Objective Curly: One Leader’s Experience with the Operations Process

18 April-June 2015 Objective Curly: One Leader’s Experience with the Operations Process by CPT Lazaro Oliva Jr. The U.S. Army has conducted continuous overseas contingency operations, including combat operations in Afghanistan from 2001-2014 and in Iraq from 2003-2010, for more than 13 years. This ongoing overseas commitment has forced a very high operational tempo (optempo). As a result, we as an organization developed “field expedient” methods that allowed us to maintain an appropriate level of readiness required to deploy and accomplish our mission in a time-constrained environment. While it was important to make an effort to disseminate lessons-learned to deploying units so they could incorporate them into their training for upcoming deployments, the unintended consequence of this approach was that the operational force became strictly reliant on our tactics, techniques and procedures and consequently ignored doctrine. Therefore, we have forgotten how to employ the most basic doctrinal concepts. As the deployments slow and optempo comes back down to a sustainable pace, we must once again shift our focus back to our doctrinal concepts to re-establish our technical proficiency. Operations process One key concept we have forgotten how to use is the operations process, which helps a leader understand, manage and account for the uncertainty inherent in the operational environment. Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0 defines the operations process as the Army’s framework for exercising mission command; in laymen’s terms, the operations process serves as a common language through which we can plan, prepare and execute our mission. This process applies at all levels of leadership – from the platoon level up to the highest levels of command, with different methodologies prescribed for each echelon. The prescribed methods to apply the operations process are troop-leading procedures (TLPs), which are employed at the company and below, and the military decision-making process, typically employed by battalion and above. The operations process is driven by the commander, who – with the help of his staff – strives to understand, visualize, describe and direct his organization by providing leadership and continuous assessment. One example of how to properly employ the operations process at the company level using TLPs was demonstrated by a young captain on Objective Curly the morning of April 7, 2003, prior to the biggest fight of his professional military career. Late on the evening of April 6, 2003, the events unfolding on Objective Peach, a bridgehead over the Euphrates River, were part of a much larger military campaign known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), which was designed to topple Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial government. At the tip of the American spear was 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), and its 2nd Brigade was the decisive operation. The following morning, on the heels of a successful raid (the first Thunder Run), brigade commander COL David Perkins devised his plan to conduct an audacious attack into the heart of Baghdad and attempt to seize the city, and this time he intended to stay there; this assault would come to be known as Thunder Run 2. Leading this raid for 2nd Brigade was Task Force (TF) 4-64 Armored Regiment (AR) and TF 1-64 AR; they would attack to seize Objective Woody and Objective Diane, respectively, which were in the heart of Baghdad. If this assault were to succeed, the largest route leading in and out of Baghdad would have to be secured to ensure that TF 4-64 AR and TF 1-64 AR had access to the resupplies they would need. This was critical if Perkins intended to retain the city of Baghdad and attempt to exploit the opportunity to end the war much more quickly than anticipated. The critical task of securing Highway 8 fell to TF China (3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry). LTC Stephen Twitty, the TF commander, knew that to accomplish this task, TF China would have to seize three key intersections along Highway Figure 1. According to ADRP 5-0, the operations process serves as a common language through which we can plan, prepare and execute our mission.

19 April-June 2015 8; these intersections would be named Objectives Moe, Larry and Curly, in order from north to south. Seizing these key intersections would prevent Iraqi soldiers and foreign fighters from gaining control of the largest avenue of approach in and out of the city and would secure the lines of communications necessary to maintain freedom of maneuver for friendly forces. Just before the TF was to execute this mission, brigade headquarters informed TF China’s leadership that one of its three line companies would have to remain on Objective Saints to occupy a blocking position to the north of the objective. This effectively reduced TF China’s combat power by one-third, leaving it with more objectives than it had companies to defend them. To mitigate the loss of one company, the TF commander compiled a makeshift team, now referred to as Team Zan, from various elements within the TF. The tall order of defending the southernmost objective, named Objective Curly, fell to an unsuspecting captain serving as an assistant operations officer in the TF; his name was CPT Harry “Zan” Hornbuckle III. Twitty informed Hornbuckle of his new mission one minute after midnight April 7, 2003, just six hours before the start of the mission. Team Zan comprised one mechanized-infantry platoon, another Infantry Fighting Vehicle (Bradley), the battalion’s mortar platoon, a scout section, an engineer squad, one armored combat earthmover (ACE), the battalion’s main aid station (MAS) and the TF’s tactical-operations center (TOC) Alpha (two M577s and one M114). Hornbuckle, now the commander of “Team Zan,” along with his senior noncommissioned officer (NCO), SFC Vincent Phillips, began to devise a plan to seize Objective Curly and prevent it from falling into the enemy’s hands. The plan With the difficult task of securing Objective Curly and defeating whatever the enemy would throw at him and his team, Hornbuckle began to develop his plan by using the TLPs he had been taught how to employ time and again throughout his military career. He had just received his mission, and the first step in the commander’s activities was to understand the problem; he focused on the enemy and the time he had available. The next step was to issue a quick warning order (warno) that would facilitate parallel planning. “I met with LT Matt McKenna, LT Rob Woodruff and CPT Trey Lawrence first to disseminate a quick [warno],” Hornbuckle recalled. “I focused on our timeline and what I knew of the enemy situation, while getting an updated status on where they stood in regard to men, weapons and equipment.”1 The next step in the TLPs is to make a tentative plan; here, the commander analyzes the mission variables to visualize how he believes the enemy would fight; he also determines his decisive point, commander’s intent and initial risk assessment. “The two defining challenges to effective planning are uncertainty and time,” according to ADRP 5-0. Both of these added to Hornbuckle’s sense of urgency. He spent the next few hours developing his plan for Objective Curly; he also met periodically with the subordinate leaders of his newly Figure 2. Seizing the objectives of Moe, Larry and Curly would prevent Iraqi soldiers and foreign fighters from gaining control of the largest avenue of approach in and out of the city and would secure lines of communications necessary to maintain freedom of maneuver for friendly forces.

20 April-June 2015 formed team to continue describing his vision and provide updates to the plan. “The smartest two moves I made that night were to develop a quick and easy plan and to designate the chain of command,” Hornbuckle wrote.2 He then went on to do his terrain analysis on a satellite map; he knew that the decisive terrain was the high ground on the two-lane overpass running west to east over Highway 8. It would provide Team Zan with superior observations and fields of fire in all directions. By occupying this overpass, he could also deny the enemy use of the high ground and freedom of maneuver. Once Hornbuckle understood his terrain, which then allowed him to visualize the enemy situation, the next step in his planning process was to develop a course of action (CoA) that would defeat the enemy and retain Objective Curly. He did his analysis of relative combat power, generated options and began arraying his forces, developing a broad concept and assigning responsibility; “my plan was to put the mech platoon Bradleys in the east and west on top of the overpass,”3 he said, and secure the high ground. He would then place his scout section oriented north, along with the engineer squad and his Bradley. To the south, he put the mortar platoon, along with his ACE, so they could cover the southern avenue of approach and provide fire support to all three of the battalion’s objectives, not just Objective Curly. Finally, he would “tuck the TOC and MAS under the overpass.”4 The next step was to prepare a CoA statement and sketch. “The basic concept was to occupy battle positions (BPs) and orient our fires by sectors,” Hornbuckle wrote.5 He divided his sectors of fire by using a terrain-based quadrant that would help him to avoid target overkill while still effectively massing his fires on the enemy. “My decisive point for the operation was to set BPs 1a and 1b, with the Bradley-Fighting-Vehicle split sections oriented to Quadrants 1 and 2. … The intent I issued to the team was [to] quickly seize the objective and set in hasty defense; control the high ground to prevent the enemy from shooting down on us; keep all communications short and concise (give distance, direction, description); and ensure interlocking fires with element on left and right (cross-talk). Endstate: Objective Curly is secured, U.S. forces can pass north through the objective, enemy forces destroyed.”6 With his operations order complete, Figure 3. CPT Harry “Zan” Hornbuckle, assistant operations officer, TF 3-15 Infantry, directs the battle. (Photo by Dennis Steele, ARMY Magazine. From Steele’s photo essay “Baghdad: The Crossroads” in ARMY Magazine’s June 2003 edition. Copyright 2015 by the Association of the U.S. Army and republished by permission of ARMY Magazine.) Figure 4. Hornbuckle’s next step was to prepare a CoA statement and sketch. He divided his sectors of fire by using a terrain-based quadrant that would help him to avoid target overkill while still effectively massing his fires on the enemy.

21 April-June 2015 Hornbuckle gathered all the leaders from his subordinate elements and is sued his plan. After Hornbuckle issued the plan, it was late; the movement was to begin at 4:30 a.m. with a lineof-departure time of 6 a.m. By this point, “I had planned, briefed and spot-checked the best I knew how. ... I played all the parts in my head, trying to visualize all the possible scenarios. … Little did I know, even my worst-case scenarios would pale in comparison to the action we would face at Curly.”7 Preparations As stated in ADRP 5-0, “The activities of the operations process are not dis creet; they overlap and recur as cir cumstances demand. … Preparing be gins during planning and continues through execution.” Hornbuckle’s war no was all Phillips, his team first ser geant, needed to initiate movement. “He began the task of linking up units and conducting resupply in the dark,”8 Hornbuckle recalled. These prepara tions also occurred at the platoon and crew level, with each senior NCO get ting his unit ready for the mission that was now only a few hours away from execution. This began with assigning priorities of work to each crew and squad. The highest priority is, without a doubt, se curity. Team Zan would have to main tain between 33 percent and 50 per cent security at all times. The second-highest priority is cleaning and inspect ing weapons; this includes everything from the individual Soldier’s M-16 to the 25mm Bushmaster chain gun on the Bradleys. Included in this was Class (CL) V ammunition to ensure that ev ery weapon had a full unit basic load. Next was ensuring that all mainte nance on the vehicles was completed to ensure they were fully mission ca pable and ready for the next day’s op eration – including any CL III petro leum, oils and lubricants. This was fol lowed by the individual Soldier’s equip ment, including night-vision goggles, PAQ4s and optics; Phillips needed to ensure that everyone had a fresh pair of batteries and that they, too, were fully mission capable. Last, but not least, came the Soldier’s chow, hygiene and rest. While these priorities of work were being supervised, the leaders of each element were developing their own plans and conducting their own TLPs to ensure their plans were nested with their immediate higher headquarters. “Effective preparations ensure that the right forces are in the right place at the right time with the right equipment and other resources ready to execute the operation,” according to Paragraph 3-7, ADRP 5-0. However, no amount of preparation could have fully prepared these men for what they were about to experience. Execution The attack began promptly at 6 a.m. April 7, 2003, in accordance with the plan. Team Zan was as ready as it could be; it was now time to execute. Execu tion is defined as “putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission … to gain and maintain a position of relative advan tage” (ADRP 5-0). TF China was third in the order of march for the brigade be hind TF 1-64 and TF 4-64. The plan was that TF China would follow and sup port by securing lines of communica tions along Highway 8. The order of movement within TF China was Alpha Mech, Bravo Tank and Team Zan. It wasn’t long before Hornbuckle be gan hearing contact reports over the radio; the lead tank battalion was reporting “heavy rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire at MB415777. As I [CPT Hornbuckle] plotted it on my map, I realized that was Objective Curly.” He did his best to assure him self and his men this was expected and they would accomplish their mission.9 As the rest of the battalion seized its objectives, Team Zan occupied Objec tive Curly, and the mechanized-infantry platoon wasted no time establishing BP over Highway 8, oriented on their Quadrants 1 and 2 to the north. Simul taneously, the mortar platoon estab lished BP and oriented south along Highway 8. “All the leaders and Sol diers rapidly occupied their points of domination and established what would become a perimeter defense. The thing I remember was how glad I was that they all knew the plan,” Horn buckle recalled.10 The objective was surrounded by multi-story buildings on three sides and a single-story home on the south east. The terrain under the overpass consisted of rubble and bunkers. The enemy used the very elaborate trench system under the overpass to conceal his movements. “It seems to me now that the enemy was waiting for us to stop before they began their serious counterattack,” Hornbuckle said. “The enemy Figure 5. As the rest of the battalion seized its objectives, Team Zan occupied Objective Curly. The mechanized-infantry platoon wasted no time establishing a BP over Highway 8, oriented on Quadrants 1 and 2 to the north. (Photo by Dennis Steele, ARMY Magazine. Copyright 2015 by the Association of the U.S. Army and republished by permission of ARMY Magazine.)

22 April-June 2015 consisted of 150 to 200 dismounts with small arms and RPGs ... believed to consist of Iraqi Special Republican Guard and Syrian jihad fighters.”11 Just north of the objective along High way 8 lay a grim reminder to Horn buckle of the reality of war: “a burning enemy MTLB to my front and de stroyed M1 tank to my northwest.”12 It was now that all hell broke loose on the objective. Hornbuckle was directing the fight over the radio from his Bradley, trying to maintain situa tional understanding and constantly repositioning his forces to respond to wave after wave of enemy soldiers who would assault the objective from the urban areas with reckless abandon. On more than one occasion, Hornbuckle found himself engaging dismounted enemy RPG teams with his personal ri fle before his Bradley gunner would identify and destroy them. During execution, the success of any plan hinges on timely decision-making and disciplined initiative by agile and adaptive leaders who can recognize opportunities. These variances present themselves in one of two ways: the first is an opportunity to accomplish the mission effectively, and the second is a threat to mission accomplishment or survival of the force. Without mutu al trust and leader development, sub ordinates will not exercise the initia tive required to gain a position of rela tive advantage. One example of this was when Phillips recognized a threat to the survival of the force in the form of enemy soldiers using the trench system underneath the overpass to be able to move unob served. He immediately approached Hornbuckle to request permission to take a three-man fire team to clear the trenches. Hornbuckle replied, “Roger, you really need to go do that.”13 He watched as Phillips quickly assembled an ad hoc squad and began to clear the trenches. “By the time he had the squad set in place, they had destroyed 15-18 of the enemy,” Hornbuckle wrote.14 Back in his Bradley, Hornbuckle and his gunner were engaging vehicles trying to penetrate the perimeter. At some point in the fight, the Bradley began to experience problems with its 25mm cannon. The crew then began to work diligently to try to repair it. Little did the Soldiers know that the motor had broken, and it would be down until the next day when they could get a re placement from the unit-maintenance collection point. At this point, with the fight raging all around him, Hornbuck le realized that “if [the enemy] man aged to coordinate and attack all at once … they might be able to over whelm his undermanned combat team just by force of sheer numbers.”15 Another critical factor of the operations process is the commander’s ability to understand, visualize, describe and direct. To do this, the commander must have the energy to be at the point of friction and lead his team to mission accomplishment; this requires a leader to be in excellent physical condition. Hornbuckle, at one point, dismounted the Bradley and Figure 7. Hornbuckle and his gunner engage vehicles trying to penetrate the perimeter under the overpass while their Bradley experienced problems with its 25mm cannon. (Photo by Dennis Steele, ARMY Magazine. Copyright 2015 by the Association of the U.S. Army and republished by permission of ARMY Maga zine.) Figure 6. Hornbuckle, kneeling on the right, and other Soldiers rush to stop an enemy attack. (Photo by Dennis Steele, ARMY Magazine. From Steele’s photo essay “Baghdad: The Crossroads” in ARMY Magazine’s June 2003 edition. Copy right 2015 by the Association of the U.S. Army and republished by permission of ARMY Magazine.)

23 April-June 2015 began running between friendly fighting positions under enemy fire to increase his situational understanding and bolster his men’s confidence through his presence and leadership. “At one point, as he hustled between positions, an enemy gunman rose up from a trench and aimed his rifle at Hornbuckle. The captain raised his own rifle and fired. The man went down,” wrote David Zucchino in his book, Thunder Run.16 Shortly after a conversation be tween Twitty and Hornbuckle about the location and status of each fighting position of Hornbuckle’s team, Twitty or dered Bravo Mech to reinforce Horn buckle. Once they arrived, Bravo Mech conducted a hasty transfer of authority. By this time, Team Zan had been engaged in a close and in tense fight for eight hours, and the fighting would continue for a while before even tually dying down prior to 2-7 Infan try’s arrival. Mission accom plishment When the fight was over and the dust settled on Objective Curly, Team Zan had accomplished its mission. The conditions for this victory were set long before Team Zan, along with the rest of TF China, began its movement north. It started when Hornbuckle started the first critical step in the operations process: the plan. He did this by using the TLPs and then disseminating information to his team to facilitate parallel planning. Concurrently, his team was taking all the necessary steps to prepare for the operation. His simple plan allowed his team to exercise disciplined initiative and seize opportunities that presented themselves throughout the day. Hornbuckle also played an active part in the execution through his ability to identify and be at the point of friction. Hornbuckle’s understanding of doc trine and employment of the opera tions process allowed him to visualize, describe and direct through his leader ship and continuous assessment. His use of the operations process is just one example that illustrates how our doctrine can serve as a combat multi plier. Way ahead As Paragraph 1-1, ADRP 5-0 states, “Military operations are human en deavors, contests of wills characterized by continuous and mutual adaptation among all participants. … Uncertainty pervades operations in the form of un knowns about the enemy, the people and the surroundings.” To ensure our victory while minimizing our casual ties, we understand our enemy, exploit his weaknesses and protect against his strengths. We must make the enemy fight us on our terms. Also, we must be well-versed in our doctrine. It serves as both a foundation and a common language, “through un derstanding you can apply judgment in its use. … This lends itself to under standing how to think.”17 Finally, as leaders, we must prepare ourselves for command; we must un derstand what our nation expects of us. We are entrusted with our nation’s sons and daughters, and as a result, we Figure 8. Hornbuckle dismounts his Bradley and begins running between friendly fighting positions under enemy fire to increase his situational under standing and bolster his men’s confidence through his presence and leader ship. (Photo by Dennis Steele, ARMY Magazine. Copyright 2015 by the Associa tion of the U.S. Army and republished by permission of ARMY Magazine.) Figure 9. Hornbuckle and SFC Vincent Phillips discuss ad justing their perimeter during a lull in the fighting. (Photo by Dennis Steele, ARMY Magazine. Copyright 2015 by the Association of the U.S. Army and republished by permission of ARMY Magazine.)

24 April-June 2015 Acronym Quick-Scan have a moral obligation to do every thing in our power to prepare, so when that moment presents itself, we will be ready to lead. Lessons-learned Courtesy of now-LTC Hornbuckle:

• Be a student of your profession; know your doctrine and tactics. If you understand the process, you can put it all together in combat.

• Continue to assess the situation. Understand what your strengths and weaknesses are. Be willing to accept risk to exploit an enemy vulnerability.

• To lead effectively, you must stay calm on the radio, and you must have the endurance to be at the point of decision.

• See yourself, see the terrain, see the enemy and make bold decisions while considering risk.

• Don’t train your subordinates on what to think; teach them how to think. CPT Lazaro Oliva Jr. is a small-group leader with the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course (MCCC), Maneuver Center of Excellence Directorate of Training, Fort Benning, GA. Previous duty assignments include brigade assistant plans officer, S-3 Plans, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA; tank-company commander, Company C, 3-69 AR, 1st ABCT, 3rd Infantry D i v i s i o n , F o r t S t e w a r t ; mechanized-infantry-company executive officer, Company B, 1-67 AR, 2nd ABCT, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO; and tank-platoon leader, Company C, 1-67 AR, 2nd ABCT, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson. His military schooling includes Cavalry Leader’s Course, MCCC, Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course, Airborne School and Air Assault School. CPT Oliva holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in psychology and history from the University of Miami. Notes 1 From the student paper “Objective Curly Task Force 3-15” by MAJ Harry “Zan” Hornbuckle, Army Writing Program, Dec. 12, 2006. To access Hornbuckle’s paper, from http://www.benning.army.mil/li brary/, click on “Digital Collections” on the left, then in the center, under “MCoE Army Writing Program Student Papers,” click on “Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)- (CAC access required).” OIF student pa pers are alphabetized by the author’s last name. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 David Zucchino, Thunder Run, New York: Grove Press, 2004. 14 Hornbuckle, “Objective Curly Task Force 3-15” student paper. 15 Zucchino. 16 Ibid. 17 Hornbuckle, “Objective Curly Task Force 3-15” student paper; confirmed in an in terview with the author March 13, 2015. ABCT – armored brigade combat team ACE – armored combat earthmover ADRP – Army doctrinal reference publication AR – armored regiment BP – battle position CAP – capabilities CL – class CoA – course of action EN – enemy ENCOA – evaluating enemy course of action MAS – main aid station MCCC – Maneuver Captain’s Career Course MCoE – Maneuver Center of Excellence NCO – noncommissioned officer OBJ – objective OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom Optempo – operational tempo ORBAT – order of battle RPG – rocket-propelled grenade TF – task force TLP – troop-leading procedure TOC – tactical-operations center Warno – warning order