Polish Cavalry Against the Panzers

. . . .. . ' 26 january-february 1984 , . .. Polish cavalrymen who batl panzers In 1939 were mounl obsolete lankeltel, like the TK upper left. Old Russian Puliiov Polish Cavalry Aga By Steven J. Tales of Polish cavalry charges against German tanks trl during the September 1939 campaign still remain widely ar believed even amon~,'st serious historians who are "other- a( wise skel>tical of similar German propaganda ex~es of cn the period. l The subject has been dealt with in extfnsive a1 detail by Polish military historians, but most oflhi~mate-VI rial is inaccessible to western historians due to the lan- U b'Uage barrier. The aim of this article is to briefly examine A the evolution of the Polish cavalry's t.actical antitank doc.'- th t.ri ne, and to examine it.s application in one of the actual M tank.vs-cavalry engagements of 1939. 1~ The anachronistic retention of a large cavalry arm, tu amounting to about. 10 percent of t.he Polish Army, after fa 1920, stemmed from the dominant. role played by mounted fo alrymen who ballled the German 1939 were mounted on horses or nkettes, like the TK-series vehicles at jld Russian Putilov field guns, above, rechambered lor more modern French ammunItion, were adequate against German light tanks, like the P'l:Kplw tB hit on the superstructure at upper right. Machlnegun sections and reconnalssance troops, below, also depended on the horses. But lancer regiments, like those seen at lower telt on maneuvers In 1938, had given up their lances prior to the German Invasion. ry Against the Panzers By Steven J. Zaloga ~nna n tanks main widely 10 are rother. :l cxcesses of in extfnsive ofthii;f ma~ c to thc Ian· efiy cxamine mlitank doc· [)f the actual avalry ann, Anny, after I by mounted troops in the 1920 Russo-Polish War.2 Although Polish army officers came to realize in the 1920's that widespread adoption of machineguns by the Red Army would drasti· cally reduce the viability of mounted charges, in the absence of a mechanized counterpart the cavalry was still viewed as a vital mobile force in the vast reaches of the Ukraine a nd Eastern Poland. Mechanization of the Polish Army was slowed by the conservative traditionalism of the cavalry as well as by formidable economic barriers. Mounted charges had been frequently successful in the 1920 war, but cavalry doctrine after that war gradually turned to the employment of the cavalry in a dragoon fashion, using the horses for mobility, but attacking on foot. In 1934, the lance was officially dropped except for • -- training. though the sabre was retained to supplement the standard arm of the cavalry, a 7.92-mm carbine of the Mauser pattern. Polish field regulations of the 1920's did not seriously (."Onsider cavalry·tank configurations as the Red Army had even fewer tanks than the Polish Army, and the Ger· man Reichswehr. by law, had none.3 The speedy b'Towth of Soviet tank forces in the 1929-32 period prompted the Poles to issue new instructions for the cavalry in 1933 dealing with antitank combat. ~ Enemy tanks were to be dealt with by the new "P" annor piercing machinegun ammunition and by cavalry, annored cars, and tanketles at short ranges. At greater ranges, horse artillery batteries were to be used. What was not appreciated at the time was that january-february 1984 27 only penetrate 9-mm of armor at 250 meters. Nevertheless, the 1933 instructions did not view antitank operations as a predominent concern of the cavalry, and foresaw no major difficulty in a direct tank-vs-cavalry engagement, if prop erly handled. By 1936, this view had completely changed. The Cavalry Department was shocked when the German cavalry began to be mechanized following the Nazi rise to power, and both Germany and the Soviet Union embarked on massive tank production programs. The 1937, cavalry instructions offered a more sophisticated tactical approach to dealing with armor than the 1933 instructions. The new instructions covered the organization of opposing forces, the use of terrain in defeating armor, and the means available to a cavalry brigade in defending against tanks. The instructions pointed out the revolutionary tactical implications of armored divisions and acknowledged that “cavalry forces will continually face (armored forces) and must learn to deal with them if they (Cavalry) are to fullill their assignments.”5 Several tactical modes were offered, mainly dealing with antitank defense against an attacking tank unit, and stressing the vulnerability of armored formations due to their long logistical trains and their supposed susceptibility to night attack by cavalry. The 1937 instructions finally recognized the central role that armored formations would play in a future war, but misperceived both the striking power of armored divisions and the means necessary to defeat them. These mispercep tions were based to some extent on Polish inexperience with armored formations larger than battalion size as well as internal controversy within the Polish Army over cavalry mechanization which made any objective evaluation of German or Soviet armored divisions very difficult. Officers outside the cavalry were irritated by the generosity shown to the cavalry brigades in the annual Polish military budget, and were skeptical of the cavalry’s reputed abilities in modem war. Polish cavalry brigades, though only 37-43 percent the size of infantry divisions on war footing, received 80 percent of the annual funding allotted to an infantry division due to the high cost of their mounts and their larger professional cadre during peace time.8 The Inspectors of the Army, such as General K. Fabrycy, were critical of the cavalry’s obdurate resistance to mechanization. In the course of these debates, the cavalry advocates denigrated the utility of mechanized units and exaggerated their weaknesses. This partisan squabbling contaminated the evolution of tactical doctrine by politicizing assessments of the German and Soviet armored forces. While the budgetary battles had an unfortunate impact on antitank doctrine, the cavalry’s reactionary position would have been given less credence elsewhere in the army had it not been for Poland’s own disappointing experience with tanks. The Polish armored force, until 1936, was equipped almost entirely with tankettes and light armored cars. The cavalry was very familiar with these vehicles as each cavalry brigade had an armored troop equipped with 13 TK or TKS tankettes and seven Model 1934 armored cars. The tankettes were so lightly armored that they were vulnerable to heavy machine gun fire under 250 meters and were only armed with a single machinegun. Their mobility was very limited and they were extremely prone to mechanical breakdown. The armored cars were little better, though some were equipped with short barrelled 37-mm guns of WWI vintage. Poland eventually manufac- 28 january-february 1984 TTP UgM Tank tured three battalions of excellent 7TP light tanks based on a modified British Vickers design, but these units were not active in the summer manuevers until 1938 and 1939. Polish cavalry officers failed to display the imagination to realize that counties which enjoyed more extensive technological facilities could develop armored vehicles which transcended the technical and operational fi-ailties of their own meager armored force. The 1927 instructions listed seven means for fighting enemy armored vehicles: antitank ammunition for rifles and machineguns hand grenades 37-mm antitank guns horse artillery brigade armored troops bombers engineer equipment Antitank ammunition for rifles and machineguns, gre nades, and brigade armor were all ineffective against German armor attacking frontally. Bombers would seldom be available and while valuable in attacking armored division trucks and transport, would not be very helpful against tanks due to the lack of shaped-charge bombs, rockets, or other dedicated antiarmor munitions. Mines were seldom available in quantities adequate to have any impact on ordinary tactical situations. This left only 37- mm antitank guns and artillery as the basis for antitank defense. The 1936 Polish army modernization program resulted in only two cavalry brigades being mechanized before the war’s outbreak, but it had dramatic results in increasing the antitank capabilities of the remaining cavalry brigades. Beginning in 1937, cavalry regiments each began receiving four 37-mm Model 36 antitank guns. These were licenseproduced guns of Swedish Bofors design and were the most effective guns of their size, capable of penetrating the armor of nearly any German tank of the period at ranges in excess of 1,000 meters. The Polish army also adopted a 7.92-mm Ur Model 1935 antitank rifle in 1937. This weapon used a novel tungsten-carbidecored bullet giving it effective armor penetration of most German tanks at 250 meters.9 The 1936 modernization program added 66 antitank rifles and 18 antitank guns to each 3-regiment cavalry brigade, and up to 78 AT rifles and 22 AT guns to a 4regiment cavalry brigade.1° In addition to these weapons, each cavalry brigade had a horse artillery troop with 12-16 75mm Model 02/26 field guns. These were old Russian Putilov 3-inchers with their barrels relined to chamber French 75mm ammunition. Although the armor-piercing capabilities of such field guns were limited, the concussive effects of their high

I TKS Tankette explosive rounds against the thinly armored German tanks of the period were quite lethal. The organization of Polish cavalry brigades was flexible and could consist of either three or four cavalry regiments, with or without a battalion of infantry, and supporting arms. The strength of a cavalry regiment was 842 men, slightly smaller than a Polish infantry battalion (941 men). The actual fighting strength of a cavalry regiment was somewhat less than an infantry battalion since a certain portion of the troops had to be assigned as horse handlers. The tales of Polish caGalry charges against tanks stemmed from a small skirmish near the village of Kre janty on the evening of 1 September 1939. Two squadrons of the 18th Lancers, after executing a successful charge against a German infantry battalion in a wood’s clearing, were suddenly attacked by two German armored cars, losing several dozen men before they could withdraw to a nearby copse.ll Italian journalists visiting the scene the next day were told that the troopers had been killed while charging tanks, and German propaganda further embellished the tales. Even the Poles have promoted the tales, if only as a metaphor for the bravery of Polish troops in 1939, although the tales of actual charges against tanks are not literally correct. A more representative example of cavalry-vs-tank action occurred on 1 September 1939 near Mokra between the Wolynian Cavalry Brigade and the 4th Panzer Division. The order of battle of the Wolynian Cavalry Brigade on 1 September was: 2nd Mounted Rifles 19th Lancers 4/84th Infantry 21st Lancers In addition to these units, on 28 August 1939, the Nr. 53 armored train “Smialy” was subordinated to the brigade to provide further artillery supp0rt.1~ The Wolynian Cavalry Brigade, part of Army Lo& in 1939, was assigned to the Ostrowy region on the German border and formed a link between the southernmost element of Army Lodz, the 30th Infantry Division, and the northernmost element of Army Krakow, the 7th Infantry Division. The brigade was assigned a sector of the front in excess of 10 km which, according to Polish tactical doctrine, was greater than prudent for such a unit. Overextension of Polish units in the 1939 disposition was one of the primary shortcomings of the defense Plan Z. The main strength of the brigade was in the woods surrounding the village of Mokra which was made up of three hamlets.13 The German border was 510 km to the west and interposed between the frontier and the brigade were screening elements of the 7th Infantry Division consisting of an infantry company, a divisional cavalry platoon (in Krzepice) and the remainder of the 7th Infantry’s divisional cavalry in Wilkowiecko. The main strength of the 7th Infantry Division was in and around Klobuck to the south, and elements of the 30th Infantry Division held the line as far south as Popow. The terrain available to the Wolynian Cavalry Brigade was very suitable for defense, with the Liswarta River to the north offering a measure of flank security, and woods extending across the whole length of the Brigade front. In addition there was Hill 268 near Opatow and Hill 258.6 near RebieliceKrolewskie offering good vistas towards the German frontier. (see map 1.) Colonel Filipowicz, Wolynian Cavalry Brigade CO., decided to adopt a typical “hedgehog” defense which 2nd Horse Artillery 12th Lancers 21st Armored Troop i 1 january-february 1984 29

Armored Train No. 53 supported Polish cavalrymen during the Battle of Mokra. meant concentrating the bulk of the forces, with reserves, in the center, with mounted squadrons scouting beyond the perimeter. The most difficult assignment went to the 21st Lancers which held the center near the forest opening leading into Mokra. A platoon of the 1st squadron was assigned to scout on horseback towards Krzepice, the 3d squadron with twemachinegun taczankas (tankettes) and a Bofors AT gun set up screening positions on Hill 268. The 2d Squadron held the north shoulder of the forest opening in shallow entrenchments, the 4th Squadron the south shoulder, and the remainder of 1st Squadron took up flank security duties on a hill near RebieliceKrolewskie. The northern portion of the woods was held by the 19th Lancers with their scouting patrols out as far as Dan-kow.14 The southern woods east of Brzezinki was held by the 4/84th Infantry and behind them, south of Kolaczko-wice, was the 11th Rifle Battalion. The 2d Mounted Rifles held the woods east of Lobodno, and the 12th Lancers were held as brigade reserves in the fields near Miedzno. The brigade’s fire support came from the 2d Horse Artillery, located in the woods behind Mokra, and from Nr. 53 armored train, riding the rails through the forest near Mokra. Brigade headquarters were located in Ostrowy and communication was by radio, field telephone and mounted courier. The cavalry troops had one day to dig in before the war’s outbreak and except for the patrols and squadrons on observation duty, all the units were dismounted with their horses held about 1 km behind their positions. Facing the Wolynian Cavalry Brigade was the 4th Panzer Division consisting of 2 tank regiments, a mote rized rifle brigade and supporting units. The 4th Panzer Division was more than double the size of its opponent with about 13,000 men and had 324 tanks, 101 armored cars, 28 field artillery pieces, 48 37-mm antitank guns and 12 antiaircraft guns. The majority of the division’s vehicles were light PzKpfw I and PzKpfw II tanks armed with twin machineguns and a 20-mm autocannon respectively. The boundary separating the 4th Panzer Division from the 18th Infantry Division to its north was roughly the Lis-warta River, while its southern partner, the 1st Panzer Division, attacked Klobuck directly. First blood was drawn around dawn on 1 September when a German Hs123 observation plane was brought down by machinegun fire. At 0600 the 21st Lancers received a mounted courier indicating that border positions near Krzepice had been overrun, and around 0630 a small German motorcycle scouting patrol was forced back by rifle fire from 4/83 Infantry. A serious problem began to develop when the Germans began machinegunning the small hamlets west of the Mokra positions. Civilians began fleeing in a wave towards the cavalry positions, and the commander of the 21st Lancers was &aid the Germans would take advantage of this situation and use the civilians as a screen. Patrols were sent out on horseback to break up the panicking mob. Polish scouting patrols began to return to brigade positions under German pressure, and while covering these withdrawals, the AT gun on Hill 268 destroyed one German tank. The main assault against the cavalry positions did not materialize until 0800. About 25 tanks began an advance towards Wilkowiecki. The tanks took advantage of the buildings to hide from artillery fire from the 2d Horse Artillery, but eventually emerged from the hamlet, guns blazing. The heavy machinegun fire from the German tanks set the thatched roofs of several houses in Mokra on fire, but the Poles held fire until the German tanks were only 150 meters away. The 21st Lancers had three 37-mm AT guns which quickly claimed 4-6 tanks, forcing the Germans to withdraw. Although the German tanks were originally supported by a battalion of infantry, the infantry was driven off by machinegun and artillery fire before they were able to get within 400 meters of Polish lines. At the same time as the main thrust against the 21st Lancers, a threepronged attack was launched against the 19th Lancers to the north. This attack, preceded by motorcycle scouts, was quickly broken up. In the wake of these attacks, Colonel Filipowicz decided to commit the reserves, and sent the 12th Lancers to take up position on the eastern side of the forest clearing behind Mokra and behind the rail line. A single squadron under Rittmeister (cavalry captain) Hollak mounted up to scout around Wilkowiecki after the Germans had withdrawn. Around 1O00, the Germans launched another attack against the center, direded mainly against the northern shoulder of the forest opening. Rittmeister Hollak’s patrol met this attack near Wilkowiecki, and the Polish patrol quickly withdrew into the village, taking up positions in the abandoned buildings. This patrol would be cut off from the brigade for most of the day, fighting a savage battle with German infantry until dark. The attack on the woods was preceded by artillery and air strikes, but the tanks this time were more cautious than before, taking advantage of terrain to advance closer to the Polish positions. The tanks were brought under fire by Nr. 53 armored train and by the 2d Horse Artillery. Over a dozen tanks were disabled before the Germans withdrew. The Germans launched another twepronged attack around 1100, with infantry against the wooded positions of the 19th Lancers in the north and with 1520 tanks against Mokra. About half the tanks were disabled by artillery and antitank guns, although the repeated tank attacks and artillery fire were 30 as both sides tended to the many woinded. Colonel Fii-ipowicz had requested bomber support, only to be informed that none could be expected. Around 1300, the 4th Panzer Division launched its most vigorous attack of the day against the Mokra clearing using about 100 tanks in two waves. The first wave overran one of the antitank guns at the clearing opening, and the tanks burst into the Mokra hamlets. As more German tanks began to pour into the clearing, the situation became extremely confused with the Germans receiving fire from several directions. Several German tanks managed to approach the positions of the 2d Horse Artillery from the rear, nearly wiping out the 2d Battery, but the fire of Nr. 53 armored train was brought to bear.15 This melee lasted about an hour with the Germans finally withdrawing. Both sides had suffered stiff casualties, and the Germans had left behind many prisoners and wounded tank crews. In view of the serious casualties among 21st Lancers, this regiment was pulled back from the western woods to the area behind the rail line in order to reinforce the 12th Lancer already stationed there.16 Anticipating a similar attack against the northern positions, Filipowicz sent Nr. 53 armored train to the Miedzno area around 1400 and it was damaged in transit by air attack.17 Around 1500 an attack was launched from the RebieliceKrolewskie area but was eventually pushed back. The Germans made the last attack of the day on Mokra at about 1600 with German tanks again entering the clearing and trying to overrun the Polish positions along the rail line. By this time, the Germans were taking more care to support the tanks with infantry, and heavy losses inflicted on the 12th Lancers prompted the regimental commander to telephone the brigade headquarters and request relief. Filipowicz told him that the rail line had to be held at all costs. Even though the 21st Armored Detachment had no armor-piercing ammunition for the machineguns of its tankettes, it was sent into action to bolster the morale of the Polish troops and to break up the German infantry.18 Machinegun fire from the German tanks was so heavy that one Polish survivor of the battle recalled that shreds of leaves fell into the trenches like snow. Antitank rifle fire and artillery fire finally broke the back of the German attack, and the tanks began withdrawing in some confusion.19 During attempts by Nr. 53 armored train to withdraw southward to support the Mokra positions, the train encountered a column of German tanks which had broken through the gaps between the 19th Lancers in the north and the 12th and 21st Lancers in the south. The tank column was destroyed by pointblank artillery fire and its supporting infantry badly mauled by machinegun fire. However, the train was unable to move southward as planned. Following a frustrating and costly day of fighting, Major General von Hartlieb ordered the German 12th Rifle Regiment and the 49th Antitank Battalion to hold the terrain captured on the western side of Mokra. The patrol of Rittmeister Hollak broke out of its trap near Wilkowiecki late that night, and rejoined the brigade a b u t 0700 on 2 September. Polish losses from the Mokra battle were 8 officers killed and 19 wounded, 182 enlisted men killed and about 300 were wounded.Z0 Three 75mm guns and two 37-mm guns were destroyed as well as one tankette and four armored cars. Although continual air attacks on Polish positions had resulted in only modest personnel casualties, the Stu- ~~~ u I I half of whichcan be &aced to the Mokra battle. There were at least an equal number of tanks knocked out but repairable at Mokra, and a significant number of trucks, motor-cyles and armored cars were destroyed. During the night of 112 September, the Poles withdrew to a second line of defense about 5 km to the east, and on 2 September, again succeeded in repulsing all attacks by the 4th Panzer Division. However, on 3 September, the Wolynian Cavalry Brigade was finally forced to retreat when the infantry divisions on its flanks were broken through. This allowed the 4th Panzer Division to make its famous dash to Warsaw. The success of the Wolynian Cavalry Brigade on 1 and 2 September in repulsing the attacks of a force considerably larger and with far greater firepower than itself is illustrative of both the excellent training and tenacity of Polish cavalry in the 1939 fighting. Footnotes I Probably one of the best known, and least accurate, accounts of this sort appears in: Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (Ballantine: NY, 1968). p. 53. 4 Norman Davies, White Eagle. Red Star: The Polish Soviet War 19191920 bndon, 1972). For a complete discussion of Polish military doctrine in this period see: Stanislaw Feret, Polish Military Doctrine 1918-1939. (WNON Warsaw, 1972). 4 Current Instructwns on Caualry Antitank Defense 19 July 1933. MS Wojsk Department Kawalerii (CAW GISZ 193/3). 5 Directive on Cavalry Combat with Armored Forces 1937, MS Wojsk Department Kawalerii Nr. 2802, (CAW GISZ279). fi Eugeniusz Kozlowski, The Polish Army 1936-39. (WMON Warsaw, 1974).

D. 70. Steven Zaloga, “Polish Armour 1939” Airfix Magazine Annual 7, (PSL Andrzej Konstankiewia, Model 1936 Anti-tank Gun, W O N : Warsaw, Cambridge, UK. 1977).

1477) n 16 -l. .,, r_ 9 Andrzej Konstankiewia, “Model 1936 Anti-tank Rifle Ur”. Wojskowy Przelglad Techniczny, 4/1978, p. 39. lo “The Problem of the Combat Value of the Cavalry of the Independent 11 Republic and Methods for its Evaluation,” Zeszyty Naukowe- Wydzialu HumanistycznegeHistoria nr. 8 (Uniwersytet Gdanski Gdansk 1978). 1 ) Major Stanislaw Malecki, “Account of the Charge of the 18th Lancer Regiment at Krojanty”, Bellona. 311954, pp. 32-36. I? Janusz Magnuski. Armoured Train “Danuta”, (WMON Warsaw. 1972). 1:’ Col. Leon Mitkiewicz, The Cavalry of the Independent Polish Republic in the 1939 War. (ZKiAKwAP: Toronto, l W ) , p. 115116. Lt. Col. Antoni Skiba, Combat of the 19th Wolysqi Lancer Regiment in the September Campaign. (WPKiBP: London, 1971), pp. 2830. Ti Karol Galster. Album of the Polish Artillery 1914-1939, (KOAPnO London, 1975), pp. 335337. The Polish Armed Forces in the Second World War: The September Campaign 1939. Vol. I, Part 2, (Sikorski Institute: London, 1952). p. 158. 17 Marian Zebrowski, Outline History of the Polish Armored Force 1918- 1947 (ZZKOBP London, 1971). p. 121. 18 Major Rajmund Szubanski, “The Polish Armored Force in the 1939 War, Part I,“ Wojskouly Przeglad Historyczne, 3/1970, p. 293. 19 Major Izydor Malinowski, “Battle at Mokra,” Wojskowy Przeglad His-tnrcznr. 31979. D. 1%. Jan Wroblew&i-Armia M z

1939, (WMON Warsaw, 1975), p. 69. STEVEN J. ZALOGA is group director of Aerospace Products, DMS Inc., a defense-oriented market research firm. He received his MA in history from Columbia University, specializing in modern Polish history, and did graduate research with the History Institute, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland. He is also the author of a dozen books on tanks and tank history.

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