Win the Battle – Lead to Peace

Win the Battle — Lead to Peace by Colonel Bruno Duhesme, French Army “Our armed forces must continue to update and expand their educational programs. This means broadening the curricula of formal schools to reflect the complexity of the modern operating environment and increasing opportuni ties — and rewards — for leaders to serve in assign ments outside the traditional military structure.” — Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli Though it remains a confrontation of will, which still breeds suffering and violence, war has fundamentally changed, as well as its place in today’s world. Military confrontation, which once led to immediate political success, is no longer sufficient to achieve today’s strategic objectives. Moreover, destroying the adversary sometimes proves to be an inappropriate response to a situation of conflict. The battle is no longer the sign of final victory or definitive failure for the protago-nists. From now on, battle is only the first step of the overall process of conflicts. The last step is normalization and in between is stabilization, which is the decisive phase because it sets the conditions for the return of peace. War has also changed with the introduction of new belligerents, whose behavior is miles apart from traditional military logic, and who live and operate among the population, which is a major and decisive player. In this changing environment, military action must adapt. Lethality is no longer the supreme capacity for the military, which is no longer the only player in achieving the strategic objective. Armed forces are required to coordinate with a large number of players who share the responsibility for success or failure. Initial intervention, with the use of powerful and lethal assets, is required to prepare the stabilization phase — the core of the global engagement and the decisive phase of the engagement, which takes place essentially on the ground. The French Army Doctrine Command has launched a reflection on these evolutions and has issued a capstone document to that purpose.1 This article presents and summarizes the pamphlet and attempts to underscore the main challenges western ground forces are likely to face in the contemporary operational environment (COE). The New Face of War: New World; New Conflicts Setting conditions for strategic success. For a long time, war was used to solve conflicts among powers promoting their own interests and will for conquest. But in the modern age, war entered an international legal framework, which no longer recognizes the use of force as a way to solve conflicts and differences between states. In this new framework, our armed forces operate within systems characterized by chaos and violations of international laws or threats on peace to restore order, which supposes, in most cases, to reestablish a stable social and political system. Therefore, while the accomplishment of the strategic objective relied yesterday on the outcome of an armed confrontation, military success on today’s battlefield contributes solely to establish the minimum conditions for the achievement of political goals. Stabilization: the decisive stage of today’s three-phase conflict. Following the decisionmaking and planning processes, today’s military commitments in armed conflicts roughly consist of three phases: intervention, stabilization, and normalization. All three phases include periods of coercion, violence control, and high-or low-intensity operations. The intervention phase is essential and must lead to tactical success, which will enable the achievement of the strategic objective through a smooth transition with the next phase. This raises two concerns. First, a modern force has to have all the capacities to deter, defeat, and even destroy an enemy who has decided to oppose the force deployment. In other words, lethality remains a “must-have” capacity. Second, the need for a smooth and steady transition between phase 1 (intervention) and phase 2 (stabilization) has important planning consequences. For example, while preparing the intervention, planners have to endeavor to limit destruction of infrastructure to the strict necessities, keeping in mind that the force will have to reconstruct in the next phase. The stabilization phase is the decisive phase in which military forces operate in close coordination with their entire environment to restore stability through global control of the area. This phase aims at establishing conditions for achieving the strategic objective. Even if this phase relies on civilian skills, military presence remains essential to support the organization and individuals involved in the reconstruction process. Depending on the security level, armed forces lead or support the entire interagency operation. In this phase, armed forces have to conduct full-spectrum operations, which range from combat and security operations to crowd control or humanitarian actions. Planning considerations are crucial for this phase as well. To enable the transition between phase 1 and phase 2, all potential players have to be involved in the planning process. A successful transition generally augurs well for the future. The stabilization phase precedes the normalization phase, which is typically the return to peace, with a durable political, legal, and social system, that all protag-onists accept. Due to cultural differences, the “norm” is likely to differ with the “norm” to which intervening nations are accustomed. In this respect, cultural aware ness is an important issue, not only for the military, but for all agencies involved. From Symmetric War to Asymmetric Conflicts The David vs. Goliath concept of conflict is nothing new; however, it is more likely to occur today due to the huge operational supremacy of western armies which have to adapt to “small wars,” as Clausewitz described them. Symmetric/dissymmetric conflicts are those that oppose institutional armed forces with similar objectives, means, and courses of action (COAs). The distinction between symmetric and dissymmetric conflict reflects the difference of power among the warring parties. Symmetric conflicts oppose comparable adversaries and dissymmetric reflects the military superiority of one of the belligerents. Dissymmetry often leads the weaker belligerent to shift to asymmetry to maintain his chances of success against the stronger opponent. In an asymmetric conflict, one of the belligerents will deliberately avoid direct confrontation and/or the domain in which his adversary has an obvious superiority and will emphasize and take advantage of the disparity of means and COAs. In these conflicts, the weak will attempt to transform the technological and operational superiority of his opponent into powerlessness or vulnerability, thus highlighting his assets that are materially, psychologically, and culturally superior to his opponent’s. The huge military superiority of western countries should normally result in more asymmetric conflicts, which are nothing new to military history. Dissymmetry and asymmetry are the most predictable forms of war for the next decades. But in some cases, such as insurgency, terrorism, guerrilla, or population manipulation, certain capabilities that suit the conventional art of war (symmetric/ dissymmetric conflicts) are somewhat inadequate to asymmetric warfare. The New Enemy Yesterday, our armed forces fought an enemy of regular forces belonging to nation states. Today, new adversaries are emerging and are using an asymmetric approach. These new enemies include:  Predacious systems mostly linked to organized crime and dedicated to the search for profits. These systems essentially concern police and justice.  Claiming systems aimed at achieving political objectives by using armed force against the state they oppose to gain political influence through the conquest of territories or populations.  Subversive systems that are revolutionary in nature and use unbridled violence to serve their global political objective, which generally relies on the foundation, without any compromise, of a new society. The New Environment Even if it is necessary to win the tactical battle, defeating the enemy is not sufficient to achieve the strategic objective. In modern theaters, all actions are mixed and tangled in what U.S. Marine General Charles Krulak refers to as the “three-block war,” in which soldiers simultaneously conduct combat operations, humanitarian aid, and reconstruction efforts. The three-block war is conducted in cities and is the preferred battlefield for enemy forces who intend to inflict significant damage on western armies, whose main effort will be placed in cities while attempting to control the rest of the battlespace. On this new battlefield, the population is both an actor and a major stakeholder in the conflict. All military efforts are dedicated to populations who aspire to order, security, and respect. To prove its efficiency and credibility, the force must satisfy these needs simultaneously. Although security remains the top priority, the population is also seeking respect. Since the use of force is essentially exerted among human societies, controlling the ground is essential in stabilization; it enables the transition from military to political control. This control must be permanent and sustained, because it takes a long time to consolidate. It also requires a large number of ground forces that are appropriately trained, deployed, and re-March-April 2008 — 23 lieved, which supposes a huge capacity to endure and sustain. A New Role for Soldiers Today, western soldiers belong to societies in which the demand for security is increasing. The new operational framework is largely influenced by law, which is omnipresent and rules over the conduct of operations. In addition, our fellow citizens are very eager for immediate information; electronic media provide information 24/7. Today’s soldier must know how to deal with the press and understand that the journalist’s mission does not necessarily promote military actions, but relates perceived facts. Anyway, like it or not, press is part of the terrain in which soldiers operate. Given the multiplicity and variety of players involved in stabilization and normalization business, soldiers at every echelon must display their ability to communicate. While geographic proximity with the population has become a must for stabilization operations, the soldier, ironically, must maintain a certain distance to remain vigilant and impartial. Compassion and understanding are two notions that somewhat differ. Although stability operations use less lethal power than conventional combat operations, soldiers still need to be morally and mentally tough to maintain control and good judgment. The “no-shoot” option is sometimes much more difficult to implement than the indiscriminate use of fire. As a consequence, force protection is one of the major requirements generated by the new operational environment. New Challenges Adapt or die, but keep your conventional warfare intact. Western armies were organized, equipped, and trained to confront Warsaw Pact forces, not insurgents, rioters, or angry citizens. Adaptation was imperative, but when one enters the world of stability and counterinsurgency, one realizes this is much more than a couple of minor adjustments. The new environ ment needs new doctrine and new training strategies. Leaders have to be grown differently; organizations must be adjusted and innovative equipment developed to meet today’s operational requirements. In short, one has to create a new system, which has to be well balanced so it can manage the intervention and stabilization phases. In other words, modern soldiers do not have to get rid of their conventional combat skills; they just have to add other competencies and knowhow to their military knowledge. Training Training units and individuals for both high- and low-intensity conflict is a major challenge; however, training soldiers on counterinsurgency and stability operations is time-consuming and may consequently degrade conventional skills. Therefore, it is essential to maintain branch core competencies even when current requirements are essentially stability and counterinsurgency operations. Prior to the stabilization phase is the intervention phase, which ends with tactical success; this success relies on conventional warfare skills. Equipment and Organization In this domain, the challenge is, once again, to equip soldiers with the appropriate weapons, vehicles, and other materials in accordance with planning. This means that western armies still need heavy armor to accomplish the intervention phase and a sufficient dismount capability, appropriately equipped, to control the ground system during the stabilization phase. There is also a need for sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, and nonlethal munitions during the stability phase; however, modernizing tanks, artillery and aviation assets, and infantry vehicles is of paramount importance, as well as maintaining supremacy in a conventional warfare area. On the other hand, stability operations need boots on the ground, and technology cannot replace human intelligence in such complex environments. A tragic mistake would be trading human strength for technology. To face the contemporary environment, a modern army needs both technology and strength. “...a modern force has to have all the capacities to deter, defeat, and even destroy an enemy who has decided to oppose the force deployment. In other words, lethality remains a ‘must-have’ capacity.” 24 — March-April 2008

“The stabilization phase is the decisive phase in which military forces operate in close coordination with their entire environment to restore stability through global control of the area. This phase aims at establishing conditions for achieving the strategic objective. Even if this phase relies on civilian skills, military presence remains essential to support the organization and individuals involved in the reconstruction process.” The Cultural Confrontation In asymmetric conflicts, western soldiers must deal with a cultural gap; we have watches, our enemies have time. Therefore, while we are counting long term with months or even years, their unit of measurement for time is eternity. In the same sense, western countries attach a high value to human life, while other cultures do not. Casualties are painful for westerners, but can fuel an insurgency — enemy casualties are glorified and used as an incentive for recruiting. National Support As previously mentioned in this article, the host-nation’s population is a possible center of gravity. Fine! What about ours? The French armed forces received no support from its fellow citizens during the Indochina War and lost national support during the Algerian War. As a consequence, despite some tactical and operational successes, both conflicts ended with a strategic defeat for France. From my perspective, this is probably the most challenging aspect of stability operations. I am not talk ing about supporting troops, but supporting the operation. Stability operations are protracted wars that need time, patience, and dedication. They are sometimes frustrating because results are slow, making it easy for the enemy to exploit our impatience and our fellow citizens’ frustration. In this respect, the enemy is much more aware of our culture than we are of theirs. Maintaining national support is not easy during these protracted conflicts — this issue must be addressed by an effective and sustained communications campaign. Conclusion Obviously, this type of conflict is very challenging. For the French army, the time to rethink doctrine, organization, equipment, and training to meet the requirements of the new operational environment has arrived. But this approach has to be appropriately balanced between high intensity and low intensity. The tragic mistake would be sweeping away the conventional capacity to the exclusive benefit of “small wars” capabilities. One must keep in mind an important thing: prior to the stability phase, there is a tactical battle to win. As for me, educating and training tactical leaders constitutes the main effort in the adaptation process. In this respect, I strongly recommend Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli’s article, “Learning from our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing a Dangerous Future.”2I am convinced this principle could apply to the French armed forces. Notes 1The French Land Forces Doctrine, FT-01 Winning the Battle, Building Peace, Land Forces in Present and Future Conflicts, Ministère de la Défense, 2007. 2Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Stephen

M. Smith, “Learning from our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing a Dangerous Future,” Military Review, September-October 2007. March-April 2008 — 25 Colonel Bruno Duhesme is the French Army liaison officer for the U.S. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, Fort Knox, KY. His education includes the Military Academy of Saint Cyr, Armor and Cavalry School Basic Officer Training Course, Armor Captain Career Course, French Army Command and Staff College, and Joint Staff and Defense College. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commanding officer, 1st Regiment de Spahis, 6th Light Armored Brigade, Valence, France; military advisor to the Royal College for Military Advanced Studies, Keni-tra, Morocco; S3, 1st Regiment de Spahis, 6th Light Armored Brigade, Valence; commander, 4th Troop (Antitank), 7th Regiment de Chasseurs, Arras, France; and tank platoon leader, 3d Company, 2d Regiment de Dragons, Laon, France. During his career, he has deployed in support of French, UN, and NATO operations, to include UNPROFOR Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; KFOR, Kosovo; and Operation Epervier, Chad, Africa.