Armor Technology: Part V. Crew Su wiva bi I i t y

Armor Technology Part V: Crew Survivability by Joseph E. Backofen, Jr. This is the last article of the series on tanks and the technologies of annor penetration, armor, and survivability. The U.S. and NATO have become very concerned with the cost of armored vehicles for land warfare, such as the Abrams, Leopard II, and the Bradley. This is an important concern because it is obvious that there will be a limited number of these vehicles and that many of them 611 be damaged in combat. Throughout this series of ARMOR articles the principal means of armor protection for these vehicles and armor penetration have been explored; but the true philosophy behind this exploration has not been fully disclosed. This latter is simply, Only the Crew Counts. Furthermore, this philokophy is apparently not such an extreme viewpoint because Sweden and Israel have taken the same approach in the design of the S-Tank and the Merkava, re~pedively.~-~ There are many reasons for placing the protection and survival of the crew above all materiel and its associated costs. On one hand, the easiest to understand are the feelings of those who have used armored vehicles in combat. Similarly, another easily understood point is that trained armor troops perform best when protected by stout armor4 and are usually sacrificed carelessly when put out as infantr~.~ Furthermore, the costs of training and replacing personnel have also been well noted before considering the complexities of modem armored vehicles and their onboard equipment.’. 6- Yet, on the other hand, one can note the attitude from the feelings of Israeli Centurion crews toward American-made Pattoms and the following quote from an Israeli infantry commander regarding armored personnel carriers9 and the attitude troops have when they do not have confidence in the ability of their materiel to provide ade quate protection. “In the first engagement we had trouble getting the troops to dismount from the protective womb of the APCs, but after witnessing the flaming destruction of entire squads in vehicles hit by antitank fire, we had trouble getting the troops back in.” The principal reason for the catastrophic loss of manned armored weapons platforms whether they be naval battle cruisers such as the Invincible, Indefatigable or the Hood, or armored vehicles such as the M-4, T-55, M60, and M113 is the destruction caused by intense ammunition and fuel fires inside the armored hull. 2, However, before discussing these, it is important to remember the sequence “don’t be seen; if seen, don’t be hi$ if hit, survive.’’ This sequence is most important because it is the exact opposite of that pronounced by the electronics and “thetank-is-dead” lobbies that preach: “What can be seen can be acquired, acquired, hit; hit, penetrated and defeated.”14 Camouflage, radiation suppression or absorption, and

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january-february 1984 21 hiding behind other materials, such as hills and buildings, are implied by “don’t be seen”.14. l5 The results of numerous studies and practical experience have shown that camouflage is effective when you are stationary. However, it is not really meaningful to mobile armored forces unless they are either broken down @e., stopped) or hiding from the enemy. It is also not particularly effective if the enemy reconnoiters by lire using improved conventional munitions (bomblets) or denies potentially hostile areas by using rapidly emplaced mines. Still, a vehicle paint scheme is necessary and can at least be selected to blend into the local terrain so as to reduce the speed with which one is discovered and acquired.16. l7 The general trend toward running helter skelter or seeking “hit avoidance” has been discussed in ARMOR Magazine and has been associated with the rapid movement across or about the battlefield and was expresed as high mobility and &ty. There are a few natural constraints that limit the usefulness of hit avoidance such as; fuel consumption and availability, mines, terrain, equipment failure and wear, and the buddy who has already moved forward to hide behind the lone rock on the battlefield. Bounding about on the battlefield will also not be conducive to camodage. The basic problem with “hit avoidance’’ advocates and the philosophy of the “hit-equals-kill” electronics community is that they are putting their money on armor being a fighter with a “glass jaw.” The tables can be completely turned if armored vehicles become capable of absorbing some hits and still be capable of reaching out and punishing the enemy. The way to achieve this is to make them survivable. And in particular, the crew must be kept alive with the will and the means to fight. The fist major survivability problem to be tackled is that of the vulnerability of ammunition. Many years before the advent of tanks, it was noted that warships were mostly destroyed when a magazine was hit. Thus, the magazines were moved deep within the ship below the waterline so that they would not be exposed to enemy direct fie.’” In tanks, a similar principle is to locate the ammunition as low as possible below the turret ring so that it will not be hit when a shapedcharge jet or kinetic energy (KE) penetrator perforates the armor and passes through the interior. This principle has been given credit for the survivability rate of the Centurions and has been applied in the S-Tank, Chieflia~,‘~ ChallengeP and T-72.21 However, keeping the ammunition stowed low in a vehicle, and still requiring it to be manhandled into the gun during battle, generates the problem of ready rounds either stowed or temporarily located in the turret. In ships, it was noted that the rounds in the turret and these on the ammunition hoist could propagate an explosion and cause the magazine to explodez2 The Germans used interlocking doors so that the ammunition was fuUy compartmentalized at all times preventing it being easily exploded and sinking the ship.= In an armored land vehicle, any main gun round struck in either its high explosive or propellant charge by a shapedeharge jet or a KE penetrator is likely to cause the death of the crew.23 Thus, it is important that all ammunition be compartmented with blast proof doors that separate the crew and the ammunition. Both the MI Abrams and Leopard 11 have applied the technology of separate, explosion-proof compartmentation of ammunition in order to enhance the survivability of the crew and the v e h i ~ l e . ~ ~ . ~ It was long known that wet propellant was difficult to ignite or use in a gun. Aboard ships, magazines were flooded to keep them from being destroyed by fies. In armored vehicles, “wet stowage” was fielded in late production, 76-mm armed Shemans in the form of water jacketsl2, 26 “so that any projectile or splinter which penetrated as far as the ammunition would puncture the water-jacket and release water over the ammunition SO as to smother any possible fire.”” Many of these vehicles were supplied to the Soviet Union or Great Britain.z6 Originally, the Wmm ammunition for the T-26El was also 22 stowed in water-protected bins in the floor of the fighting compartment.27 However, this was sacrificed so that more ammunition could be squeezed into the tank and also so that the ammunition would be more a~cessible.~~ Later, when the British considered improving the survivability of their tanks during the development of the Chieftain, they consulted the Royal Navy about the vulnerability of bagged propellant charges versus those in metal cartridge cases.2 They discovered that: “when cased charges were hit they usually disrupted on impact. This was attributed to a rapid rise of pressure when the hot projectile or fragment reached the cordite. When bagged charges were struck delays of several seconds were often noted whilst the cordite smoked before igniting; so experiments were made to see if tires could be prevented by water cooling the cordite during the delay period.”lg This research led to the ammunition water jackets used in both the Chieftian and the new Similar research has recently been conducted with the German 120-mm ammunition for the Leopard 11 and has used high-pressure water jackets.% This technique also uses the introduction of the water to quench the propellant by lowering the temperature and pressure thus minimizing the total reaction and its 29 However, water jackets increase each round of ammunition’s volume, causing either the ammunition compartments to increase or the number of rounds carried to be reduced. If one truly believes in new fire control equipment that will make very efficient use of the ammunition, then decreasing the number of rounds carried to make the vehicle more survivable may now be acceptable design practice. Since it is generdy accepted that a properly designed ammunition compartment can save the crew from the effects of propellant charges being struck by shapedcharge jets and KE penetration debris, the natural q u e tion arises as to whether the effeds of high explosive warheads could be similarly contained. Recent research has indicated that the vulnerability of the warheads themselves to impact can be reduced,% that fratricide between warheads can be controlled to some and that structures can be designed to successfully contain or vent high explosive eventsB However, it is too early to predict for certain whether ammunition stowage could be engineered so as to sustain hits directly into high explosive illed ammunition. In the interim, such ammunition could possibly be handled in jettisonable magazines such as has been investigated in Sweden.32,33 The removal of ammunition into a stowage comparb ment separate from the crew compartment brings up the question of automatic loaders that could be used to make this removal complete, to increase the rate of tire of the gun, and to reduce the overd cubic volume of the weapon station. Automatic loaders for tanks were considered as early as late 1943 on the 222E1, f%ng 75mm ammunition.n Automatic loaders have been considered and prob typed for numerous U.S. tanks such as the Ma, T-90, T-92, and MBT-70, as well as the recent test bed vehicles, such as HIMAG and HSTVL. Apparently, the ability of the U.S. to field an automatic loader for tanks is still being questioned as a critical issue in the latest test bed program “. . . . do we have the technology to provide a safe, reliable automatic loader for a main tank gun?”34 However, aute matic loaders have been fielded in the French AMX-13 light tank, the Swedish S tank, and the Soviet T-64 and T-72 tanks?, 13.21, 24 Hopefully, the technology of autoloaders can be used in future US. tanks to complete the separation of the crew and the ammunition to enhance the survivability of both of them. The second major survivability problem is associated with the vehicle’s fuel and lubricants. In a sense, this prob lem is similar to the well-publicized problems involving Ford Pintos that were hit in the rear during auto accidents. The safety hazards associated with gasoline stowed in the tank‘s crew compartment were recognized very early in the 1930’s and resulted in suggestions that diesel fuel and engines be used for reasons of both safety and fuel economy (which would result in less fuel being needed to be stowed for a specific range capabilityJ6 The Soviets were the first to switch to diesel engines, using them in the production versions of BT-7M tanks from 1939 on so that they could take advantage of the increased range for a given weight and volume of However, it must be remembered that research on their engine had started as early as 1932.36 Furthermore, they had recognized the survivability problems associated with using gasoline and the vapors from engines in the design of the T-28 tank in 1932 by stowing the fuel in two armored compartments mounted on each side above the tracks and by using a fireproof bulkhead between the crew and engine compartment.% (An additional benefit of the Soviet engine research conducted with the “fast tanks” of the 1930’s was the mobility and agility experimentation performed on test ranges and battlefields with test beds having horsepower-toweight ratios of around %I). During WWII, the Germans switched over from gasoline to diesel fuel while the U.S. and Britain used d i e l engines in a few vehicles, mostly when gasoline engine production was insufficient.”*

12. 35 This was greatly influenced by the War Department policy that US. troops would only be supplied with gasolinepowered tanks, which resulted in U.S.-manufactured, diesel-pow& tanks being supplied to the Soviet Union and Great Britain under Lend-lease.% Furthermore, the decision to fully favor diesel in design practice appears to have occurred in Britain about 1956 and in the US. in late 1956 with the trial installation of an AVDS-1790-P in an M-48 tank that led to the present M60 series tanks.24, 35 The vulnerability or survivability of gasoline, diesel fuel and hydraulic fluid are generally attributed to their flammability. However, burning pools of these and other mate rials release their energy over a long period of time and can usually be quenched by tire extinguishers. The real problem is associated with their vapors or with aerosols produced by weapon impact (shapedcharge jet or KE ~ e n e t r a t o r ) . ~ ~ ~ This is because the vapors and aerosols provide a very large surface that can “bum” so rapidly as to cause an explosion such as happens in the cylinders of an engine. The hazards of such explosions are well known in industries such as chemical manufacturing, oil refining, coal mining, grain silo storage, and spray painting.4043 Similarly, the methods of protecting personnel by means of proper equipment design, remote automatic operation, blast bulkheads, and automatic flamespread suppression are well known to plant and industrial equipment builders.- The difference between these industrial hazards and crew-killing explosions is that the conditions for their occurrence are deliberately caused by an enemy shooting through a fuel tank placed inside the crew compartment. The best way to provide for crew and vehicle survivability from fuel fires appears to be by placing the fuel in lightly armored, self-sealing multiple fuel cells located outside the principal armored envelope as suggested by Brigadier Simpkin and practiced by some designers.11,13,36,44 This would remove the initial hazard from the crew and would also not subject them to the effects of a fire suppression ~ y s t e m . ~ ~ - ~ Additional technology adapted h m the january-february 1984 23 aircraft industry which is concerned with crash-proof fuel tanks as well as battle damage assessments. could be used to provide fuel tank resistance to explosions and fire. For example, nitrogen-inerting of the empty portion of the fuel tank could be used to hold down the formation of fuel vapora Another method would be to use foams, foils, or powders within the fuel tank to soak up the shock wave generated by weapon penetration and to absorb the heat so that fuel is not raised to its ignition temperature.4548 Employing some of these methods may permit the use of the fuel as an integral part of the armor system as pre viously suggested in ARMOR Magazine. If the primary destroyers of the crew and vehicle (ammunition and fuels) are removed from the crew mm-partment, then only the effeds of the attacking weapon overmatchjng the armor are left as hazards to the crew. As previously discussed in ARMOR Magazine, the spall pro duced from the rear surface of metallic armors produces a signiscant hazard. However, spall liners, can very effectively reduce this hazard. (See “Improving Combat Crew Survivability,” by Donald R. Kennedy, ARMOR, July-August 1983. Ed.) Furthermore, the hazard of very fine debris and larger fragments is not unlike that faced by the tankers of WWI where bdet splash entered through numerous cracks, crevices, etc. As protection, the tankers developed and wore safety goggles, helmets with a silk curtain that draped around their necks to their shoulders, and body protecti011.4~ More recently, Israeli tank crews have been provided with bulletproof goggles, light armor vests, fireproof gloves, and overalls.5o The application of the modem technologies used in police vests, executive protective clothes, and lightweight helmets should be cap able of comfortably providing enhanced ballistic protection while both inside and outside an armored v e h i ~ l e . ~ ~ - ~ There is little doubt that these protective measures will enhance survivability of individual crew members. They may also help to enhance crew effectiveness on the battle field. Such an increase in effectiveness was obtained by the Mongol hordes of Genghis-Khan who wore tightly woven silk undergarments to capture and arrest arrows and other weapons that pierced their leather and metal outer 55 The ability of their Chinese doctors to remove the offending weapon, leaving a puncture wound treatable with the medicine and herbs of that period, sig-nZcantly helped to return battletrained soldiers to their ranks.% Another point that should not be overlooked by military planners is that logistically it is much more efficient and less expensive to provide for survival of personnel at the front than to collect, train, and transport repla~ements.~ Although body armor and protective suits can provide protection from spall and high speed debris, they do not yet necessarily provide safety from blast overpmsures. These blast overpressures can be caused by the ignition of the ammunition and fuel, if they are within the crew compartment. However, they can also be caused by “vaporific” explosions from light metal armors. As previously discussed in ARMOR Magazine this can be caused by shaped chargejet perforation of aluminum armor.56, s7 However, it can occur with any finely divided reactive material that is Footnotes R Simpkin, “Tank Warfare: An Analysis of Soviet and NATO Tank Philosophy,” Crane Russak & Co., Inc., N.Y., 1979. 2 D. Crow, ed. “Modern Battle Tanks,” Arco Publishing Co.. Inc., N.Y., 1 m a 6yEshe1, “The Merkava Tank,” War Data Number 10. Eshel-Dramit Ltd., Hod Hasharon, Israel, 1981. 4 R. RhoderickJones, “A Soldier’s Tank,” RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Sep, 1975, pp 30-34 5 “Translation of Taped Conversation with General Hermann Balck” on 12 January 1979. Battelle Columbus Laboratories, Tactical Technology Center, January 1979. 8 J. K. Christmas, “Tanks andTactics” ADiscussionof Mechanization and Automotive Ordnance: Army Ordnance, Vol. XVII, No. 100, January-February 1937, pp 208214. J.F. Dunnigan, “How To Make War: A Comprehensive Guide To Modern Warfare,” ‘William Morrow & Co., Inc., N.Y., 1982.

S. Dunstan, The Centurion Tank in Battle,”Osprey Publishing Ltd., London, 1981. 9 P.A. Karber, ‘TheGrowingArmor/Anti-ArorImbalancein Central Europe,” Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 118, No. 11, Whole No, 5676, July 1981, pp 37-48. l o J. Batchelor, et al., “Fighting Ships of World Wars One and Two,” Crescent Books, N.Y., 1976. I.V. Hogg, “Armor in Conflict: TheDesign and Tactics of A m w e d Fighting Vehicles,” Jane’s Publishing Inc., N.Y., 1980. l 2 P. Chamberlin & C. Ellis, British and American Tanks of World War 22,” Arc0 Publishing Co., Inc., N.Y., 1969. l 3 S.J. Zaloaa. “Modern Soviet Armor.” Prentice-Hall. Inc., Ennlewood . . -

Cliffs. N.J..-1979. I 4 W. T. McLarty, Jr., “Technolo ‘Implications: The Need For Change,” Mlitary Review, Vol. LXIE No. 1, January 1983, p.p 47-57. 15 V.D Velikanov, et al., “Radar Absorptive Coahngs,” Chap. 6 in Radr-oteknicheskive Sistemv v Raketnov Tekhnike. edited bv V.I. Galkin. et . . -

Cliffs. N.J..-1979. I 4 W. T. McLartv. Jr.. “Technolo ‘Implications: The Need For Vol. LXIE No. 1. January 1983, pp 47-57. Radi-nike. edited bv V.I. Galkin. et al., Voyenizdh, Moscob 1974. “ 16 K. Mackse Tank &acts and Feats,” Guinness Superlatives Ltd., Enfield, Midaesex, England, 1980. 17 S. Reit, “Masquerade: The Amazing Camouflage Deceptions of World War 11, Hawthorn Books, Inc., N.Y. 1978.

W. Hovgaard, “Modern History 0 ) Warships,” 1920 reprinted by US. Naval Institute, 1971. l9 G. Forty, “Modern Combat Vehicles: I, Chieftan,” Charles Scribner’s Sons, N.Y., 1980. 20 R. M. Ogorkiewicz “British Army Introduces the Challenger,” $mor, Vol. XCI, No. 2. March-April 1982 pp 32-36. “T-72,” Armor, Vol. XC, No. 6, Novemder-December 1981, p 30-33 22 B. Fitzsimons, ed., “Warships BE Sea Battles of World War f’’ Beekman House, Crown Publishers, N.Y., 1973. 23 J.J. White, 111, “Containment and Control of Explosions,” Proceedings of the 11th Symposium on Explosives and Pyrotechnics, Franklin Research Center of The Franklin Institute, Philadelphia, PA, September 15-17, 1981. 24 january-february 1984 2‘ C. F. Foss. “Jane’s A m u r and Artillerv 1979-80.” Jane’s USA. a division of F k k l i n Watts, Inc., N.Y., 1979.- 25 D.H.C. Jenkins, “Abrams and Leopard 2-A User’s View of the Hea-vyweights,” International Defense Review, Vol. 14, No. 12, 1981, pp 1657.1 664 -I_ _. 26 R.P. Hunnicutt, “Sherman: A History of the American Medium Tank,” Taurus Enterprises, Bdmont, CA, 1978. 27 R.P. Hunnicutt, “Pershing. A History of the Medium Tank 220 Series,” Feist Publications, Berkeley, CA, 1971. 28 H.W. Nebel, “Basic Investigations on Countermeasures to Reduce Vulnerability of On-Board Ammunition,” proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Ballistics, Toulouse, France, April 1980, paper VI1 9. 29 B.T. Eroklin & Yu. I. Fedorov, “Rate of Fall of Chamber Pressure Following the Injection of a Coolant,” Fizika Goreniya i Vzryua, No. 4. October-December 1971, pp 492-497. 3O P.M. Howe & R.B. Frey, “Catastrophic Reaction of Compartment+- ized Ammunition-Causes and Preventive Measures,” Ballistic Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 1978 presented at Eighteenth Explosives Safety Seminar, El Tropicano Motor Hotel, San Antonio, TX, 12-14 September 1978 (available from National Technical Information Service as ADA 056 448 or in ADA 066 569). 3’ J. Thomas & P.M. Howe, “Effectiveness Testing for Antipropagation Shields Developed for M456 HEAT Tank Ammunition,” U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, Sep tember 1981, (available from NTIS as ADA 107037). 32 “UDES XX-20: A Revolutionary AFV Design,” Military Technology, Vol. VI, Issue 3,1983, pp 35-39. 33 R. Simpkin, “The Future of Swedish Armor,” Armor, Vol. XCI, No. 4, July-August 1982, pp 11-16. 34 D.eW. R. Hoeltzel, S. Sawka & P. Cag, “2 Fighting Vehicle Concept Designs,” Army R,D&A, Vol. 23, No. 6, November-December 1982, p 19. 35 R. M. Ogorkiewicz, “Design and Development of Fighting Vehicles,” Doubleday & Co., Inc., Garden City, N.Y., 1968. 36 J . Milsom, “Russian Tanks 1900-1970: The Complete Illustrated History of Soviet Armoured Theory and Design,” Stackpole Books, Hamsburg, PA, 1971. 37 R. Meller, “SAFE-a Fire and Explosion Sup ression System for Combat Vehicles,”InternationalDefenseReuieLu, bo]. 12, No 1,1979, pp 75-76. 38 R. J. L. Dicker, “Countering the Crew-Corn artment Explosion: An Automatic Fire Su pression System From kughes,” International Defense Review Vof 12, No. 5,1979, pp 816-816. 39 R. J. L. Dicke;, “AFV Fuel FireSuppressi0n”AThreASensor System From Graviner,”Znternatronal Defense Revrew, Vol. 13, No. 8,1980, pp 1242-1244. “Fire Protection Guide on Hazardous Materials,’’ 7th edition, National Fire Protedion Association, , h t o n . MA, 1978. ‘1 E. Cohen, ed., “Prevention of and Protection Against Accidental Explosion of Munitions, Fuels, and Other Hazardous Mixtures,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 152, Art. 1, pp 1-913.

flashed at elevated temperatures, such as: aluminum, magnesium, uranium, zinc, flour, grain, wood dust, paint, sugar, plastics, pharmaceutical drugs, hydraulic fluid,- even powdered milk!42 It is very simply an industrial hazard that commonly occurs in hammer-mills, machine shops, and powder manufacturing fa~ilities.~Z 5861 The suppression of these effeds by means of soft liners, relief valves, and other techniques are well known. Even though armor materials, arrays, and equipment can be chosen and designed to minimize crew comparb ment blasts, there have been and are presently available weapons that attempt to produce their own crew compartment blasts so as to reach out sideways and kill the crew. Early versions of these were the KE armor-piercing ammunitions copied from naval projectiles having base charges consisting of aluminized (dust or flake) explosives. These were used by both Germany and the Soviet Union throughout WWII.26, G2 The subcaliber uranium cores of German WWII ammunition were also noted to provide an incendiary effect. This has similarly been advertised for newly developed depleted uraniumared projectiles and others having special Recent shapedcharge weapons have been developed to produce blasts and incendiary effects behind armor in order to kill the crew and destroy the vehicle.6567 However, the same effeds were deliberately achieved by zinc, shaped-charge liners in hundreds of thousands of Gennan WWII HL/C gun-fired antitank Similarly, blast effectiveness behind armor led to the selection of aluminum for use as the shaped-charge liner material for the US. DART during the 1950’s. Means to suppress these weapons’ effeds will need to be incorporated within the arrays of future armored vehicles or the crew will have to be protected by blast-proof annor suits similar to those worn by the imperial storm troopers in Star Wars, which might be just as well when the chemical and biological threat from the Soviets is also considered. The previous articles in this series discussing armor for armored vehicles have covered protection from nuclear radiation. An armored vehicle similarly provides good protection for the crew from other nuclear effeds, such as blast, intense light, and thermal radiation.”, 71 However, nuclear explosions can seriously affect the electronic eyes, ears, and brain of an armored vehicle through these effects as well as nuclear electromagnetic propogation and neutron interaction with solid-state c i r c ~ i t r y . ~ ~ . ~ ~ A tank that has lost its fire control and its ability to communicate will be at a serious disadvantage on the modem, mobile battle field.75 In modern combat these devices have become extensions of the crew in order to accomplish their mission as much as the telephone has become both in the home and modem business. However, this equipment, too, may be sacrificed in order to keep the crew alive. In summary, this article has completed the series on tanks and the technologies of armor penetration, armor, and survivability. It has explored the means for accomp lishing the most important mission of peacetime military planners, program managers and materiel designers: personnel survival. If this goal is properly considered during periods of peace, it may greatly contribute to the factors that determine success on the battlefield through its use of and within the principles of war.7 42 W. Bartknecht, “Explosions: Course, Prevention, Protection,” Springer-Verlag. N.Y., 1981. 43 P. Field, “Dust Explosions,” Elsevier ScientificPublishing Co., N.Y., 1 QR7 i‘%.’Simpgin, “The Light Tank AViable Proposal?” Military Technology, Vol. VI, Issue 8,1982, pp 92-108. 45 “Explosafe Trials-A New System Effectively Demonstrated,” Defence Materiel Magazine, 1977. 46 “Expramet ExplosafeLtd.,” Armies 8 Weapons, No. 56, July (August) 1979). on 38-39. ~. .., c _ 47 “AF Finds ‘Explosafe’ prevents fuel tank explosions,”Aerospace Daily, January 28,1981, p 33. 48 C.M. Pedriani, “Powder-Filled Structural Panels for Helicopter Fuel Fire Protection,” Army R,D&A, Vol. 22, No. 3, MayJune 1981, pp 19-20. 49 B. Dean. “Helmets and Body Armor in Modern Warfare,” 1919, t$atd_t_o include World War I1 supplement, C. J . Pugliese, Tuckahoe, 1 Y . I . . l Y ( I . 50 “Modernization of the IDF,” in Born in Battle No. 31,1982, p 512 51 B. Rosen, “Now There Are Designer Clothes bor the Really &ugh Nights Out,” The Wall Street Journal, Monday, March 22, 1982, p 25, 52 Hardcorm Bodv Armor.” literature from Second Chance. Central colz 1-2. Lake, MI, 1982. 53 Advertisement, Point Blank Body Armor, International Defense Reuiew, Vol. i5. No. 11, 1982. 54 H. Lamb, The March of the Barbarians,” The Literary Guild of America, Inc., N;Y., 1940. 55 T.N. Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare,” The Bobbs-Memll Co., N.Y., 1980. 56 J.E. Backofen, Jr., “Shaped Charges Versus Armor,”Armor, Vol. 57 K. Blagoev, “Projectiles with Dual Shaped Charges,” Voenna Tehnika, No. 8, 1973, pp 26-27. 58 Pienvsza Krajowa Szkola Wybuchowosci Pylow F’rzemyslowych (Proceedings of the First National School on Explosibility of Industrial Dusts), Karpacs, Poland, November 14-16.1978. 59 V. V. Nedin, et al., “The Explosion Risk of Metal Powders,” Vzryoo-pastnost ’Metallicheskikh Poroshkou Kiyev, Naukova Dumka, 1971. 6o S. N. Osipov, “Vzryvc’hatyye Svoystva i Nevtralizatsiva par0 Gazo-Pylevy’kh Smesey (Explosive Properties and Neutralization Vapor-Gas-Dust Mixtures)’, Teknika, Kiev, 1977.

V. N. Verevkin, et al., “Problems of Combustion and Fire Extinguishing,” All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Fire Fighting, MOOP, SSSR, Moscow, 1968. 62 J. E. Backofen, Jr., “Kinetic Energy Penetrators Versus Armor,” Armor, Vol. LXXXIX, No. 2, March-April 1980, pp 13-17. 63 R. E. Simpkin, “Antitank: An Airmechanized Response to Annored Threats in the 90’s.’’ Brassey’s Publishers Ltd., N.Y.. 1982. a “A. S. eufoss,” Mditary Technology, Vol. IV, Issue 20, 19a0, p. 74. 65 M. Hewish, “FFV’s hghtweight AT-4: First of a New Family of WUUX, NO. 4, July-August 1980, pp 60-64. Swedish Anti-Armour Weapons,” International Defense Review, Vol. 15, No. 5,1982, pp 612-614. 66 B. Fritz, “Manurhin’s A P W A Non-Conformist Weapon,” ibid, pp ~ 7 x 1 n ”” I -“I”. 67“AUSA ’B1 Part 2: Weapons and Sensors,” International Defense Review, Vol. 15, No. 2,1982, p 205. 68 Private communication by F.R. Thomanek, 1982. 69 D. R. Kennedy, “DART,” Armor, Vol. XC, No. 5, September-October 1981, pp 22-23. 70 A. Kn. Babadzhanyan, “Tanki i Tankovye Voyska,,” Voyenizdat, Moskva, 1980. 71 S. Glasstone & P.J. Dolan, ‘The Effects of Nuclear Weapons,” third edition, U. S. Department of Defense, and U.S. Department of Energy, 1977. 72 W. J. Broad, ‘The Chaos Factor,” Science 83, Januaryrnebruary, pp 40-49. 73 N. A. Sidorov, et aL, “Radiatsionnaya Stoykost’ Materialov Radio-teckhicheskikh Konshktsiy (Radiation Stability of Radiotechnical Equipment Materials,” Soyetskoye Radio, Moskva, 1976. 74 “Technology in War and Peace,” IEEE Spectrum, October 1982, pp 34-114. 75 M. 0. Oetken, “Countering the Soviet EW Threat to Field Artillery Communications,” Field Artillery Journal, Vol. 48, No. 2, March-April 1980, pp 44-47.

was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers upon graduation from the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn in 1966. While with the 62d Engineer Battalion, his service included Rome Plow Land Clearing Operations in Cambodia and Vietnam. Mr. Backofen is currently involved with the development of advanced weapons technology at Battelle Columbus Laboratories.

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