Command Responsibility for PM-HOW?

' Command Responsibility for PM-HOW? by MAJOR GENERAL JOHN H. COLLIER W HEN General Heinz Guderian first suggested to the German General Staff that mechanized equipment be employed in a combat role he was sharply re-buked. It was then the common belief of the German General Staff that motorized elements were only of value in a service support role, hauling beans, flour and forage to combat troops. But that was 1924. Twenty-nine years, including a first rate war and a not-to-be-sneezed-at police action, have taught us that without the combat use of mechanized equipment, military operations today have no hope for success. You and I know that combat is not done entirely by machines, important as they are, even though our so-called advanced thinkers of the comic books continue to speak of push button warfare. Should that technological dream ever come true, I can assure you that a horde of technicians will be kept very busy doing preventive maintenance to keep the push button working. But to return to the mundane present, we all recognize that our vast array of military machinery is of little value unless it is kept operating effectively-and that requires PM-plenty of preventive maintenance that must be stressed at every echelon of command. Last year it was my pleasure to sponsor a class such as yours here at MAJOR GENERAL J. H. COLLIER, the Commanding General of The Armored Center and Commandant of The Armored School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, has been intimately connected with Armor since 1941. This article is based on his recent address at The Ordnance School, Aber· deen Proving Ground, Maryland. 26 Aberdeen. My remarks at that time were directed to what I consider to be the key to effective preventive maintenance-command responsibility. Today I am more firmly convinced than ever that good preventive maintenance can only be had when every commander, from Corporal through General recognizes that he has the prime responsibility for preventive maintenance within his command. The very fact that each of you has left your busy everyday tasks to concentrate for a few days on the importance of PM convinces me that you sincerely believe preventive maintenance is your responsibility. Therefore, I have decided to expand on my remarks of a year ago and attempt to answer a question that I frequently hear, "How can I discharge my responsibility for preventive maintenance?" My answer to that question will be a framework only. That framework will be filled in by the course you are now beginning. As Commandant of the Armored School, I would set a very poor example here at the Ordnance School if I did not follow the well-known pedagogical precept that you will see so well demonstrated in your course here, that is, for a speaker to tell what he is going to say, say what he has to say, and then tell what he has said. And I might add that I shall also attempt to be guided by that famed ecclesiastical advice to a young clergyman-that few so_uls are saved after the first twenty minutes. I intend to stress seven simple actions that commanders can take to insure effective PM. They are: l. Use the chain of command.

2. Require effective status reports that show the results of com· pleted staff action-not fire alarm reports that require time con· suming investigation before command action can be taken.

3. Don't let subordinate commanders pass the buck to technicians.

4. Insist that training and PM go hand-in-hand.

5. Encourage initiative and enthusiasm for PM by every echelon.

6. Require that all command and staff visits practice the principle of instructor-inspector sen·- ice of which you will hear so much.

7. Finally, take effective, timely command action to include such things as providing or requesting technical help if required, condemnation for the incompetent, or, of course, praiseworthy recognition where deserved. Now let us consider these points. First, the chain of command is the only effective means to build and hold together good preventive maintenance. Far too frequently I have observed junior officers and NCO's who appear utterly ignorant of what is meant by the chain of command. Some of this ignorance has come about because of concepts that were allowed to develop during World War II when experienced leaders found themselves with green troops and green junior leaders. The easy way out of the dilemma at that time seemed to be over-centralized con· trol from the top. Battalion and regi· mental commanders found themsell'es directing minor administrative details that should have been taken care of by company commanders. Perhaps ARMOR-May-June, 1953 remember company commanders o never learned to supervise a ply room or operate a mess bese they knew the Colonel would it. That attitude of passing the ck up permeated all levels of mmand until now we find Cor-rals and Sergeants who look on ir stripes solely as a mark of in-asecl pay and privilege. Few know m as a badge of increased rcsponsi-ty. By our every action, you and must eradicate these ill founded ncepts and restore the inspired eling of responsibility in our non-ms and junior officers. See that ey recognize that the prestige of dership goes only to those who ow that responsibility is the first ality of leadership. That deep sense of responsibility, upled with initiative, form the lines the chain of command. The neces- y for assuming and carrying out sponsibilities goes all the way up cl all the way down the chain of mmand. A company commander ho by-passes his platoon leader by aling directly with squad or secon leaders, or crew or tank com-anders, violates not only the princi- e of the chain of command, but he >es an injustice to the platoon lead- . If this is done because the pia-on leader is incompetent, let's re-ve him. Only by the full use of e chain of command can any mili-ry activity be assured of success. his principle is not confined to the ilitary, it is used in all successful tdcrtakings involving groups of ople, civilian or military. It is just great an obligation that one's sub-linates be required to know and :ume their responsibilities and ·ry them out as it is to know, as-ne and carry out one's own re-msibilities. \r1y second point-require mean- ;ful equipment status reports that licate clearly the need for and ent of corrective action. Reports ning to you that half the radios out; that meals can't be prepared ause the stoves don't work; or t men are falling out of a march 1mn with sore feet clue to poorly ng or worn out shoes, tell you ~ one thing-that a crisis has de- >ped. To take. action, you as a tmander must find out what went ng, and why; how the trouble be corrected; who is taking ef- ~OR-May-June, J953 ' @':. ,. •.•. ~:::.~;? ~1·-1 .~ U.S. Army The Commander uses a P A system to instruct trainees in crew PM at Fort Knox. fective action, and when it will be completed. Getting the answers to these questions is a difficult and time-consuming job that increases in complexity as you rise to higher command and staff levels. Until these simple questions can be answered your hands are tied and you as a commander or staff officer cannot take effective action. Make it SOP that deadline and critical status reports give all the facts required for corrective action. Speaking of reports, it might be well at this time to set straight a widely held misconception. Maintenance and supply reports should not be mere paper work or red tape. Such reports should be based on the need to transmit facts to the person who must know them. Facts can be transmitted orally in many cases. When written reports arc required, they must be devised to show necessary essentials with a minimum of administrative effort. Paradoxical as it may seem, I must here warn you to beware of PM-the initials this time meaning pencil maintenance. That is the enemy of real preventive maintenance. Preventive maintenance is hard work with equipment, tools and supplies. It is not fancy paper work embellished with meaningless red tape. Commanders and staff officers who require substantiated reports of maintenance and supply difficulties will stop some of the so-called snow jobs that are frequently thrown at senior visitors. As you know, many officers and men seem to be obsessed with an overwhelming desire to tell something to staff visitors, even though their comments are based on vague rumor. Perhaps I can best illustrate my point by recalling an incident that occurred only two or three years ago when I was with the U. S. Constabulary in Germany. During a large scale maneuver a senior General officer came upon some tanks out of action along a road. As the story later was reconstructed, it appears that one of the noncoms with the tanks reported that the failure of fan belts had put the tanks out of action. That's ·when the Sergeant should have shut up. But no, he volunteered the information that fan belts were critically short throughout the theater and many units had deadlined tanks as a result. This one unconfirmed report led to frantic action at all levels of command. Commanders and staff officers were rushed, ill prepared, to conferences without knowing the subject for discussion. Priority telegraphic requests demanded blitz reports of deadlined tanks and stockage of the required fan belts. Special red ball requisitioning procedures were prescribed. Arrangements were made to air lift fan belts. When the hassle had been under way for nearly two weeks it was learned that nearly 3,000 fan belts were on hand in a nearby depot and most units had some on hand, although the outfit with the deadlined tanks had neglected to determine their requirements or requisition the fan belts. What can we learn from this little story? That unconfirmed fire alarm reports result in untold expense in time and money to dig clown to the real facts. Previously I stated that my talk would be only a framework upon 27 which commanders could build effectively the body of their responsibility for PM. At this time I would like to illustrate my point by going into a little detail on the s~1bject of deadline reports. That subject has received far too much of the broad brush treatment already and it needs some careful examination. As I have already mentioned, the mere paper work will accomplish nothing. It should be used as an administrative tool to get the maximum equipment in operation. To do that requires .that each echelon process the report promptly and hand-carry it to the next higher commander. Normally, the completed report, showing that all possible action has been completed at company and battalion level, should reach the supporting technical service within two workdays. T here it can be processed and action taken to remove every possible item from deadline and the following day presented to the commander for his information. Thus, equipped with facts, he can apply pressure where it is needed. My third point- Don't allow specialists and technicians to become whipping boys for commm;ders delinquent in maintenance. I cannot stress this too strongly. It is closely related to my earlier remarks about the chain of command. Squad, platoon and company commanders are the foundation of maintenance. Their attitude and actions can result in success or failure. It is the job of senior commanders to develop the proper attitude within their commands by pinning down maintenance responsibility to commanders-not technicians. A squad leader is fully responsible for the condition of his vehicles, weapons and radios. This responsibility cannot be cast off on A1morers, Motor or Communication Sergeants. You will hear of subordinates who attempt to dodge this responsibility with the plea that the maintenance of equipment is beyond their technical knowledge. Squash that bunk when you hear it. Organizational maintenance manuals clearly describe the work to be done. Commanders must be taught that they, and they alone, must insure that lubricants are applied properly and tires correctly inflated. It is not essential that they be able to pump tires or use a grease gun. But it is essential that they know that their subordinates have performed their tasks properly. My fourth point- PM is military training and goes hand-in-hand with other military training. The goal of all training is success in battle, so demand that they go hand-in-hand. In every phase of a training program that requires the use of equipment, insist that maintenance of that equipment-and sufficient time to do it -are musts. Far too frequently many of us think of maintenance as being concerned primarily with major items of ordnance equipment. This is only natural as a large percentage of our defense dollars are invested in such equipment. However, we should all f<QIIIIliCIITINV!IUf~ IS YW! ~flliT't .,,., "iff11 tNt,Jn.,_ hiffi!JWI ."foil ..,, ~ c#~t<W Glvr rf ~R J,t$llu:..;fooa"" - "l !~ .·::.,.. fo!fl/(!IFi'P /B!.. ·~ t::'-•""" ~ .... "'~h -·· S'"'F'!VtC e ;'}-i..l.u- . I.- j FO~~ .~:;p, ,,r.i;!lt! =-~ ~ ~- ~..... ~~iin~· frS.I -'f 0".:~u•" \Sf ~ .... .,... S'"'RVt C£ 4 ... "-- t _ ,._.,, $-i._ U.S. Army Displays serve to emphasize basic points in a command wide training program. 28 emphasize that the principles of maintenance apply with equal force to all types of military supplies and equipment, and, I might add, that PM must apply to items obtained from every source and entrusted to the care of a command. For instance, in an administrative activity or training program, where only individual items of clothing are used, it is the duty of squad and platoon leaders to see that such items are properly cared for. Shoes must be cleaned and polished, wool clothing air dried and brushed, cotton and webbing washed and dried. Perhaps you are thinking, "Doesn't he know that soldiers buy and pay for such items with their monetary clothing allowance? Why should we concern ourselves with PM on such items of insignincant values?" My answer is-regardless of who owns them-all are products of our nation's resources and her industrial economy. We, as a nation, cannot afford to again waste such critical resources or the industrial capacity needed to produce them. It is no secret that ilie raw materials for these three cited examples: leather, wool and cotton, have been on the list of critical items required in the event of mobilization. Finally, they are not of insignincant value. Only one pair of ·wasted shoes per soldier in an Army of a million and a half, equals Sl0,800,000 at $7.20 per pair. Eren insignincant web belts at 45¢ each amount to $675,000, if every man allows one to rot from sweat and dampness. These amazing sums loom large when considered in the light of your withholding tax and mine. Preventive maintenance training in the care of all Government equipment is the nrst step in real supply economy. All training programs must include PM. Training of specialists and technicians in maintenance must convey the idea of getting the most from the least by repair and reclama· tion . My flfth point-encourage your subordinates to sell PM at the squad and platoon level and try to instill the spirit of pride in equipment, once so prevalent in our Army. One ef. fective means employed by the Third Armored Division at the Armored Center is the sponsorship of inter· unit competition, wherein the tank crews demonstrating the least demand ARMOR-May-June, 1953 for higher echelon repairs and parts are recognized by the award of a distinctive pennant to be flown from the antenna mast. Real leadership can again develop the old competitive spirit of bucking for orderly. Perhaps the very best way to develop initiative and enthusiasm for PM is for the commander to set the example. H is evident personal interest soon becomes contagious. I would like to give you an example of this point from my own experience. I cited this same example last year. I had the good fortune to command a tank battalion and later a tank regiment in the Second Armored Division when General W illis D. Crittenberger was in command. H e understood this principle and made full use of it. T he division had published very adequate directives to implement a sound PM program, but it was evident that the units were not attaining the prescribed standards. T here was a lot of the other type of PM going on. I refer to pencil maintenance. H is solution was to schedule frequent personal visits t~ the motor parks during the PM periods. Gentlemen, I commanded a tank battalion when these visits started and I can assure you that my interest in the PM program increased enormously and quickly. Not surprisingly, my company commanders also became very much interested quickly. T he chain of command started to function. To me, this was the example par excellence of putting on the heat. Life may not have been very pleasant in the motor pool during his visits, but it certainly was not dull. It might be well at this time to digress and consider some factors of good fortune in the care of our great quantities of mechanized equipment. That is, comparative good fortune. If you've got troubles, think of the other fellow. For instance, uncle Joe's boys aren't having the easiest sailing in maintenance these days. In a recent edition, Time magazine quotes a satellite premier as blaming a production shortage on an "anti-machine attitude" on the part of the workers. Radio Sofia concluded that "a barbaric attitude towards machines was too prevalent." An Iron Curtain Communist journal reports that the maintenance of machinery was so poor that pieces of farm equipment ARMOR-May- June, 1953 ' U.S. Army Essential teamwork is shown by crew as they perform P M during a lull in Korea. were found '1eft in such condition that wheat began to grow in them." Ponder these consoling thoughts the next time you note the ex-ribbon clerk struggling with the intricacies of a wrench or grease gun. All American soldiers are most certainly not born mechanics, but our people have a native knowledge far above that of any other people in the world. Thank God for it, and, by ingenuity and leadership, develop it. My sixth point-T he instructor-inspector service concept should not be confined to technical service personnel. All command and staff visits and inspections should have as their goal the training of personnel in what standards are desired and how they can be attained. Most Americans are anxious, yes, even eager, to do what is required, if they only know and understand what is expected. Insure that they do. There are ways to handle the occasional Bolshevik who bows his neck. My seventh point-If your job, now or later, is that of a commander or on the staff of a commander, always remember that PM is a command responsibility. We all realize the need for capable specialists. Yet qualified Armorers, Supply and Motor Sergeants, Mechanics and other essential technicians are not always to be found in every unit. They must be trained within the unit. I I ere, the technical services can give you much help when you are stuck. I have found that requests for such assistance are freely granted wherever and whenever possible. When maintenance problems arise that require outside assistance, ask for it. If technical channel requests fail to bear fruit promptly, go through command channels. Your commander expects to be kept informed and wants to give help when it is needed. On those unpleasant occasions when subordinate commanders fail to appreciate and fully exercise their responsibility for PM, do the unpleasant things necessary. You will be surprised at the far reaching salutary effect attained by the condemnation or relief of an incompetent commander. Such actions are taken in confidence, but the news seems to spread where it is needed. Contrariwise, see that praiseworthy accomplishment is noted-and be as public as you want with well deserved commendations. As we consider these seven points, let us ask-Why preventive maintenance? vVars are fought with men - mobility- firepower. To win, all three must be in prime fighting shape. Our training is devoted to that end. Preventive maintenance puts more mobility and firepower on the fighting line where it is needed, instead of on the deadline. Preventive maintenance is applied supply economy and practical cost consciousness in these days when every pound of metal in our resources and the output of every industrial facility must be made truly effective. Preventive maintenance is a command responsibility. It is your responsibility. 29

Reiteration With the change in editorship, it is only proper that a statement of policy be reaffirmed regarding The United States Armor Association. This policy, in general is a reiteration of those policies as laid down by this Association, the oldest of the Ground Arms Associations, during its colorful sixty-eight years of existence. However, one must remember the old Army maxim that repetition serves to emphasize and drive home those points considered to be of the greatest importance. In consonance with these thoughts, let us restate the objective as set forth in the constitution and by-laws of the United States Armor Association: The aims and purposes of this Association are to disseminate knowledge of the military art and sciences, with special attention to mobility in ground warfare; to promote the professional improvement of its members; and to preserve and foster the spirit, the traditions and the solidarity of Armor in the Army of the United States. New Book Savings Effective when this is read is a new Book Department discount schedule which means increased savings to users of our book service. The scale on all standard discount publisher items ordered through the Association will be as follows: 5% on orders from $1.00 to $5.00. 10o/0 on orders from $5.01 to $10.00. 15% on orders from $10.01 up. 30 To determine the amount to be paid when ordering books, you should take the total prices of the books as advertised and then subtract the allowed discount. In company with this, will be a continuation of the prepaid postage provision on shipment of books when payment accompanies your order. The feature of special house ads which bring you the widest intelligence of worthwhile books in the service journal field will continue. This new program is inspired by several rea- .... There shall be no capital stock, and no distribution of profits to any officer, member or other person, but the entire income of the Association from all sources shall be applied and used in the conduct of its activities and in furtherance of its object as set forth above. This Association has perennially advocated cooperation and teamwork, and has contributed substantially to the Army team. As industry made this great country of ours more machine-minded, Armor went through the transitional stages concurrently, from animal to machine, from horse to horsepower. Armor thus evolved as an integrated arm and, as such, appropriately represents mobility and mobile warfare. Mobile warfare and its concepts are American in character. America leads the field in technological processes. To capitalize on these characteristics may spell the difference between defeat and success. To scorn them is sheer folly. sons. First of all, there is the increased volume of Book Department business. This allows greater publisher orders at higher discount. Secondly, a substantial and sustained increase in Association membership and magazine subscription has made possible a limited stocking of worthwhile books, which means larger publisher orders and, once again, greater discounts. And thirdly, this is in line with the function of the Book Department- a subsidiary activity of the Association which is designed as a service to you rather than as a profit medium solely. In connection with the above, once again it is emphasized that, although only professional material is treated through the pages of ARMOR, the Book Department can suppy you with any book in the English language that is in print and available. Use of the Book D epartment works both ways. You help yourself and the Association when you order. ARMOR-May-June, 1953

... Disseminating military knowledge of all arms to our professional soldiers is our aim. To emphasize mobility in ground warfare is our purpose. In so doing we promote the professional improvement in our members. For example, from typical pages within this issue, one may note among others, articles of historical significance; an article on self-propelled antiaircraft artillery; an article on discipline and morale; an article on preventive maintenance; and a feature book review of an appropriate book by a well known book reviewer. Within these pages, when recommendations for changes are made they are offered constructively for the good of our Country, our Army, our Branch. This Association is a non-profit making organization, and all monies received are invested within the covers of each issue of the magazine. Thus, any monetary profit is shared with the reader. One need only review the magazine over the past several years to note its growth in quality and quantity. In view of the fact that all material is submitted voluntarily, and published on a gratis basis, To the Great Beyond When the last issue of ARMOR was put to sleep-in printing jargon this denotes when the editor turns his final proofs over to the printer -we were not aware of the passing away of one of our former editors. Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Forney Steele died at his home in Fargo, South Dakota on 25 February 1953 at the age of nearly 92. Colonel Steele graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1883. His first service was in the Dakota Territory where as a junior officer at Fort Lincoln and Fort Reno he engaged in numerous skirmishes with the Indians. Following this service, he participated in the battle of San Juan Hill during the Spanish-American War, for which action he was awarded the Silver Star. Colonel Steele served as editor of ARMOR, at that time under the name of The Cavalry Journal, during 1904-1905. He served an extended tour of duty as instructor of tactics at the Command and Gen-ARMOR-May-June, 1953 editorials this further enhances the prestige of the magazine and is a tribute to those who willingly give their time in the furtherance of the military art and science of war. In promoting professional interest in our branch and in mobile warfare, we maintain that only the branch Association can accomplish this. Branch Associations, dating back to the conception of The U. S. Cavalry Association in 1885, have served as a repository for all ranks to present their views and share their findings. However, an Army-wide military organization to operate in the general area above existing organizations with membership open to all military personnel, irrespective of branch, rank, or existing organization, is advocated by this Association. This type organization would serve to supplement existing organizations in a further contribution to inner unification of the Army and as a medium for transmitting the Army view to the sister services working for the defense of our great natiqn. eral Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Later, his Leavenworth lectures were compiled into a a two-volume classiC entitled "American Campaigns." These volumes have been used as textbooks at many military institutions the world over, and are still a best seller here at ARMOR. It is rare to find a professional military library that does not contain a set of Steele's "American Campaigns." His last tour of duty was as Military Attache at Moscow. Retiring in 1912, he was recalled to active duty during World War I to serve as Professor of Military Science and Tactics at North Dakota State College. After his retirement, Colonel Steele was a prominent citizen in the civic affairs of Fargo and was held in great esteem by the townspeople. Colonel Steele's contributions to the mifitary art and sciences will never be forgotten. 31

\ ' / Dust and rocks fly as the driver of an M4A3 negotiates a difficult curve. A slight incline on foot becomes a major obstacle for the new tank driver. Sinking in to its fenders, the tank engines prove ability to push forward. 32

TANK ORI

The lst Armored Division at For world, including Korea and the basic principles of a tanker's taught that their presence in the does not soon recover-his lines of his front line will crumple. However, student tankers at are in a position to speed across the most of the many obstacles they will mud, bad roads, no roads and road There are three phases of tank approximately 100 yards long, to various operations controls. The straight-away driving, teaches the to "cowboy" a 48-tOJ, tank around a throw a track in the process. As Tankers are taught to gauge cums their tank. Divided into four sections, the bouncing. It consists of a barrel piles. The backing stalls, dug out of into position with as little jockeying sort is of great tactical value when a avoid enemy fire. The uneven his tank over bumps and ditche,. tank to rock and lurch. The last course where the driver learns Directing all classes from an has a complete view of all tanks assigned to each tank to lend aid and ARMOR-May-June, 1953

TRAINING

tankers for duty in all parts of the power and shock action-these are maximum shock action, tankers are eates havoc from which the enemy rupted, it is only a short time before )bstacles are many before the tanks 1bstacle course prepares tankers for mance of their duties-water, hills, base consists of straight, flat lanes, with normal tank driving and the mile tank trail which, in addition to te hills and curves. It is easy enough :lauds of dust. It is equally easy to ~ is a right way and a wrong way. 1 a manner which will not disable course is the tanker's baptism of >, an uneven log obstacle and log ractice in moving a tank quickly . Reverse movement drill of this r scoot rapidly for camouflage or o test the tanker's ability to guide ly at distances of 10 feet, cause the the fourth section of the obstacle 1igh barriers. ooking the course, the instructor :ontact. An assistant instructor is rivers. ARMOR-May-June, 1953 ' Teamwork is essential in parking as the commander gives instructions. Log obstacles teach the driver greater maneuverability over high barriers. 33