One Force, One Fight

x 2 x 5 Soldier & Mounted Requirements Determination Experimentation (The Maneuver Battle Lab) TRADOC Capability Managers (Points of Entry for BCTs) ✓ Warfighting Function ✓ Capabilities Analysis ✓ Science and Technology ✓Studies ✓ Small Arms ✓ Soldier Systems ✓ Future Combat System ✓ M1 Abrams ✓ M2 Bradley ✓ Experimentation ✓ Air Assault Expeditionary Force ✓ Technology Demonstrations ✓ Validation & Analysis

✓ TCM HBCT

✓ TCM SBCT

✓ TCM IBCT/CCMS

✓ TCM Soldier ✓ TCM Combat ID Concept Developments DA Civilian (GS15 Equivalent) Capabilities Development & Integration Directorate Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate Organization The mission of the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) is to provide the Nation with the world’s best trained infantry, armor, and cavalry soldiers and adaptive leaders imbued with the Warrior Ethos; to provide a power projection platform capable of deploying and redeploying soldiers, civilians, and units anywhere in the world on short notice; and to define capabilities for the infantry and armor to meet the needs of the future force. The Infantry and Armor Schools have a long tradition of training, preparing, and equipping soldiers to fight together and win. This culture of teamwork continues as the MCoE is established. The new organization within the MCoE primarily responsible for ensuring soldiers retain their dominance on all future battlefields is the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID). Its mission is to develop operational and organizational concepts, requirements, and integrated capabilities across maneuver formations and into the joint, interagency, and multinational arenas. CDID combines armor, cavalry, and infantry capabilities development into a unified, effective team to support our warfighters. The director of CDID was recently selected and assumed duties in February

2008. With this move, both centers have taken another critical step toward the MCoE. CDID consists of several organizations responsible for overseeing conceptual development across the warfighting functions, developing and overseeing the fielding and sustainment of the Army’s premier fighting vehicles and equipment, and providing the point of entry into the Generating Force for brigade combat teams to address their issues and needs for the current fight and future requirements. As early as Fiscal Year 2010, the CDID Director will be supported by an integration staff that will assist in the development and transition of the organization. In the interim, the staff is working to prepare each center to integrate into CDID through a series of progressive milestones. Upon approval by the MCoE board of directors (chaired by the commanding generals of the Armor and Infantry Centers), the CDID will establish a virtual operating capability. Equipment and personnel movements to Fort Benning will begin CDID’s transition to an initial operating capability. When the transition is complete and CDID is operating under its objective organization, it will have reached final operating capability, which will occur before 15 September 2011, according to guidelines in the base realignment and closures (BRAC) law. The transitional milestones will continue to be developed as both centers move toward the MCoE. Effective communications will inform military, civilian, and contract personnel of key dates and timelines as CDID comes on line. CDID represents a unique opportunity to put together what is best in each organization to provide unparalleled support to our Nation’s warfighters. Mr. Don Sando was selected to the Senior Executive Service in February 2008 and is currently assigned as director of the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate for the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia. A 1981 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he holds a Master of Science degree in Operations Research from the Air Force Institute of Technology, and a Master of Science degree in Strategic Studies from the Army War College. July-August 2008 — 49 2008 Infantry Warfighting Conference Fort Benning will host the 2008 Infantry Warfighting Conference 15-17 September 2008 at Fort Benning and the Iron Works Convention Center in Columbus, Georgia. The conference is open to all Infantry and Army leaders. Register online at: www.benning.army.mil/infantry or www.fbcinc.com/infantry For more information contact CPT Turner or Mr. Cliff Davis at:

DSN 835-0927/9734/8528

or commercial (706) 545-0927/9734/8528

ONE FORCE,

ONE FIGHT

specialized skill identifier, allowing intel support team trained soldiers to fill slots in a specialized job. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs). These senior soldiers are the backbone of this concept and they must master the functions required to achieve the purpose of the intel support team’s mission statement. Thus, the training for the NCO must be rigorous and the admission process selective. Ideally, the intel support team NCO would be an intelligent staff sergeant from the combat-arms branch. Once the NCO completes the intel support team NCO course, he would be locked into his position, much like that of a company master gunner. However, the intel support team NCO career path is only through the company level, thus selected sergeants would not serve repeat assignments in this position. The requirement for company intel support teams will not soon go away. Our Army’s most current published doctrine, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, is deeply rooted in intelligence-driven operations, particularly at the lowest levels.2 Just as our Army is finding success in moving from larger collective FOBs to smaller JSSs, it must reinforce this success by continuing to push the right assets and training to the lowest possible levels. As commanders give directives for meeting the fundamentals of counterinsurgencies through intel support teams, the Army should match this guidance with updated oversight in training and management. Notes 1Headquarters, Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps X-File 2-1.1, Company Intelligence Cell in Stability and Support Operations (SASO), GPO, Washington, DC, 17 December 2004. 2Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, December 2006. Major Rodney J. Morgan is currently serving as an armor company team trainer, Scorpion Team, Operations Group, National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA. He received a B.S from Missouri State University. His military education includes Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Infantry Captain Career Course, Airborne School, Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle Commander Course, Infantry Officer Basic Course, and Air Assault School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include battalion intelligence trainer, Scorpion Team, Operations Group, NTC, Fort Irwin; headquarters company trainer, Scorpion Team, Operations Group, NTC, Fort Irwin; commander, C Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, TX; and assistant chief, G3 Training, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood. Intel Support Teams from Page 25 50 — July-August 2008 then distributed throughout the local market. The desired effect of this leaflet was to force Abu Ahmed to go into hiding or flee the area to avoid capture, thereby disrupting his ability to attack friendly forces. While no intelligence was gained from Abu Ahmed in this scenario, a disrupt effect was still achieved. Assess. During the assess phase, the focus of targeting remains the effect achieved during the deliver phase. Operational priorities must be taken into account when considering reengaging a target. As operational priorities change, so must targeting priorities. Targeting individuals across multiple cells can produce dramatically different effects than targeting multiple individuals in a single cell. Effects can also diffuse over time, as a cell recon-stitutes with new members, new cells are formed, and others branch out. Effects on a target cannot be assessed in a vacuum isolated from other targeting efforts throughout a unit’s area of interest, including targeting conducted by adjacent unit and host-nation forces. Using the example of Abu Ahmed, who was forced to flee the area, the unit assessed the achieved effects. After a short rise in IED attacks, in retaliation by the rest of Abu Ahmed’s IED cell, the company S2 section determined that overall IED activity dropped 50 percent within 14 days. The S2 section assessed that the desired effect was achieved and recommended the commander continue targeting Abu Ahmed’s cell until it could no longer conduct operations. Throughout the targeting process the company S2 section has an integral role in the company. By evaluating intelligence, forming information requirements, and refining targets, the S2 section ensures the company is equipped with the intelligence it needs to conduct COIN operations. Without the capabilities that the company S2 section provides to the unit, companies will not be as effective at conducting intelligence-driven operations. The experiences of the U.S. Army operating as a COIN force in Iraq has demonstrated a compelling need for a military intelligence section within every company-sized maneuver force. Intelligence in a COIN environment is almost exclusively a human-driven, bottom-up process, where information is collected and acted on at the lowest possible level. Intelligence must drive all operations on the low-intensity battlefield, yet company-sized maneuver forces are the formations most likely to conduct operations and the least equipped to develop and analyze intelligence. Changing the company MTOE to make intelligence personnel organic to maneuver companies would be the preferred response to fix company-level intelligence gaps, yet this may not be possible. However, in environments where fire support assets are under centralized control, and are unlikely to be routinely employed, the fire support team presents one solid alternative. Commanders must carefully weigh the loss of fire-support capabilities against an increase in intelligence capabilities when they decide to employ company fire support teams as provisional intelligence sections. The flexibility of the fire support team, along with the fire supporter’s understanding of the targeting processes, increases their relevancy in conflicts of all intensities. Notes 1Department of Defense Directive 5100.77, DoD Law of War Program, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 9 December 1998. 2Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-09.42, HBCT Fires and Effects Operations, GPO, Washington, DC, 15 April 2005, p. 6-13. 3HQDA, Army Regulation 530-1, Operations Security, Washington, DC, 19 April 2007, p. 1-6. 4HQDA, FM 2.22-3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, Washington, DC, 6 September 2006, p. 5-1. 5HQDA, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Washington, DC, 15 December 2006, p. 3-16. 6HQDA, FM 3-09.31, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander, Washington, DC, 1 October 2002, p. 1-7. First Lieutenant David R. Cowan is currently serving as fire support officer, C Company, 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Benning, GA. He received a B.S. from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. His military education includes the Field Artillery Basic Course. He has served in various company-grade assignments, to include assistant effects coordinator, 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Benning; and XO and platoon leader, Battery A, 6th Battalion, 37th Field Artillery, 2d Infantry Division, Korea. Company Intelligence Section from Page 22