Do We Really Own the Night?

Do We Really lllration by SPC Jcdy H m n Own The Night? by Josef Schroeder From the swamps of Vietnam to the sands of Iraq, the Army has learned the importance of seeing effectively at night.

We developed and fielded the frrst generation of starlight scopes and image intensifier (I*) systems in Southeast Asia. These systems added a new dimension to land warfare, allowing us to fight the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces on our own terms. Operation DESERT STORM reaffmed the importance of conducting ground campaigns on a 24-hour basis.

Army Chief of Staff GEN Gordon

R. Sullivan recently voiced his concern with our night vision capabilities in a pointed question: “Do we really own the night?”

To discover the answer, the Armor School examined an armor battalion/ task force through a warfighting lens (the battalion commander’s combat perspective). The study focused on the task force structure in terms of tanks, scouts, and support elements. The Threat The first step in the study was a comparison of our capabilities and vulnerabilities and those of a variety of threats, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) “SovietlRussian” and regional.

That comparison showed that the countries employing the doctrine of the former Soviet Union turn night into day through extensive use of flares and reliance on infrared sights and devices. However, the CIS is beginning.to install thermal equipment on tanks, attack helicopters, and some reconnaissance elements. In addition, the CIS seem to have reduced the thermal and radar signatures on its tanks (T-72s and T-80s) by making simple changes such as adding rubber skirts around the hull and turret. By insulating and reducing the hot spots on a tank, opposing gunners have fewer visual cues for target identification.

Most regional threats primarily use CIS equipment, with U.S. night vision goggles (NVGs) and some U.S. thermal-equipped weapon systems. In DESERT STORM for example, Iraq had Dutch-manufactured NVGs.

Friendly nations such as the Egyptians, through the M60A3 buy, now have its thermal technology. It is becoming obvious that not only is the CIS selling its best equipment, but the ARMOR - March-April 1992 If we do not have a long-range identification capability, crews will fire when they detect a target; if the target is friendly, the result could be fratricide. Chinese and others are also willing to sell their best equipment. As a result, we can expect a worldwide prolifem tion of thermal and I2 devices. They will be available to any country or terrorist organization that can afford them.

Current U.S. Capabillty In the U.S. annor battalidtask force, night vision capability ranges from the unaided human eye to thermal devices. Most crew-sewed weapons in the task force have thermal sights, but their capability ranges from poor O W , scouts) to adequate (the tank fleet). NVGs and driver viewers for combat vehicles primarily use I* technology, which provides some additional capability, but has the same range limitations first noted in the Vietnam conflict. Essentially, little new capability has been fielded since the mid-1980s.

Current U.S. thermal technology Consists of first-generation common-module forward looking infrared systems (FLIRS), with detector amys ranging from 60 channels (M-3 CFV) to 120 channels (M6OA3, M1) to 180 channels (AH64).

Modules with fewer detectors provide less information and detail and have reduced range to identify. Second-generation FLIRS, which could be available in the mid-19%, could increase the number of detectors to 1,OOO. A 1,OOO-detector amy will greatly enhance image defmition, to about the same as future high definition television sets, and will increase the range at which targets can be identified. and M1A2 with commander’s independent thermal viewer (CITV) -use the same 120-channel thermal sight. Most tankers recognize that the Tank Thermal Sight W S ) on the M6OA3 is better than the Thermal Imaging System (TIS) on the MlAl. All U.S. tanks - M60A3, MlAl, The M6OA3 sight, when compared to the MlAl presents a more detailed image to the gunner. Even though both have a 120channel detector, the signal to noise ratio of the ?TS is better. The TIS uses a small TV tube whose curvature results in part of the image always being slightly out of focus. This image passes through beam splitters and lenses which reduce the total amount of light from the image. Consequently, the gunner increases the image conlrast causing low resolution targets to disappear. The l’TS does not have this handicap since its image is displayed directly onto an image intensifier tube screen, rather than through a monocular sight. The screen is easier to view for long periods of time. The sight on the CITV of the M1A2 also features improved image presentation, providing more detail than the gunner’s TIS. The future does not look bright for the Armor Force. We expect only limited improvement in the armor and cavalry fleet. A key development would have been the introduction of the CITV, the position location/navigation (POSNAV), and inhavehicular information system ( IVIS ) on the MlA2, but it appears that only 62 of these tanks will be produced.

(POSNAV and M S would allow the crew to easily navigate and know their position at night) The only other programmed improvement for our tanks and scouts will be the addition of global positioning systems (GPS), which also will improve our night navigation.

U.S. Tank Force vs Threat A comparison of our c m t capabilities with those of various threats shows that we currently have an edge in night vision. Only a concerted effort, however, will allow us to keep that advantage. This will be particularly true against regional threats, who could very quickly have a capabdity equal or superior to our current equipment. We could fall behind if we fail to program funds b field new technology while threat countries and organizations take advantage of the pro-lifedon of Westem technology, including thermal equipment, available on the open market.

The crucial area, in which we need a decisive edge, is in identifying targets beyond the maximum effective range of our weapons. That range is generally considered to be 3,000 meters for the MlAl and 3,750 meters for the CFV. If we do not have a long-range identification capability, crews will fm when they detect a target; if the target is fkiendly, the result could be fratricide. Historical data indicates that htricide occurs mainly at night or during limited visibility. We also need an edge in our ability to maneuver quickly, accurately, and confidently at night. This means we must know precisely our unit’s position and our own vehicle’s position in relation to the unit: anything less accurate increases the chance of fratricide or vehicular accident. In addition to the major concerns of target identification, fratricide. and night navigation discussed above, we also face vulnerabilities related to thermal and radar signature, chemical operations, and task force support. Tanks and scout vehicles have incorporated very little thermal or radar signatm reduction technology. Both the MlAl and the CFV have an especially distinct and bright thermal signature. Flat surfaces on tanks and CFVs further increase their radar signatures. Those who have used NVGs during chemical operations know that chemical operations cannot be conducted effectively at night because NVGs are not compatible with the protective mask. Task force support operations are only rarely trained and conducted under blackout conditions. ARMOR - March-April 1992 Few support units are given enough NVGs or navigation devices (GPS). What Can Be The Future?

The mor School has recommended several immediate actions tc correct these vulnerabilities. For tanks, the following actions can be taken: .Field more than the 62 MlA2s currently programmed. .Implement the MlAl TIS tuneup. Night Vision Labs believes that the performance of the gunner’s TIS can be improved by tuning up the electronics so they are operating at peak efficiency, producing a sight that is as good as the ‘ITS on the M6OA3. This would be done by an Night Vision Electro Optical Lab (NVEOL) team deployed worldwide to work on every tank. .Field a second-generation FLIR with increased magnification and a 480-channel detector amy, possibly with a 16-power namw field of view. This would allow the gunner to identify targets out to the maximum range of the main gun. .Replace the driver’s I2 viewer with a thermal viewer, thus allowing the driver to drive nearly as fast at night as in the day. His capability would not be limited to clear weather and available illumination. He would also be able to select routes that would provide cover and concealment. .Employ a combat identification device ( 0 ) . This would allow gunners to shoot with confidence at targets that can currently be detected but not identified. Without a CID, the gunner has to wait until the enemy closes to within identification range. .Reduce thermal signature and radar cross section. The thermal signature could be reduced by cooling the engine exhaust with shielding similar to that used on a helicopter. For Scouts: .Field GPSs with compass, POSNAV, and IVIS on all scout vehicles, to allow them to readily navigate at night and also know where the rest of their unit is at any one time. .Upgrade all CFVs and HMMWVs with second-generation FLIRS with very high magnification (2O-power, for example) and a Combat Identification Device.

For Combat Support: .Ensure that NVGs are completely compatible with the protective mask and that they are adaptable to equipment in all types of units (for example, the tinting of some buck windshields prevents the driver from seeing out while wearing NVGs). .Ensure that more support units have GPS.

Training Fixes: .Implement more extensive target identification training. Tank Crew Gunnery Skills Test (TCGST) should/must include thermal vehicle identification. NVEOL conducted four to five hours of target ID training during a test at Yuma Proving Grounds. The result was the crews were able to detect targets by their exhaust gas signatures. .Thermal camouflage can be created by simple methods, such as using wet burlap to produce a black/cold area or oil that looks like a hot spot. .Teach crews how to set up thermal sights/devices for lowcontrast targets, improving both acquisition range and detection range. .Improve training devices and simulators, so that they include enhanced thermal target training capability. This could be accomplished by showing lowcontrast targets under battlefield haze. For example, the thermal targets on the Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer (VCOFI‘) today are very clear and distinct.

The proposals outlined here can help the armor battalion/task force maintain its superiority in night-vision capability.

But not forever. Advancing technology, much of it available to potential threats around the world, will some ARMOR - March-April 1992 day -perhaps soon - render our current equipment second-rate. We must pursue new programs and field new and improved equipment, with emphasis on POSNAV, second-generation thermal sights, signature reduction, and training to enhance OUT proficiency in night operations. And we must begin now to guard against the day when we no longer “own the night.”

References:

Chapman, Clifford W. State of the Art in Thermal Imaging Modules: Common Modules, Proceedings of the 1 lth Electro-Optical & Laser Conference/S ymposium, November 1979.

R. Paul Orentas, Ferdinand H. Zegel, Jaime Gonzalez, Desert Shield IR Guide II, January 1991 Mr. Josef Schroeder is an Operations Research Analyst for the Directorate of Combat Developments, Armor Center, Fort Knox, Ky. As a Reservist, LTC Schroeder is the commander of the 3rd Bn, 399th Armored Regt., 2nd Bde, 100th Dwision, Ft.

Campbell and Hopkinsville, Ky. He was commissioned in Armor as a Distinguished Military Graduate from the University of Minnesota in 1970. He has served as an armor and recon platoon leader with 2-32 Armor, 3rd AD, Germany; company commander, 15th Bn, 4th Training Bde, Ft. Knox, Ky.; and Armor Test Officer with the Armor Engineer Board, also at Ft. Knox. He is 1986 graduate of the Command and General Staff College. His reserve assignments include battalion S3 and XO; and brigade S4 and S3,2nd Bde, 100th Dw.