To Fight or Not to Fight? The Saga Continues Robert S. Cameron, Ph.D

Fall 2023 To Fight or Not to Fight? The Saga Continues by Robert S. Cameron, Ph.D. In 1996 I started my civil service career in the Armor Center. While document ing and observing key Armor Branch activities, it soon became clear that a recurring point of debate lay in the na ture, organization, and operation of cavalry. In the post-Cold War era, longstanding beliefs associated with the importance and role of reconnais sance and security organizations were sometimes tossed aside in favor of new technology-based concepts. Nov elty garnered attention and funding, while Old School concepts enshrined in Field Manual 17-95, Cavalry faded. Yet these trends marked only the lat est development in this recurring de bate that often fixated upon the scout’s need for combat power at the platform and organizational level. This issue sooner or later emerged in doc trine, training development, and force design. The inability to resolve it sty mied efforts to articulate the role of reconnaissance, security, and surveil lance assets at echelon. No definitive and timeless framework of ideas ex isted to guide the incorporation of new technology or adaptation to an evolving operational environment. Hence, cavalry development boomer anged between the extremes of maxi mized versatility based upon organic combat power and aversion to hostile contact. Force structure decisions, se nior leader ideas, deployment experi ence, or new technology often trig gered the shift from one extreme to ward the other. The absence of an overarching set of principles left reconnaissance, securi ty, and surveillance assets stranded “in the moment,” continuously reacting to rather than managing changes that threatened their very existence. Great reconnaissance schism In 1938, the Cavalry Journal published an article advocating unarmored re connaissance vehicles. In the author’s view armor increased the tendency to use the platform for combat, raised its silhouette, reduced mobility, de creased visibility, and complicated maintenance. Freed from an armored shell, the scout would not be embold ened to forgo information collection and engage in combat. Therefore, an unarmored platform was preferable to either the scout or armored cars then in service. 1 This view contradicted the reconnais sance principles developed by the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized), the Ar my’s only mechanized cavalry unit. It emphasized rapid information collec tion to enable a high maneuver tem po. Its leaders believed that scouts operating near the enemy required the means to survive sudden contact situations and when necessary, en gage in combat to complete their mis sion. Therefore, scouts relied upon turreted, armored cars. COL Charles

L. Scott considered advocacy of an un armored reconnaissance platform “… the most inane, asinine proposal that’s ever been submitted. To take such ac tion would be the most backward step the Cavalry could possibly take.”2 He wrote a rebuttal article outlining the principles governing mechanized cav alry reconnaissance and associated them with more traditional and histor ical employment of the mounted branch. He accepted the possibility that scouts might have to fight to ac complish their mission and should be so trained, equipped and organized. After all, “a scout who is not trained and equipped to fight but, on the con trary, told to avoid combat under all conditions will always be a spineless adjunct to the regiment.”3 These two viewpoints became the range fans governing the debate over the nature and purpose of cavalry. Vacillating force structure decisions, confusion World War II marked the creation of division cavalry organizations with in fantry formations receiving a mecha nized cavalry troop and armored for mations including a cavalry reconnais sance squadron. Army and corps com mands relied upon cavalry groups of at least two squadrons. The initial de sign of these units anticipated the broad range of missions traditionally associated with cavalry. However, when Army Ground Forces became re sponsible for training, doctrine, and force design, it reduced the size of Figure 1. Mechanized cavalry column in France, August 1944. (Photo from the U.S. Army Armor and Cavalry Collection)

Fall 2023 these units and narrowed their focus to reconnaissance. The mechanized cavalry’s unofficial motto became “sneak, peak and retreat.”4 When the mechanized cavalry went to war, it found few opportunities for the singular mission of reconnaissance. Field commanders needed old-fash ioned cavalry more than just informa tion collectors. The mechanized cav alry thus abandoned their one-trick pony status and performed the full range of missions originally intend ed—even though they were no longer configured and equipped to do so. At corps and army levels, combat and se curity operations predominated, while security missions constituted frequent actions at division level.5 The maneuver battalion scout pla toons deployed in jeeps, prepared to conduct stealthy reconnaissance with out combat. These platoons experi enced considerable success when they could establish a dismounted observa tion point without detection, but such an accomplishment proved difficult in the face of hostile combined arms, counter reconnaissance teams. Jeep scouts found their ability to collect information impaired by even a mini mal enemy presence. Armored battal ions attempted to resolve this issue by integrating light tanks with their jeep scouts to provide both security and the means to overcome light resis tance. After the war a restructuring of caval ry organizations occurred that reflect ed the wartime preference for a more versatile unit with increased organic combat power. The basic building block became the combined arms re connaissance platoon with light tanks, scouts, a mortar team, and a rifle squad. It constituted the smallest combined arms team in the Army and the basis for the infantry division’s re connaissance company and the ar mored division’s armored reconnais sance battalion. At the corps level, the armored cavalry regiment replaced the wartime cavalry group. The new regiment included three armored re connaissance battalions bolstered by tanks and assault guns. In this man ner, the Army recrafted its tiered re connaissance structure around a com mon platoon organization. In the Korean War the mobility differential among the tracked and wheeled vehicles of this unit ham pered its employment and complicat ed command and control. The jeep’s lack of survivability triggered impro vised armor protection, unofficial guidance to dismount immediately when fired upon, and personnel trans fers into tank units. Nevertheless, jeep supporters highlighted the vehi cle’s small size, lightness, quietness, and ease of maintenance — character istics that encouraged stealth. Following the war, the maneuver bat talion scout platoon alternated be tween the wartime combined arms configuration and a scout platoon with only jeep-mounted scouts. These shifts generated confusion, disrupted training, and ensured the dissatisfac tion of both those who favored versa tility and combat power as well as the advocates of stealth and greater re connaissance coverage. The scout pla toon lacked survivability and combat power, but nor did it possess the com plexity of the combined arms platoon with its four vehicle types and eight different weapons.6 This complexity constituted a significant drawback in an era in which “a unit commander is fortunate indeed to receive a scout who is able to find himself on a map.” Similarly, platoon leaders possessed little preparation other than the tank training received in the Armor Officer Basic Course.7 More generally the advent of the atomic battlefield in the 1950s result ed in the Army’s embracement of mo bile, dispersed operations and recog nition of the related importance of re connaissance, security, and surveil lance. The increased dimensions of the bat tlefield and accompanying demands for intensified intelligence effort, tar get acquisition and surveillance of the enemy — emphasize reconnaissance. To meet this demand we must have re connaissance, which is improved in penetrating ability, protection, and possesses the facility for fighting for information in all conditions of terrain and weather. This means armored re connaissance ground elements in close coordination with air-transport ed reconnaissance and battle surveil lance units.8 Figure 2. Jeep scouts practicing stealthy observation. (U.S. Army photo)

Fall 2023 This characterization suited the versa tility and combat power of the division cavalry squadron and the armored cavalry regiment, which gained a fur ther boost in capability through the addition of helicopter-based air caval ry. ‘Find the bastards, then pile on!’ In Vietnam the overriding role of cav alry lay in finding and fixing an elusive enemy. Cavalry organizations often lacked the luxury of simply locating enemy forces and leaving their de struction to friendly maneuver units. Such an approach ensured that the en emy simply withdrew before they could be engaged. Hence, reconnais sance in force missions sought to lo cate and engage the enemy long enough for other friendly forces to at tack and destroy them. Similarly, when contact occurred during a recon naissance sweep, every unit in the area received notification. They raced to the point of contact, effectively pil ing on combat power to ensure the hostile force’s destruction. This con cept found expression on the vehicles of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, with each one carrying the carefully stenciled note “Find the bastards, then pile on!” Reconnaissance in force and pile-on tactics encouraged cavalry organiza tions at all echelons to adopt a com bative approach, leaving stealth to long range reconnaissance patrols. In cavalry organizations, the M113 trans formed into the armored cavalry as sault vehicle (ACAV) through the addi tion of more machine guns and gun shields. In the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the division cavalry squadrons, the combination of air cav alry, fires, tanks, and ACAVs provided a powerful hammer with which to de stroy enemy combatants. Moreover, it enabled the development of sophis ticated counter-ambush tactics that necessitated surviving first contact and carrying the fight to the enemy. The organic combat power of the ar mored cavalry regiment also permit ted its employment in more conven tional combat operations, exemplified by the prominent role given the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during the 1970 Cambodian incursion. Such Figure 3. ACAVs in a herringbone formation in Vietnam. (U.S. Army photo) combat prowess raised concerns with in the broader cavalry community. Were cavalry organizations specially crafted organizations with unique re connaissance, security, and surveil lance capabilities or just another ma neuver unit with a different name? After Vietnam the Army refocused upon its principal Cold War adversary — the heavily armored Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. Senior leaders proved much less concerned about the finer points of a scout’s role at echelon than in maximizing combat power on the battlefield. The forward posture of the cavalry or ganizations made them ideally suited to delay and attrit attacking armored columns. Hence, cavalry units in Eu rope experienced an increase in com bat power, particularly in anti-armor capabilities. By decade’s end the division cavalry squadron of an armored or mecha nized infantry division included 36 main battle tanks, 18 improved tube-launched optically tracked wire-guided missile (TOW) vehicles, and 18 M113s armored personnel carriers carrying Dragon anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) teams—in addition to air cav alry troops equipped with attack heli copters carrying still more anti-armor weaponry.9 Battalion scouts also acquired more combat power and ATGMs at the ex pense of specially trained information collectors. Collectively, these trends called into question the very essence of and need for cavalry. No tanks, no recon The emergence of AirLand Battle, the Army of Excellence, and the fielding of the Big 5 in the 1980s intensified the debate and confusion surrounding the purpose and structure of cavalry. The armored cavalry regiment remained a powerful capability at the corps level. The division cavalry squadron under went significant redesign. The three ground cavalry and one air cavalry troop configuration of the preceding decades gave way to a curious mix of two ground cavalry and two air caval ry troops aligned under the division aviation brigade. Moreover, the squadron lost its tanks, and its princi pal mission became reconnaissance. For the light infantry divisions, this fo cus suited their one ground and two air cavalry troop configurations. In the heavier formations, the loss of tanks generated concerns about their ability to operate on a battlespace populated by Warsaw Pact armor. A suite of sensors was originally intend ed to enhance information collection and surveillance capabilities of these units, but it was never fielded. Simi larly, a planned brigade reconnais sance element failed to materialize. The fielding of the Bradley Fighting Ve hicle offered some mitigation with its mix of armor protection, 25-mm Bush master gun, TOW missile launcher, and coax machine gun. In the heavy divi sion cavalry squadrons, the armored cavalry platoons abandoned their

Fall 2023 combined arms flavor for a pure Brad ley configuration. However, far from resolving issues, the nature of this ve hicle created new ones. With a large silhouette, heavy firepower, and loud noise signature, it represented every thing a scout platform should not be for most professional cavalrymen. In deed, Armor Center Commander MG Thomas Tait quipped that “Reconnais sance in a Bradley is like doing recon naissance in a Winnebago,” a refer ence to a popular recreational vehi cle.10 The controversy and debate surround ing the division cavalry squadron also affected the maneuver battalion scout platoon. The central issue at this ech elon lay in identifying the proper role of the scout and the optimal tools needed, but it became more confused when heavy divisions adopted the pure Bradley configuration for their battalion scouts. Trend assessments at the newly opened National Training Center noted the tendency of battal ion scouts to become engaged and de stroyed. These observations and the dislike of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle encouraged the adoption of a pure high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) scout platoon. Sup porters of this new organization echoed the 1938 advocate of unar mored reconnaissance vehicles and ar gued that minimal armament would further encourage scouts to avoid combat and rely upon stealth for their own safety. In 1991 Operation Desert Storm show cased the Army of Excellence’s new set of reconnaissance, security, and sur veillance organizations. Unsurprising ly the armored cavalry regiment proved the most successful with its ar ray of combat power further enhanced by corps and army attachments. Ar mored and mechanized division com manders attached tanks to their cav alry squadrons, noting a resultant in crease in their operational tempo. Battalion commanders generally mar ginalized their HMMWV scout pla toons out of concern for their surviv ability on an open battlefield. The overall success of the Army, and armored units in particular, helped the Armor community to restore tanks to the heavy division cavalry squadrons Figure 4. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle, aka the “Arsenal of Democracy.” (U.S. Army photo) Figure 5. HMMWV scout patrol prepares next move. (U.S. Army photo) which also regained a ground cavalry troop. Consequently, these units end ed the 1990s in a greatly enhanced state. The pure HMMWV scout pla toon, however, emerged from the war heavily criticized, but it remained in the force structure since it suited stealthy information collection and there was no funding for a new vehi cle. New technology, new contact paradigm In the 1990s the rise of computer net works to manage, coordinate, and share data encouraged the Army’s em bracement of Network-centric war fare. A belief in the ability to attain near perfect situational awareness in turn stimulated expectation of preci sion employment of maneuver units. Network-centric concepts offered scouts a different way of conducting reconnaissance, security, and surveil lance. The standoff capability of the Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveil lance Systems (LRAS3) enabled them to gain contact with an enemy force, maintain contact, and develop the sit uation without ever entering the di rect fire engagement range of hostile forces. Moreover, a scout could use the network to orchestrate the de struction of a hostile force. He could focus upon watching and observing, relying upon the network and standoff

Fall 2023 capabilities for force protection. Against an aggressive enemy recon naissance force, he could use the same capabilities to alert maneuver commanders, monitor the enemy, and move aside when combat became im minent. This new contact paradigm altered tra ditional views of cavalry operations and organization. Light, digitized, and information-oriented scouts offered the allure of executing reconnais sance, security, and surveillance with out the iron fist of combat power. The brigade reconnaissance troop with its handful of HMMWVs and LRAS3 con stituted the first step in this direction, but it was truly embodied in the re connaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron of the Stryker brigade combat team. This new brigade type emerged as part of Army Transformation and reflected the need for an organization optimized to conduct small-scale contingency operations. The RSTA squadron provided situation al awareness for its parent brigade, re lying upon scouts, sensors, radars, and signal detection systems while avoid ing combat. Despite its specialized na ture, the related doctrinal concepts quickly spread and eclipsed cavalry Figure 6. The HMMWV-LRAS3 combination — the essence of a new contact par adigm. (Photo from the U.S. Army Armor Branch archives) doctrine and force design. The March to Baghdad in March-April 2003 paused the proliferation of RSTA concepts, albeit briefly. In the con fused series of movements to contact that characterized the advance to and into the Iraqi capital, it was the lethal ity, survivability, and versatility of the division cavalry squadron, represented by the 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, that met commander’s needs. Expectations of perfect situa tional awareness faded amid a sur prise Iraqi counterattack upon Objec tive Peach and the unexpected tenac ity of the Fedayeen Saddam.11 By the time Saddam Hussein’s regime col lapsed, RSTA concepts had lost their luster amid calls from the theater of operation to reevaluate their validity and utility. Cavalry versatility and Figure 7. The air-ground muscle of 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment on display during Operation Iraqi Freedom 1. (U.S. Army Photo)

Fall 2023 combat power was in and the technol ogy-based assumptions of RSTA were out. Had the war ended at that point, the path of reconnaissance, security, and surveillance development would have taken a different path. But it did not. It transformed into a counterinsurgen cy (COIN) that lasted another eight years. In this period units remained in assigned areas of responsibility for months at a time, focused upon area security and bolstering local commu nities and government, while periodi cally engaging in combat operations to clear enemy safe havens. Similarly, the war in Afghanistan focused upon counterinsurgency, and the impor tance of surveillance and information collection predominated. Protracted counterinsurgency breathed new life into RSTA concepts. Trooper Down! Impact of modularity The announcement of a Cavalry Sol dier in distress is never desirable, es pecially when the causation stems from friendly fire. To sustain its de ployment operational tempo for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army opted to increase the number of bri gades at the expense of division as sets. Division cavalry thus became a casualty of Army Modularity, soon followed by the elimination of the ar mored cavalry regiment. With these actions the Army decapi tated its tiered reconnaissance, secu rity and surveillance structure. More over, division cavalry squadrons and armored cavalry regiments had served as finishing schools where skills were honed over a career and a reservoir of talent in cavalry operations estab lished. Institutional training re mained, but it became increasingly skewed toward COIN information col lection and surveillance needs rather than more general cavalry operations. A growing number of cavalry leaders passed through the ranks knowing much about COIN but little about in tegrated air-ground reconnaissance and security or combined arms ma neuver. The new brigade combat teams bene fited from the acquisition of a recon naissance squadron, but these units lacked the capabilities of the prior di vision cavalry squadron. Without or ganic aviation, their doctrine bore the imprint of RSTA concepts, and the small size of the early modular bri gades often forced commanders to use the squadron as a third maneuver element. Over time the brigade com bat teams increased in size, permitting the squadron to be employed more frequently in reconnaissance. Figure 8. Soldiers of the 6th Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment prepare to search a village in Afghanistan’s Khowst Province in 2011. (U.S. Army Photo by Joint Combat Camera Afghanistan) Nevertheless, a capability gap existed above the brigade. No organization bore responsibility for reconnaissance, security, and surveillance outside bri gade areas of operation. Therefore, the Army created the battlefield sur veillance brigade (BfSB) to collect in formation, refine it into actionable in telligence, and share it with other units. The BfSB possessed a range of sensors and technology to facilitate its information collection and surveil lance mission, but it lacked the organ ic combat power to act upon the intel ligence it generated. In essence, it mirrored the RSTA squadron on a larg er scale, reflected in its original desig nation as a RSTA brigade. Still, the BSB suited a COIN environment, remaining in place for a sustained period, gath ering information on enemy disposi tions and networks. Once operations began to move over time and space, however, it quickly became marginal ized. By the end of the 2000s, a state of confusion blanketed reconnaissance and security. Sustained COIN opera tions in which units spent long periods monitoring civilian activity to detect signs of hostile action and better un derstand the human terrain upon which they operated eroded the tradi tional emphasis given to screen, guard, and cover missions. Surveil lance trumped security, particularly when doctrine reduced security to the force protection, area or route securi ty, and convoy escort missions expect ed of all units. Little need existed for an organization capable of a broad mission set that might entail combat when static information collection and activity monitoring constituted the principal activities. The term “cavalry” fell into disfavor, with too many leaders preferring the acronym “R&S” (reconnaissance and surveillance), in which the second let ter denoted surveillance. Reinventing the wheel, modifying the wheel, or building something new? In the 2010s the prevailing emphasis upon reconnaissance and surveillance began to change in response to the Ar my’s emphasis upon large-scale

Fall 2023 combat operations against a peer or near peer threat. In 2012, formation commanders reached a consensus concerning dissatisfaction with the BfSB and a preference for a combined arms organization capable of gaining information through direct interaction with a threat, fighting for it as neces sary. Similarly, they wanted such a unit to provide early warning to its parent formation and prevent its pre mature deployment.12 Cavalry was back. A growing interest emerged in rees tablishing reconnaissance, security, and surveillance units at echelon, but their composition remained uncertain. Funding constraints ensured that their creation would necessitate force struc ture cuts elsewhere. Hence the issue of cavalry at echelon blossomed into broader questions of force design, personnel manning, and materiel. Emerging concepts centered upon a resurrected armored cavalry regiment, a cavalry group with a mix of old and new capabilities, or the task organiza tion of an existing brigade combat team. A campaign of learning ensued initially focused upon the corps, in formed by the 2017 National Training Center deployment of 1st Brigade (Stryker), 4th Infantry Division, recon figured and trained as a reconnais sance and security brigade. Further analysis failed to offer a viable solution, and the Army’s focus shifted to division cavalry, using the pre-Modularity organization as an an alytical start point. Through experi mentation and analysis, a course of ac tion emerged for the creation of a di vision cavalry unit through the reduc tion of subordinate brigade squadrons to troops. This approach solved much of the billpayer question, but it did not resolve the purpose and composition of the division organization. Rebuild ing an armored cavalry organization with tanks, Bradleys, and aviation con stituted a popular yet very retro ap proach. It remained unclear whether such an organization would possess the same operational versatility as its predecessors in a changing operation al environment. Rebuilding reconnaissance, security, and surveillance at echelon became still more complicated with the Army’s adoption of multi-domain operations as its overarching warfighting concept. How would such units operate upon a battlespace subject to air, sea, land, cyber, and space threats? What multidomain capabilities should they pos sess, and what constituted the optimal means of ensuring the satisfaction of commander priority information re quirements? In a resource environ ment constrained by investments in new programs and technologies deemed vital to modernization, clear ly reconnaissance, security, and sur veillance units could not be all things to all people. New ideas proliferated, including cross-domain maneuver or ganizations with a mix of sensors, un manned systems, and cyber and elec tromagnetic capabilities. Warfighter exercises introduced new threats and capabilities, and the 1st Cavalry Division became the vehicle for the Army Reconnaissance and Se curity Pilot, but determination of what reconnaissance, security, and surveil lance should be at corps, division, and brigade levels remained an elusive ob jective. The outbreak of the Nagorno-Kara bakh war in 2020 showcased the po tential impact of drones on the battle field. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine also provided a sensing of how new technologies might be em ployed and the challenges they posed. The conflict introduced a transparent battlefield in which drones monitored all activity and precision weapons — or loitering munitions — attacked tar gets identified by drones or their own electromagnetic signature. In such an environment the notion of relying upon unmanned air and ground sys tems to make initial contact gained traction. Nevertheless, force design solutions that embraced technology at the expense of more traditional means did not address those aspects of the Ukraine war that had more in common with World War I than the push-but ton warfare oft projected for the fu ture. Collectively, these developments cre ate an imperative to rethink recon naissance, security, and surveillance at echelon rather than resurrect past concepts or reintroduce them with slight modification. Even if it were possible to rebuild the armored caval ry regiments and division cavalry squadrons of the post-Desert Storm era, combat training center experience suggests that the related skill sets have atrophied. Ironically, Modulari ty’s legacy lies in robust brigade cav alry squadrons that have no parallel since the emergence of the mecha nized cavalry. Perhaps these units should mark the concentration of ca pabilities oriented upon the close fight, leaving the division cavalry squadron with more unmanned sys tems and cross domain maneuver tools for initial contact and shaping operations that are in turn informed by sophisticated information collec tion abilities at corps and higher lev els. Such an approach builds upon current efforts to improve brigade proficiency while aligning new skills and capabili ties at higher echelons already in flux due to Army 2030 modernization ob jectives and the transition to a divi sion-centric force. Past as prologue “You can’t understand where you’re going until you understand where you’ve been.” This expression under scores the importance of understand ing how cavalry arrived at its current state before attempting to chart its fu ture course of development. The vari ables of field commander need, force structure decisions, combat Figure 9. Ukrainian drone targets Rus sian combat vehicles moments before striking. (Photo courtesy of the Ukrai nian Armed Forces)

Fall 2023 experience, and tech-based capability assumptions that shaped the histori cal evolution remain in play today alongside personnel shortfalls and an adaptive threat array. Army leaders need to start managing change by ar ticulating a set of analytically based framing principles to recraft the mis sions, force design, and tools for re connaissance, security, and surveil lance units at echelon. We instinctive ly know that consistent, all-weather reconnaissance, surveillance, and se curity capabilities constitute a critical requirement at echelon on the future battlefield. Regardless, absent such a conceptual framework, these organi zations will continue meandering – subject to the latest perceived techno logical offset, shortage of resources, or theoretical debate about the future of warfare. Dr. Robert Cameron is the Armor Branch Historian, U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Moore, GA. He has held this position since 1996. Dr. Cameron is an honorary graduate of Armor Of fice Basic Course, Armor School, Fort Knox, KY, 1996. He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in history from SUNY Bing hamton (now Binghamton University); a bachelor’s of arts degree in econom ics from SUNY Binghamton (now Bing hamton University) and a doctorate degree (Ph.D.) in modern military his tory from Temple University. Dr. Cameron is the author of several arti cles and books, including To Fight or Not to Fight?: Organizational and Doctrinal Trends in Mounted Maneu ver Reconnaissance from the Interwar Years to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Stud ies Institute Press, 2010). Notes 1 MAJ Clinton A. Pierce, “Armor for Horse Cavalry Reconnaissance Vehicles?” Caval ry Journal, XLVII, 4 (July-August 1938). 2 Quoted in Matthew Darlington Morton, “Horses for ‘Iron Ponies’: The Interwar Development of Mechanized Ground Re connaissance” (Master of Arts Thesis, Florida State University, 2001). 3 COL Charles L. Scott, “Armor for Cavalry Reconnaissance Vehicles is Essential,” Cavalry Journal, XLVII, 5 (September-Oc tober 1938). 4 CPT Stuart J. Seborer, “Modern Cavalry Organization,” Cavalry Journal, LVI, 2 (March-April 1947). 5 “United States Forces, European The ater,” Mechanized Cavalry Units, Gener al Board, Study Number 49. 6 LTC Charles S. Johnson Jr., “One of Our Units is Missing,” ARMOR, LXXI, (Septem ber-October 1962). 7 CPT Joseph D. Posz, “To Train a Cavalry man,” ARMOR, LXXIII, 4 (September-Oc tober 1962). 8 “Armor—Where Are We Going?” AR MOR, LXVI, 6 (November-December 1957). Acronym Quick-Scan ACAV – armored cavalry assault vehicle ATGM – anti-tank guided missile BfSB – the battlefield surveillance brigade COIN – counterinsurgency HMMWV – high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle LRAS3 – Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance Systems RSTA – reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition TOW – tube-launched optically tracked wire-guided missile 9 CPT Randy D. Tatum, “Cavalry’s Tradi tional Role Endangered,” ARMOR, XC, 1 (January-February 1981). 10 John Cranston, “Assessment by Major General Thomas H. Tait of his Tenure as Commanding General, U.S. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, June 1986-August 1988,” End of tour interview, Aug. 18, 1989. 11 David Talbot, “How Technology Failed in Iraq,” MIT Technology Review, Nov. 1,

2004. Online article accessed on Oct. 10, 2023 at: https://www.technologyreview. com/2004/11/01/232152/how-technolo gy-failed-in-iraq/. 12 Information paper, Subj: seizing the Ini tiative: Meeting corps and Division Re connaissance and Security Requirements, draft 9 November 2012, p. 3, Armor Branch Archives, electronic: 2012 Annual Command History/BCT.