prioritized. Such proliferation of R&S executors allows the commander to redirect his intelligence assets once resolution of the enemy course of action is obtained. There, then, are three key elements of successful attempts to find the enemy. oThe R&S plan is the commander’s plan. He must communicate it to the executors, particularly to the scout platoon leader. Thereafter, he must stay personally involved in it’s prosecution. .The R&S plan must be inextricably linked to the scheme of maneuver. This synchronization is the first and most critical step in synchronizing the TF fight. .The R&S plan must address the entire depth of unit operations in terms of time, space, and resources. This is not an exhaustive list, nor does it do justice to the myriad of other aspects essential to a successful intelligence gathering effort. The IPB process, scout platoon survivability ARMOR - May-June 1993 and reconstitution, fire support integration, and TF-level command and control are just a few topics that deserve articles on their own merits in terms of their importance to the intelligence gathering effort. However, the activities described form the core of my observations for the rotational year just ended.

Find the enemy and our warfighting doctrine can be applied to defeat him. If not found, the initiative we seek to seize or retain is up for grabs. We all understand the importance of this imperative. We must, therefore, put forth the effort its accomplishment requires. Lieutenant Colonel Michael

A. Kirby is a 1974 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. He attended the Armor Officer and Basic Courses and the Armed Forces Staff College, and earned an MBA from the Harvard Business School. He served in the Office, Chief of Staff, Army and armor units in Korea and Germany. He recently commanded 3-77 Armor in Germany and Southwest Asia.

He is currently a senior task force observerkontroller at CMTC, Hohenfels, Germany. 21