Camouflage - Air Superiority Indicator?

Camouflage- Air Superiority Indicator? by Paul J. Hoven and Joseph R. Burniece Camouflage has been a necessary element, indeed in many cases, a weapon, of warfare for thousands of years. Used for the purpose of entrapping an enemy force by ambush or simply for the purpose of remaining unseen, camouflage has proven the critical tool in many great battles. But camouflage as a function of combat forces seems, as is the case many times with most weapons, to wield the apparent double-edged sword of an indicator of otherwise unapparent strengths and weaknesses. One such indicator, we believe, may be found in the relationship between air superiority and combat vehicle camouflage. World War 1-1917-1918 Armored fighting vehicles, as originally employed for the “trench busting” actions of WWI, were meant to advance, destroy enemy machine gun positions, penetrate the line, and capture or destroy the enemy main artillery (and command centers and communications lines as well when possible). Naturally, to do so entailed the exposure of the tanks and the acceptance of a given level of hostile fire. In 1917, aircraft were only just entering the field of tactical bombing for practical results, as opposed to har-rassment, and posed little if any threat to the then current armored fighting vehicles. In this regard, since the tanks were not expected to hide from their ground opponents no camouflage for any purpose short of avoiding air spotting was required or used. Even WWI-vintage tanks were camouflaged in the 1930s. Interwar Years- 1920-1938 Between the war years, the various armies developed the tank as a weapon either for the decisive breakthrough, as in the case of the Germans and the British desert force, or for the support of the infantry forces as was the case with most armies. However, regardless of the type, quality, or combat capability of the armor, the various armies tended to “protect” their armor through the medium of camouflage, generally not when they had little armor available, but when they had little in the way of air assets. Poland- 1939 In Poland in 1939, the Poles, lacking a realistic armor complement, nevertheless considered that the Polish air force was at least capable of holding its own in air combat and their armor was painted in only one color. Although they understood that they were outnumbered, t h e concept of t h e “Blitzkrieg” had yet to be demonstrated. In days, however, the German air force pounced on the Polish air force to the extent that the Germans obtained total air supremacy and caught and destroyed the Poles on the ground. And in a few short weeks only the panzer gray painted tanks of the victorious German army remained. France-1940 Turning to France in the west in 1940, the Germans again committed their armor under their air umbrella. The Lufmafle was superior to the allied combined air forces by a factor of 3:2 in total aircraft (and qualitatively, was far superior) and could achieve local superiority over virtually any point of the line. The French army, the main allied ground forces, well understood their lack of air power both in terms of number of aircraft and when comparing modern types. Their armor forces, apparently as a measure of their under- 16 standing of their situation, were painted in a three-color scheme, the most elaborate to that point and especially significant since the entire French armored fighting force of some 3,500 tanks, was so camouflaged. The armor of the British forces committed to Europe at that time were, however, supported by a higher proportion of aircraft than were the French and in addition could rely on the superior performance of those aircraft in relation to the French and in some cases, German aircraft. Their tanks indicated this aspect as they were painted in a standard solid dark green. The Germans advancing with precision under their Luftwaffe were again in the panzer gray color with large white crosses painted on as the decks and turret identification marks, which were hardly conducive for ground combat survivability, but were of value for air identification. North Africa-1940 In North Africa, in the same time frame as the battle for France, the Italians had a sizable, but technologically inferior, air force and advanced across the border into Egypt against the British. Their vehicles were for the most part painted in an overall desert sand while their light scouting forces, noting that they would seldom obtain close air support, tended to employ two-color camouflage. The British, on the other hand, short of virtually every type of equipment, painted their fighting vehicles in a strange, three-color splinter pattern apparently because paint stocks were short as well. They achieved a surprising and stunning victory over the Italians at the border and chased them back to Tunisia. In both cases it will be noted that neither side expected great problems from the opponent’s air forces, and this seemed to have promoted an attitude that a solid base color matching the predominant terrain color was acceptable for purposes of ground-view camouflage. Greece-1940 In Greece, the Italians were finding the going very difficult and called for assistance from the Germans. Once again the German tanks in gray advanced under the Luftwaffe through Yugoslavia and into Greece, where they managed to drive the majority of the British forces into a precipitate retreat to the islands of the Mediterranean. On Crete and Malta, virtually lacking any air support of any kind, the British employed a unique brickwork paint pattern on their tanks which could ostensibly allow them to blend into the background of walls on the islands. A British Crusader II in typical desert camouflage pattern. North Africa-1941 tive in providing camouflage from Upon the successful conclusion of around and air forces. the battles for Greece and Crete, the Germans prepared for the invasion of North Africa-1942 Russia while sending a force of armor In the meantime, the war in Africa with Lutwaffeair support under Gener- continued to seesaw back and forth a1 Rommel to assist the Italians in with the GermadItalian forces more North Africa. Under the leadership of often than not at least slightly superior Rommel. the Germans and Italians in air strength to the British. Thus, by I 1942, both sides had settled for a solid attacked and drove the British all the way from the Tunisian border to the major port of Tobruk. Their air forces, again superior to the British, provided the apparent edge in confidence as the German and Italian armor attacked in either plain desert sand color or the same panzer gray with which the German tanks had been painted before unloading in Tunis. The British forces continued to employ the same three-color splinter pattern as they fell back from the Tunisian border and prepared for combat around Tobruk. Russia-1941 Entering Russia in 1941, the Germans again were preceded by their Luftwaffe and their armor was seen again in the standard punier gray. The Russians, with the largest tank and air forces in the world, in terms of numbers, were found to have painted their armor and air equipment in a single color. Although they enjoyed a great numerical advantage, the Russians were unable to meet the coordinated assaults of the German forces and suffered huge losses in planes and tanks. By the latter stages of the summer battles, lacking the air power to provide cover, the Russian tanks were covered with mud in an attempt to provide protection against observation and destruction by enemy aircraft. By late 1941, in front of Moscow, the Russians had prepared for and assumed the offensive. Both sides in an attempt to camouflage their vehicles adopted whitewash which would be very effec-color, in this case desert sanci, and little changed but the battle lines on the maps. This dual choice of solid color seemed to prove an indicator of air parity. However, at the furthest extent of the Axis drive for Egypt the Germans and Italians were halted at El Alamein where the sweeping desert battles were reduced to a set-piece infantry battle. At the limit of their air support range, the Germans and Italians started to paint their vehicles in a variety of camouflage schemes while the British, closer to their base support than ever before, now applied only two colors in some instances but remained mostly with solid sand color. Successful at El Alamein, the British pushed the Axis forces back to Tunisia. Tunisia- 1943 With the Axis hemmed in by two allied armies in Tunisia, both sides committed additional air forces which led the ground forces to the use of better camouflage techniques. Since both air forces were well skilled in the art of ground attack, the survival of the vehicles might well rest in the ability to remain undetected. The Americans had now entered the war. Their equipment, sporting large white or yellow stars on solid olive drab colored vehicles, seems indicative of the attitude that they had air superiority, which was certainly the case upon their arrival. It was only after their first major confrontation with the German forces at Kasserine and after a taste of German/ july-august 1984 17

Italian air power that the vehicles were rapidly covered with extemporized mud camouflage and later with various painted patterns in accordance with the Lufmafle period, Germ variety of colc gle solid coloi battle approacnea, me crerman unKs appeared in two-color camouflage apparently in direct proportion to the rising air superiority of the Allies. Russia-1942-43 Throughout 1942 and 1943 both sides committed heavy air forces along the lengthy fronts. In those sectors where the one air force gained superiority, the vehicles were camouflaged using a number of interim measures, while in areas of little air activity the tanks continued to be painted generally with only a single basic color, panzer gray or dark green for the Germans and Russians respectively. However, even in early 1943, the Germans had recognized the growing strength of the Red Air Force and had prepared special paints in three basic colors to be used on all vehicles. After the disastrous U.S. Army Epninnnr nattnrnq Rnmii~h battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943, virtually all German tanks received a two-color paint scheme and many adopted the three-color scheme as the Riiariin air fnrrn rnntinllnd tn Rrnw in in itaiy in late 1~43, me Aiiiea Iorces found that the Germans, far from withdrawing precipitously, were fighting for every foot they yielded. Faced with the situation that the German ground forces had immediate air support while the allies had to rely on air cover from Sicily, the allied armor was soon found in a variety of camouflage colors more often than not composed of up to three colors in irregular patterns. As the allies became firmly established ashore and transferred more aircraft to Italy fewer and fewer allied vehicles were found camouflaged. The case was reversed for the Germans who reverted to three-color schemes in early 1944. Europe-1944-45 By 1944, the allies in Normandy and the Soviets on the eastern front were able to maintain almost total air superi- A brush-covered Sherman fires on German positions in France in 1944. 18 july-august 1984 Complex French paint scheme, at far left, was Instituted in the 1930s. A German “Puma” armored car, above, in sand with sDraved sDlotches of red and ority and their vehicles, painted in either an olive drabor darkgreen, testified to the situation. On the German side, with the Lufmaflecommitted to halting the allied strategic bombing offensive over Germany, the German armor was generally found in at least two-and many times three-color camouflage. This period also produced the initial versions of the very intricate ambush splinter camouflage patterns. These patterns were usually of the standard three-color mottled design, but displayed a unique overpainting of small triangles and squares of opposite color shades (light over dark, green over mustard, etc.) which realistically simulate the effect of sunlight striking the ground after passing through foliage. Of course, such patterns could only be effective if the vehicles were generally free of mud, but with the continous infantry retreats, the German armored forces could often find the time to locate and prepare both a fighting position and the vehicle. To a great degree then, we can summarize the intricate camouflage pattern of this period as one that optimized a situation under an overwhelming air threat in which the designed protection could only be achieved by a defensive camouflage scheme. Ardennes-1944 In the Ardennes offensive of late 1944 (Battle of the Bulge) the Germans once again enjoyed local air superiority and appeared in the old solid panzer gray, in many cases even without the application of whitewash for the purpose of wintedground camouflage. The hoped for air cover failed, the German attack was broken and proved to be far less effective than had been hoped. And, perhaps, in confirmation of the overall air situation, the last German attack in April 1945 in the east was carried out by the Grossdeutchland Panzer division, whose tanks had received the best possible camouflage paint job of any tanks during the war. Undoubtedly, this was done because the Germans knew that the Red air force would make every effort to destroy the German armor. Korean War-1950-54 Five years after WWII, the West found itself engaged in a police action in Korea. Although the United Nations forces were to advance and retreat under the fortunes of war, they held virtual total air superiority. Under their air umbrella, U.N. forces appear not only did not use any special camouflage but many went so far as to paint unit insignias and provocative designs on their vehicles. This anti-camouflage could have only been used by a force that well knew that their opponent had nothing on the ground or in the air which could seriously contest their strength. India-Pakistan Conflict-1965 In this conflict, both sides possessed air forces but neither could claim a numerical superiority. The Indians, although granted by most observing militaries prior to the opening of hostilities to hold the best chance for victory due to a long and generally successful military history, failed to obtain any edge in the air. However, neither did the Pakistanis. Both sides’ forces went into combat with vehicles painted in a single solid color and maintained their vehicles in those colors for the duration of the conflict, apparently as a recognition of the general equality in air forces. Vietnam War- 1968-73 In Vietnam, the American forces were never seriously contested by major air actions and little in the way of North Vietnamese ground-support air activity was experienced. The mechanized units again provided a recognition factor of this “security” from both the air and ground by adopting the various armored forces were painted in solid unit designators as vehicle emblems colors. The Israeli vehicles were paint-while seldom if ever applying any cam- ed in a sand color with a blue air identi-ouflage. fication stripe. While the Arabs, in the case of the older equipment, had paint-Arab-Israeli “Six Day war’’-ed theirs sand, but in the case of the 1967 massive arms build-up from the Soviet In 1967, both the Arab and Israeli Union had left their new vehicles in the An M8 Howitzer carried a light screen of branches in this 1944 photo. This painted camouflage was typical of Japanese vehicles during all of WW II.

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F Facing no air opposition, some U.S. armor in Vietnam carried a sort of anti-camouflage, including drawings and sio-gans. same standard Soviet tactory green. The air forces, although everyone granted the Israelis’ professionalism, were counted as relatively equal due to the numerical superiority of the Arabs. As events were to prove, the 1967 war was concluded in the incredibly short span of only six days which obviously did not provide any opportunity for the Arabs to adjust their vehicles in terms of camouflage, but the results may be seen in the later war of 1973. Yom Kippur War-1973 Faced with what was immediately understood to be a technologically advanced and considerably better trained Israeli air force, the Arabs adopted various camouflage patterns: The Syrians-sand over Soviet green; the Egyptians-sand, with greenand red brown; the Jordanians- earth brown with sand. For their part, the Israelis removed the air identification stripe and fielded their new U.S.-supplied equipment in green, an apparent reversal of ground forces’ thinking in terms of air superiority. This thinking seems to remain the case today. Europe Today-Some Thoughts To gather these observations together we have only to look at the various forces in Europe today to make at least a general comment concerning their attitude about air superiority. I he Soviets maintain a large air force that is largely committed to ground attack and support. Their vehicles, in a single solid factory green, appear to tell the tale when matched against the various allied forces in their vari-colored camouflage schemes: Netherlands- three-color; BAOR-three-color; and Belgian Army-three-color. Of all the NATO allies, only West Germany has maintained tanks in a solid color of Bundeswehr gray. The U.S. Army has for the past decade carried four colors. Now, however, with the apparently successful conclusions of discussions between West German officials and the U.S. Army, both countries (and it is expected the forces of all other NATO members) will apply a new broad patch, three-color scheme. Naturally, these new patterns should be helpful in reducing the identification of NATO forces vehicles by country of origin. The abandonment of a camouflage system that was more meticulous in scientific detail than the ambush pattern of the long-ago heavily outnumbered German Wehrmacht is seen as a step forward in practical coloration. However, paint may only be an identifier of current attitudes concerning air superiority, and color schemes can change as rapidly as did the attitudes of the combatants in the Arab-Israeli wars. PAUL A. HOVEN served as a combat assault helicopter pilot and flight commander in Cambodia and Vietnam with the 9 t h Infantry Division. Upon his return to the U . S . , he completed h i s studies at the University of Minnesota and Mankato State University and received his bachelor degrees i n political science and education in 1973. H e is currently a weapons analyst and researcher with Summit Simulations, Inc.. where h e is involved in the design of tactical training systems. c

JOSEPH R. BURNIECE

attended t h e University of Minnesota where h e studied history and historical geography, receiving his bachelor degree in history in 1974. Upon graduation, he continued his studies in history with emphasis on the evolution of tactics and doctrine in response to t h e development of new weapons technology. H e is currently involved as a research analyst in the design and development of analytical training systems with Summit Simulations. Inc.. 20