Maintaining the ACR and its Capabilities for the Force

Maintaining the ACR and its Capabilities for the Force by Major Christopher Mahaffey As the U.S. Army prepares to restructure its formations in an effort to regain balance, it has determined that creating 45 brigade combat teams (BCTs) is decisive to its effort.1 Within this transformation effort, the Army is also seeking a structure to create enough enablers, such as aviation battalions, to support these BCTs. The U.S. Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process and the fact that the Army is entering a period of resource-constrained operations are central to this effort, and are driving the Army to consider dissolving the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3d ACR) and other heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs) to facilitate more Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs) and enablers, specifically, aviation assets. Obviously, the U.S. Army Armor Center’s position is to maintain the capability of the 3d ACR as is and, if possible, maintain the correct mix of HBCTs in the force. This effort is in the face of stark criticism due to the resources it takes to operate and sustain these formations, the deployability of these formations, and the perceived lack of a need for heavy formations as the Army continues to shift its aim point to focus on irregular warfare. The Armor Center has shown through experimentation the requirement for lethal, well-protected forces that can fight for information.2Experiments, such as the Complex Web Defense Experiment, revealed that reconnaissance squadrons and combined-arms battalions, equipped with Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, were superior to Stryker battalions when conducting offensive operations against a future hybrid enemy. It lacks, however, experimentation that depicts the ACR in an operational setting and therefore it is difficult for leaders to understand this formation and its capabilities.3 Because they do not understand this capability, many senior leaders believe that maintaining the ACR, at the detriment of creating all 45 BCTs, will negatively impact ARFORGEN. The fact remains that with ARFORGEN, the Army requires optimally three of any one type of formation — one BCT in the reset pool, one BCT in the trained and ready pool, and one BCT in the available pool — and the ACR is one of one, which does not allow it to fit neatly into this construct. As the Armor Center participates in the process of redesigning the Army’s structure, it becomes apparent that many think it is easier to redesign the ACR as an HBCT or an SBCT, as mentioned above, and use its aviation and other force structure to provide more enablers. This lack of understanding makes it imperative that the ACR’s unique capabilities are brought to the forefront in an effort to better inform this decision. Because decisions on force structure will likely be made this summer, Colonel David A. Teeples, Armor Center Commander, commissioned his initiatives group to conduct a comparative analysis on the force structure of the 3d ACR in an effort to highlight its unique and relevant capabilities. This comparative analysis was designed to explore each BCT structure and was then vetted through a Maneuver Captains Career Course small group to get a tactical perspective from captains who had served in each of these BCTs. The conclusions from this analysis resulted from combining existing doctrine with respect to modular BCTs and are the collective conclusions of the initiatives group. They serve to both highlight the capabilities of the ACR and provide subjective arguments to maintain its structure. 34 — July-August 2009

U.S. Formations Capabilities Comparison Each U.S. formation is optimized, whenever possible, to conduct full-spectrum operations. From a brigade headquarters standpoint, each modular BCT is designed to have similar capabilities with respect to its construct — light, Stryker, or heavy. Due to methods used to achieve transformation to the modular BCT headquarters, the ACR headquarters remains relatively unchanged from the BCT headquarters of the legacy force; whereas, other BCT headquarters have grown through adding what were once division assets.4 For example, the ACR regimental S3 has 19 personnel, versus 48 personnel in a combination of movement and maneuver staff sections within the HBCT. In general, all BCTs have a command structure, a support structure, a communications structure, and a fires structure that support the various capabilities of each BCT. The initiatives group analysis team found differences between these formations primarily in their capabilities and structure, such as aviation assets, number of systems, number of dismounts, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow these formations to have differing capabilities. The Infantry Brigade Combat Team As outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, the mission of the infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) focuses on “rugged terrain,” and describes this formation as the “most versatile.”5 The IBCT’S operational capabilities are:  Conducting small-unit operations.  Conducting operations with armored, mechanized, or wheeled forces.  Conducting operations with special operations forces (SOF).  Partaking in amphibious operations.  Maintaining the ability to conduct forced-entry or early-entry operations.  Conducting air assault, air mobile, or airborne operations.  Maintaining brigade support battalion/forward support company (BSB/ FSC) transportation assets that allow four rifle companies to be truck-borne for any operation.  Maintaining a reconnaissance squadron consisting of both mounted and dismounted personnel.6 The IBCT’s limitations include:  A lack of firepower, mobility, or the inherent protection of an HBCT.  Two of its maneuver battalions move predominately by foot; organic vehicles must move either soldiers or supplies. The BSB has only enough trucks to transport two rifle companies.  Its soldiers are especially vulnerable to enemy fires and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks while moving.  With only two maneuver battalions, its options are limited for retaining capabilities for a pursuit, exploitation, or reserve force.  A lack of organic gap-crossing capability.  Its soldiers require U.S. Air Force (USAF) support for airborne assault.  It requires the support of at least two combat aviation brigades for brigade-level air assaults.7 By far, the IBCT’s strength is in its dismount capability; each of its two infan-

FIRES

SPT

BTB

16 x 105mm Howitzer (2 Batteries) Target Acquisition Engineer Company 6 Engineer Squads Light Equipment 4 Forward Support Companies (provide maintenance and other support to battalions) Maintenance Company Distribution Company Counterfire and CounterMortar Radars Medical Company TUAV Platoon Multi-Sensor Unit - Various sensor capabilities Signal Company -Communications/Network Operations Support Military Intel Company - Intelligence Integration & Analysis - Human Intelligence Capabilities - Increased Staff - C2 Enhancements - Deputy Commander - Special Ops/Civil Affairs Coordinator - Aviation & Air Defense

HHC

- Security Platoon - Military Police Platoon Recon Squadron 2 Motorized Recon Troops 1 Dismounted Recon Troop HMMWV with Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System 2 Sniper Sections 72 Squads Fires Battalion Joint Fires Cell 3 x Joint Tactical Air Control Teams (Infantry and RSTA Battalions) Target Acquisition Platoon Support Battalion UA Headquarters Battle Command: Networked Battle Command Enabling Systems. 6 Infantry Companies 6 Assault Platoons (Motorized) 2 Scout Platoons 2 Mortar Platoons Infantry Battalions Infantry Brigade Combat Team X BCT Total = 83 Squads Dismount capability Figure 1 July-August 2009 — 35 try battalions is composed of three infantry companies that collectively make up 72 squads of dismounts. Each infantry battalion also has an assault company and a headquarters company with a scout platoon, a mortar platoon, and a sniper section. Counting scouts as squads is difficult as their function and design is different; however, for the purposes of this discussion, we will determine the scouts within each structure as a function of nine-man infantry squads.8 The scout platoon in an IBCT battalion consists of 22 personnel, which equates to four additional squads for the brigade. The brigade also has a reconnaissance squadron with two mounted recon troops and one dismounted recon troop, a fires battalion with two batteries of towed 155- mm howitzers, and an engineer company. Adding the reconnaissance squadron provides an additional seven squads to a brigade, a total of 83 squads of dismount capability. The team’s analysis revealed that the IBCT’s inherent weaknesses are its lack of protection and mobility. It is also the least digitally enabled BCT, which limits its ability to conduct command and control (C2) and situational awareness and understanding. The IBCT’s strengths include the ability to operate in restrictive terrain and the versatility of its dismount capability. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team The SBCT’s mission focuses on small-scale contingencies and its mobility and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets when conducting major combat operations. The SBCT’s operational capabilities include:  Three infantry battalions for maneuver (versus two in the HBCT and

IBCT).

 Infantry battalions that have organic armor in their mobile gun system (MGS) platoons.9  In-theater mobility.  Fewer class III supplies than the HBCT, with nearly the same mobility.  Greater survivability than an IBCT.  The ability to conduct forced-entry or early-entry operations.  Reconnaissance squadrons with organic human intelligence (HUMINT) soldiers. The limitations of the SBCT include:  A lack of firepower or inherent protection of HBCTs.  A requirement for more aircraft to deploy than an IBCT.  Its BSB does not have FSCs for each maneuver battalion.  A lack of organic gap-crossing capability.  A lack of a brigade special troops battalion (BSTB) for C2 of brigade troops.10 The Stryker brigade builds on the IBCT’s dismount capability with the use of the Stryker for mobility. Each of its three infantry battalions has three infantry companies, with a total of 108 squads. Each company also includes an MGS platoon, which has three MGS vehicles with the capability to provide 105mm lethality for the dismounted force; a sniper team, which provides lethal precision small-arms fire; and a mortar section complete with 120- mm mortars. The Stryker infantry battalion also has a headquarters company, a scout and mortar platoon, and a sniper squad. The scout platoon provides two additional squads of dismounts, which totals six squads for the BCT. The brigade also has a reconnaissance squadron with three reconnaissance troops; each troop has three scout platoons and an organic HUMINT capability. The reconnaissance squadron adds an additional 18 squads of dismount capability, which brings a total of 132 squads to the SBCT. The SBCT also has a fires battalion, with three batteries of towed 155mm artillery, an antitank company, Figure 2 18 x 155mm Howitzer (3 Batteries) Total = 108 Squads Dismount capability Stryker Brigade Combat Team X Signal Company * Integration & Analysis Platoon - Trojan Spirit - Common Ground Station * HUMINT Platoon - TACHUMINT Teams

(CHATS)

- Operational Mgt Teams (CHIMS) - Increased Staff - C2 Enhancements - Deputy Commander - PSYOPS/Civil Affairs - Aviation & Air Defense - Military Police C2 Cell Target Acquisition Counterfire and Counter-Mortar Radars Target Acquisition Platoon Military Intel CO Stryker HQs Fires Battalion Maintenance Company Distribution Company Medical Company Support Battalion 9 Engineer Squads 3 Mobility Squads w/ Various Equipment Anti-Tank Company 9 Stryker Anti-Tank Vehicles Engineer Company Infantry Battalions (x 3) 3 x ICV Companies 3 x MGS Platoons 1 x Mortar Platoon 1 x Scout Platoon Over 127 Infantry Carrier Vehicles 14 x 120mm Mortar Carriers Snipers: Squads at BN / Teams at CO 27 x Mobile Gun System

SPT

HHC

Recon Squadron 3 x Recce Troops 3 x Recce Platoons 1 x Mortar Section (120mm) 1 x FSV 1 x TACP 1 x Surveillance Troop 1 x TUAV Platoon - 4 x Shadow 200 1 x MS Platoon - 3 x PROPHET - 3 x GSR /

REMBASS

1 x NBC Recon Platoon - 3 x FOX-NBC Total = 18 Squads Dismount capability BCT Total = 132 Squads Dismount capability 36 — July-August 2009 and an engineer company. After careful examination, the analysis team determined that the SBCT is optimized for urban operations in a medium- to low-intensity environment against an irregular threat. The team discussed its weaknesses, its lack of protection, and its centralized support structure. In short, the team concluded that the SBCT was optimum for the irregular threat in Iraq and Afghanistan, but offered less capability at other ends of the spectrum. The Heavy Brigade Combat Team The mission of the HBCT focuses on conducting full-spectrum operations; its capabilities include:  Conducting sustained operations in most environments.  Accomplishing very rapid movement and deep penetrations.  Conducting security operations.  Conducting offensive and defensive operations.  Maintaining the ability to integrate light or special operations forces.  Possessing mobile protected firepower.  Providing digital situational awareness down to vehicle level.  Performing company-sized air assaults. The HBCT’s limitations include:  A high dependence on radio communications.  Restricted mobility in highly mountainous terrain or dense forests.  A high usage rate of consumable supplies, particularly class III, V, and IX; do not underestimate its requirements.  Vulnerability to mines and antitank weapons.  A footprint usually larger than that of lighter forces.  A higher risk to fratricide of light forces due to an inability to determine friend or foe unless mounted.  A lack of an S3 air section to plan and oversee air assault operations.  A lack of organic gap-crossing capability.11 The HBCT focuses on the protection and lethality provided by its armored systems. It has limited dismount capability and can deploy 36 squads from its two mechanized infantry companies. Its real strength is in its systems, which include two combined arms battalions and a reconnaissance squadron, bringing 53 Abrams tanks and 112 Bradley fighting vehicles to the fight. Each battalion also boasts a scout platoon, with an additional squad of dismounts, a mortar platoon, and a sniper squad. The brigade contains a reconnaissance squadron, which provides the brigade with six additional squads of dismounts for an HBCT, a total of 44 squads. The HBCT completes its force structure with a field artillery battalion that has 16 155mm howitzers. The brigade also contains a sustainment battalion, which has the capability to sustain each of its maneuver and fires battalions with forward support companies, and an engineer company with two sapper platoons. The team determined that the HBCT is optimized for operations in open areas, but has proven effective operating in urban areas. Its strength is in the lethality and protection of its systems. The team also discussed the BCT’s weaknesses, which include a requirement for more logistics support than lighter organizations; a lack of mobility assets, which can constrain its maneuver; and a reduced dismount capability compared to its lighter counterparts. The Armored Cavalry Regiment When researching the mission, capabilities, and limitations of the ACR, the Army’s doctrine is somewhat outdated — Figure 3 Heavy Brigade Combat Team X

BSTB

HHC

- Increased Staff - C2 Enhancements - Deputy Commander - PSYOPS/Civil Affairs - Aviation & Air Defense - Military Police Platoon and C2 Cell - Security Section (2 M2s) - CBRN Platoon

HHB

Counterfire and Counter-Mortar Radars Brigade Special Troops Battalion 12 x 155mm Howitzer (2 Batteries) Fires Battalion Support Battalion Combined Arms Battalions (x 2) 2 x Mech Infantry Companies 2 x Tank Companies 1 x Mortar Platoon 1 x Scout Platoon 91 IFVs 12 x 120mm Mortar Carriers Sniper Squad at Battalion 58 x M1 Abrams Recon Squadron 3 x Recon Troops 6 x Recon Platoons

- 5 HMMWV

- 3 M3 Bradleys

- LRAS3

3 x Mortar Section (120mm) 3 x BFIST 1 x Headquarters Troop 1 x Medical Platoon Signal Company - Voice and Data Network Operations Support Engineer Company - 2 Sapper Platoons MI Company -HUMINT Section - Prophet Section - UAV Platoon 4 Forward Support Companies (provide maintenance and other support to battalions) Maintenance Company Distribution Company Medical Company BCT Total = 44 Squads Dismount capability 21 IFVs Total = 36 Squads Total = 8 Squads July-August 2009 — 37 there is not a manual that covers the ACR. FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, was written with little insight into irregular warfare, yet it is the last publication that discusses the ACR.12 Furthermore, there has been little experimentation from which to glean insight that included the ACR structure.13 The most current squadron-level cavalry manual, FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, does not address the armored cavalry squadron.14 Therefore, the team had to develop a mission, capabilities, and limitations based on its own analysis, which was then vetted through the Armor Center commander, a former commander of the 3d ACR. As mentioned earlier, this analysis is crucial if the Army is to understand the capabilities of the ACR and, in effect, what the Army would lose if it changes its current formation. The team began with FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, the most recent FM we could find that discusses the ACR, which states, “The fundamental purpose of cavalry is to perform reconnaissance and provide security in close operations. In doing so, cavalry facilitates the commander’s ability to maneuver subordinate units and concentrate superior combat power and apply it against the enemy at the decisive time and point. Cavalry clarifies, in part, the fog of battle. Cavalry is, by its role, an economy of force. The flexible capabilities of cavalry allow the commander to conserve the combat power of his organization for engagement where he desires. The combat power of cavalry units, in particular, makes them ideal for offensive and defensive missions as an economy of force.”15 On the other hand, FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, states that the mission of the reconnaissance squadron is to “conduct reconnaissance and security operations in support of BCT stability, offensive, and defensive operations.”16 Taking both definitions into account, the team determined that the mission of the ACR was to conduct reconnaissance and security operations in support of a division, corps, or joint force commander’s stability, offensive, and defensive operations. This ACR also has the flexibility to conduct full-spectrum operations as an economy of force within any theater. Counterinsurgency (COIN) and, by correlation, irregular warfare are intelligence-driven endeavors.17 Therefore, by its abundance of intelligence-gathering assets, the ACR is capable of operating at the high end of the spectrum, while maintaining its capability of operating in the new aim point of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. Furthermore, the ACR is the only organization in our Army that can offer reconnaissance and security support to the joint force. Next, the team looked at the capabilities of the reconnaissance squadron in accordance with FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, and the role of cavalry in FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations.18 The team focused on FM 17-95, understanding it was outdated, but looked at the role of the ACR in support of corps-level offensive and defensive operations.19 The manual states that during offensive operations, “The ACR performs a number of missions for the commander, which includes:  “Covering force during movement to contact.  Flank security along an exposed flank during movement to contact or deliberate attack.  Area security operations, to include route and convoy, within the corps area of operations; reserve during a deliberate attack to serve as an exploitation or pursuit force.  Offensive or defensive operations.  Special purpose operations such as deception operations, rear area tactical combat force, reconnaissance in force, and raid.”20 Figure 4 Armored Cavalry Regiment

HHT

MI

HHT

-Regimental C2 Maintenance Company S & T Company Medical Company Support Squadron 150 Cavalry Fighting Vehicles 14 x 120mm Mortar Carriers 123 x M1 Abrams Tanks Armored Cavalry Squadron x 3 3 x Armored Cavalry Troops 2 x Scout Platoons 2 x Tank Platoons 1 x Mortar Section 1 x Tank Company 3 x Tank Platoons 1 x 155mm Howitzer Battery 2 x Paladin Platoons 1 x HHT Total = 36 Squads Dismount capability Total = 36 Squads Dismount capability 18 x 155mm Howitzer MI Air Cavalry Squadron 3 x Attack / Recon Cavalry Troops 2 x Apache Platoons 1 x Assault Troop 2 x UH-60 Platoons 1 x Aviation Maintenance Troop (AVUM) 1 x Aviation Support Troop (AVIM) 1 x Forward Support Troop 1 x HHT MI Company -HUMINT Section - Prophet Section - UAV Platoon Chemical Company -Recon Platoon -Smoke/DECON Platoon 24 x AH-64 10 x UH-60 Blackhawk

HHT, RSS

Engineer Company -2 Sapper Platoons -1 Assault and Obstacle Platoon 38 — July-August 2009

During defensive operations, the ACR can perform:  “Defensive covering force; flank security along an exposed flank of the corps.  Area, convoy, and route security within the corps area of operations.  Defensive operations in an economy-of-force role.  Reserve initially or after a defensive cover to serve as a counterattack force or one prepared to lead a transition to offensive operations with offensive cover.  Special purpose operations such as deception operations, rear area tactical combat force, spoiling attack, or raid.”21 Taking both manuals, 3-20.96 and 17-95, into account and looking at the full-spectrum capabilities of the HBCT (the BCT that is most similar to the ACR from a systems standpoint), the team determined that the ACR is capable of:  Operating independently over a wide area and at extended distances to conduct reconnaissance and security operations, to include guarding and covering in support of supported unit or joint force full-spectrum operations.  Conducting full-spectrum operations as an economy of force.  Conducting close reconnaissance of threat forces by maximizing assets to gather information on multidimensional threats, both conventional and unconventional.  Conducting stealthy small-unit operations to gather intelligence or information.  Maintaining the ability to integrate light or special operations forces.  Possessing mobile, protected firepower.  Providing digital situational awareness down to vehicle level.  Using its organic capability to perform troop-level air assaults, to include the capability to plan these operations.  Fighting for information against heavy threats.  Special purpose operations such as deception operations, rear area tactical combat force, reconnaissance in force, and raid.22 When exploring the ACR’s limitations, we were forced to look at FM 3-20.96 alone, as FM 17-95 did not discuss its limitations.23 Based on FM 3-20.96, the limitations of the reconnaissance squadron include:  “A lack of direct-fire standoff, lethality, and survivability in open and rolling terrain and requires augmentation when an armor threat is anticipated.  A requirement for augmentation to perform offensive and defensive operations as an economy of force.  Limited sustainment assets that must frequently operate over extended distances.”24 The team noted that with the ACR’s capabilities and structure, the first and second bullets above do not pertain at all. The third bullet was debated without consensus due to the fact that although the ACR is based on heavy platforms that require more sustainment, its sustainment structure mitigates this limitation. In short, the ACR and squadron do not share the same limitations of other Army reconnaissance squadrons. Taking these facts into account with the limitations of the HBCT, the team determined the ACR’s limitations include:  High dependence on radio communications.  Restricted mobility in highly mountainous terrain or dense forests.  High usage rate of consumable supplies, particularly class III, V, and IX, which requires sustainment assets to frequently operate over extended distances.  Vulnerability to mines and antitank weapons.  A larger footprint than that of a lighter force.  An increase of fratricide of light forces due to the inability to determine friend or foe unless mounted. The cavalry regiment focuses on being a robust combined-arms team and is best suited for conducting reconnaissance, security, and economy-of-force operations. It, too, focuses on the lethality and protection provided by its systems; however, its troopers, based on their conditioning through the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security, strive to avoid direct-fire contact with their enemy unless it is on their terms. They use their systems for survivability and to develop the situation for the commander on the battlefield. If necessary, they can fight for information. The cavalry regiment is built, from the ground up, to be a combined-arms team and operate decentralized. Although it lacks infantry squads, its dismounted scouts are extremely capable of conducting small-unit dismounted operations. The regiment consists of three cavalry squadrons; each of which has three cavalry troops and one tank company. In total, these squadrons are composed of 123 Abrams tanks and 150 Bradley fighting vehicles, a formidable force. The scout platoon can dismount 18 soldiers, which equates to 36 squads for the regiment. This is fewer than that of an HBCT; however, because they operate in two- to four-man teams, they are capable of fielding up to 72 dismounted patrols, as well as supporting these patrols with vehicular overwatch.25 Each squadron also has its own organic artillery battery of six Paladins, for a total of 18 for the regiment. The real beauty of the cavalry regiment is its organic aviation squadron; units routinely train with aviation assets and become experts at air-ground integration. The air cavalry squadron consists of three Apache troops, each equipped with eight Apache attack helicopters. Within this squadron, there is an organic lift assault troop, equipped with ten Blackhawk utility helicopters. There have been many discussions, both in ARMOR and other professional journals, about the necessity to be proficient in air-ground integration. Based on my experiences, having organic aviation at the BCT level is paramount to air-ground integration. As a former scout platoon leader, I know nothing is more powerful than having a pilot who knows how your organization operates — this intangible is lost in all other aviation structures throughout the Army. To further my point, I quote Captain Steve Wojdakowski, Apache Troop, 1st Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment: “Organic aviation simplifies the fight considerably. We train with Nomad [an aviation troop] consistently, integrating them into the cavalry team. Much of the air-ground integration is automatic when the aviation troop knows and understands the way ground cavalry troops fight [and operate]. We understand each other’s capabilities and limitations and can more effectively achieve our endstate. The pilots learn our TTP and can tailor their maneuver to better our objectives and vice versa.”26 The cavalry regiment has a robust engineer company with four platoons — three sapper platoons with Bradleys and one assault and obstacle platoon with organic gap-crossing capability. The ACR July-August 2009 — 39

Capabilities/Limitations Comparison ACR Capabilities:  Operates independently over a wide area and at extended distances to conduct reconnaissance and security operations, to include guarding and covering in support of its supported unit’s or joint force’s full-spectrum operations.  Conducts full-spectrum operations as an economy of force.  Conducts close reconnaissance of threat forces by maximizing assets to gather information about multidimensional threats, both conventional and unconventional.  Conducts stealthy small-unit operations to gather intelligence or information.  Maintains the ability to integrate light or SOF.  Possesses mobile, protected firepower.  Provides digital situational awareness down to vehicle-level.  Has the organic capability to perform troop-level air assaults.  Fights for information against heavy threats.  Special purpose operations such as deception operations, rear area tactical combat force, reconnaissance in force, and raid. IBCT Capabilities:  Conducts small-unit operations.  Conducts operations with armored, mechanized, or wheeled forces.  Conducts operations with SOF.  Takes part in amphibious operations.  Maintains the ability to conduct forced-entry or early-entry operations.  Conducts air assault, air mobile, or airborne operations.  Maintains BSB/FSC transportation assets that allow four rifle companies to be truck-borne for any operation.  Maintains a reconnaissance squadron consisting of both mounted and dismounted personnel. HBCT Capabilities:  Conducts sustained operations in most environments.  Accomplishes very rapid movement and deep penetrations.  Conducts security operations.  Conducting offensive and defensive operations.  Maintains the ability to integrate light or SOF.  Possesses mobile, protected firepower.  Provides digital situational awareness down to vehicle-level.  Performs company-sized air assaults. SBCT Capabilities:  Three infantry battalions for maneuver (vs only two in the HBCT and IBCT).  Infantry battalions contain organic armor in their MGS platoons.  In-theater mobility.  Lower usage rate of class III supplies than the HBCT, with nearly the same mobility.  Greater survivability than an IBCT.  Ability to conduct forced-entry or early-entry operations.  Reconnaissance squadrons with organic HUMINT soldiers. ACR Limitations:  High dependence on radio communications.  Restricted mobility in highly mountainous terrain or dense forests.  High usage rate of consumable supplies, particularly class III, V, and IX, requires sustainment assets to frequently operate over extended distances.  Vulnerability to mines and antitank weapons.  Footprint is usually larger than a lighter force.  Risk of fratricide of light forces is higher due to the inability to determine friend or foe unless mounted.  Lacks an S3 air section to plan and oversee air assault operations. IBCT Limitations:  Lacks the firepower, mobility, or inherent protection of HBCTs.  Its two maneuver battalions move predominately by foot; organic vehicles must move either soldiers or supplies. The BSB has only enough trucks to transport two rifle companies.  Infantry soldiers are especially vulnerable to enemy fires and CBRN attacks while soldiers are moving.  With only two maneuver battalions, options are limited for retaining capabilities for a pursuit, exploitation, or reserve force.  No organic gap-crossing capability.  Its soldiers require USAF support for airborne assault.  For a brigade-level air assault, the IBCT requires the support of at least two combat aviation brigades. HBCT Limitations:  High dependence on radio communications.  Restricted mobility in highly mountainous terrain or dense forests.  High usage rate of consumable supplies, particularly class III, V, and IX; do not underestimate its requirements.  Vulnerability to mines and antitank weapons.  Footprint is usually larger than a lighter force.  Risk of fratricide of light forces is higher due to the inability to determine friend or foe unless mounted.  Its staff does not have an S3 air section to plan and oversee air assault operations.  No organic gap-crossing capability. SBCT Limitations:  Lacks the firepower or inherent protection of HBCTs.  Requires more aircraft to deploy than an IBCT.  The BSB does not have FSCs for each maneuver battalion.  No organic gap-crossing capability.  There is no BSTB for C2 of brigade troops. Figure 5 also has headquarters and headquarters troops robust enough to sustain each of its squadrons, and an organic support squadron with a robust sustainment capability that is easily decentralized. The formation is built to be decentralized with sustainment and mortar capability in each troop and company. In addition to the two UAVs in a normal BCT military intelligence (MI) company, the ACR’s MI company boasts four UAVs, doubling its coverage. As with the heavy brigade, this organization is optimized for operations in an open environment, but has proved effective when operating in urban areas as an economy of force and decentralized. Its weaknesses include an increased logistics requirement compared to lighter organizations and a reduced dismount capability; however, its strengths include its aviation assets; its structure, which enables combined-arms operations at the troop level; and its ability to conduct full-spectrum operations as a BCT while maintaining the ability to support a joint commander by gathering intelligence and providing security, dependent on the contingency. All these strengths are in addition to its lethality and protection of its systems. Capabilities Comparison If the ACR’s structure is changed, the Army and the joint force will lose all of its capabilities. Figure 5 highlights these 40 — July-August 2009 capabilities and the limitations with respect to the other BCTs in the Army’s inventory. In our discussions, the team focused on four capabilities the Army would lose, as well as four limitations of other structures that depend on the ACR to fill their gaps. In particular, the team noted that the ACR is the only unit designed to operate as an economy of force.27 Capabilities lost include:  Reconnaissance and security operations, to include guarding and covering in support of supported unit or joint force full-spectrum operations.  Conducting full-spectrum operations as an economy of force.  Conducting close reconnaissance of threat forces by maximizing assets to gather information about multidimensional threats, both conventional and unconventional.  The capability of conducting stealthy small-unit operations to gather intelligence or information. The capability gaps the ACR fills include:  The capability of a fully integrated combined-arms organization.  The capability to operate as an economy of force.  The capability to supplement the SBCT, which does not have the firepower or inherent protection of HBCTs.  An organic gap-crossing capability. The risk associated with losing this capability is high. The ACR is the only brigade-sized organization equipped to conduct reconnaissance and security operations for the Army. Although the battlefield surveillance brigade (BfSB) is designed to conduct limited reconnaissance, it is not equipped to conduct security operations.28 Furthermore, the ACR is the only organization without augmentation that can conduct security operations other than a screen. Realizing both of these tasks are geared toward the high end of the spectrum, the ACR has the added capability of conducting full-spectrum operations as an economy of force, giving the combatant commander a capability that can be surged into an area to maintain stability, allowing him to focus on his center of gravity. For example, during the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment was used to control the western province of Al Anbar, which is roughly the size of the state of Wyoming, to include the cities of Ramadi, Fallujah, Hit, Haditha, and Al Qa’im, while Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) focused on Baghdad. The ACR’s capability to conduct close reconnaissance of conventional and unconventional threats gives it a unique capability to function against hybrid threats. This was demonstrated partially by the success of the reconnaissance squadron tested in the Complex Web Defense Experiment. The test squadron was outfitted with Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles similar to that of an ACR squadron, and was re-tasked due to its success and the Stryker battalion’s difficulties as the main effort. This squadron subsequently achieved the brigade’s objective and did so without the added capability of organic aviation. One can surmise that with the addition of aviation, this organization becomes optimized to meet the hybrid and irregular threats the United States may one day face on the battlefield. The team also focused on the ACR’s structure, which allows it to conduct decentralized operations. One of the contemporary imperatives of counterinsurgency is to “empower the lowest level.”29 After nearly 7 years of conducting these types of operation in Iraq and Afghanistan, we continue to struggle to accomplish our mission because most of our enablers are massed at higher levels within our structure. For example, when I deployed to OIF III with the 3d Infantry “The fundamental purpose of cavalry is to perform reconnaissance and provide security in close operations. In doing so, cavalry facilitates the commander’s ability to maneuver subordinate units and concentrate superior combat power and apply it against the enemy at the decisive time and point. Cavalry clarifies, in part, the fog of battle.”

Division as a tank company commander, I had to get my infantry platoon from another company, my maintenance and fuel support from the FSC, and if I wanted aviation or UAV support, I had to request these through my battalion and brigade to the division. The ACR is designed with the majority of these assets positioned on the battlefield to operate decentralized, thus, making it more conducive to irregular warfare or counterinsurgency. An ACR troop has organic mounted and dismounted capability and its own maintenance capability. The squadron’s headquarters and headquarters troop has a fuel package designed to break off and support the troop, and if the troop commander needs aviation or UAV support, it is organic at the regimental level. In fact, the regiment has the capability to operationally control (OPCON) assets, from aviation troops to ground cavalry squadrons, to increase decentralization and flexibility. This was certainly the case during

OIF I.

Finally, the team focused on the gaps the ACR fills for our force. First and foremost, as discussed above, the ACR is a fully integrated combined-arms organization. No other organization’s structure even compares to the ACR’s capability to operate decentralized. In fact, the ACR’s capability to operate as an economy of force replaces a division’s worth of combat power. The ACR is a force that can deploy to a second front, or contingency theater, as a holding force while the bulk of the Army is engaged elsewhere. The results of the Complex Web Defense Experiment highlight the gap that the ACR and the HBCT, in general, fill for the Stryker platform. Furthermore, if one looks at the development and fielding of the mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicle, which was driven by America’s public outcry for more protection for its soldiers, one can surmise that the need to maintain this level of protection is paramount to conducting protracted future engagements. Lastly, the ACR has its own gap-crossing capability, although this gap can be fulfilled by maneuver enhancement brigades, it correlates to our discussion of aviation and other enablers that allow the ACR to operate decentralized and independently. Conclusive Facts The ACR is built as a combined-arms force from troop to regiment. Its loss to our Army would be detrimental to our current and future capabilities. In short, once this structure is dismantled, it is unlikely the Army will ever get it back. The initiative group’s study highlights the ACR’s efficiencies, capabilities, and limitations, which should inform redesign. With this thought, I acknowledge the possibility that we, as an army, may have to get past some of the “branchisms” that have driven our restructuring decisions in the past. We may need to stop worrying about how many battalions are available for a certain branch to command and instead open up brigades and battalions to more branches. For example, if we did not have aviation-pure battalions and brigades and pushed that capability to organic maneuver brigades, we could allow aviation lieutenant colonels and colonels to command maneuver battalions and brigades. The point is to develop the best possible platoon, company, battalion, and brigade capable of successfully operating in the perceived future. With this in mind, an enterprise approach of looking at the capabilities the Army desires at each echelon, and the mix of these capabilities, is where we need to start. This, coupled with experimentation that informs our decisions, may be a wiser approach than what appears to be a race to get to 45 BCTs. Maybe the right answer is a BCT, equipped with a Stryker battalion, a light battalion, a combined-arms battalion, an ACR squadron, and an aviation troop. The point is: we, as an Army, are obligated to take a good hard look at the capabilities, both current and future, of the ACR — not destroy it because of ARFORGEN. Another alternative is to look at the structure and design of the BfSB and determine if this structure is necessary or if it can be used to provide the unique capability that the ACR brings our Army. In accordance with its operational and organizational concept, the BfSB is designed to perform Army tactical task 1.3, “perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR);” however, as recent as Unified Quest 2009, Army leaders have questioned the term “ISR” and its use in the Army lexicon.30 Furthermore, recent attendees at the former brigade commander’s seminar made the following points:  Irregular warfare is still warfare and security remains first priority.  Irregular warfare demands proficiency in fighting as a combined-arms team as the price of admission.  Modular approach is sound, but would prefer more robust BCTs: reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron able to fight for information; third maneuver battalion (four companies); more combat and construction engineers; more signal intelligence (SIGINT); and better intelligence analysis at all echelons. These points, coupled with the BfSB computer-assisted map exercise (CAM-EX), which identified that the BfSB can perform surveillance and limited reconnaissance, but is not resourced to conduct security operations, strengthen the position that the cavalry regiment and squadron are better resourced to provide this capability than the BfSB and, therefore, are the better structure choices to retain. The ACR is, and has been, the premier heavy force within the Army. It provides the right mix of forces at the right level to conduct full-spectrum operations. In 1993, Colonel David Teeples, then the S3 for the 11th ACR, along with now-retired General William S. Wallace as his commander, conducted a similar study. This study was, for its time, farsighted in focusing on conducting what was then known as “peacekeeping operations,” and demonstrated how an ACR was uniquely configured to conduct stability operations (then peacekeeping operations) as an economy of force for a combatant commander. General Wallace’s insights from this study concluded that the ACR provided the combatant commander a force that could conduct security, had a robust command and control network, and could operate as an economy of force. This study was briefed to the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) commander, but, unfortunately, fell on deaf ears. The 11th ACR has since been turned into a heavy brigade, minus the 2d ACR, and was transformed into a light regiment, leaving the 3d ACR the only surviving ACR. The ACR is misunderstood and under attack; repeating the mistake of dismantling the ACR means a loss of capability for the Army and future joint task force commanders. Notes 1Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced his decision on 6 April at a Pentagon press conference to reduce the initial 48 brigade combat teams (BCTs) to 45 better manned BCTs. 2The 2008 Reconnaissance Summit (Outbrief), 13 and 14 November 2008, Skidgel Hall, Fort Knox, Kentucky. The summit provided feedback to the TRADOC commander and other stakeholders on the current status and capabilities of modular reconnaissance organizations and ongoing initiatives, as well as gained consensus on reconnaissance issues and identified options for future reconnaissance developments in the modular force. 3During the Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) in March 2008, under the Mounted Maneuver Battle Lab (MMBL) leadership, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) Battle Lab Collaboration and Simulation Environment (BLCSE) federation executed the Complex Web Defense (CWD) experiment. Parallel to multipurpose OneSAF Testbed (OTB) baseline’s main entity driver functionality, OneSAF Objective System was used 42 — July-August 2009 and bands of thieves to negotiate and pacify Iraq without a shot fired. As long as Nazim Pasha governed, security reigned in Baghdad and its environs. Nazim Pasha was, however, removed in 1911 after being impli-cated in an amorous scandal with an Armenian woman, which led 20,000 Iraqis to protest the removal of a popular governor. Thousands of telegrams and petitions were sent to the Sultan and officers threatened to resign their commissions. It was to no avail; disorder, as well as tribal raids, returned to Iraq under the callous rule of Jamal Bey, the new Vali of Baghdad. Jamal Bey spent his entire governorship militarily subjugating the tribes. He used force only and not the subtle methods of Nazim Pasha, who worked with the clergy, cooperative tribes, and public works, in addition to force, to bring stability to Iraq. Wardi’s concluding chapter is a fascinating look at the several technological advancements that changed Iraqi society — the steamship, telegraph, automobile, postage mail, piston engine, printing press, newspapers and journals, hospital, and modern schools. The majority of these changes involved transport and communication, which minimized the country in terms of distance a person or idea could travel to, through, and out of Iraq. Wardi writes of how the telegraph was seen by some Iraqi tribesmen as being the spies of central Ottoman authority and sought to tear down poles. Others saw it as a means of sending grievances to Istanbul, with the practice of paying the telegraph operator extra for depressing the keys harder, thinking this would ensure the ability of the message getting through. American military planners can learn much from this volume, understanding the strong influence that Shiite Marjas have on Iraqi society and how Nazim Pasha brought peace to Iraq through a mixture of force, clerical interaction, and tribal diplomacy, to name just a few concepts explored. It is vital that Wardi’s work be highlighted in today’s intermediate and senior-level war colleges to equip America’s military leaders with a nuanced understanding of the complexities of Iraqi society. The next exposé features Volume IV, which covers Iraq being the stage on which Ottoman and British forces fought in World War I. Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein is a U.S. Navy Medical Service Corps Officer and Middle East foreign area officer. He currently serves as a senior counterterrorism advisor, warning officer, and instructor on militant Islamist ideology, Joint Task Force for Combating Terrorism, Washington, DC. He received a B.B.A. from the University of Mississippi (Ole Miss), an M.B.A. and M.A. from the University of Arkansas, and an M.S. from the National Defense Intelligence College. His military education includes the U.S. Naval War College, the U.S. Army War College Defense Strategy Course, the Marine Corps University Amphibious Warfare School, and advanced analytic courses at the Joint Military Intelligence College. His most recent assignments include country director for North Africa and Egypt, assistant country director for the Arabian Gulf, and special advisor on Islamist Militancy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Washington, DC. This work would not have been possible without the help of the librarians of the Library of Congress Middle East Reading Room and the librarians of the John T. Hughes Library in Washington, DC. A special note of thanks to Commander Margaret Read, Medical Service Corps, U.S. Navy, who provided valuable edits and comments and is currently studying for her Master’s degree in National Security Studies at the Naval War College Fleet Seminar. Works of Dr. Ali al-Wardi from Page 33 July-August 2009 — 43 to examine the effectiveness of systems and tactics of a force composed of a combined arms battalion (CAB), one Stryker infantry battalion, force design update (FDU) reconnaissance squadron, supported by appropriate joint and Army enablers against a predominately dismounted enemy embedded in a semi-urban environment. 4During transformation and subsequent force design updates, guidance was given to look for internal billpayers within each formation as structure was created. For example, an engineer battalion headquarters from the legacy division structure became billpayers for brigade special troops battalion headquarters; however, the ACR is a single colonel level-command, making it difficult to find this type of efficiency that will allow growth. 5Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, August 2006. 6Ibid., p. A-6. 7Ibid., pp. A-6 and A-7. 8HQDA, FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, GPO, Washington, DC, December 2002, pp. 1-7 through 1-9. According to doctrine, infantry squads operate as two four-man fire teams, led by a squad leader who has command and control over the teams. Scouts operate in two- to four-man reconnaissance and security patrols. The point of training with respect to scouts and infantrymen, and the implications of a scout being trained on more tasks and thus being more versatile, was also discussed during the 3d ACR analysis; however, we chose not to include this argument due to lack of empirical evidence. For the purpose of the analysis, we studied how many squads could be formed within a platoon, adding the additional six scouts as prescribed in the last round of FDUs. We used the standard mathematical rules of rounding. 9FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team. Although stated in FM 3-90.6, based on the design and specifications of the mobile gun system (MGS), the analysis team had a detailed discussion on the lack of protection for this system, which prevents it from being used as a tank; therefore, we disputed its use as armor. 10Ibid., p. A-9. 11Ibid., pp. A-3 and A-4. 12HQDA, FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, GPO, Washington, DC, September 1996. 13HQDA, FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, GPO, Washington, DC, September 2006. 14According to the Maneuver Battle Lab at Fort Knox, there has not been an experiment using the ACR structure for at least 10 years. 15FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, pp. 1-1 and 1-2. 16FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, p. 1-14. 17HQDA, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, GPO, Washington, DC, December 2006, p. 3-1. 18FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron; and FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations. 19FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations. 20Ibid., p. 1-13. 21Ibid., pp. 1-13 and 1-14. 22FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron; and FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations. 23Ibid. 24FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, p. 1-15. 25Each scout platoon can dismount up to four teams, which equates to 72 dismounted patrols. 26E-mail from Captain Steve Wojdakowski, Apache Troop, 1st Squadron, 3d Armor Cavalry Regiment, to Colonel Teeples, commander, U.S. Army Armor Center. 27According to FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, GPO, Washington, DC, 21 September 2004, economy of force is defined as one of the nine principles of war: allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. 28Battlefield surveillance brigade (BfSB) computer-assisted map exercise (CAMEX), February 2009; BfSB can collect information, but does not have the structure to conduct many of the tasks associated with reconnaissance. 29FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, p. 1-26. 30Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BfSB) Organizational and Operational (O&O) Plan, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2007. Major Christopher S. Mahaffey is currently serving as the chief, Commanding General’s Initiatives Group, U.S. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.S. from Duquesne University. His military education includes Airborne School, Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Platoon Leader Course, and Armor Captain Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include small-group instructor and team chief, Maneuver Captain Career Course, 3d Squadron, 16th Cavalry, Fort Knox; military transition team leader, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, Adamiyah, Iraq; commander, D Company, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (3ID), Fort Stewart, GA, and Baghdad, Iraq; assistant S3, brigade plans officer, 2d Brigade, 3ID, Fort Stewart and Iraq; and scout platoon leader, XO, and squadron maintenance officer, 3d Squadron, 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, LA, and Bosnia.