A Current Assessment of Excalibur Employment in Afghanistan

(Editor’s note: In the previous article, retired MG Stricklin, former commander of the Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, makes a case to maneuver commanders for more use of the M-982 Excalibur. In this article, COL Gene Meredith and other writers assigned to Fort Sill’s Fires Center of Excellence give a more cautionary view of Excalibur. Both articles are presented here for consideration.) In November 2011, I had the opportunity to lead a four-man assessment team from the Fires Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, OK, exploring the operational employment of the 155mm Excalibur and other precision munitions in Afghanistan. One of our objectives was to determine why U.S. Army forces were employing a limited number of Excalibur projectiles in Afghanistan. As we conducted our survey, we quickly realized there were multiple reasons for the limited number of Excalibur projectiles being fired, and this was a symptom of a much larger issue with indirect fires as a whole. We organized these reasons into seven focus areas:

• Combined joint task force/regional command fire-support element capability;

• Combined-arms Excalibur live-fire training;

• Fire-support team collective training;

• Employment, institutional and field-artillery schools training;

• Close-air support employment;

• Firing-unit capabilities; and

• Airspace management. Although Excalibur usage can and should be increased due to its accuracy, we also recognize this munition, like all others, has its strengths and weaknesses. Excalibur is neither the field artillery’s nor the maneuver commander’s precision-weapon panacea; rather, it is one of a select group of precision or near-precision munitions available. Therefore, the focus areas we identified are not necessarily exclusively specific to Excalibur employment but can be applied to most IDF. Field-artillery organization for combat. To discuss the current Excalibur employment, it is necessary to understand how Army field artillery is employed and organized for combat in Afghanistan. Most deployed firing units are organized in the same way: they employ two gun platoons of M-777A2s, M-198s or M-119s. RC-East consists of eight brigades, of which five resemble standard U.S Army brigade combat teams, and of these five BCTs, only four have deployed their organic fires battalions. RC-South consists of five brigades, of which three resemble standard U.S. Army BCTs. RC-South has only one fires battalion that provides IDF for the entire RC. Due to the size of the battlespace in both RC-East and RC-South, there are not enough fires battalions to ensure field-artillery coverage for all maneuver forces, much less coverage by a weapon system that can deliver Excalibur. CJTF/RC FSE capability. One of the most detrimental aspects to surface-to-surface IDF employment and FSE capability has been the loss of the division artillery and/or the lack of a deployed force field-artillery headquarters. There is no colonel-level command authority at the CJTF/division level to enforce standardization and certification, or to share IDF tactics, techniques and procedures, much less advocate for Excalibur or other sur- A Current Assessment of Excalibur Employment in Afghanistan by COL Gene Meredith, with MAJ David Moser, CPT Andrew Zikowitz and Daniel Hallagin face-to-surface IDF. Although the division increased the FSE’s personnel authorized strength to offset the loss of DIVARTY, it was not enough to allow them to perform the same functions as the 150-person DIVARTY staff or FFA headquarters. Couple this with some of the division FSE personnel shortages, and it is easy to see why there has been a degradation of surface-to-surface IDF employment, as a whole, with the second-order effect of limited precision-munitions employment. Without a deployed FFA HQ, fires battalions assigned to BCTs are forced to accept more responsibilities that would otherwise be considered the FFA HQ’s duties. The lack of FFA HQ and diminished capability of the division/CJTF FSEs places the onus of Excalibur employment on fires battalion commanders and junior fire-support personnel. To better influence the IDF fight, a fires brigade, at a minimum, should deploy with each division headquarters to provide FFA functions and fires experience and expertise for the CJTF. If that is not possible, a post brigade commander with a staff designed to execute FFA functions should deploy with the CJTF. CJTF/ division fire-support coordinators and FSEs should be manned at authorized modified table of organization and equipment levels with the commensurate level of expertise required to perform their mission. Combined-arms Excalibur live-fire training. Combined-arms Excalibur live-fire training at home station and/or at the Army’s combat-training centers is inadequate for units preparing to deploy. In many cases, Excalibur capabilities are misunderstood by maneuver commanders and FISTs alike. The first time many units live-fire an Excalibur round is in Afghanistan. This is primarily due to the fact they cannot fire Excalibur at home station and/or during their pre-deployment training at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA. Units with pre-deployment training opportunities at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA, do not fare much better since they are limited to only one live-fire round (if it functions properly). Also, CTC training is often focused on the target packet and concept-of-the-operations process, opposed to the conditions they will face in Afghanistan. CTC Excalibur training does not offer experience in solving problem sets that deployed units encounter such as airspace coordination, tactical employment, collateral damage estimate concerns, ballistic-impact-point consideration, target location and the mensuration of 10-digit grids. Due to this limited exposure and incomplete training, units do not understand Excalibur employment TTPs. In addition to this situation at the CTCs, when units deploy to Afghanistan, Excalibur live-fire training isn’t conducted frequently. Not unlike missions fired at the CTCs, rounds fired downrange seem to degrade some maneuver commanders and fire supporter’s opinions of Excalibur, rather than gain their confidence. In the relatively small sampling of training rounds fired in Afghanistan, any resulting “fail-to-function” or “precise miss” skews the perception of the munition’s actual dependability. To facilitate better understanding among fire-support personnel and maneuver commanders alike, the Excalibur round must be fired during home-station live-fire training. The Excalibur proj-April-June 2012 19 Excalibur: 2 views ect manager needs to support this requirement by immediately implementing a technical solution to reduce the size of the surface danger zone. CTC Excalibur training should be scenario-driven, to include procedures and battle drills required to accurately locate the target, clear airspace, and synchronize and crosstalk among fire-support officers and fire-direction centers to produce a BIP plan integrated with pre-planned airspace coordination measures. Units should shoot Excalibur early and often during their rotation, demonstrating to maneuver commanders Excalibur’s effectiveness as well as training the entire FIST. FIST collective training/employment. Collective FIST training is currently inadequate to support more frequent use of Excalibur. As a consequence of modularity, many FIST teams do not conduct pre-deployment training with the fires units they will serve with in Afghanistan. FISTs further decrease their ability to employ surface-to-surface IDF by training for nonstandard missions at the expense of their core competencies. (We acknowledge that this is not a new concern, and the impact is even more apparent when trying to employ a complex munition such as Excalibur.) Precision capability was further degraded when units did not train using the required digital equipment accurately employing precision munitions. Also, FISTs do not often carry the required equipment to obtain the 10-digit grid required for precision fires because they are carrying the additional equipment necessary and required by their patrolling units. Commanders are increasingly relying on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets to provide observation for fires. Assets that provide real-time or near-real-time feeds to the tactical-operations center are preferred over dismounted observers due to their ability to aid in CDE decisions. Providing target grids, which can be mensurated with Precision Strike Suite for Special Operations Forces, with ISR assets designed for force protection is an effective practice. However, it removes the ground-based observer from the situation and further erodes the maneuver commander’s confidence in the observer to do his job. Continuing support for the current force-design update, which aligns FIST training and oversight with the fires battalion commander, will correct a great deal of the noted training inadequacies. The FCoE needs to promote the importance of the fire-supporter’s priorities through continued discussion with the Maneuver Center of Excellence. The FCoE needs to refocus field-artillery junior-officer development on fire-support tasks to produce surface-to-surface fires experts. Most importantly, FIST personnel at all levels need to be proponents for fire-support expertise by training and certifying their subordinates in their primary mission of the employment of all IDF. Institutional training. Many of the senior leaders in Afghanistan are concerned that junior officers and senior fire-support noncommissioned officers don’t graduate from the Army’s Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, OK., with a thorough understanding of Excalibur TTPs. They are also concerned that these Soldiers and officers have no experience on digital systems required for precision fires. As a result, units deliver pre-deployment Excalibur training to fires-battalion key leadership and generally fail to include maneuver leaders and fire supporters. The result is a failure to adequately educate commanders on the training requirements for enabling and sustaining the capability to exploit Excalibur’s precision. We recognize recent updates to 13F (forward observer) Senior Leader Course, Artillery Basic Officer Leadership Course and Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course, which are significant and appropriate, but graduates of these new programs of instruction have yet to reach the deploying force. To improve precision-munitions understanding, field-artillery officers need access to material previously taught by the Excalibur new-equipment fielding team. Also, junior field-artillery officers need exposure to material – such as airspace coordination, CDEs and technical PSS-SOF instruction – currently taught in 13F Senior Leaders Course and Targeting Warrant Officer School. Some required updates can be incorporated into the existing POI. For example, in-depth BIP management can be added to the gunnery portion of training in BOLC and FACCC. We consider the introduction of Precision-Guided Kit as an opportunity to hone the precision skills of artillery leaders. Acquiring 10-digit grid and training target mensuration should be included in the PGK training plan. Training should be carefully developed to focus on precision-fires planning and coordination, and on considerations for tactical employment – not just delivery-system requirements. FSOs need to know how to doctrinally incorporate Accelerated Precision Mortar Initiative, Excalibur and eventually PGK into echeloning precision and near-precision fires coverage. Combined-arms support employment. It is important to realize the influence that unmatched levels of air support and aerial ISR in this conflict have had on the combined-arms fight. Due to the lack of an air-interdiction mission or counter-air mission, air support is available to maneuver units in Afghanistan at greater levels than during any other conflict in recent history. These large numbers of CAS missions and air weapons teams have been a great asset on the battlefield; however, it has now created an overreliance and demand for CAS and AWT that will most likely not be fulfilled in future conflicts. Air assets are favored for perceived ease and speed. Guidance and restrictions (such as rules of engagements and tactical directives) in theater favor the use of CAS and AWT as “direct fire systems” over indirect assets. Because a pilot can easily establish visual contact with a target, and the joint fires observer can easily guide the pilot to a target from an eight-digit grid, JFOs perceive air support as more responsive and don’t use precision if systems. Fire supporters must ensure their maneuver counterparts understand the impact of relying on CAS and AWT. The capability to deliver surface-to-surface fires is their only 24-hour-a-day, all-weather IDF source. Fire supporters must be advocates for all IDFs and familiarize maneuver commanders with the capabilities and limitations of these systems. They must be advocates for surface-to-surface fires in much the same way as the air-liaison officer is for CAS. Firing-unit capabilities. Currently, M-777A2 firing locations do not cover all maneuver areas of operation in Afghanistan, thus limiting Excalibur employment. Due to the wide dispersion of firing locations, autonomous platoon operations and force cap limitations, fires battalions theater-wide do not have overlapping, mutually supporting fires, cannot mass fires nor provide precision fires throughout the entire AO. Presently, RC-East artillery employs M-777A2s, M-198s and M-119s, while RC-South employs only M-777A2s. RC-East has more IDF capability available, but both AOs have considerable field-artillery coverage gaps. All fires battalions responsible for M-777A2 and Excalibur coverage have multiple missions, some supporting more than one brigade AO, adding complexity to employing IDF. Several deployed field-artillery units’ MTO&E howitzers are the M- 119A2; however, in some cases they operate M-777A2 during deployment with very limited pre-deployment training. The limited 155mm coverage, difficulties with cross-brigade IDF and lack of institutional understanding of a digitized howitzer exacerbates limitations of Excalibur employment. The pending composite M-777A2/M-119 FDU, when implemented, will have a positive impact on the capability to deliver precision IDF in theater. However, this will take time to realize, and there are solutions that can be implemented immediately. Deployed units should employ all operational M-777A2s in Afghanistan and replace all existing M-198s with M-777A2s, ex- 20 April-June 2012 vocates for surface-to-surface IDF, including Excalibur. This will ensure we have the fire-support expertise and experience required to support the maneuver commander, for the rest of this conflict and for the next, with all his IDF requirements. Reprinted with permission from Fires, March-April 2012 edition. COL Gene Meredith is assigned to the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Ok. He has served as a field artillery officer for 22 years, spending most of his career in Airborne units, including the 82nd Airborne Division, 18th Fires Brigade (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade and Special Operations Command Europe. COL Meredith deployed to Panama, Iraq and multiple times to Afghanistan where, on his last tour, he commanded 1-321st Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, providing 155mm fires in support of 82nd Airborne Division. MAJ David Moser was a previous member of the M777A2 and Excalibur fielding teams. CPT Andrew Zikowitz’s last deployment was as an M777A2 battery commander in Afghanistan, 2010-2011. Daniel Hallagin is a retired 13D, field-artillery automated tactical-data-systems specialist. He is a Department of Defense civilian employee and a member of the Excalibur fielding team. panding available Excalibur delivery. Lethality and accuracy can be improved by using M-777A2s for all forward-operating base-oriented IDF operations while maintaining M-119A2s for missions requiring mobility. To ensure a common understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the M-777A2 and Excalibur munition, fires battalion commanders, supported-brigade fires cells and CJTF FSCOORDs should track precision-guided munition capability, along with the five requirements for accurate predictive fire. Also, PGM capability needs to be reported and visible to the maneuver commander to ensure he understands both the capabilities and limitations of his organic precision-weapons systems. Airspace management. Airspace management is often cited as the major reason for the limited use of Excalibur and other IDFs. Many maneuver commanders and fire supporters believe the employment of IDFs restricts the use of other systems sharing a given airspace. In some cases, the use of “hot-walls” or restricted operations zones limit the airspace for AWT, ISR and CAS. Another concern is the overall timeliness of effects on target. As Excalibur is always fired high-angle, more time is required to clear airspace than a low-angle mission. Time of flight also affects the timeliness and associated risks, where time of flight for direct-fire systems is significantly shorter. Typical time of flight for an Excalibur mission fired in theater is between 90 and 120 seconds, based on range. The greater time of flight equates to more opportunity for target movement or for civilians to enter the battlefield target area. As surface-to-surface fires experts, fire supporters need to recognize these legitimate concerns and manage airspace to best integrate surface-to-surface IDF into the airspace-management framework. Units successful in Afghanistan use hot walls with multiple pre-cleared BIPs maximized to facilitate greatest coverage with the fewest restrictions. The phrase “hot walls” refers to a non-doctrinal, field-expedient restrictive airspace-coordination measure, built along the gun-target line with a predetermined width and altitude encompassing ballistic trajectory for the round and the BIP. BIP planning should be synchronized with the battlespace owner and integrated with airspace-coordination measures to support the AO. Units preparing to deploy to Afghanistan need to train on hot-wall development and airspace management supporting precision-fires employment. Training should integrate the brigade air element, task-force FSE and fires battalion. Only by working within the current airspace-management process and addressing the characteristics of current precision munitions will fire supporters be able to increase the use of these munitions. The vast majority of the recommendations made in this article to increase Excalibur and surface-to-surface IDFs came directly from units currently fighting with fires in Afghanistan. There are many reasons for the limited IDF and Excalibur usage in Afghanistan; however, the seven focus areas (CJTF/RC FSE capability; combined-arms Excalibur live-fire training; FIST collective training; employment, institutional and field-artillery schools training; CAS employment; firing-unit capabilities; and airspace management) were the most prominent areas observed by the assessment team. Overall, we found incredible work being done by fires battalions to develop TTPs and increase the use of Excalibur and IDFs. However, as with many issues concerning the delivery of IDF, it was the fire-support side of the equation where most of the challenges exist in regards to the employment of Excalibur and surface-to-surface IDF. Since the integration of fires with maneuver has historically been, and continues to be, the most difficult task in the delivery of fires, this is not surprising. Realizing this, fire supporters must increase our precision-munitions expertise, but, more importantly, we need to once again be adAO – area of operations AWT – air weapons team BCT – brigade combat team BIP – ballistic impact point BOLC – Basic Officers Leadership Course CAS – close-air support CDE – collateral damage estimate CJTF – combined joint task force CTC – combat-training center DIVARTY – division artillery FACCC – Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course FCoE – Fires Center of Excellence FDU – force-design update FFA – force field artillery FIST – fire-support team FSCOORD – fire-support coordinators FSE – fire-support element FSO – fire-support officer HQ – headquarters IDF – indirect fires ISR – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance JFO – joint fires observer MTO&E – modified table of organization and equipment PGK – Precision-Guided Kit PGM – precision-guided munition POI – program of instruction PSS-SOF – Precision Strike Suite for Special Operations Forces RC – regional command TTP – tactics, techniques and procedures Acronym Quick-Scan April-June 2012 21